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FROM THE WHOLE CITIZEN BODY?

THE SOCIOLOGY OF ELECTION AND LOT IN THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY

ABSTRACT

In this article the author examines the sociology of selection procedures in the Athenian democracy. The role of election and lot within the political system, the extent (or lack) of corruption in the selection of officials, and the impact of the selection procedure on political life are considered. A comparison of selection procedures demonstrates that the lot was a relatively democratic device that distributed offices widely throughout Attica, whereas elections favored demes near the city. The reasons for these different patterns of participation are examined.

ELECTION AND LOT IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS

Most Athenian officials were selected by lot, but elections were also held to allocate offices that required special expertise.[1] In Aristotle's opinion, "the use of the lot [for the appointment of officials] is regarded as democratic, and the use of the vote as oligarchical" (*Pol.* 1294b7–9). While modern scholars have sometimes considered the ideological or religious factors associated with election and sortition,[2] the sociology of selection procedures has usually been neglected, despite its importance for understanding Athenian political sociology in general.

Did the choice of procedure promote one group over another or affect the ways in which citizens could participate in public life? Was the lot democratic in practice, or did those who put themselves forward for selection represent relatively small sections of society, such as the wealthy or those who lived close to the city? Were citizens constrained in their political choices by the organization of officeholding? I address these questions in this article by examining political participation in the context of election and lot.

There is, unfortunately, little direct evidence for selection procedures in ancient Athens. The discovery of bronze tokens *(pinakia)* confirms that officials were selected by lot using allotment machines *(kleroteria)* similar to those described in the discussion of jury courts in the *Athenaion Politeia*

1. Andy Merrills, Peter Rhodes, and the anonymous referees for *Hesperia* made a number of suggestions to improve this paper at its various stages. Patrick White gave helpful advice on statistics. I am grateful to them all. Unless stated otherwise, all translations are my own.

2. See, e.g., Headlam 1933; Hansen 1990; Bers 2000; Daverio Rocchi 2001; Demont 2001. For areas outside Athens, see Cordano 2001; di Salvatore 2001.

(*Ath. Pol.* 63–69; Aischin. 3.13). This process apparently took place in the Theseion (*Ath. Pol.* 62.1). By the 330s all selected officials except *bouleutai* and *phrouroi* seem to have been appointed "from the whole tribe," although this was not always the case previously, and there is controversy about the practicalities of the procedure.[3]

Regarding elections, the *Ath. Pol.* states that "the election of *strategoi*, hipparchs, and other military officers is held in the assembly, in whatever way the people see fit" (*Ath. Pol.* 44.4, trans. Rhodes). In the case of the generalship, "the ten *strategoi* were formerly one from each tribe, but now are appointed from the whole citizen body" (*Ath. Pol.* 61.1, trans. Rhodes). But it was not only military officials who were elected; some financial and religious officials, as well as envoys and secretaries, were also elected (e.g., *Ath. Pol.* 54.3–5).[4] In elections for the generalship, voting was by *cheirotonia* (Aischin. 3.13), a *probouleuma* was necessary (*Ath. Pol.* 44.4), and it is likely that some form of promotion of the candidate took place beforehand, either personally or by friends (Dem. 13.19; Thuc. 8.54.4).[5]

Previous scholarship has attempted to reconstruct electoral procedure in more detail (at least for the *strategia*) from the limited information supplied by the *Ath. Pol.*, supplemented by Plato (*Leg.* 755c–d, 763d–e). The *Ath. Pol.* is frustratingly vague, however, while Plato was not describing any existing system. Any conclusions based on these texts are therefore rather speculative.[6] Furthermore, even though it is assumed that the procedure for all elections was similar, presumably not all of them were held in the same Assembly meeting, as the months in which different offices were handed over varied considerably.[7]

Apart from the information in the *Ath. Pol.*, it is not known how votes were organized or to what extent factors such as the candidates' wealth, family background, or deme of origin played a role in influencing or deciding elections. Similarly, we do not know whether electioneering or electoral fraud were common. Previous studies have concentrated on explaining the intricacies of the nomination of candidates, the changing nature of tribal

3. Cf. Whitehead 1986, pp. 266–270, and Jones 1995, pp. 514–515.

4. See also *Ath. Pol.* 42.2, 43.1; Dem. 21.171; Dein. 1.51; Hansen 1987, pp. 121–122, 188, n. 751; Develin 1989, pp. 1–23; Rhodes 1993, pp. 513–517, 599–604, 677–688. For elections of envoys, see Briant 1968; for priests, see Aleshire 1994, although these are not counted as public officials following Arist. *Pol.* 1299a12–31.

5. See Rhodes 1993, pp. 536–537; Hansen 1999, p. 234. If tribes were allowed to adopt an outside candidate, as stated at *Ath. Pol.* 44.4, this must have been known prior to the election; see Mitchell 2000, pp. 347–352.

6. Hansen (1999, p. 235) argues that Plato's account was "probably based on Athens," but it is impossible to be certain which features reflected contemporary Athenian practice and which were due to Plato's imagination. See also Hansen 1987, pp. 44–46.

7. *Tamiai* (treasurers) did not take office until after the Panathenaia, five or six months after the elections for *strategoi*. There was a gap of some months between the election of *strategoi* and the assumption of their office, however. See Hansen 1987, p. 121. For *tamiai*, see *Ath. Pol.* 43.1. Furthermore, the ephebic *sophronistai* started their term of office in Boedromion, later in the year than *strategoi*, but they are only attested after 334/3. See Rhodes 1993, p. 504; Hansen 1999, p. 234.

representation, and the political power wielded by the *strategoi*.[8] Many scholars have recognized that a range of factors must have affected the outcomes of these elections, but much less emphasis has been placed on isolating these issues or assessing the sociology of selection procedures in a wider context.[9] These neglected problems are addressed below, beginning with a consideration of whether corruption was a factor in Athenian elections, followed by an analysis of the sociological dimensions of election and lot.

PATRONAGE AND POLITICS IN ATHENS

If there is little evidence for the procedural aspects of Athenian elections, there is even less for any type of malpractice associated with the elections, such as electioneering or bribery. This situation is surprising given the frequent accusations of bribery in other contexts (e.g., for speaking in the Assembly, accepting gifts while on an embassy, or in the law courts) and may suggest that elections were not considered important enough to manipulate.[10] In comparison with Roman Republican elections, where canvassing for votes was common and money was an important factor, the Athenian case was strikingly different.[11] The holding of office fulfilled a different sociopolitical function in Athens, partly because power was attainable without political office—through speaking in the Assembly, for example. There was, moreover, no Athenian equivalent of the Roman *cursus honorum*, which required that a candidate have held a previous office before he could stand for high office.

The Roman Republican example is useful, however, for providing a framework in which to think about the functioning of Athenian elections. To be successful in Roman elections, candidates needed to cultivate a public reputation with oratorical skills, make great shows of popularity, exploit friendship and patronage ties, and disparage opponents (Cicero, *Comment. pet.* 2–3, 7–13, 16, 34–38). Some of these features can certainly be seen in Athens. For example, the creation and maintenance of a public reputation was as vital in Athens as in Rome, oratorical skills were highly prized, and opponents were attacked in the Assembly and courts. Speaking regularly in the Assembly considerably enhanced a citizen's profile, and many *strategoi* are known to have played a leading role in Assembly policy and decision making, especially in the 5th and early 4th centuries B.C.[12] Disparaging opponents and prosecuting them in court were also useful ways of obtaining or sustaining influence in the Assembly, as the battles between Demosthenes and Aischines demonstrate (e.g., Aischin. 3.93; Dem. 19.120–122).

8. Staveley 1972, p. 102; Piérart 1974, pp. 128–130, 142–146; Rhodes 1981, pp. 129–132; Hansen 1999, pp. 233–235; Mitchell 2000, pp. 347–356. For voting in the Assembly in general, see Stanton and Bicknell 1987, answered by Hansen 1989b.

9. Hamel (1998, p. 19) highlights the difficulty, stating that "for the most part . . . we must remain ignorant of the political considerations which influenced Athenian appointments and of the tribal, familial, and other loyalties which probably determined how large numbers of Athenians voted."

10. Accusations of bribery: Hyp. *Eux.* 1–2; Dem. 19.277; *Ath. Pol.* 27.5.

11. Yakobson 1999, p. 22; Morstein-Marx 2004, pp. 275–276.

12. For the separation of *rhetores* and *strategoi* after the 370s, see Davies 1981, p. 125. That it is not so marked as Davies suggests is exemplified by the careers of Phormion in the 5th century and Kallistratos in the 4th; see Sinclair 1988, p. 46.

Displays of popularity and the use of patronage ties so characteristic of Roman elections, however, seem not to have been common in Athens.[13] Eliciting sympathy and highlighting personal courage through the display of war wounds and scars were commonplace in Roman elections,[14] but such ploys may perhaps have reminded the Athenians too much of Peisistratos and tyranny to be successful in their case (Hdt. 1.59); Nikomachides complained that despite his many wounds, he was not elected *strategos* (Xen. *Mem.* 3.4.1).[15]

Paul Millett has argued that patronage, although crucially important in Roman political life, played a minimal role in Athenian politics, at least after Perikles' introduction of jury pay.[16] According to Millett, jury pay, portrayed in the *Ath. Pol.* as a response to Kimon's generosity, undermined a social system that tied ordinary citizens to the local elite and enabled them to have access to resources without relying on men such as Kimon (*Ath. Pol.* 27.3–4; Theopomp., *FGrH* 115 F89; Plut. *Kim.* 10.1–6).[17] Nicholas Jones contends, however, that while Millett is correct in minimizing the role of patronage in the democratic context of the city, where citizens could redirect the patron-client relationship through the democratic institutions of the Assembly or the law courts, traditional patronage relationships survived in rural Attica, principally as a means of spreading agricultural risk.[18] The only direct support for his argument, unfortunately, is from the case of Kimon himself, since his deme, Lakiadai, was not in the city. This reasoning, as we shall see, is less than convincing.

Jones acknowledges that there is a lack of direct evidence for patronage after this episode in the mid-5th century, but suggests that its absence conceals a form of disguised patronage that is difficult to recognize. He is certainly correct that there is no reason to expect indications of patronage in the literary evidence; as he says, in Rome it was the role of the client, not the patron, to advertise the relationship, usually epigraphically.[19] Instead, Jones cites honorific decrees passed by demes as evidence of local patronage. This argument is not particularly persuasive, as these decrees praise wealthy demesmen for their benefactions, with none of the language of personal patronage that appears in the Roman corpus (e.g., *patronus, cliens,* and *amicus*).[20] The decrees commemorate expenditures benefiting

13. Alkibiades, advertising his Olympic victories in a bid to get elected, may be considered an exception; Thuc. 6.16.2–6. Amazingly popular as well as being severely loathed, he played on this ambiguity for his own political advancement; see Thuc. 6.28.2; 8.48.4, 53.2.

14. For Cato the Elder, see Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 49 (*Mor.* 276C–D); for Marius, see Sall. *Iug.* 85.29; and in general Plut. *Cor.* 14.1. Cicero also used the showing of scars as a rhetorical tactic in law courts; see Quint. *Inst.* 6.1.21; Leigh 1995, pp. 195–203.

15. It is unclear whether Xenophon wants us to believe that Nikomachides actually displayed his scars during the vote. He certainly was not too shy to do so, since he is portrayed showing them to Sokrates, but it is clear that the demos knew of his battle experience and still voted for a candidate more experienced in business than in war. Perhaps such a tactic was more successful for other candidates, however, since Xenophon presents Nikomachides as someone who thought the display of war wounds could lead to his election.

16. Millett 1989; but see also Rhodes 1986, pp. 135–136; Zelnick-Abramowitz 2000.

17. See Millett 1989, pp. 23–25; also Whitehead 1986, pp. 305–311.

18. Jones 2004, pp. 59–88.

19. Jones 2004, p. 73; also Saller 1989, p. 54. Zelnick-Abramowitz (2000, pp. 72–76) argues, however, that the orators in particular record many examples of *philia* relationships with "implications in the public sphere," which she interprets as a form of patronage.

20. Zelnick-Abramowitz (2000, pp. 68–71) discusses the language of *philia* in this context. Whitehead (1983) focuses on *philotimia.* For the language of patronage in Rome, see Saller 1989, pp. 54–56.

the entire community, such as the financing of a chorus (*IG* II² 1198) or the building of a bridge (*IG* II² 1191), but they afford little indication of a personal relationship between honorand and deme members.

Furthermore, it is difficult to equate these local honorific decrees with those passed by the polis. Jones calculates that 58% (94 out of 162) of the attested deme inscriptions are honorific decrees. Three-quarters of these can plausibly be interpreted as honoring wealthy or prominent citizens; thus Jones claims that a "model of patronal exchange" is represented here.[21] These figures, however, are not out of line with the number of decrees enacted by the polis, yet the polis decrees do not represent patronage relations between foreigners and Athens, at least not in the terms that Jones suggests.[22] Clearly, a large proportion of surviving decrees, whether enacted by the polis or the deme, were honorific. They demonstrate social and economic stratification of some sort, but they are not in themselves indicators of patronage, as Jones claims.

Finally, the distinction Jones makes between the deme of Lakiadai and the city is overstated.[23] Lakiadai lay outside the city walls, probably close to the Sacred Way, east of the Kephisos River.[24] It was therefore less than 4 km from the city and was located on a major communications route. The deme was not at all isolated or separated from the city, and it would hardly have been difficult for demesmen to journey to Athens to participate in democratic government.The democratic alternative to patronage was literally within an hour's walk of the deme.

ELECTORAL CORRUPTION? THE CASE OF OSTRACISM

Although Jones's analysis of patronage in Athenian society does not stand up to scrutiny, there are examples of networks of friends of equal status performing favors for one another, such as lending money without interest (*eranos* loans)[25] or the *hetaireiai* described by Thucydides (8.54.4) in the context of the oligarchic coup of 411. Although these groups may not have functioned solely as revolutionary organizations, the fact that they are mentioned in a revolutionary setting and existed for the expressed purpose of promoting their members in the law courts and elections is revealing.[26] Such *hetaireiai* are widely believed to have been used in the ostracism of Hyperbolos, when Alkibiades' and Nikias's supporters allegedly united to exile him.[27] In

21. Jones 2004, p. 79.

22. Of the 775 4th-century decrees collated by Hansen (1987, pp. 110–112), 367 (47%) were honorary decrees.

23. Jones (2004, p. 78) notes that "the effects of the rise of the democratic ideology invoked by Millett remained a mainly urban phenomenon and . . . in rural demes, certainly in ones *as far removed from the asty* as Kimon's Lakiadai, the old ways survived" (my italics).

24. Milchhoefer 1883, p. 16; Traill 1986, p. 133.

25. On *eranos* loans, see Millett 1991, pp. 153–159.

26. Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover (1981, pp. 128–131) associate the *xunomosiai* of Thuc. 8.54.4 with *hetaireiai*. See also Calhoun 1931, pp. 126–127; Konstan 1997, pp. 60–67.

27. [Andoc.] 4.4; Plut. *Nik.* 11.3–4, *Alk.* 13.4, *Arist.* 7.3. Heftner (2000, pp. 52–55) is skeptical, however, and sees the machinations as late-5th-century speculation after the event to explain the surprise result. Nonetheless, contemporary speculation of this kind is in itself good evidence for what the Athenians believed could have occurred. See also Hansen 1987, pp. 76–77; Siewert 1999; *contra* Rosivach 1987, pp. 163–167; Rhodes 1994, p. 94.

light of this case, it may be worthwhile to examine ostracisms for indications of how elections might have been open to manipulation. The evidence is controversial, however, and the procedure for ostracism was slightly different from that used for electing officials. For these reasons, the process is summarized here.

After the initial vote to hold an ostracism was taken in the Assembly, the actual vote, a ballot organized by tribe (*Ath. Pol.* 43.5; Philoch., *FGrH* 328 F30), was held in the Agora.[28] Although Philochoros says that the inscribed side of the ostrakon was carried face down (implying that this was a secret ballot), scribes were sometimes used, which suggests that secrecy was not always maintained. This must have been especially true in the case of poor citizens, who were the most likely to be illiterate.[29] The discovery of a deposit of ostraka bearing the name of Themistokles has suggested to some that groups of Themistokles' enemies prepared votes for distribution.[30] M. H. Hansen, however, is probably correct in doubting the role of organized political groups here; these ostraka were, after all, not used.[31]

Even if the Themistokles ostraka do not attest to the manipulation of ostracism votes in any underhanded way, it certainly demonstrates that the vote was not as secret as suggested by Philochoros. Nevertheless, a different sort of manipulation can perhaps be detected in the vote to ostracize Hyperbolos.[32] As mentioned above, Hyperbolos was ostracized after Alkibiades and Nikias (or Phaiax?) allegedly joined forces against him. It is difficult to reconstruct the details surrounding this vote; the fullest account is given by Plutarch (*Alk.* 13.4), who highlights the confusion, not least in the identification of the protagonists. Contemporary sources suggest that the result was not particularly surprising in view of Hyperbolos's poor reputation (Thuc. 8.73.3; Plato Com. fr. 187 K = 203 K-A).[33]

Given the difficulties of this episode, it may not be wise to place too much weight on any suggestions of corruption. It may instead be useful to consider other factors that could have contributed to the result. Prosopographical analysis of ostraka shows that candidates with large numbers of votes, that is, those who were in serious danger of being ostracized, came predominantly from the wealthy elite.[34] Other factors, such as the political prominence or notoriety of individuals or the election procedure itself may also have been relevant, as discussed further below. Direct

28. Hansen 1999, p. 35; Forsdyke 2005, pp. 146–149. Brenne (2002, p. 103) discusses the possible interpretations of Kerameikos O 1309 (= T 1/88), an ostrakon inscribed with the name Megakles, son of Hippokrates. The inscription on the reverse of this sherd *(Antiochides phyles)* may demonstrate the organization of voting by tribes. Brenne suggests that it may have belonged to the tribe of Antiochis, of which Megakles himself was not a member.

29. Plut. *Arist.* 7.4–6. See also Vanderpool 1973, p. 218; Brenne 1994, p. 21. Boegehold (1963, p. 372) finds it difficult to believe that secret ballots (in the law courts) were used in Athens "until well into the fifth century."

30. Broneer (1938, pp. 231–241) suggested that 14 people were responsible for the 190 ostraka found in the deposit. See also Lang in *Agora* XXV, pp. 142–161; and n. 31, below. For variation in the letter styles, see Broneer 1938, pp. 231–232.

31. Hansen 2002. It is unknown, however, whether any prepared ostraka were used.

32. Rosivach 1987, pp. 166–167; Rhodes 1994, p. 94; Heftner 2000, pp. 56–57. For other citizens who had ostraka cast against them on this occasion, see Heftner 2000, p. 50. A second ostrakon cast against Nikias was found in the Agora in 1998 (P 33264, unpublished); for details, see http://www.agathe.gr (1998 excavation season).

33. Scheidel (2002, pp. 488–489) demonstrates that social and moralizing motives for ostracism were as regular as political motives, e.g., Kimon's alleged sexual relationship with his half-sister Elpinike; Kerameikos O 6874 (= T 1/67). See also Brenne 2002, pp. 92–93.

34. See Brenne 2001.

manipulation of the vote by disgruntled aristocrats cannot necessarily be assumed.

The supposed use of the secret ballot in the ostracism of powerful citizens is interesting, given that secrecy was not maintained for the selection of officials in the first place. In Rome, the secret ballot was used in elections at least after A.D. 139. It was usually connected with efforts to discourage electoral bribery; candidates could no longer be sure whether their efforts to bribe the voters would be successful.[35] Secret ballots were used in Athens not by voters to elect officials, but by juries to decide legal cases.[36] It is perhaps ironic that the only extant evidence suggesting corruption specifically in relation to voting comes from arenas in which the secret ballot was used. This may suggest that there was at least a perception that secrecy was necessary in certain contexts.[37]

There are, however, accusations of bribery connected with officials. Isokrates specifically makes a link between bribery and *strategoi,* noting that "although the penalty fixed for anyone convicted of bribery [ἁλῷ δεκάζων] is death, we elect those who do it most obviously to be generals" (Isok. 8.50). The verb (συν)δεκάζειν often occurs in the context of a law court, but it is clear that it was also associated with the Assembly (συνδεκάζειν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν καὶ τἆλλα δικαστήρια; Aischin. 1.86), and perhaps even with the 10 tribes. This would make its use in an electoral context plausible, as candidates were selected according to tribe (Dem. 46.26; *Ath. Pol.* 27.5).[38] These elections and the effects of the selection procedure in general are assessed in the remainder of this article.

A COMPARISON OF ELECTION AND LOT

Electioneering, electoral bribery, or other electoral malpractice could have been operative in isolated cases of Athenian politics, but there is no evidence that such practices were a feature of the democratic system. In the surviving source material, the Athenians frequently accused each other

35. If this was the intention, it was not particularly successful; competitive bribery continued, and voters expected to receive bribes from all candidates. See Yakobson 1999, pp. 124–126, 142. For a different view of the political significance of the change, see Gruen 1991, pp. 259–261. See also Lintott 1990, p. 4.

36. The religious importance of the secret ballot is highlighted by Dem. 19.239. This contrasts with Lys. 13.37, a trial in which voting was not secret, and which is portrayed as a flagrant act of intimidation by the Thirty. The use of ballots that were not secret in the law courts seems to be associated with revolution and oligarchy; see, for example, the reprisals against the Athenian sympathizers at Megara (Thuc. 4.74.3). See esp. Boegehold 1963, pp. 372–374, who suggests that ballots were originally not intended to be secret, but that secrecy became important in votes in which accuracy in counting was required. See further Rhodes 1981, pp. 126–127; Hall 1990, p. 193; Hansen 1999, p. 202; along with Spivey (1994, pp. 48–51), who examines the cluster of voting scenes on red-figure pottery around 490–470 and suggests that this was a way in which the Athenians could create a link between contemporary practice and "the epic past."

37. Dem. 57.13 alleges double voting in a deme *diapsephismos. Ath. Pol.* 27.5 claims Anytos tried to bribe a jury, while Lys. 29.12 accuses Ergokles of the same. See also Xen. *Symp.* 5.8 and Arist. *Pol.* 1303a15 for intrigue *(eritheias)* in elections at Heraia in Arkadia that led to the switch from elections to the lot.

38. Nevertheless, the main aim of the surviving legislation on bribery seems to have been its prevention in respect to speakers in the Assembly, rather than electoral bribery (Dein. 2.16–17; Hyp. 4.7–8), and admittedly the link with *strategoi* seems to refer to their period of office rather than their selection. Ar. *Ach.* 598 implies that elections lent themselves to manipulation by the wealthy, however. In any case, MacDowell (1983, p. 68) does not sufficiently explain the appearance of the Assembly in Aischin. 1.86–87. See also Harvey 1985, pp. 108–113.

of taking bribes to speak in the Assembly, propose decrees, or advise a particular course of action, but not to sway an election.[39] This relative lack of interest in electoral bribery may be partially explained by the procedural practices of elections themselves. Inducing many members of the Assembly to raise their hands for a specific candidate may, in practice, have been difficult, and perhaps not worth the trouble—especially if elections were, relatively speaking, not that important in any case.[40] If energy was to be spent swaying the Assembly, it would be better used to influence the vote on a particular decree.

Social factors and the dynamics of the selection procedure may have figured more prominently in Athenian political life than electoral malpractice. The "Old Oligarch" claimed that offices such as the *strategia* were distributed on socioeconomic grounds; he asserted that some citizens deliberately avoided holding positions that "bring safety or danger to the people as a whole," because they did not want to take responsibility for the associated risks ([Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.3). Although he may have observed a genuine phenomenon (that is, while all citizens were equally entitled to hold these offices, in practice not all citizens did), his explanation for this need not be accepted. Nevertheless, wealth was undoubtedly a factor in political activity, and the wealthy were disproportionately represented in many areas of public life.[41] Indeed, well over half of all attested elections produced officials known to be rich, supporting the idea that certain types of political activities attracted the wealthy elite.[42]

Large financial resources may not have been the only factor affecting officeholding. Just as the procedure used in the judging of dramatic competitions can be seen to influence the outcome of those competitions,[43] electoral procedure may have been a factor in deciding who was selected for certain positions, boosting those candidates from a particular region of Attica. Organization of offices into boards of 10 members, although designed to ensure equality of tribal representation, may have accentuated differences and resulted in unintended consequences. For example, the geographical distribution of elected officials seems to have differed from that of officials selected by lot. The relationship between this variation and the method of appointment are considered below.

39. See n. 10, above. *Ath. Pol.* 62.1 mentions corruption in the appointment to sortitive offices organized by demes, in which they seem to have been illegally sold. The remedy for this, however, was the removal of office allocation from the demes to the whole tribe, suggesting that there was less opportunity for this kind of corruption at tribal level. Aischines (3.62) alleges that Demosthenes bribed fellow demesmen not to stand for the Boule in order that he be selected (by lot).

40. Even so, this did not prevent accusations of bribery against those speaking in the Assembly, e.g., Kallistratos (Hyp. *Eux.* 1–2, 39) and Philokrates (Aischin. 3.79–81; Dein. 1.28).

41. This situation may have been more common in the 5th century than the 4th; see Taylor, forthcoming.

42. Of the 631 known elections, 61% produced officials who were also liturgy payers. (Note that these figures treat all elections separately, and thus count individuals more than once. If individuals are counted only once, 42% of the 305 elected citizens are also attested as liturgy payers—still a significant proportion).

43. See Marshall and van Willigenburg 2004, p. 101, on the role of the judging procedure in the outcome of dramatic competitions.

Elected Officials: Strategoi

Strategoi could be highly influential, presumably because they were among the few officials who could serve for more than one year in office.[44] In the first half of the 5th century the *strategoi,* like other officials, were chosen one from each tribe for a board of 10 (*Ath. Pol.* 22.2).[45] Most scholars agree that there were three stages in the development of elections to the *strategia.* In 501/0 candidates were chosen one from each tribe, but there seems to have been some modification by at least 441/0 to allow tribes to field two representatives if required.[46] Sometime between 357/6 and ca. 329/8 the tribal basis of elections was completely abandoned, and the *Ath. Pol.* (61.1) refers to all of the *strategoi* being elected from the whole of the citizen body.[47]

The phenomenon of double representation has provoked controversy both in regard to its organization and its purpose. It was once thought to be a way of conferring special privileges on individuals, but K. J. Dover has demonstrated that this was not the case. Charles Fornara claimed that tribal representation was completely abandoned in the 460s, but this point has been disputed, most recently by L. G. Mitchell, who also suggested that double representation was a way in which *strategoi* could be elected for their special expertise.[48] The acceptance of double representation as a phenomenon relies on the prosopographical identification of *strategoi,* which may be problematic in itself.[49] The problem is heightened with the possible appearance of "double-doubles" (i.e., only eight tribes represented instead of ten), but Mitchell has shown that double-doubles can theoretically be accepted as part of a system in which tribal voting was still used (tribes that could not field a suitable candidate could put forward someone from another tribe). She suggests that this may have occurred in practice on a handful of occasions.[50] Mitchell's theory on the election of *strategoi* is persuasive in that it would account both for double representation and double-doubles.

Whatever the reasons behind double representation, it seems that in the 5th century, at least, the practice favored *strategoi* from demes lying in close proximity to the city (Fig. 1).[51] This is not surprising, given that individual boards of *strategoi* were also weighted toward citizens from these demes. In most 5th-century examples of double representation, one or both members of the pair had a demotic from these demes (Table 1).

44. Connor 1971, pp. 9–10; Davies 1981, p. 124.

45. Other officials selected in this way included, e.g., *tamiai,* archons, *poletai, apodektai, logistai, epimeletai* of the dockyards, repairers of temples, *astynomoi, agoranomoi, metronomoi, epimeletai* of the *emporion, synegoroi,* and *epimeletai* of the Dionysia; *Ath. Pol.* 8.1, 47.1, 48.1, 48.3, 50–51, 54.2, 55.1, 56.4. The Forty were appointed four from a tribe; *Ath. Pol.* 53.1.

46. In 441/0 Perikles and Glaukon both represented Akamantis; Andrótion, *FGrH* 324 F38. For three stages in the development of elections, see Lewis 1961; Hammond 1969, pp. 111–114; Staveley 1972, pp. 42–43; Rhodes 1993, pp. 265–266; Mitchell 2000, pp. 348–350; *contra* those who prefer a two-stage process without the intermediate stage of modified tribal representation, e.g., Fornara 1971, p. 20; Bicknell 1972, pp. 103–111; Bicknell 1979; Hamel 1998, pp. 85–86.

47. There were possibly three *strategoi* from Akamantis around 329/8 (Sthenyllos of Eiresidai, Mnesimachos of Hagnous, and possibly Lysimachides of Hagnous). See Develin 1989, p. 394.

48. Dover 1960; Fornara 1971, pp. 22–27; Mitchell 2000, pp. 352–355, following Piérart 1974, pp. 128–139.

49. Lewis 1961, pp. 118–119; see also the general criticisms by Thompson (1974).

50. Mitchell 2000, p. 345, n. 11, pp. 353–354. The years that may have "double-doubles" are 432, 431, and 426.

51. The demes shown in Fig. 1 are all within approximately two-hours' walk from the city.



Figure 1. Demes in the city area (approximate locations). Base map from Camp 2001, p. 272, fig. 248

In 441/0 seven of the board of ten *strategoi* (all of whom are known) came from demes close to the city area (Androtion, *FGrH* 324 F38).[52] Again in 433/2 five of the nine attested *strategoi* have demotics from this area (Table 2).[53] This may simply be chance, but together these observations imply that the demes close to the city were important providers of *strategoi* and that belonging to one of these demes aided a candidate's chances of being elected.[54]

The organization of the *strategia* along tribal lines is consistent with the pattern of office division in the democracy, and it was presumably deemed to be a fair way of dividing powers.[55] The fact that the *strategia* was distributed among the 10 tribes, however, made it possible that all

52. The suggestion of Fornara (1971, p. 49) that Glauketes Athenaios is a later interpolation should stand.

53. Thuc. 1.45.2, 51.4, 57.6; *IG* I^3 364 (= Meiggs-Lewis no. 61); *IG* I^3 466; Plut. *Per.* 16.3. See Develin 1989, pp. 99–100.

54. It is unlikely that this pattern was a deliberate intention of Kleisthenes, as suggested by Sealey (1967, pp. 85–94) in a study of the demotics of *strategoi* known in each decade from 441/0–412/1. Sealey claimed that this city elite was eventually broken down during the Peloponnesian War. His arguments seem unlikely, however, as a city elite still appears to have been prominent in the *strategia* after the later adjustments to the system of election, which Kleisthenes could not have foreseen (i.e., after the introduction of double representation and the abandonment of tribal organization). Furthermore, the evidence probably does not warrant the breakdown into such small temporal categories. See also Sealey 1960, pp. 173–174; Lewis 1963; Andrewes 1977, p. 247; Stanton 1984, pp. 8–16; Osborne 1996, pp. 299–304.

55. The widespread use of boards of 10 suggests that the citizen population was (at least in the perception of the Athenians) divided reasonably equally between tribes. This idea gains support from the fact that the army was also organized by tribe (and it would presumably have been important to have fighting units of approximately equal size); *Ath. Pol.* 21.3, 22.2. See Stanton 1984, p. 9; Rhodes 1993, p. 253.

TABLE 1. DOUBLE REPRESENTATION OF STRATEGOI

Date	*Strategoi*	*Tribe*
441/0 435/4 434/3 433/2	*Perikles of Cholargos* *Glaukon of Kerameis*	Akamantis
433/2	Proteas of Aixone Archestratos of Phlya?	Kekropis
432/1 431/0	*Perikles of Cholargos* Karkinos of Thorikos	Akamantis
432/1	Proteas of Aixone *Eukrates of Melite*	Kekropis
431/0 430/29 429/8	Phormio of Paiania? Hagnon of Steiria	Pandionis
426/5 425/4	Sophokles of Acharnai? Lamachos of Oe	Oineis
426/5	*Hipponikos of Alopeke* Aristoteles of Thorai?	Antiochis
424/3	Thucydides of Halimous *Nikostratos of Skambonidai*	Leontis
423/2	*Kleon of Kydathenaion?* ? of Myrrhinous	Pandionis
418/7	Laches of Aixone Kleomedes of Phlya?	Kekropis
407/6	*Alkibiades of Skambonidai* *Adeimantos of Skambonidai*	Leontis

Source: Mitchell 2000, pp. 354–355. *Strategoi* in italics have demotics from or near the city.

TABLE 2. DEMOTICS OF BOARDS OF STRATEGOI

Date	*"City"*	*Rest of Attica*
441/0	Sophokles of Kolonos Andokides of Kydathenaion Kreon of Skambonidai Perikles of Cholargos Glaukon of Kerameis Xenophon of Melite Lampides of Piraeus	Kallistratos of Acharnai Kleitophon of Thorai Sokrates of Anagyrous
433/2	Diotimos of Euonymon Lakedaimonios of Lakiadai Glaukon of Kerameis Metagenes of Koile Perikles of Cholargos	Proteas of Aixone Archestratos of Phlya Drakontides of Thorai Archenautes of Ikarion

Source: Develin 1989, pp. 89–90, 99–100. The term "city" refers to demes in or near the city.

strategoi in a given year could be from demes near the city, enabling a city elite to dominate this office. An examination of the *strategoi* elected between 480/79 and 357/6 (i.e., when the tribal system is known to have operated) suggests that the bias toward the city elite visible in Tables 1 and 2 was not uncommon. But in order to assess whether *strategoi* throughout the 5th and 4th centuries were heavily drawn from demes in close proximity to the city, it is necessary to compare the number of *strategoi* who could be expected to hold office from specific areas of Attica with the number who actually served. By comparing this distribution of *strategoi* with that of *tamiai* (who were selected by tribally organized lot), it is possible to see the impact of the choice of selection procedure on participation in politics.

Officials Selected by Lot: Tamiai

Strategoi were elected, but most *tamiai* were selected by lot, presumably by means of *pinakia* and *kleroteria*.[56] Here *tamiai* refers to the *tamiai* of Athena and the *tamiai* of the Other Gods only, since the *tamiai* of the stratiotic and theoric funds were elected, and it is disputed whether *hellenotamiai* were elected or were selected by lot.[57]

W. Kendrick Pritchett argues that there is evidence of iteration among *hellenotamiai* and that accordingly the office must have been elected. He claims, moreover, that because the *Ath. Pol.* (30.2) groups together *strategoi* and *hellenotamiai* in the discussion of the constitution of the Five Thousand, they must both have been elected offices in the period of the democracy.[58] It is obvious that this cannot be assumed.[59] Moreover, Pritchett's claims of iteration in this office are weak and have been completely refuted by Benjamin Meritt.[60]

Aristotle groups *strategoi* with *tamiai* (not *hellenotamiai*) in his *Politics,* probably because both offices were distributed among the wealthy, rather than because of the method of selection (Arist. *Pol.* 1282a30–33, 1300b6–13).[61] Aristotle also implies elsewhere (*Pol.* 1309b1–9) that *tamiai* were elected. Some *tamiai* were indeed elected in the second half of the 4th century (*Ath. Pol.* 43.1, 61.7), but *tamiai* of Athena were explicitly noted not to have been elected (*Ath. Pol.* 47.1). There is no surviving evidence for the selection procedure used for *hellenotamiai,* and for this reason they are excluded from the following analysis.

56. Kroll 1972, pp. 55–56.

57. For *tamiai* of Athena, see *Ath. Pol.* 47.1. For *tamiai* of the Other Gods, see *IG* I^3 52, lines 13–14: "*tamiai* of these moneys are to be chosen by lot [ἀποκυαμεύεν]." For the Kallias decree and the creation of a new board of *tamiai,* rather than the reorganization of a previously existing board selected by a different procedure, see Samons 2000, pp. 125–126. See also *Ath. Pol.* 8.1. There are various other *tamiai* known (e.g., those for the ships Paralos and Ammonias), but these were either elected or had a different role from that of the *tamiai* of Athena and the Other Gods; in any case, they provide very little prosopographical information.

58. Pritchett 1970, pp. 108–109; Pritchett 1977, p. 295.

59. For discussion of the Five Thousand, see Ste. Croix 1956, pp. 14–20; Rhodes 1993, pp. 391–392.

60. Meritt (1971, pp. 105–106) disputes this in vitriolic style (he does allow, however, that *hellenotamiai* are elected; p. 105, n. 6); see also Meritt 1987, p. 174. The debate is bound up with arguments over the calendar. For discussion see Samons 2000, pp. 299–304.

61. *Hellenotamiai* no longer existed by the time Aristotle was writing. In a fragmentary text attributed to Theophrastos, *strategoi* and *tamiai* are considered similarly high officials; Keaney and Szegedy-Maszak 1976, pp. 230–236. See also Davies 1981, pp. 122–123.

Strategoi and Tamiai in Attica

Strategoi and *tamiai* warrant comparison as the evidence for both offices is relatively good, and in both cases the officeholders were likely to have been recruited predominantly from the wealthy.[62] If the demotics of people holding these two offices reveal different geographical distributions within Attica, this may have been related to differing methods of selection (although continuity of officeholding or personal prominence may also have played some role). Since the evidence presented above in Tables 1 and 2 indicates that *strategoi* came disproportionately from demes in close proximity to the city, it is important to ask whether all known *strategoi* were distributed in this way, or whether this pattern is simply a feature of the small body of evidence presented in the tables.

A simple chi-square test may be used to establish whether there is a statistically significant difference between the number of officeholders attested in a given area and the number expected in that area if their distribution mirrored that of the citizen population in general.[63] This analysis is based on the assumptions that the relative citizen population of the demes is partly recoverable through the bouleutic quotas and that deme membership and citizen population were closely related, even if the relationship is not exact.[64] Although citizens undoubtedly moved around Attica, permanent migration has generally been overestimated, and regardless of its extent, it does not significantly affect the conclusions discussed below.[65]

The results of the chi-square test, shown in Table 3, support the patterns seen in Tables 1 and 2: *strategoi* were not equally distributed throughout Attica. A comparison of the observed with the expected distributions of *strategoi* (based on the general citizen population from which they were drawn) shows a statistically significant difference. This is not the case for *tamiai,* however; the difference between the distribution of attested *tamiai* and the distribution that might be expected based on the general citizen population is not particularly large.[66] These results, together with the evidence presented in Tables 1 and 2, suggest that *strategoi* were concentrated in areas close to the city, but that *tamiai* were drawn more evenly from demes throughout Attica. This conclusion is further supported by an examination of individual boards of *tamiai:* in any given board, *tamiai* were not heavily weighted toward the city.[67]

The extent to which personal prominence or office rotation affected the sociology of democracy has long been debated. The different social geography of the *strategoi* and the *tamiai* may have been due to a combination

62. For *tamiai* as *pentakosiomedimnoi,* see *Ath. Pol.* 8.1. That this meant little by the end of the 4th century is evident from *Ath. Pol.* 47.1. See Rhodes 1993, pp. 146–148, 551.

63. See the Appendix below for details of the chi-square test and discussion of the mathematical assumptions.

64. This view is accepted by, e.g., Gomme 1933, pp. 49–66; Rhodes 1972, pp. 11–12; Traill 1975, p. 56; Whitehead 1986, pp. 22–23.

65. Cf. Damsgaard-Madsen 1988; Hansen 1989c; Osborne 1991; and see n. 80, below.

66. The chi-square value is 0.36, less than the theoretical distribution of 3.84 (see Table 3).

67. In fact, although there are more surviving examples of complete, or nearly complete, boards of *tamiai* than *strategoi,* there is little hint that *tamiai* with city demotics outnumbered those from the rest of Attica on any specific board. See, for example, *IG* I^3 455 (dated to 444/3); I^3 457 (442/1; only eight listed; see Develin 1986, p. 82); I^3 472 (full boards for 421/0 and 418/7, along with nine from 420/19).

TABLE 3. STRATEGOI AND TAMIAI FROM THE CITY (AND VICINITY) AND THE REST OF ATTICA

	*Attested Number (Expected Number)**			
Officials	*"City"*	*Rest of Attica*	*Total*	*Chi-square***
Strategoi	41 (27.92)	70 (83.08)	111	8.19
Tamiai	67 (62.88)	183 (187.12)	250	0.36

* The expected number of *strategoi* (shown in parentheses) is based on the proportion of citizen population attested for each area, derived from bouleutic quotas. If 25% of the citizen population can be said to have demotics from demes in or near the city (123/489 assignable *bouleutai*), then we would expect 27.92 of 111 *strategoi* to have demotics from this area. In fact there are 41.

** The theoretical value of chi-square at a significance level of 0.05 with 1 degree of freedom is 3.84; a larger observed value means that there is a statistically significant relationship between deme of origin and officeholding. See the Appendix for an explanation of the calculations.

of factors. *Tamiai* are often believed to have held more responsibility than power, and the officeholders were rotated regularly, thus broadening participation in this office.[68] The scale of participation in the *strategia,* by contrast, may have been influenced by the possibility of holding office for more than one term, making these positions more attractive for politically ambitious members of the city elite. The difference in the selection procedure would have further contributed to the differing geographical distribution of officeholders. The comparison of *tamiai* and *strategoi* suggests that the use of the lot mitigated the effects of distance on participation in democracy to a much larger degree than the use of election. The question of whether this conclusion is valid only for these two elite offices, however, or whether other positions were similarly affected must now be considered.

Broader Political Effects of Election and Lot

Strategoi and *tamiai* are not the only officials who show different distributional patterns. Selection procedure seems to have had a social impact on other elective and sortitive offices as well, and in elections unrelated to officeholding. Like the *strategoi,* candidates for ostracism (categorized as an election because voting was used) were also distributed unequally throughout Attica. Conversely, dikasts, who were selected by lot like *tamiai,* seem to have been distributed more evenly (Table 4).[69] This observation further supports the hypothesis that selection procedure affected political participation.[70]

68. See further [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.2–3.

69. Table 5 in the Appendix gives a more detailed breakdown of the evidence. To those dikasts recorded by Kroll (1972) should be added Chairestratos, son of Phoryskides of Lamptrai, whose *pinakion* was found in tomb 148 in the cemetery uncovered by the metro excavations at Syntagma Square (along the road leading out to the *mesogeia*); Parlama and Stampolidis 2000, p. 166, no. 137. For 4th-century *kleroteria* and courtroom procedure, see Rhodes 1993, pp. 704–722; Bers 2000, pp. 553–557.

70. A similar relationship can also be seen on magisterial *pinakia,* the tickets for selection by lot, and also for

TABLE 4. SELECTION METHODS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY

Office	*Chi-square*	*Significant?**
Selection by Election		
Grammateis (before 363)	5.60	Yes
Strategoi	8.19	Yes
Ostracism candidates	23.72	Yes
Selection by Lot		
Grammateis (after 363)	1.54	No
Dikasts	0.13	No
Tamiai	0.36	No

*Significance is determined on the basis of a comparison of the calculated chi-square value with the theoretical value of chi-square (3.84) at a significance level of 0.05 with 1 degree of freedom.

The office of secretary to the Boule *(grammateus tes boules)* presents another relevant case for consideration.[71] This office was an elected office until the 360s; a new *grammateus* was elected in every prytany from the members of the Boule, except those of the tribe in prytany.[72] Between 366/5 and 363/2, however, the *grammateus* became an annual office chosen by lot from the whole of the demos.[73] A difference in the geographical distribution of officeholders between the elected and sortitive phases of this office would provide strong support for the influence of selection procedure. This pattern is clearly indicated in Table 4: in a sample of 95 *grammateis,* the chi-square test shows that elected *grammateis* were unequally distributed across Attica, but *grammateis* selected by lot cannot be said to be unequally distributed. Such variation within the same office strongly suggests that the choice of procedure affected the selection (or self-selection) of candidates.[74]

archons (according to *Ath. Pol.* 22.5, they were selected by lot after 487/6). The distribution of both magisterial *pinakia* and archons cannot be said to have been unequal throughout Attica, following the patterns of *tamiai* and dikasts. There are 18 examples of magisterial *pinakia* (31 including those of classes 3 and 6, which could be either dikastic or magisterial; see Kroll 1972, pp. 126–147, 212–232) and 34 archons.

71. This position was known as the *grammateus kata prytaneian* after 363/2. See Rhodes 1972, pp. 134–137; Henry 2002, p. 92.

72. It is not known who elected the *grammateis,* but presumably it was the members of the Boule. There are a variety of ways to reconstruct the election process, though without any evidence all remain hypothetical. It is possible that each tribe elected its own representatives, who served after some sort of secretary-tribal order allotment had taken place (Ferguson 1898, p. 26), but there are other possibilities, e.g., the tribe in prytany could have elected a man from the rest of the Boule with whom they wished to work. Alternatively, the tribes not in prytany could have elected a *grammateus* from the 450 remaining *bouleutai* (as the *epistates ton prytaneion* selected by lot one of the nine *proedroi,* excluding his own tribe, to serve as the *epistates ton proedroi;* Rhodes 1972, p. 25), or the whole Boule could have elected the *grammateus* every time. The latter seems easiest, and since the *grammateis* served the whole Boule, it is perhaps most likely. All other offices were elected by the Assembly, however, so this could also have been the case for *grammateis.*

73. Henry 2002, p. 92, n. 5. Abel (1983, pp. 62–63) thinks that *grammateis* would have been subject to *prokrisis* before they were selected by lot because they required "functional literacy." But see Rhodes 1985 and Hansen 1986 for a refutation of her arguments.

74. See also Appendix, Table 5. The reason for the change from election to lot is obscure, though it probably did not signal a major change in attitudes to record-keeping or a desire to weaken the Boule. It did, however, bring the selection of *grammateis* into line with that of most other offices and perhaps was more efficient since citizens would have had a longer tenure. See Ferguson 1914–1915, p. 395; Rhodes 1972, pp. 137–138; Sickinger 1999, pp. 141–146; *contra* Brillant 1911, pp. 27–28.

ELECTIONS, SORTITION, AND THE CITY ELITE

The use of the lot not only randomized the selection process, as Isokrates (7.23) once noted, it also dispersed officeholding to a wider section of society and prevented monopolization of power by a city elite.[75] The comparison of the two selection methods shows that when elections were held, candidates with demotics from or near the city were disproportionately represented. On the one hand, this finding implies that elective offices were particularly attractive to members of city demes. On the other hand, the lack of evidence for electoral corruption suggests that elections were not considered worth manipulating and that elected positions were not highly sought. If the incidence of allegations of corruption is meaningful, other political activities, such as speaking in the Assembly or representing the city on an embassy, seem to have been considered more important. Serving as a *strategos,* of course, was not a negligible activity. It was clearly a position that brought influence, attracting many prominent citizens to serve for years at a time. The possibility of reelection probably played a role in ensuring that *strategoi* hailed disproportionately from city demes. Yet considerations of political power cannot explain why elected *grammateis* display the same distributional pattern as the *strategoi.* It may be useful, therefore, to examine the process of election in more detail, that is, to look at the candidates themselves and how the demos voted.

Wealth may have been an important factor in the pursuit of elected office. There were large numbers of candidates in all types of election who were demonstrably wealthy. Even among the *grammateis,* those who could be classified as wealthy were selected predominantly by election rather than by lot.[76] If those who were wealthy and had longstanding associations with the city were much more visible in elective office than in sortitive office, we should perhaps emphasize the competitive aspect of elections, which offered candidates the possibility of demonstrating and accruing political capital.[77]

Members of the elite could compete with one another for influence in the Assembly, but elections allowed them to demonstrate this influence further by winning votes. The process of contesting elections should thus be seen within the context of an agonistic aristocratic culture. It was not necessarily the office that was the primary reward (although the office could bestow on the elite the power and influence to which they believed they were entitled), but the acting out of aristocratic values and rivalries in open competition. It is no wonder, therefore, that Aristotle regarded elections as oligarchic.

In terms of the voting itself, there is very little evidence to suggest that malpractice was considered a problem (or even a feature). It is remotely possible that the disproportionate number of elected officials from the city demes was achieved through the mobilization of supporters by *hetaireiai* or other such groups, but it is much more likely to reflect the organization (not necessarily deliberate or underhanded) of voters from the candidates' home demes or the self-selection of candidates themselves. Although it may have been worthwhile engineering support for elections to the *strategia* or to rid the city of opponents through ostracism, it is difficult to see why it

75. Headlam 1933, pp. 12–13; Hansen 1999, p. 236.

76. Seven of the nine *grammateis* attested as wealthy occupied the office during the period when election was used. Large numbers of *strategoi* and candidates for ostracism were also demonstrably wealthy. See also n. 42, above.

77. For a similar view of ostracism as "a symbolic institution," see Forsdyke 2005, pp. 149–165.

would have been necessary or desirable for one to manipulate an election to become the *grammateus* of the Boule.[78] Demes close to the city were probably well represented not only by candidates but also by voters who outnumbered those from outlying demes.

The comparison of elected and selected officials suggests that members of the city elite were overrepresented in positions of elected responsibility, and also provides insight into the electoral behavior of the Athenian demos. Sara Forsdyke suggests that ostracisms were aimed deliberately to include as many citizens as possible in "the decisions of exile," but those from more distant demes may not have found it easy to attend.[79] It may have been more difficult for citizens from nonurban demes to compete in elections, either because they themselves were not based permanently in the city or because many of their supporters were not. Any individual could move to the city and live there, and many did, but this does not explain the disproportionate representation of certain demes in elective offices.[80] To be successful in an election or to be ostracized, a candidate would need to be well known to those citizens who voted, whether or not he himself was from the city area. Given the minimal evidence for corruption or malpractice, it is perhaps more plausible that voters from the city area cast their votes in elections in greater numbers than did voters from other parts of Attica.

This argument assumes that citizens voted predominantly according to deme ties. Although this may not be an unreasonable assumption, it is far from demonstrable, and in reality decisions were probably far more complex. It would be interesting to know whether the composition of the Assembly in meetings in which elections for office were held was socially representative, and whether the voting patterns characteristic of those occasions were replicated when other votes were taken within the Assembly. Unfortunately, detailed evidence for participation in these proceedings is lacking.

It is possible, however, to observe the deme of origin of those proposing decrees. Hansen demonstrated that the number of individuals proposing a decree must have been great, since a high proportion of proposers are attested only once.[81] If the surviving decrees are representative, Hansen's findings suggest that such proposals were a common form of political activity not dominated by a political elite. Comparing these citizens with

78. The *grammateus* was "in charge of all the documents" (*Ath. Pol.* 54.4) and was responsible for recording and displaying decrees as well as checking the archives when necessary. This was an important job in administrative terms, but one that had little political power in comparison with that of the *strategoi*. A *grammateus* may have been able to decide whether to include a relief sculpture on a published stele, but presumably only if it fell within the cost allocated by the Assembly itself or provided by an honorand (cf. *IG* II^2 31 and *IG* I^3 156). See further Rhodes 1993, p. 603; Lawton 1995, p. 26; Low 2005, pp. 102–103.

79. Forsdyke 2005, pp. 162–163.

80. There are many examples of individuals from nonurban demes owning property in Athens or Piraeus: e.g., Demosthenes of Paiania and Timotheos of Anaphlystos both had properties in Piraeus (Dein. 1.69; Dem. 49.22). Timarchos of Sphettos had a house near the Acropolis (Aischin. 1.97), and Themistokles of Phrearrhioi supposedly had one in Melite (Plut. *Them.* 22.2). Similarly, many gravestones from the city record nonurban demotics, perhaps implying residence in the city for citizens registered in other demes. While some citizens certainly did move to Athens, it is very difficult to assess whether this movement was widespread or occasional, whether it was permanent or temporary, or whether property ownership in both the city and the deme was common. For some of the difficulties of using funerary inscriptions as evidence for migration, see Osborne 1991.

81. Hansen 1989a, pp. 112–125.

the general citizen population by means of the chi-square test shows that proposers of decrees were not concentrated in the city area, but came from demes throughout Attica.[82] The result of the test implies that the Assembly attracted citizens from a very wide area, not just from the city. If decree-proposers came from all corners of Attica and included a large number of citizens, then we might assume that the composition of the Assembly was quite varied. Thus, a wide range of citizens both attended and participated actively in the Assembly, and the Athenian democracy was not merely the concern of a privileged few.

Elected offices in Athens were held primarily by the wealthier members of demes near the city. Due to the practice of assigning positions to boards of officeholders rather than to individuals, however, no single officeholder within the democracy wielded a vast amount of power. Instead, elections allowed members of the elite to compete with each other and to demonstrate their influence within the demos as a whole. Elections played a dual role in Athenian life: they allowed offices that required particular expertise to be distributed according to the wishes of the demos, and they permitted a highly controlled form of aristocratic competition.

The selection of officials by lot, on the other hand, minimized the geographical bias of elections and allowed more citizens from other parts of Attica to participate in the political process. Since sortition was widely used while elections were comparatively scarce, Athenian political life is perhaps better characterized by the lot than by the popular vote. The lot distributed political power throughout Attica more effectively and encouraged *hoi bouloumenoi* to take an active part in public affairs. It was a system in which nonurban citizens could, and did, participate widely.[83] Aristotle's observation that the lot was a democratic element in ancient Greek politics is well substantiated by the evidence presented here.

82. The value of chi-square is 1.55; as in the cases discussed above, the value would have to exceed 3.84 in order for the null hypothesis to be rejected.

83. Ruschenbusch 1994, p. 190; and to a lesser extent, Hansen 1989c, pp. 80–84.

APPENDIX
THE CHI-SQUARE TEST

The chi-square goodness-of-fit test is a statistical test that measures the departure of a set of observed values from a corresponding set of expected values.[84] It does not measure degrees of association or interrelationship between variables, but rather the likelihood that the relationship apparent in the data (here, the relationship between deme of origin and officeholding) is not a result of sampling variation.

The calculation requires the setting of a null hypothesis (H_0), that is, a hypothesis of no association, that the test seeks to disprove. In this case, H_0 states that there is no relationship between deme of origin and officeholding. H_1 (its opposite) states that there is a relationship.

Through the use of the chi-square test, we can either accept or reject H_0 by asking how likely it is that, for example, the observed number of *strategoi* from various demes in our sample is typical of the distribution of the citizen population of Attica from which it was drawn. The analysis necessitates a number of historical and mathematical assumptions. First, it is assumed that bouleutic quotas are representative of the distribution of the citizen population of Attica, which is therefore recoverable within certain limits. Second, the data must be collected in the form of counts and be divided into mutually exclusive categories. Third, underlying the calculation is the assumption that the sample is typical rather than unusual.

The formula for chi-square is as follows:

$$\chi^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{k} \frac{(O_i - E_i)^2}{E_i}$$

O_i = the observed number of officeholders in any category (expressed as category i)

E_i = the expected number of officeholders in any category

k = the number of categories (i.e., the number of cells in the table)

For example, the chi-square calculation for *strategoi* (see Table 3, above) is as follows:

$$\frac{(41-27.92)^2}{27.92} + \frac{(70-83.08)^2}{83.08} = 8.19$$

84. See esp. Blalock 1972, pp. 275–295; Handel 1978, pp. 310–319; Siegel and Castellan 1988, pp. 49, 123–124; Shennan 1997, pp. 104–121.

TABLE 5. POLITICALLY ACTIVE CITIZENS FROM THE CITY (AND VICINITY) AND THE REST OF ATTICA

	Attested Number (Expected Number)			
Political Figures	*"City"*	*Rest of Attica*	*Total*	*Chi-square**
Ostracism candidates	47 (25.66)	55 (76.34)	102	23.72
Dikasts	17 (18.36)	56 (54.64)	73	0.13
Grammateis (before 363)	24 (15.85)	39 (47.15)	63	5.60
Grammateis (after 363)	5 (8.05)	27 (23.95)	32	1.54

* The theoretical value of chi-square at a significance level of 0.05 with 1 degree of freedom is 3.84.

The chi-square value calculated must then be tested for statistical significance by determining what level of risk is appropriate and the degrees of freedom associated with the sample. In this instance the level of risk or significance is 0.05 (a standard choice, meaning that if H_0 is true there is only a 5% risk of the data showing the observed pattern as a result of chance variation). The degrees of freedom are determined by subtracting one from the number of cells in the table; here, because there are two cells in the table there is one degree of freedom. Statistics textbooks provide a reference table to find the corresponding value for chi-square with one degree of freedom at the 0.05 significance level.[85] This figure (3.84) is then compared with the value calculated.

If the calculated value is larger, chi-square can be said to be statistically significant, and H_0 must be rejected. If the calculated value is smaller, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. For *strategoi,* chi-square is 8.19, which is larger than 3.84. Therefore H_0 is rejected; there is a statistically significant relationship between deme of origin and officeholding for *strategoi.* The opposite is the case for *tamiai:* chi-square is 0.36, which is less than 3.84, meaning that the null hypothesis must stand.

Table 5 presents the data on which the calculations discussed above and summarized in Table 4 are based.

85. Shennan 1997 is the most accessible textbook for nonmathematicians; see esp. pp. 422–423, table F.

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Claire Taylor

UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER
DEPARTMENT OF CLASSICS AND ANCIENT HISTORY
SCHOOL OF ARTS, HISTORIES, AND CULTURES
OXFORD ROAD
MANCHESTER M13 9PL
UNITED KINGDOM

claire.taylor-2@man.ac.uk