

THE QUESTION OF TRIBUTE IN 449/8 B. C.

I. EPIGRAPHIC

IN *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, Vol. I,¹ the authors gave to the quota list which stands at the foot of the front face of the First Stele, immediately under List 5, the number 7: with a note (*op. cit.*, p. 133) that "since no tribute was collected in 449/8 there is no List 6." This dogma is repeated in the commentary (p. 175) with the promise that "a more detailed discussion is reserved for Volume II." This has drawn a challenge from Gomme, *Class. Rev.*, LIV, 1940, pp. 65-67. His arguments are both epigraphic and historical: I wish to deal first with his epigraphic contention, reinforced as it has been by Dow's two *Studies in the Athenian Tribute Lists* in *Class. Phil.*, XXXVII, 1942, pp. 371 ff. and XXXVIII, 1943, pp. 20 ff. Gomme observes that no explanation has been suggested of the blank space which must be presumed at the head of the back face of the First Stele, just above List 9: and Dow, elaborating this point in the second of his *Studies*, concludes that the real List 8, for 447/6, stood in this space.

The space is not large. Dow computes (p. 27) a minimum of 42 lines of names, a maximum of 65. This is very fair: my own computation allows a little more latitude. The prescript of List 9 stands level with line 15 (of List 1) on the front face, and with line 12 (of the postscript to List 1) on the right-hand side face: the space presumed blank is thus of 14 lines of rather crowded, or 11 lines of rather open, writing.² However economically it was used, not much more than 70 names could be got there: probably many fewer.³

¹ Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, Vol. I (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1939).

² I gave this determination in *B.S.A.*, XXXIII, pp. 102 ff., and *ibid.*, fig. 1. The size of the blank space depends wholly on the relation of Groups I and III (as defined, *loc. cit.*, p. 103) and is unaffected by the relation of these to Group II. [In what follows I number the fragments as in *A.T.L.*: but since in *B.S.A.*, XXXIII, I numbered them as in *I.G.*, I¹, I add the *I.G.*, I¹ numeration in square brackets: thus "frag. 1 [= 3]" means "frag. 1 in *A.T.L.*, frag. 3 in *I.G.*, I¹." The numbers may be readily equated by comparing *B.S.A.*, XXXIII, fig. 1 (on p. 102) with *A.T.L.*, plate II.] The determination of the blank space is thus unaffected by Meritt's rejection (*Documents on Athenian Tribute*, pp. 74 f.) of my "horizontal equation" between frags. 1 [= 3] and 94 [= 60], whereby I sought to tie Groups I and II: it depends essentially on the horizontal equation (which ties Groups I and III) between frags. 6 [= 4] and 11 [= 45], provided by the heads of the columns of *A.T.L.*, List 2. This gives the fine adjustment (and, if the unity of *A.T.L.*, List 2 is allowed, the coarse adjustment also) for Groups I and III: the truth of the whole arrangement, including Group II, can be computed from the lengths of the various columns affected. Theoretically, the column heads in frag. 11 [= 45] might be level with the prescript (not the column heads) in frag. 6 [= 4], *sc.* one line higher: this would reduce the blank space by one line.

³ The first two lists are exceptionally tightly spaced, both laterally and vertically. Laterally: after List 1, the figures are always in separate columns (this needs more room), and the tremendous lateral crowding of List 2 was never repeated (the nearest approach is the double columns on the side faces of the Second Stele: meanwhile, *A.T.L.*, List 7 takes four columns where List 2 had

Dow refrains from historical enquiry, and so he offers no explanation of why his List 8 should be so phenomenally brief: he and Gomme are agreed that we cannot with any probability lengthen it by supposing that part of it stood elsewhere (e.g. on the side or front face). I have been led to assume that the space was blank⁴ by an epigraphic reason which I think is serious, viz: that no fragment from the top of the back face has been identified. Blank fragments if found (until quite recently) are not kept, and are anyway very hard to place. This argument tells heaviest against Dow's view that an actual list of names and quotas stood here: a list is the easiest thing of all to identify in fragments. It tells less strongly (though no doubt it tells) against the possibility of something other than a list having stood here.⁵ There are several such possibilities. List 9 is the first list after the Thirty-Year Peace with Sparta, and it is possible that in the terms of peace Sparta conceded to Athens a right, irrespective of war with Persia, to take tribute from her allies: or perhaps Athens and her allies came to some revised understanding at the Great Panathenaia of 446 (the first Great Panathenaia since Kimon's death). Either of these⁶ might be cited as a sanction for

taken seven, and List 8 takes two where List 2 had taken three: the standard practice on the back face, from List 9 onwards, is five columns). So it is unlikely that there were more than five columns of names at the top of the back face, and almost impossible that there were more than six. Vertically: the body of List 1 is extremely close: the 14 lines above line 15 include 4 lines of rather more open prescript, but even so these 14 lines correspond to about 11 lines of List 9: this means that the postscript to List 1 is pretty near the usual later practice. This would give us 11 lines, not allowing for any space between the two lists. I think 12 lines and 5 columns is a fair estimate on the high side: since one line must be prescript, that leaves 5 columns of 11 lines each. With unlikely crowding, we could suppose 6 columns of 13 lines each. A possible 78 lines of names, a more probable 55 or under.

⁴ Why it was blank, is an architectural question. Perhaps the top of the back face was steadied against some beam or lintel. The decree of Kleinias has a blank space in the upper right-hand corner (= *A.T.L.*, D7 + new fragment, see note 10 below: the new fragment shows there was no corresponding blank in the upper left-hand corner: Meritt in *Epigraphica Attica*, p. 145, note 16, cites the parallel of *I.G.*, II², 2496 for this asymmetry): the blank is exactly square, 0.26 m. each way: was it masked by the square end of a beam? If the decree is as I think (note 37, below) of early 447, it is presumably some six years later than the erection of the First Stele. So far as I know, the architectural context of the Quota-List Stelai is quite undetermined: perhaps in this respect too the First Stele and the decree of Kleinias may be found to throw light on each other.—Alternatively, the blank on the First Stele may be due to the reason (whatever that was) which led the stonemason to begin a long way below the top of the back face of *I.G.*, I², 304 (see Meritt, *Athenian Financial Documents*, plate XI and p. 117).

⁵ The unique matter at the head of the right lateral face of the First Stele (frags. 4 and 5) has been duly placed: frag. 4 easily, because of its obverse face. Frag. 5 was rejected by Koehler from the Quota Lists (see bibliography in *A.T.L.*, p. 10) but was of course preserved; and fragments of mid fifth century writing are uncommon enough to make their chances good of being placed eventually.

⁶ The Spartan concession was perhaps *sub silentio* (see below, p. 229): an agreement between Athens and her allies, parallel to the agreements with Chalkis and Eretria (*I.G.*, I², 39 and 17: Schweigert in *Hesperia*, VI, 1937, pp. 317 ff.) is more likely. A number of somewhat similar sanctions are collected by Ferguson (*Treasurers of Athena*, p. 78; in note 1 from p. 77). More

the quota lists which follow. This is on the assumption that Lists 7 and 8 are rightly so called in *A.T.L.*, i.e., that the show-down came in the *sixth* year, 449/8; there are further possibilities if we suppose that this came in the *eighth* year, 447/6. This has been argued by Accame (see note 7 below), and Dow's phenomenally short "List 8" evidently presupposes some serious trouble in that year. I do not think this likely, for reasons which I will state later: but provisionally I do not deny the possibility that the defeat at Koroneia in 447, the known hostility of Sparta, the imminent expiry of the Five-Year Truce, combined to produce *either* (Dow's view) a wide-spread *de facto* refusal of tribute in 447/6, *or else* (Accame's view) a tardy and short-lived concession from Athens. In the former case the blank space will have held Dow's "List 8" of less than 70 names, in the latter case perhaps something on the lines of *I.G.*, I², 370, lines 13 and 18, "in the eighth *arche* no tribute having been received no quota was declared" *vel simile quid*.⁷ In either of these cases the list at the foot of the front face ("List 7" in *A.T.L.*) will be List 6 and belong to 449/8; the list on the right-hand side face ("List 8" in *A.T.L.*) will be List 7 and belong to 448/7: and in the former case List 8 will stand at the head of the back face and there will be no year without tribute.

The epigraphic evidence, in fact, does not *compel* us to assume a year without tribute. It compels us, I believe, to assume *either* a year with no tribute recorded *or else* a sensationally (and, as I think, improbably) short list for 447/6. It *compels* us to these alternatives: and the absence of identified fragments makes the second alternative (to me at least) improbable.

List 5 and List 9 (of 450/49 and 446/5 respectively) are numbered: it is tantalizing indeed that in what is obviously the vital period, between the Peace of Kallias in 450/49 and the Thirty-Year Peace in 446/5, we have no such numbers. List 7 never had a number (a circumstance which our hypothesis explains and Dow's leaves unexplained⁸): in List 8 the number is lost. *Pariunt desideria non traditos vultus*: Dow has drawn an imaginary portrait of the stonemason whose handiwork we have lost. His second *Study* (in which he contends for his short list) builds upon his first *Study*, in which he argues that the lost numeral in our "List 8" ought to be restored as *seven*.

generally, we may perhaps compare the comprehensive sanction *φσεφισαμενο το δεμο* in *I.G.*, I², 304A, line 3; or the codicil which Athens added to the *Λακωνική στήλη* in 419 (Thuc. V, 56, 3). More generally still, for the combination of (a) a statement of principle with (b) a statistical record of the consequences of that principle, compare the decree of Aristoteles establishing the Confederacy of 378/7 (*I.G.*, II², 43) or the decree of Thoudippos authorizing the assessment of 425 (*I.G.*, I², 63 = *A.T.L.*, A9).

⁷ Accame's hypothesis (*Riv. d. Fil.*, LXVI, 1938, p. 414) is that Athens remitted the tribute of 447/6 as a "benevolenza" to prevent the revolt of Euboea from spreading.

⁸ Cf. *Athenian Studies presented to W. S. Ferguson* (*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, Supplementary Vol. 1, 1940), p. 151, note 1.

This contention cannot possibly (as Dow will no doubt admit) be conclusive. He has argued that though we have not got the numeral at the end of line 1 of the prescript, we can determine the principles on which the stonemason disposed his letters (a "loose [or "freehand"] stoichedon"), and we can say that [*ἡεβδομῆς*] conforms to those principles better than [*ογδοῆς*]. He claims a "clear preference though not an absolute compulsion": these words "not an absolute compulsion" are so considerable an understatement⁹ that I make no apology for continuing to explore the alternative.

I have mentioned (in note 7 *supra*) Accame's view that the year without tribute was 447/6 instead of 449/8, and have noted that in this respect Accame and Dow agree, namely that our "Lists 7 and 8" are really "Lists 6 and 7." Accame's view is not open to the objection that no fragments have been identified from the top of the back face of the stele, since he can have this space blank: alternatively, as I have suggested, this space could hold a negative statement as in *I.G.*, I², 370, lines 13 and 18. It further gets us over the difficulty that there are no traces in List 9, such as abound in List 8, of there having been a poor collection the year before (Dow's "short list" *must* have led to considerable discrimination in List 9 between non-payers and payers). It certainly deserves serious attention. I do not indeed believe it, because I think the historical case for 449/8 is very much stronger. I put the case for 449/8 in the sections which follow: against 447/6, I think that such a *remission*, after two years' violation of the principle of *πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον* and after the great energy shown in *A.T.L.*, List 8, would have been a sign of weakness and done more harm than good (cf. Thuc. VIII, 64, 5). And I doubt if it was practicable. If Athens made this gesture (of remitting the current tribute) *after* Euboia had revolted, a good deal of tribute would already have arrived at Athens: the remission should come at the beginning of the year, and to that I see several objections. In 449/8, I believe there was no question of remitting it, since it was just not due: but whether it was due or not, the new situation was defined (by the Peace, the Congress Decree, etc.) in 450/49, well before the new year began.

⁹ Dow's contention about *A.T.L.*, List 8 is in two parts: (a) the line of the prescript is probably of 22 letters: (b) if this be so, it is improbable that the mason left two letterspaces vacant at the end of line 1, after the numeral, before beginning the relative clause in line 2: *ergo* the numeral was long enough to fill the line. I have not seen the stone since Meritt published his discussion in *D.A.T.*, pp. 66 ff.: on (a) it would be idle for me to give an opinion, but I note that Meritt has strongly contested Dow's view, in *Cl. Phil.*, XXXVIII, 1943, pp. 229 ff. But suppose Dow is right on (a), and line 2 has 22 letters: our hypothesis requires that line 1 has 20. There are only four comparable prescripts, in *A.T.L.*, Lists 14, 15, 22, 23: and 14 is practically non-existent. Of the other three, one (23) has exactly the problem which we are now supposing our mason to have had, and solved it in exactly the way we must suppose he solved it. That seems to me good enough, even though it is sixteen years later.

II. HISTORICAL

The weight of Gomme's attack is historical. Leaving on the knees of the gods the epigraphic decision, he advances certain considerations which "make the historian doubt the epigraphist's conclusion." His difficulties will all be met, I believe, by a careful consideration of two passages in our record: Thucydides I, 96, 1 and Plutarch, *Pericles*, 17. From them we may infer that in 449/8 tribute was not legally due (Thucydides) and that in 449 Perikles sought, but failed to find, a new sanction for its collection (Plutarch). Considering how little Thucydides cared to record even the major facts about tribute, and how casual our record is otherwise, we ought hardly to complain here. Gomme puts the rhetorical question, "how was the fleet maintained for that year?": not, presumably, because he expects any answer, but rather to indicate that such a question rises on our hypothesis and is absurd in fact. Yet the passage in Plutarch shows that Perikles was concerned with precisely this question. For his further question, "and how was Athens able, after loosening her grip so decisively, to resume her sway, so smoothly and so successfully, in the following year?," the quota lists (as we interpret them) show considerable friction in the collection in 448/7 (*A.T.L.*, List 7) followed by extensive collection of arrears in 447/6 (*A.T.L.*, List 8). How did Athens overcome this friction? It is hardly in reason to expect a concrete answer; and yet it is extremely likely that we have it, in the more nearly complete form of *A.T.L.*, D7 which has recently been published. That decree, moved by a certain Kleinias¹⁰ (Alkibiades' father?), prescribes minutely the pro-

¹⁰ Hill and Meritt, *Hesperia*, XIII, 1944, pp. 1-15. In *A.T.L.* we dated this decree "before 426/5" (*sc.* before D8) and by numbering it D7 we betrayed our belief that it was not much before: but I have now no doubt at all that the opinion of Hill and Meritt is correct, namely that it was voted in close connection with the unsatisfactory "List 7" and that its consequences may be seen in "List 8": for the closer dating see note 37 below. The date rests, in my opinion, on the fact that the very remarkable progress in collection between List 7 and List 8 presupposes exactly the action which the decree prescribes: this date is supported (but I doubt if it could be proved) by the character of the writing (Raubitschek in *A.J.P.*, LXI, 1940, pp. 447-9), and further by the fact that the Karic province is included in Ionia (lines 26-28: Hill-Meritt, pp. 8, 12) and by the likelihood that Kleinias who moved it is the well-known Kleinias (father of Alkibiades) who was killed at Koroneia in 447 B.C. (Hill-Meritt, p. 8). I regard this identification of Kleinias as extremely probable but not certain. Apart from the serious possibility that the mover is otherwise unknown to us, there are still one or two known bearers of the name. Alkibiades' brother and his cousin (*P.A.* 8512, 8511) are indeed out of the question: but *P.A.* 8510 is two persons, Alkibiades' father being distinct from the Kleinias of Herodotos VIII, 17 (*P.A. Addenda* no. 597). The latter who fought at Artemision in 480 was perhaps born between 520 and 510 (is he the bearded Κλινίας in a banquet scene of the Ambrosios Painter? Beazley, *Attic R.-F. Vase-Painters*, p. 72, no. 8: the drawing in Klein, *Lieblingsinschr.*², fig. 9 on p. 68, shews the inscriptions): he would be something over 60 in 447, and it is possible (though not very likely) that the decree is his. He was Alkibiades' great-uncle. It was perhaps the same man whose son was strategos in 431 and 430 (Κλεόπομπος ὁ Κλεινίου, Thuc. II, 26, 58): if not the same, then here is another claimant of the right age and

cedure for getting the tribute in; provides against faulty transport, delays, arrears; names the responsible officials: and reinforces all with heavy penalties. That is no doubt how Athens overcame the friction: the procedure prescribed by the decree of Kleinias accounts for the remarkable achievement of *A.T.L.*, List 8. Athens met friction with severity: ἦσαν δέ πως καὶ ἄλλως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες (Thuc. I, 99, 2).

Indeed what really surprises Gomme is not that Athens should have overcome the friction, but that she ever should have admitted, in practice, the weakness of her case. Thucydides may say that the collection of tribute depended on the continuance of the Persian war, but one must not be asked to believe that the Athens of 449 seriously allowed that doctrine.¹¹ Gomme says more: such an attitude in 449 would be a *volte-face*. When, then, (I must ask) had Athens denounced the doctrine of Thuc. I, 96, 1? or is Thucydides wrong in saying such a doctrine existed?

It is time to turn to the texts.

standing. And there is Kleinias the son of Pedieus, named as *καλός* on vases of the second quarter of the century (Beazley, *op. cit.*, p. 928), who would perhaps be old enough if the decree is of 447, and certainly would be if it be of 438 or later. That is to say, Alkibiades' father is not the only Kleinias among the leading Athenians of about this time. But he is much the most likely candidate.

¹¹ Meritt, too, has found this unlikely: in his recent essay "Athens and the Delian League" (*The Greek Political Experience, Studies in Honor of William Kelly Prentice* [Princeton, 1941]), p. 53, he suggests that in the year 449/8 "Athens collected some tribute, and may have transferred all of it, not merely a quota, to Athena." No doubt he has the reserve decree (*A.T.L.*, T9) in mind. I should be surprised if the Reserve Decree meant that: its main provision (or at least the only one we hear of) concerned the "reserve," *sc.* the accumulated surplus. It may be felt that by not collecting tribute Athens would be virtually disbanding the League: yet it was surely not too difficult a distinction (for contemporaries) that the League lasted till the iron swam (*Ἀθ. Πολ.*, 23, 5), but tribute was contingent on the Persian war (Thuc. I, 96, 1). Intermittent contributions (usually men, sometimes money in lieu, e. g., Xen., *Hell.* V, ii, 21) were a feature of the permanent Peloponnesian League: when a war ended, the Xenagoi no longer demanded the wartime contributions. Larsen, in *Harv. Stud. Class. Phil.*, LI, 1941, p. 199, assumes that the Persian war was the "purpose of the League": he expresses surprise that the "purpose" of a permanent league should be a particular war, but attributes this confusion to "short-sighted statesmanship." The question to put is: did those oaths which were to be binding till the iron swam specify one particular enemy? I think the answer must be "No," and rhetorical passages such as Thuc. III, 10, 3 and VI, 76, 3 do not prove the contrary. But one particular enemy *was* specified in the Assessment of Aristides.

The terms of the oaths exchanged need a systematic enquiry, which I cannot undertake now, though I hope to do so soon. I equally postpone discussion of the inscriptions which record arrangements made with individual allies, though some of them are clearly close to our date: those with Phaselis, Erythrai, Kolophon, are undated, but Sigeion comes in the actual year of Kimon's return and Miletos in the year of his death (*Hesperia*, V, 1936, pp. 360 ff.; *Trans. Amer. Phil. Association*, LXVI, 1935, pp. 177 ff.). Meanwhile I do not think these individual settlements conflict with my conclusions in this paper, and they are too difficult and important to be treated incidentally.

III. ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΒΑΡΒΑΡΟΝ

Thuc. I, 96, 1: *παραλαβόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν . . . ἔταξαν ἅς τε ἔδει παρέχειν τῶν πόλεων χρήματα πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον καὶ ἅς ναῦς. πρόσχημα γὰρ ἦν ἀμύνεσθαι ὧν ἔπαθον δηοῦντας τὴν βασιλέως χώραν.* There is no need for me to underline *πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον*, which Thucydides has reinforced by the explanatory *πρόσχημα γὰρ ἦν*. The Athenian assessment of 478/7, commonly called the Assessment of Aristides,¹² was a measure of war. The ships and money assessed were for use against the Persians: and the grounds for such an assessment were, that it was proposed to continue the war for some time longer.

It is certain that, at some time, this doctrine was abandoned. All tribute collected after the Peace of Kallias (450/49)¹³ was collected in violation of this doctrine or (as I would sooner phrase it) in virtue of some new doctrine. The "new doctrine" (cf. below, note 30) is commonly put pretty cynically: the statement of the Korinthian in Thuc. I, 121, 5 that the allies "pay the cost of their own subjection" has a sharpened edge, but substantially is the same as Thucydides says in his own person in I, 99, 3 (quoted below) or in Euphemos' mouth, VI, 84, 3, *ξύμφορος ἡμῖν ἀπαράσκεινος ὧν καὶ χρήματα μόνον φέρων.*

Of the actual process of this change Thucydides tells us as little as (for example) of the actual process whereby the *κοινὰ ξύνοδοι* were discarded. But twice at least he describes the change in general terms: in III, 10, 4 (in the Mytilenean's mouth), *ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐωρῶμεν αὐτοὺς τὴν μὲν τοῦ Μήδου ἔχθραν ἀνιέντας τὴν δὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων δούλωσιν ἐπαγομένους, οὐκ ἀδεεῖς ἔτι ἡμεῖς:* and in his own person in I, 99, 3, *διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόκνησιν ταύτην τῶν στρατειῶν οἱ πλείους αὐτῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἀπ' οἴκου ὦσι, χρήματα ἐτάξαντο ἀντὶ τῶν νεῶν τὸ ἰκνούμενον ἀνάλωμα φέρειν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις ἡὔξετο τὸ ναυτικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς δαπάνης ἣν ἐκείνοι ξυμφέρουεν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ὁπότε ἀποσταλεῖν ἀπαράσκεινοι καὶ ἄπειροι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντο.* In the former passage tribute is not mentioned (though the earlier and later grounds of tribute, as defined in I, 96, 1 and 121, 5 respectively, are

¹² By the "Assessment of Aristides" I understand that assessment which Thucydides speaks of in this passage (I, 96): which had been voided by the Peace. In the Reserve Decree (*A.T.L.*, T9) the phrase appears to cover both it and all developments or revisions of it down to 450: all such were on the original basis of *πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον*. In the Peace of Nikias one particular category of cities is to pay "the tribute of Aristides' time," *τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐπ' Ἀριστείδου* (Thuc. V, 18, 5): perhaps none of them was assessed in 478/7 or before the Eion campaign: some perhaps (e.g., Spartolos) not by Aristides himself: I take the phrase to be equivalent to *τὸν ἀρχαῖον φόρον*, as *τὸν ἀρχαῖον δασμόν* in Xen., *Hell.* III, iv, 25 is equivalent to *ὡς ἐτάχθησαν ἐξ Ἀρταφρένους* in Herodotos, VI, 42, 2. This use of Aristides' name in the Reserve Decree and the Peace of Nikias suggests to me that Aristides was held to have made the *τάξις πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον*, and that after 450 there was deemed to be a new *τάξις*, on a new principle.

¹³ For the reality of this Peace, see my paper *The Peace of Kallias* in *Harv. Stud. Class. Phil.*, Supplementary Vol. I, 1940, pp. 121 ff., and for its date, *ibid.*, pp. 149 ff. (where indeed I presuppose the conclusions here argued).

contrasted). In the latter passage tribute is mentioned, but he is concerned with the change not of its grounds but of its incidence. In neither passage is his eye exactly on the object of our enquiry, viz: *when* and *how* did Athens denounce or discard the principle stated in I, 96, 1, that tribute was intended for the war against Persia? We must accept the fact that, on the scale which he allowed for the Pentakontaetia, Thucydides did not think such cardinal moments worth defining. "Cardinal Moments" (such as when the Treasury was moved to Athens, when peace was made with Persia, when the synod met for the last time, or when tribute was first claimed as irrespective of the Persian war) must be defined if we are to get events into sharp focus. Thucydides is more concerned with the underlying facts:¹⁴ the profound change in Athenian intentions (III, 10, 4), the fatal disparity between the energy of Athens and of her allies (I 99). His details in the Pentakontaetia are almost purely military.

IV. WHEN WAS THE PRINCIPLE OF *πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον* DENOUNCED?

Fortunately we have other evidence. Since we know that Athens made peace with Persia after Kimon's death, probably in the winter of 450/49,¹⁵ there is good likelihood that it was this Peace which provided the occasion for revising the doctrine of I, 96, 3, that tribute was intended for the war against Persia. It must have been then or earlier: for tribute was certainly being collected *almost* immediately after the Peace, when the *πρόσχημα* of I, 96, 3 no longer existed. Gomme evidently thinks it was earlier, since not to have collected the tribute for 449/8 (he says) "would have been a remarkable *volte-face* in Athenian policy." He thinks, evidently, that Athens had publicly decided some time earlier than 449 to go on collecting tribute irrespective of any war with Persia: he implies that such had been Kimon's intention.

I imagine this opinion is based chiefly on Thucydides I, 98, 4-99. The big change-over from *νῆες* to *χρήματα*, with which Thucydides illustrates his thesis that the allies' inferior energy put too much power in Athens' hand, is generally (and I think rightly) assumed to have been more or less complete before the Peace of Kallias was made.¹⁶

¹⁴ Posterity lacks sharp focus, contemporaries lack perspective. Thucydides tends to compensate these two facts, to take focus for granted and to seek for perspective: notably in I, 96-99.

¹⁵ See note 13.

¹⁶ There are certainly no very significant transfers to the *χρήματα* group after List 5, until, e. g., the Aktaian cities are added in the Archidamian war. But List 5 has some 30 or 40 names more than any of Lists 1-4 (= Assessment Period I): statistics are given in the next note. The first useful discussion of List 5 in its historical context is West's paper, written soon after he and Meritt had established (approximately) the said statistics, "The Tribute Lists and the Non-Tributary Members of the Delian League," in the *American Historical Review*, XXXV, 1929-30, pp. 267 ff. An independent enquiry was made by Nesselhauf, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der delisch-attischen Symmachie* (*Klio*, Beiheft XXX, 1933), pp. 10 ff. The crucial question is to determine what names, normally present later, are absent in Period I. West believed them to be the "Charter

List 5, of 450/49, is not only considerably longer than any of Lists 1-4, it is also comparable to, perhaps longer than, the longest during the next twenty years (for the special case of *A.T.L.*, List 8, see below, p. 227): and these payments of 450/49 represent obligations assumed whilst Kimon still lived.¹⁷ With all this I am prepared to agree. Kimon wanted the most efficient force he could get for use against Persia; he therefore accepted the fact of Athens' superior energy, and by the change from *νῆες* to *χρήματα* he got a fleet more homogeneous, more venturesome, more centrally controlled.¹⁸ But all this is beside the mark unless Gomme will answer a further question, viz: when Kimon invited (for example) the Euboic cities to stop providing ships and to pay tribute instead, did he know (and did they understand) that they were exchanging an obligation which stopped automatically when war stopped, for one which

Members" of the League, i.e. the mainly west-Aegean cities who had fought from the beginning of the war of liberation and therefore remained mobilized in 478: they were absent from the lists because in Period I they were still in the *νῆες* group: adducing Plutarch, *Cimon*, 11, he argued that Kimon arranged their transfer to the *χρήματα* group when he was setting out for Cyprus in 450. Nesselhauf classed them as "islanders," who (he inferred) were in a state of recalcitrance between 454 and 451. Without giving a new analysis, I may perhaps suggest that the west-Aegean and island cities involved are absent not because they were recalcitrant but (as West contended) because they still provided ships; but this was due not to their Charter Membership but to their being within a certain radius from Peiraeus. It was easier to assemble small contingents from close at hand, easier both for the ally and for the hegemonic power. So the arrangement lasted longest nearest Peiraeus, but was now becoming burdensome to both parties even there. [See now Meiggs, *J.H.S.*, LXIII, p. 31.]

¹⁷ There are 150 lines of names in List 1, 163 in List 2, 151 in List 3, 160 in List 4. This assumes that all columns are complete which are not known to be incomplete: the possibility of incomplete columns makes little difference except in List 1, which might be about 7 lines shorter. These figures are "lines of names": to convert them into numbers of names is not quite easy. In List 1, while once three names occupy two lines (1 II 25-6), much more often one name occupies two: there were perhaps hardly more than 130 names. List 2 has less overrunning than List 1 (compare 1 IV 17-20 with 2 IX 8, 2 X 11) but perhaps not less than the normal later practice (2 IV 7-8 is the only name extant in this list which normally takes two lines): here, and in Lists 3 and 4, a deduction of about ten percent should about cover the two-line names. Thus:—

List 1, in 150 lines (or less), will have about 130 names;

List 2, in 163 lines, will have less than 150 names;

List 3, in 151 lines, will have less than 140 names;

List 4, in 160 lines, will have less than 150 names.

We suggest in *A.T.L.*, Vol. I, p. 455, in the note on *πόλεις ἄτακτοι*, that Lists 2 and 4 include some Karic towns who did not continue to pay but made an exceptional contribution to a passing military force (cf. *Ἀλινδῆς*, *Θύδωνος*, *Κιλλαρῆς*, *Οὔλαις*, *Οὔρανῆται*, *Υβλίσσης*). It looks as if the normal number of names for the assessment period 454-450 is between 130 and 140. Against this the 199 lines in List 5 can hardly mean less than 175-180 names. This suggests a very considerable transfer from *νῆες* to *χρήματα* at the great Panathenaia of 450, while Kimon still lived and the Persian war looked likely to last. On West's view (see note 16) the decision then implemented was reached in the spring of 450, when Kimon was collecting his forces and those cities who had opted for *χρήματα* were excused their contingent.

¹⁸ We have good evidence (Ion, in Plutarch, *Cimon*, 9) that he took pride in winning advantage for Athens at the allies' expense; a trifling advantage, to be sure, and to my mind the sort of friendly overreaching which precludes really sinister designs.

did not? ¹⁹ When the question is put the answer is clear: he did not know, and quite certainly they did not understand. Athens' policy of stopping the war but continuing to take tribute, was not yet published: her acceptance in 449 of the doctrine of "tribute for the Persian war" was no *volte-face*.

It was not a *volte-face*: but perhaps it showed a rather surprising constancy? Surprising, yes, if Athens had accepted it permanently: not surprising, that in the circumstances she had one year's hesitation. Peace had been extremely sudden, precipitated by Kimon's death. Kimon died, of illness, when he was probably well under sixty, probably a good deal younger than his father was at the battle of Marathon, not very much older than Perikles was when he began his fifteen years' principate in 443. ²⁰ Because of his early death, he did in fact pass from the scene almost at once after his return from ostracism, ²¹ but he was not expected to. His last campaign was

¹⁹ In notes 16 and 17 West's view is set out, that Kimon was responsible for the transfer of a large number of allies from the *νήες* group to the *χρήματα* group in 450 B.C. I believe that West is right (and that in this, as in the "missing list," the early lists reflect phases of deliberate policy rather than mere recalcitrance; recalcitrance is easily detected in Lists 7-8). If so, both the contracting parties expected a lot more Persian fighting, and I doubt if either had faced the question of where they would stand if there was not: if they had faced it, they certainly did not expect Perikles' answer. The most conspicuous of these allies are the Euboic cities, Chalkis, Eretria, Styra, Hestiaia: none appears in Lists 1-4, the first two not even in List 5 (this *may* mean recalcitrance): if West is right, they only became tributary in 450, and in 449 (or 448) they found themselves tributary for ever. Their revolt in 446 is no doubt a consequence (so West, *loc. cit.*, p. 275, note 26): a delayed reaction, timed for the expiry of the Sparta-Athens truce: we may see it being concerted in western Boiotia (Thuc. I, 113, 2; cf. note 27).

²⁰ Kimon was *μενράκιον παντάπασιν* when his father died (Plutarch, *Cimon*, 4, 4: the phrase recalls Ion's account of himself, *ibid.*, 9, 1): not quite so young as the *νέον τι ἔτι μενράκιον* of Plato, *Protagoras*, 315 d, but presumably under twenty. His first well-authenticated strategía is in 476 Thuc. I, 98, 1; cf. I, 131, 1 and *Ox. Pap.*, XIII, 1610, frag. 6), when he must probably have been at least thirty. He was thus between 56 and 59 when he died. If the archon of 524/3 is his father (*Hesperia*, VIII, 1939, p. 60: such an archonship would agree well with Herodotos' words in VI, 39, 1, *οἱ Πεισιστράτιδαι οἱ μὲν καὶ ἐν Ἀθήνῃσι ἐπολεῖν εὖ*), Miltiades at Marathon was well over sixty. Perikles, choregos in 472 (*I.G.*, II², 2318, line 9), was probably at least fifty in 443. Kimon's premature death is lamented by Kratinos *ap.* Plutarch, *Cimon*, 10, 4.

²¹ I cannot discuss here whether Kimon returned in 457 or 452/1, but it seems to me certain that the former is wrong. Theopompos is indeed quite specific (*F. gr. Hist.*, 115 F 88), but by *τὸν πόλεμον κατέλυσε* he can mean nothing other than the Five-Year Truce, the date of which is near certain. It is true, further, that nothing could be more specific than Plutarch's statement (*Cimon*, 10, 8; *Pericles*, 10, 5) that Perikles recalled Kimon by psephisma: this is not in Theopompos, but Plutarch had a collection of Perikles' psephismata (*Pericles*, 8, 7; cf. note 25: no doubt from Krateros' collection) and I am unwilling to disregard his evidence completely. Kimon may have been recalled a few months (not years) before his term was up, when everyone was wanting peace. The "compact of Elpinike" (see next note) is thus not tied to Theopompos' date (of which indeed it makes nonsense), even if it is tied to the psephisma: it looks to me like contemporary gossip. Its outward and visible sign, I believe, was the marriage of Kimon with Isodike, Plut., *Cimon* 4, 2: I follow the stemma given by C. A. M. Fennell in *Pindar, Olympian and Pythian Odes*², 1893, p. 231: Isodike will have been still a young girl in 451 and have died very soon, no doubt in childbirth: was Peisíanax her son (schol. Aristid. III p. 515 Dind.)? I think that the late tradition which makes her mother of Kimon's other sons is not to be taken seriously (Plut., *Cimon* 16, 1).

not expected to be the unimportant echo of the Eurymedon which it proved to be in fact. The Five-Year Truce was meant to allow Athens to bring the Persian war to final victory, under Kimon's command: is not this the implication of Thucydides' words 'Ελληνικοῦ μὲν πολέμου ἔσχον, ἐς δὲ Κύπρον, etc.'?²² When he died, Perikles succeeded in changing the whole picture, a real volte-face:²³ he ended the Persian war. If he knew beforehand what he intended, few others did: few foresaw either the Peace or his answer to the problems it posed.²⁴ In such circumstances he was bound to feel his way: he had to make the delicate calculation: ὅσον αὐτοῖς ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐπρεπέα τε λόγον καὶ γνώμης μᾶλλον ἐφόδω ἢ ἰσχύος τὰ πράγματα ἐφαίνετο καταληπτὰ (Thuc. III, 11, 3).

So far *a priori*: it is improbable that the doctrine that tribute was for war against Persia had yet been formally challenged; consequently the Peace posed a new problem. Athens was forced to seek for a new basis for tribute, and *a priori* I see no reason why this search should not have involved one year's delay. Fortunately, we have positive evidence about this search: Perikles' famous Congress Decree reported by Plutarch, *Pericles*, 17.

V. THE CONGRESS DECREE = PLUTARCH, *Pericles*, 17

Περικλῆς — — — γράφει ψήφισμα, πάντας Ἑλλήνας — — — παρακαλεῖν, καὶ μικρὰν πόλιν καὶ μεγάλην, εἰς σύλλογον πέμπειν Ἀθήναζε τοὺς βουλευσομένους

(a) περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἱερῶν, ἃ κατέπρησαν οἱ βάρβαροι,

²² Ἐς δὲ Κύπρον ἐστρατεύοντο ναυσὶ διακοσίαις αὐτῶν [*sc.* Ἀθηναίων] τε καὶ τῶν συμμάχων Κίμωνος στρατηγοῦντος (I, 112, 2). Kimon's death altered the picture for Sparta as much as for others (see below, p. 223). It is no doubt to this wave of Panhellenic anti-Persian feeling that Kimon's decree against Arthmios belongs (Demosthenes, IX, 42; Krateros in Wilamowitz, *Coniectanea* [1884], p. 10): Arthmios had presumably been rebuffed at Sparta (Thuc. I, 109, 2). In the same context, perhaps, belongs Kimon's impeachment of Epikrates (Stesimbrotos *ap.* Plutarch, *Themistocles*, 24, 6). I do not insist on the "compact of Elpinike" in Plutarch, *Pericles*, 10, 5, that Kimon was to conduct the war abroad while Perikles was master in Athens: but it looks to me like contemporary gossip (see previous note) and it is meaningless unless a continued war against Persia had been the average expectation. Cf. Plutarch, *Cimon*, 18, 3: οὐδὲν μικρὸν ἀλλ' ὅλης ἐπινοῶν τῆς βασιλείας ἡγεμονίας κατὰλυσιν.

²³ One of the few references to the Peace which may be from a contemporary source is in Plutarch, *Pericles*, 12, 1 (see however note 31): it shows that opinion was outraged, precisely for the reason that "if we had guessed what was coming, we would not have done what we did."—It may seem a circular argument to point out that the First Stele was clearly designed to take more than five quota lists: to me this implies that the end of the war was not in sight.—Plutarch, *Cimon*, 18, 1 records that the allies were liable to complain, by 450, that the League's war potential was used against Greeks instead of Persians. This was the dangerous precedent for what perhaps became, after the show-down, the new basis of tribute (see note 30). But the complaints were recognized by Kimon as just, and it was *not* expected in 450 that the grounds of complaint were very soon to be made permanent.

²⁴ See note 23.

- (b) καὶ τῶν θυσιῶν, ἀς ὀφείλουσιν ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος εὐξάμενοι τοῖς θεοῖς ὅτε πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους ἐμάχοντο,
 (c) καὶ τῆς θαλάττης, ὅπως πλέωσι πάντες ἀδεῶς καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγωσιν.²⁵

Plutarch gives no date:²⁶ he is simply illustrating the splendour of Perikles' plans. Many dates have been suggested, but it is becoming agreed now that it is sometime in the early 'forties: The Parthenon has not been begun, but it is no longer expected that the spoils of Persia will pay for it; *sc.*, it is between 450 and 447. It is further clear that the business of the proposed Congress is financial: money has to be found

- (a) for the Parthenon
 (b) for the festival funds
 (c) for the Athenian fleet.

[Perhaps I oversimplify in taking for granted that the Athenian fleet was to be the chosen instrument for keeping the seas safe: but there was not much real alternative.]

Unless the collection of tribute was questionable, item (c) has no meaning. Tribute, if collected, would easily maintain the fleet, and the fleet would keep the seas safe. The allies had consented to pay for the fleet's war function of fighting Persia: they are now obliquely invited to pay for its peace function. The Congress was to recreate that atmosphere, of Panhellenic goodwill and Athenian prestige, which had surrounded the Assessment of Aristeides. But Kimon's unforeseen death had altered the picture for Sparta as much as for others: Sparta had no intention of using the Five-Year Truce (made with Kimon) for negotiating with Perikles: she meant to resume the war.²⁷ She refused to come to this Congress, which consequently never

²⁵ Plutarch, *Pericles*, 17, 1. Evidently from the collection of Perikles' psephismata to which Plutarch had access (*ibid.*, 8, 7; cf. note 21). The circumstances which Plutarch reports, e.g., that Sparta declined the invitation (17, 4), will perhaps be from Krateros: how did Krateros know?

²⁶ "When the Spartans were beginning to resent the growth of Athens' power": this could be said of many moments in Perikles' career. It is appropriate, but I cannot claim it as uniquely appropriate, to the morrow of Kimon's death. All three items of the agenda reveal the situation created by the Peace of Kallias (cf. note 28, below) and the end of the long hostilities.

²⁷ The Five-Year Truce was properly an armistice during which the parties should have time to concert a more permanent understanding. When Kimon died and Perikles made peace with Persia, it became evident that Sparta did not now intend to negotiate but to prepare for further fighting. Her ejection of the Phokians from Delphi (Thuc. I, 112, 5) comes near being an attack on Athens' allies: the Spartans were normally scrupulous over formal covenants, and perhaps they argued that the Phokians were in Delphi at their own risk, much as Phormion no doubt argued about the Ambrakiots in Amphilocheian Argos (Thuc. II, 68, 7), as the Athenians about the Corinthians at Sybota (Thuc. I, 53, 4).

Was it not this demonstration at Delphi which served to rally against Athens those parties, Euboians and others, ὅσοι τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἦσαν (Thuc. I, 113, 2)? Henceforward Sparta merely bides her time, and so do the said parties, until the expiry in 446. That Athens had at least an inkling of this is shown by Tolmides' Euboic cleruchy (Diodoros, XI, 88, 3; Pausanias, I, 27, 5:.

met. It is easy to believe that Perikles foresaw this and had merely wished to put on Sparta the odium for the steps he was now compelled to take: but it is no less possible that here was a real chance of peace which Sparta threw away.

VI. THE RESERVE DECREE

The next step is perhaps recorded in the Strassburg papyrus (*Anonymus Argentinensis*, lines 5-8: *Hermes*, XLII, 1907, pp. 374 ff.; *A.T.L.*, T9): and if so, both the Congress Decree and this Reserve Decree are dated between the return²⁸ of Kallias from Sousa and midsummer 449. Meritt's principles of restoration in *A.T.L.*, T9 (p. 572) leave no reasonable doubt²⁹ that here is a decree of Perikles relevant to the building of the Parthenon, and dealing with a Reserve Fund of 5,000 talents accumulated "according to the Assessment of Aristides" (cf. note 12, above). It is dated to the year of "Euthydemus," by whom the Anonymus must mean the same as Diodoros does by the same name (XII, 3, 1), viz: the archon of 450/49 ("Euthynos" in fact: *I.G.*, I², 22, and Oliver's new fragment, *Trans. Amer. Phil. Association*, LXVI, 1935, pp. 177 ff.). In Meritt's restoration the decree is cited as simply authorizing the "use" (*κινεῖν*: cf. Thuc. II, 24, 1; VIII, 15, 1) of this Reserve of 5,000 talents.

The discussions to which the Reserve Decree sooner or later gave rise are reported by Plutarch, *Pericles*, 12. One possibility, not perhaps the most likely, is that this is a report of the actual debate which attended its passing.³⁰ If so, that decree included

but this may be in 450, see note 39), and his expedition to western Boiotia, where the said parties were gathering. Kleinias joined him (Isokrates, XVI, 28; Plato, *Alcibiades I*, 112 c: probably as a volunteer, Plutarch, *Pericles*, 18, 2). Perikles thought Tolmides' strategy unwise (Plutarch, *ibid.*) but probably it at least disturbed the timing of one of the events planned for 446. Perikles wished to wait until the whole menace had shown its shape (*τόν γε σοφώτατον οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται σύμβουλον ἀναμείνας χρόνον*): perhaps to conserve his force so as to hold Geraneia against the Spartans.

²⁸ He need not perhaps have *returned*: the situation which the Congress decree envisages (note 26, above) could be created by the *opening* of negotiations: for the mention of *τὴν εἰρήνην* in item (c), compare the phrase *περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης* in the armistice of 423 (Thuc. IV, 118, 14) which means "the *prospective* peace."

²⁹ They exclude the possibility of a fresh *lemma* between the Parthenon in lines 3-4 and Perikles' decree in lines 5 ff.

³⁰ If *πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον* in 12, 2 and 12, 4 means "for the particular war in question" (as it well might if a particular war *was* in question: 'Αθ. Πολ., 40, 3, *τὰ χρήματα . . . ἃ οἱ τριάκοντα πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἔλαβον*; *ibid.*, 29, 5 and 39, 6; Thuc. II, 68, 9; *I.G.*, I², 87 [= *A.J.P.*, LVI, 1935, p. 69], line 16; *A.T.L.*, D8, line 29) the phrase in 12, 2 could mean "the monies which are being exacted even now for the Persian war" and could refer to the payments of 450/49. I hope to provoke discussion of the exact occasion of the debate or debates (*ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις*, 12, 1) in question, including that in 14, 1-2, where the expenditure spoken of in a past tense (*δεδαπανήσθαι*, *δεδαπανήσθω*) may well have been on, e.g., the Promachos or some other work earlier than the Parthenon. What needs to be determined is the sense of *πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον*, which is as ambiguous as "pour la guerre" and certainly *could* mean "for general war purposes" as it does in 'Αθ. Πολ., 43, 1; 44, 4; 61, 1

some sort of specification, and estimate of cost, of the ἀναθήματα (such appears to have been the term used, 12, 1 and 14, 1), as well as authority to meet this cost from the Reserve. I give a rough paraphrase:

(12, 1) The opposition's case was: the transfer of the Reserve from Delos has been an invidious action, made much worse by the *conclusion of peace so soon after*; ³¹ (12, 2) these monies are paid for war purposes, and it is tyrant's behaviour to use them for an image and temple on the proposed scale. (12, 3) Perikles answered: Athens has kept Greece safe from Persia by her own energy, and is now entitled to do what she wishes with the money; (12, 4) she has sufficient military equipment, and it is reasonable to spend the available wealth on works which will be an enduring glory and an immediate economic easement; they will give employment to practically everyone. (12, 5) Accordingly Perikles' specification was on a most lavish scale, so that craftsmen as well as combatants should draw public wages.

This Specification (the Greek is partly quoted in note 30) could be in place as part of the Reserve Decree: ³² what the opposition attacks is certainly the policy in which the Reserve Decree was a critical step.

If this debate actually attended the passing of the Reserve Decree, in the year of Euthynos, 450/49, then Perikles' claim for Athens to do what she wishes with the allies' money, is essentially this: if by her energy and skill she keeps Greece effectively safe from Persia at less cost than was estimated, she is entitled to the balance. It is a plea for the use of the Reserve, not yet for the continuation of tribute in peace. But if it belongs to the Parthenon controversy of 447 or 448, then both these issues have been raised and settled; the new basis of tribute has been found. ³³

(23, 2 is ambiguous: more generally, cf. Thuc. III, 82, 2, ὁ πόλεμος . . . βίαιος διδάσκαλος). When that is determined, we can evaluate the force of the tense of εἰσφερομένοις. It will make a lot of difference: if πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον means "for the war" (sc. for the Persian war), it is equivalent to πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον: if it means "for war purposes," then we have here a statement of *the new basis of tribute*, viz: it was for a standing "Defence Fund." At one of the debates Perikles presented a *Specification* (12, 5: πολυτέχνους ὑποθέσεις ἔργων διατριβὴν ἔχόντων ἐνέβαλε φέρων εἰς τὸν δῆμον): this is most easily understood as an advance specification, but might (perhaps?) be an indemnity such as Perikles is seeking in 14, 1-2.

I see nothing serious against fixing the occasion to 447 (or perhaps 448, if some months passed between the Specifications being voted and the work being begun): tribute has been reimposed πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον "for (eventual) war purposes," and Perikles is laying before a succession of Ekklesiai a series of specifications, for Parthenon, Parthenos, etc. [The opposition accept the new basis of tribute, and charge Perikles with violating it: was there some sanction which secured it, like the Democracy itself, against repeal or discussion (cf. *A.T.L.*, A9, line 33)?].—I forbear here any attempt to determine Plutarch's source: it appears to be first-rate.

³¹ The Greek is not so specific: is the reference rather to the *Reserve Decree*?

³² Demosthenes includes the πόρον ἀπόδειξις in the motion to which he is speaking in his First Philippic (Demosthenes, IV, 30).

³³ Sc. πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον in the sense of "for (eventual) war purposes." See note 30.

VII. *A.T.L.*, LISTS 7 AND 8 AND THE DECREE OF KLEINIAS (*A.T.L.*, D7)

The Reserve Decree settled item (*a*) of the Congress Decree's agenda: the Parthenon and the other *ἀναθήματα* were to be paid for out of the surplus which had accrued during the war. Item (*b*) was of less importance: perhaps no decision was reached, and each city found its own festival money. Item (*c*) was still unsolved, though both urgent and important: the Athenian fleet was expensive and performed an international service; if it were demobilized, pirates would appear and very likely the Persians would become dangerous again. Athens probably claimed full discretion in using the Reserve (cf. Plutarch, *Pericles*, 12, 3), and the fleet may have been maintained out of this in 449/8: but a routine expense of that sort could not properly or for long be met out of capital.

When was tribute reimposed? We have no evidence, except that the quota lists have not more than one blank year: this means, I think, that it was reimposed during 449/8, to be paid in 448/7 and thenceforward. To judge from the extant figures there was no fresh assessment of amounts: tribute was due in 448/7 and 447/6 on the same scale as in 450/49, *sc.* as assessed while Kimon lived. A city which had to pay tribute in March/April 447 (*sc.* at the Dionysia) might reasonably expect a year's notice in which to collect it: so the decision was probably announced not too late in 449/8. Was there a Synod of allies, the Congress of Greeks having failed? We cannot tell: it is simpler to assume a decree of the Ekklesia. If Plutarch is right in saying that Perikles appeared in the Ekklesia only *ἐκ διαλειμμάτων* (*Pericles*, 7, 7), perhaps this decree stood in some other name, and if so Krateros is less likely to have preserved it.

Naturally there was difficulty in collecting the tribute thus reimposed: we see something of this difficulty, and of how it was surmounted, in *A.T.L.*, Lists 7 and 8 and in the Decree of Kleinias. If List 5 and List 8 are the longest of all quota lists till the Archidamian war, List 7 is the shortest (these three lists, *A.T.L.*, 5, 7, and 8, are apparently in the same assessment period). List 5 has 199 lines of names: with deductions for two-line names and second payments, the total of names may be put at 175-180 (see note 17, above). In List 7, 146 names are extant or restorable, 4 lines are lost: that makes 150 names, so that 25-30 cities who paid in 450/49 did not pay in 448/7 (see note 36). Further, nine are listed in List 7 as paying late, several more made only partial payments: of those who had paid in 450/49, something like one third either defaulted in whole or part or else paid late. Among those who defaulted altogether are Miletos and Ephesos, probably Aigina, perhaps Kyzikos and Perinthos: ³⁴

³⁴ Since List 7 has four names wholly missing, even after comparison with the corresponding part of List 8, viz: 7 I 30, 7 I 32, 7 II 14-15, we cannot be dead sure exactly which cities defaulted totally. On a very detailed analysis, Meritt (*D.A.T.*, p. 85) estimates the total collection represented by List 7 as about 280 talents.

Lampsakos paid less than one per cent: other part defaulters are Abdera, Byzantion, Thasos, perhaps Ainos. [The normal tributes of these ten cities are over a quarter of the whole.] In List 8 several of these arrears are picked up.³⁵ This remarkable list must first be divided into A (which is a repeat, in more or less the same order, of the 150 names of List 7) and B (which is an appendix, containing cities which had not paid at all in List 7, and arrears from cities which had paid partially): B must then be subdivided.

An analysis follows:³⁶

A: lines 4-73 in both the two columns contain 137 of the names of List 7: the remaining 13 are lost, but probably stood in I 74-86. For the detail of the arrangement of A, see *A.T.L.*, Vol. I, p. 176. [The quotas are not always the same as in List 7: part defaulters of 448/7 did not default equally in 447/6.]

B: of this appendix of 67 lines too much is lost for certainty about its disposition. We can distinguish at least two categories:

(a) partial defaulters from List 7 (most of I 90-107 and II 100-102): these are evidently arrears from 448/7.

(b) total defaulters from List 7 (I 108-113 and II 103-107).

The payments in category (b) are complete payments, and I suggest that they, like (a), are arrears from 448/7: if so, we must assume that the same names stood somewhere earlier to denote their payment for 447/6: *sc.*

(c) total defaulters from List 7, recorded as paying for 447/6. I suggest these stood in II 74-86.

(d) a possible fourth category is partial payments complementary [not, as (a), to List 7, but] to partial payments in A. The only extant instance, not indeed certain, is Kos. Kos was evidently assessed at 5 talents but was only prepared to pay 3 talents 3360 drachmas. She does this in List 5, and the balance was extracted in a second payment. She does so again in Lists 7 and 8, and the balance was extracted in driblets (8 I 92, 8 II 102). It is impossible to determine whether either or both of these are arrears from 448/7 or 447/6. I suspect that 8 II 108-109 are also Koan payments.

A.T.L., List 8, then, as I conceive it, records *first* the payments for 447/6 of those cities who had paid in 448/7 (I 4-86, II 4-73): *secondly*, the payments for 447/6 of certain cities who had not paid in 448/7 (II 74-86?): *thirdly*, partial payments complementary to partial payments in 448/7 (I 87-107, II 87-102: among these there

³⁵ See *A.T.L.*, Vol. I, Register, *s.vv.* Ἀβδηρίται, Βυζάντιοι, Θάσιοι, Κῶοι, Λαμψακηνοί, Σαναίοι, Σιγείης.

³⁶ In this analysis, to save repeated qualification, I use "448/7" and "447/6" for the years of *A.T.L.*, Lists 7 and 8 respectively. The reader who believes these years should be 449/8 and 448/7 respectively can make the necessary adjustments.

may be some of category [d] above): *fourthly*, total defaulters from 448/7, paying their arrears for that year (I 108-113, II 103-107, 111-112?). This would allow 163 names for first payments in List 8. In List 9 there were 156, so the sequence is: 150 in List 7, 163? in List 8, 156 in List 9. Together with its huge recovery of arrears, List 8 reveals a very remarkable effort: it was due, I believe, to the stringent provisions (against arrears and default) of the Decree of Kleinias. *A.T.L.*, List 7 was before that decree, and *A.T.L.*, List 8 was after it.³⁷

Money should come from folks who are willing to pay: such was Pindar's dry comment.³⁸ As he saw the matter, in Athens (which he had once admired) Athena was now defied by the brutal giant. Upon the son of Pindar's friend, upon Thucydides the son of Melesias, devolved the duty of protest.

VIII. KIMON AND THUCYDIDES, AND THE THIRTY-YEAR PEACE

The crisis of the alliance came with Kimon's death. Whilst Kimon lived, even during his ostracism, the war against Persia was waged vigorously. Perikles' rise to power in the late 'sixties led to Kimon's eclipse and ostracism, and the war against Peloponnese during the 'fifties (on which no doubt some of the money paid *πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον* was spent) was full of dangerous precedent.³⁹ But so long as Kimon lived, the original *πρόσχημα* by which tribute had been justified was not publicly questioned:

³⁷ For particulars of this Decree, see note 10. The editors date it to 448/7, "about the time of the Dionysiac festival of that year" (p. 9). The opening clause provides that the Boule and certain specified officers shall make it their business that the phoros be collected *each year*, *κατὰ το εἴτος ἑκαστον*: and I see no way of determining how much of what follows (including the ekklesia which shall be summoned *μετὰ Διο[νυσια]*) is procedure for the current year as well as for future years. The mention of the incoming Boule in line 57 points to a date late in the Attic year; it is likely, too, that the decree was provoked by the poor payments of 448/7 which would become most obvious when the Dionysia was past. If *το περυσ[ινο]* (*sc. φоро*) in line 73 concerns current procedure, it anticipates the new year since no phoros had been due in 449/8. Perhaps steps like those specified in lines 18-28 were actually taken immediately after the Dionysia of 447, and this decree then systematized the whole procedure.

³⁸ *Pythian* VIII, 13-14: *κέρδος δὲ φίλτατον ἐκόντος εἴ τις ἐκ δόμων φέροι*. The poem was written in the summer of 446 for an Aiginetan. I have discussed its historical bearing in *J.H.S.*, LII, 1932, pp. 214 ff., and (in collaboration with Bowra) in *Pindar, Pythian Odes* (Nonesuch Press, 1928), pp. 143 ff. [On p. 144, line 3, "year" is a misprint for "years."]—"Porphyrion defies Athena": Athena is not named (*τὰν* in line 12 is *Hasychia*), but see *J.H.S.*, *loc. cit.*, p. 215 (top) and *ibid.*, note 40.

³⁹ I do not wish to deny that before 450 Athens' position as Hegemon had changed profoundly. For the kind of dangerous precedent, see Plutarch, *Cimon*, 18, 1, cited in note 23. The process of *δούλωσις* (= loss of autonomy: concretely, a resident governor with garrison; cf. Isokrates, VIII, 16: *τοὺς Ἕλληνας αὐτονόμους εἶναι καὶ τὰς φρουρὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων πόλεων ἐξίέναι*) was no doubt nearly complete when Kimon died: Kleinias' decree speaks of the "archontes in the cities" as if they were the common thing. Plutarch's account of the allies in *Cimon*, 11, 3, *ἐλάβον ἀντὶ συμμάχων ὑποτελεῖς καὶ δοῦλοι γεγονότες*, refers to Kimon's lifetime, and if sufficient weight is allowed to *ἐλαβον*, it is no doubt true. [Meiggs in *J.H.S.*, LXIII, p. 32 plausibly dates a group of cleruchies to the late summer of 450, pretty certainly before Kimon's death.]

we do not hear that the status of the allies was a matter of controversy between the two men;⁴⁰ and when Kimon went to Cyprus in 450, he could reasonably look forward to many years of activity against Persia. When he fell ill and died, Perikles broke abruptly with his traditions: the war was suddenly ended, the allies found they had lost a friend and got a master. For a short time Perikles (whether sincerely or not is hard to say) sought a settlement by consent: the Congress Decree and (as I believe) the hesitation in claiming tribute in peacetime, are the symptoms. When Sparta refused to trust him, he changed his tone: the symptoms are the Reserve Decree, the Monetary Decree (*A.T.L.*, T69 = *I.G.*, XII, Suppl., pp. 215-217), the Decree of Kleinias. The cause of the allies devolves on Kimon's political heir, his brother-in-law Thucydides. He has nothing like Kimon's prestige, and against him Perikles forced, successfully, that issue which he had not ventured to force whilst Kimon lived.

Sparta did not insist on autonomy for Athens' allies in the Thirty-Year Peace (Thuc. I, 144, 2): the autonomy of Aigina was indeed guaranteed (I, 67, 2), but her case is in many respects parallel to that of the cities (Argilos, etc.) for whom it was stipulated in the Peace of Nikias, of 421, *φερούσας τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐπ' Ἀριστείδου αὐτονόμους εἶναι* (Thuc. V, 18, 5). Other cities (Skione, etc.), though they had expected Spartan support, were left in 421 to Athens' unconditional discretion: *Ἀθηναίους βουλευέσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων ὅτι ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς* (*ibid.*, 18, 8): in 446/5 I conceive this was the fate of Euboia. In the treaty of 421, the rest of the empire is casually dumped into this latter class (*καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων ut supra*): in 446/5 I would think that of this whole class nothing was said; what had become the practice was allowed to pass *sub silentio*. What that practice was is fairly clear. The cities had originally been autonomous and had paid tribute for war against Persia: both principles had evidently lapsed (for the former, see note 39). But the loss of autonomy cannot have been specifically allowed, since in 432 the allies' status in this respect is evidently a matter of interpretation. The Spartans could argue that it had not lapsed and Athens must give them autonomy (Thuc. I, 139, 3), Perikles can retort that it had lapsed *de facto* before the Peace was made (I, 144, 2) and Sparta had not specified its retention.⁴¹

H. T. WADE-GERY

OXFORD UNIVERSITY

⁴⁰ From this, Gomme draws the conclusion that Kimon had accepted Perikles' view. The fact is, surely, that Perikles never explicitly challenged Kimon's, until Kimon was dead. Of course both men liked to see Athens powerful: Kimon hoped it could be done without damage to anybody, except the King and the King's friends: Perikles believed (or came to believe) that it could not.

⁴¹ If Aigina had her autonomy stipulated *nominatim* in 446/5 (and I think she had) Perikles' contention has a good deal of colour. The explicit recognition of Athens' discretion in the treaty of 421 (and especially the words *καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων*: Thuc. V, 18, 8) would put an end to such ambiguity.