The
United States
and
Greece
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The United States and Greece

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The initiation of American Aid to Greece in the summer of 1947 marked a precedent-shattering change in the foreign policy of the United States. After more than a century of deliberate care to avoid entanglement in political questions beyond the Atlantic the United States now found herself not only actively involved in a European problem, but deeply entangled in the internal affairs of a small Balkan state. For better or for worse our power and prestige were committed to the support of a regime in a little country nearly 5,000 miles away from our own shores. This was not an enterprise to be undertaken lightly, nor was our departure from all precedents of the past to be shrugged aside as a matter of little moment. Indeed it was a development of profound significance and of real concern to every American citizen, and the meaning of it should be clearly understood.

The debate in the House of Representatives and in the Senate during the consideration and enactment of the bill, revealed the serious situation faced by our government. In President Truman's message to the Congress asking authorization for the program and the grant of a large sum of money, the sober import of the commitment was plainly stressed, and in the supporting statements of Secretary of State Marshall the stern reality of the crisis was frankly explained. The proceedings in both Houses of Congress made it manifest that the underlying character of the problem was fully comprehended. The United States, as a nation, has grown up, and has become not only one of the great countries of the world, but one of the greatest -- if not the greatest -- of the world powers today. In our change of policy we have openly recognized that with that leading position goes a corresponding responsibility; and in a non-partisan action endorsed
by our two political parties we have officially accepted the responsibility.

From the beginning it was made clear in all the proceedings that our purpose in coming to the assistance of Greece at this juncture was to enable that country to maintain its territorial integrity and its independence and to rehabilitate its ruined economy so that it might resume its place as a self-sustaining member of the free nations of the world. It was not to promote any imperialistic ambitions or desires for territorial aggrandizement of our own. But our action was by no means a purely altruistic gesture to help an unfortunate foreign people in distress. It was a definite notice to the other nations of the world that we believe our own vital interests are bound up with the situation in Greece, and that we are determined to defend our own society of government and to safeguard the way of life in which we have faith and which, we realize, is being threatened by international forces eager to destroy it. The debate in Congress witnessed both American preference for action in the framework of the United Nations and our fears that that organization had not yet grown to the full stature which would permit rapid and effective action. The assistance act specifically provides that, if the Security Council or the General Assembly finds that action taken by the United Nations makes continuance of American aid unnecessary or undesirable, the President is directed to withdraw our assistance, in whole or in part.
It has become crystal clear that Greece is the object of pressure and attack by international communist totalitarianism which is seeking to expand its domination step by step, first over Europe and then over the world. As the strongest capitalist power, the United States is the ultimate object of attack; and in aiding Greece to preserve her liberty it is our own freedom, too, that we are defending. It is high time for the democracies -- and the term is used here in the normal well understood western sense, and not in that so widely and constantly exploited by current communist propaganda -- to join together in a common front against a ruthless foe, well trained in applying the maxim divide et impera. The democracies are still strong and still able by united efforts to hold their lines. But their
maximum strength can be developed only through unity, and their
greatest danger lies in separation and division. Unless a firm con-
certed stand can be taken, in which the United States must play a chief
role, those states in the most exposed positions are in serious danger
of being cut off and swallowed up, one by one.

Americans not familiar with developments on the southeastern
European scene might well wonder why it has fallen to the lot of
Greece to become the bone of contention between the two powerful rival
world forces of communist totalitarianism and democracy. A glance at
the map will reveal at once the supreme strategic importance of Greece’s
situation, so far as the Eastern Mediterranean is concerned. It is
not the unproductive impoverished little land of Hellas itself that is
at stake. With its barren rocks and mountains, its lack of almost all
the most essential natural resources, its meagre quota of arable agricul-
tural land — pitifully inadequate to make the country self-
sustaining — Greece for its own sake offers little incentive to
aggression. The prize is a much greater one; in its immediate aspect
it is the domination of the entire Near East with its immensely rich
potentialities: its key position athwart the main channel of shipping
and commerce between the East and the West, its fabulously prolific
sources of oil, its indispensable facilities for the development and
control of world-wide aviation routes.

If the Soviet-directed totalitarian bloc made itself the arbiter
of Greece’s destiny and established sufficient air bases, it could
close off the Western from the Eastern Mediterranean, could cut a
main artery of world communication and the life-line of the British
Commonwealth of Nations, regulate all traffic to and from the Black
Sea, and could impose its will on the political and economic life of all Near Eastern peoples. But this would be only the first step in a much larger plan. Turkey, caught in the grip of powerful pincers on the west and east might next be forced to yield, and the countries of the Near East would soon follow into the Soviet communist orbit.

A similar pincers operation could be developed against the west; Italy might first be pinched off and the turn of Western Europe would inevitably come. There can be no doubt that the seed of internal troubles has been carefully sown in all these threatened countries, and that domestic fifth columnists with fanatical zeal are everywhere preparing in every way to assist in the spread and establishment of international communism.

Western democracy is clearly facing a stern struggle for survival. The trial of strength has not yet been lost, and there is no need that it should be. Indeed the potential might of the democratic nations, if it can be united, coordinated and wisely directed, is still far greater than that of the opposing forces. But we must join together with a clear understanding of the issue at stake. This does not mean that another world war, more destructive than any that has preceded, is imminent and inevitable. Irresolution and lack of unity on the part of the democracies might easily incite vigorous and aggressive communist action and might lead to a rupture. But a resolute stand now may head it off and may convince those who control international totalitarianism that they would be imprudent to risk all in an open conflict at this time. It must be remembered, however, that militant communism has never yet made a real peace with capitalism, democracy, or socialism; if forced to agree to a truce, it has merely bided its time, waiting for an opportunity to renew the conflict.
Meanwhile all the resources of a highly trained and skilled propaganda organization have been unleashed against Greece; and a small internal minority, well instructed in subversive activities and sabotage, encouraged and supported from the neighboring Soviet satellite states, is carrying on a savage and ruthless civil war against law and order and against the elected and legally constituted government of the country. A study of the situation in Greece should therefore be illuminating in revealing the tactics and the methods now being used in the relentless fight of totalitarian communism against democracy; and it should make clear the character of the problems confronting us.

To a great extent the conditions now prevailing in Greece—political, economic, and social—are the heritage of history. Some have roots going back to events of a generation and more ago; others stem from the time of World War II and the German occupation. Still others spring in some measure from the geographical environment and from various facets of Greek character and temperament. Without some knowledge of these contributory factors a full understanding of the situation in Greece today is difficult, if not impossible. In the following pages, consequently, considerable space has been given to a presentation of the background, beginning with a brief description of the country and an account of the human element. Chapters 3 to 7 offer a historical sketch which deals in increasing detail with more recent times, especially with the years immediately before, during, and after World War II.
PART ONE

THE HORIZONS OF GREECE
Greece today, with an area of almost 52,000 square miles, is only slightly larger than the state of New York; and the total population of between 7,500,000 and 8,000,000 is little more than that of New York City. Like the Empire State in another respect, Greece has a long northern border and tapers sharply to the southward; forming the extremity of the Balkan peninsula, it ends in five finger-like tips which jut out into the Mediterranean. It lies between 20° and 26° east longitude and 36° and 42° north latitude, that is to say, within an area measuring some 400 miles from east to west and nearly 400 miles from north to south, not including all the islands. Bordered on the north by the mountainous mass of the Balkans, and touching from east to west Turkey, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania, Greece is bounded on the other three sides by water, the Aegean Sea on the east and south, the Ionian Sea on the west. In all three directions there are numerous islands, the most important being the Ionian group off the west coast, Crete and the Cyclades to the south and southeast, the Sporades and the Aegean Islands to the northeast and east, and not least the Dodecanese, a cluster of twelve islands centered about Rhodes, and for the most part within sight of the southwestern shores of Asia Minor.

The mainland itself is cut by deep gulfs and bays, the largest being the Gulf of Corinth which extends from west to east separating central Greece from the southern peninsula called the Peloponnesus. At its northeastern corner the latter is connected with the mainland only by the Isthmus of Corinth, a narrow strip of land less than four miles wide through which a small ship canal was opened in 1893. No part of the country is much more than 50 or 60 miles distant from salt water. It is only natural, therefore, that the sea has always exercised a profound influence on Greek life and economy, and has brought
into being, especially on the islands, a sturdy strain of enterprising mariners.

A Greek folk tradition says that when God created the world, He carefully sifted the earth, allotted the good soil to other regions, and then made Greece out of the rocks and the stones that remained in the sieve. It is indeed a rugged, mountainous country, with few fertile plains and valleys of any considerable size. Less than one-fifth of the total land area can be cultivated at all, and much of that is good for little more than marginal production. The mountains are largely bare, but many still retain on their northern side some remnants of the pine and fir forests that once in the remote past covered them.

In general the mountains run from northwest to southeast. A glance at a contour map shows several irregular, roughly parallel ranges, fairly continuous, though interrupted occasionally by deep gaps. The Gulf of Corinth, for example, is one such gap; it cuts through the western ranges from west to east, but south of it their lines reappear in the Peloponnese, persisting until they finally end in bold projecting headlands, the best known of which are Capes Malea and Matapan. An eastern chain forms the backbone of the long island of Euboea, and its southeasterly continuation may be traced through a series of other islands—Andros, Tinos, Mykonos, Naxos, and others.

Here and there these ranges rise into fairly lofty peaks, many of which are noted in Greek tradition and mythology. The principal western chain, north of the Gulf of Corinth, is called the Pindus, the wildest and most rugged region of Greece today. It was here in the snowy winter of 1940-41 that the Greek army heroically stopped and hurled back Italian aggression. In a more central position, branching away from the Pindus range, are the high summits of Korax, Ghiona (8,240 feet), and Parnassus (8,040 feet), with Helicon to the east. The main easterly range raises its highest peak in Mt. Olympus
(9,600 feet) which stands between Macedonia and Thessaly; and it continues southeastward in Mounts Osse (6,398 feet), and Pelion (5,350 feet), and in the rocky spine of Euboea. Northern Peloponnese lifts three lofty heads in Cyllene (7,790 feet), the Arcadian peaks (7,725 feet), and Erymanthus (7,300 feet), while the long five-pointed ridge of Taygetus (7,905 feet) stretches far southward to the rocky promontory of Matapan. The mountain chains appear again in Crete, where the summits of the Levka Ore (7,905 feet), Ida, the birthplace of Zeus (8,195 feet), and Dikte (7,170 feet) soar in the western, central, and eastern parts of the island.

In the depressions between ranges lie many fertile valleys, for the most part small and narrow. The only broad plains are in Macedonia, where marshes have been drained along the Strymon River and the lower course of the Verder; and in Thessaly -- formerly the breadbasket of Greece -- where an old lake bed is rich in alluvial soil. A similar but much less extensive lake bed is now under cultivation in the Copaic Basin in Boetia; and northwestern Peloponnese, in the province of Elia, also contains a fairly broad plain.

Elsewhere, agriculture is for the most part carried on with patient hand labor in narrow river bottoms, beside seasonal streams, and on countless stone-walled terraces that untold years of toil have built ever higher and higher up the steep hillsides and mountain slopes. (Those who sometimes lightly call the Greeks indolent might do well to make a tour of exploration about the country and to consider the immense long-sustained effort and industry that have gone into these unpretentious and scantly-requiting works.)

Greece possesses few rivers that maintain a substantial flow during the long dry summers, and none that is really navigable. The more important streams in Thrace and Macedonia, beginning from the east, are the Evros (now called Maritsa), forming the frontier with Turkey, and noted for its sturgeon
and caviar; the Nestos (now called Mesta) and the Strymon (Struma), both of
which rise in Bulgaria; the Axios (Vardar), which comes down from Yugoslavia;
and the Haliacmon (Vistritsa), descending from the eastern slopes of the Pindus.
In Thessaly is the Peneios (Salamvria), which flows out to the sea through the
Vale of Tempe, famed in poetry. From the highlands of Eurytania the Spercheios
descends to empty into the Gulf of Aigio not far from the ancient Thermopylae.
In northwestern Greece is the Acheloös (Aspropotamos), which reaches the Ionian
Sea just outside the entrance to the Gulf of Corinth. Formed by the con-
fluence of several tributaries that rise on the western slopes of the Pindus,
this may someday become the most important river in Greece; for detailed
studies made shortly before the outbreak of World War II indicated that it is
a potential source of water power sufficient to supply a large part of the
country with electricity for industry, transportation, light, and heat. Two
small streams in the Peloponnesus also deserve to be recorded here; the
Alpheios (Rouphias), which emerges into the Ionian Sea not far from Olympia;
and the Eurotas (Iri), which runs southeastward, draining the valley of Sparta,
to empty into the Laconian Gulf.

In Greece there are few lakes of any consequence. The most important are
the Prespa Lakes, Ostrovo, and Kastoria in western Macedonia; while in the
rest of the country Trichonis (now called the Lake of Aigrinion) in Aetolia
is almost the only one that is worthy of special mention.

The Isles of Greece merit much more than the passing attention that can
be given them here. Each is a little realm unto itself, with its own peculiar
and characteristic way of life, and each has much of interest to offer. Count-
less books have been written about them, singly and collectively, from the time
of the early travelers some centuries ago to our own day. Here there is space
for only the briefest mention of some of the most important among many (there
are more than 2,000 in all told).
The ancient Kérkyra (Corcyra), now called Corfú (278 square miles), is the largest of the Ionian group, rich in olive orchards and vineyards and endowed with considerable rainfall and a mild climate which makes it a pleasant winter resort. It is commonly believed that this was Scheria, home of the Phaeacians mentioned in Homer’s Odyssey. Farther southeastward and close to the mainland, lies Levkăs, or Santa Maura (111 square miles), whose precipitous headland, Cape Doukato, also known as Sappho’s leap, one rounds in passing on to little Ithaca (36 square miles), traditional home of Odysseus, and the subject of long controversy among Homeric scholars. Outside Ithaca, Cephalonia (266 square miles) raises its bare lofty peaks from which one can see in the distance toward the southeast the relatively low-lying Zakynthos, or Zante (152 square miles), largely covered by luxuriant vegetation.

Lying directly athwart the shortest line from Greece to Egypt is Crete, 160 miles long, largest of the Greek islands (3,330 square miles). Its backbone is formed by high treeless mountains, below which are many fertile valleys and coastal plains, for the most part given up to vineyards and olive culture. Here has been nurtured for centuries a passionate love of liberty which time and again roused the Cretan people to struggle for independence against Venetian and Turk, and which in modern times has inspired some of the best fighting units in the Greek army.

To the north of Crete is spread an extensive group of small islands, the Cyclades, ranged roughly in a circle about Syra which formerly, as the modern successor of Dalos, was a prosperous center of shipping and commerce. It has now been almost completely superseded except for local traffic by the port of Piraeus. It is interesting to note that nearly all the Cyclades, as well as most of the other Greek islands, bear names of pre-Hellenic character; this must mean that they were already familiar landmarks to mariners before the Greeks descended into the peninsula.
Continuing northward, one comes to Euboea (1,380 square miles), with its chain of rugged mountains. It stretches for almost 100 miles alongside the mainland from which it is separated by a sound that narrows at one point to a Strait barely wide enough for the passage of coasting steamers. A modern drawbridge carries a road and railway across the channel to the small city of Chalcis.

Farther northeastward are the northern Sporades, for the most part small, the best known being Skyros, where the tomb of the poet Rupert Brooke has become a pilgrim's shrine. Close to the Macedonian and Thracean coasts, and both famous in Greek history, lie wooded Thasos, home of a noted cult of Dionysus, and twin-peaked Samothrace, with its well-known sanctuary of the Kabeiroi. Not far to the south is the relatively low-lying and rather bare island of Lemnos, with its magnificent harbor of Moudros in which the Allied fleet was based during the operations against Gallipoli and the Dardanelles in World War I.

Along the shores of Asia Minor are three fairly large and wealthy islands, Lesbos, or Mitylene (674 square miles), Chios (319 square miles), and Samos (170 square miles), all noted for their wines and olives and other fruits, and intimately connected with many important events in ancient and modern Greek history.

Farther south is the Dodecanesian group which was finally awarded to Greece in 1947 after 34 years of Italian and two of military occupation. The most important is Rhodes, the island of roses (545 square miles), rich in ancient and medieval associations. It still retains interesting monuments from the time of the Fourth Crusade when it became the capital of the Knights of St. John of Rhodes; but in its natural beauties it has strong claims in its own right to the attention of tourists. Among other members of the group is Cos (11 square miles), site of a famous sanctuary of Asklepios, and home
of the celebrated physician, the father of medicine, Hippocrates, whose oath has been adopted as a basic article of conduct by the medical profession.

Today, another interesting island is Syros (24 square miles), well-known for its sponge fishers and its boat builders, many of whom have migrated to the United States and now live at Tarpon Springs, Florida. One of the smallest islands of the group is Patmos (13 square miles), venerated for its old monastery and as the place where tradition says St. John wrote the book of Revelation.

From earliest times in Greece the inhospitable mountain ranges reared themselves as natural barriers to communication and union, dividing the country into many small and semi-isolated districts. In the restricted valleys, where some cultivation was possible, communities formed themselves, largely self-sustaining, self-governing, and self-centered. The numerous islands, too, widely spaced or separated one from another by treacherous straits and frequently turbulent waters, likewise encouraged a detached and self-differentiated manner of life. Such were the geographical factors that gave rise to the ancient Greek city-states, with its domain most commonly limited to its own immediate vicinity. Each fiercely jealous of its neighbors, resentful of the encroachments on its own scanty preserve, but eager to seize adjoining territory when occasion offered, these city-states were often at war with one another, and long maintained their isolationism, their local traditions and customs, and even their own dialectal forms of speech.

Although the building of roads and the general improvement of communication have greatly reduced the effectiveness of these natural barriers, the same divisive conditions have to a certain extent survived down to modern times; and they are reflected in some facets of Greek character today. For the Greek, wherever he may happen to live, has a special and enduring attachment to his own "patrida," the place of his or his family's origin; and he still retains in some degree traces of the particular dialect he learned in his youth and of his native
customs and traditions. Moreover, he cherishes most fondly the strong individualism and sense of independence implanted in his nature through generations of living in such character-forming surroundings.

Climate, too, as well as environment, has always played an important part in influencing the life and perhaps also in fostering division of the Greek people. In the northern provinces, especially in the high mountainous districts, where toil and hardships are the common lot, rigorous winters prevail, snow and cold linger long, and the flora is mainly that of continental Europe. Farther south on the largely treeless mountains, where rocks are bare and water

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often scarce and precious, men have had to adapt themselves to equally harsh conditions of existence and to learn self-reliance. In the southern parts of the country, however, especially along the shores of the Ionian Sea and the Aegean and on the islands, the Mediterranean sun shines warm, and sub-tropical vegetation flourishes wherever natural springs or modern irrigation provide the necessary water. Here winters are relatively mild, summers long and hot, and the afternoon siesta moderates the pace of daily life. But humidity is low, the air is dry, and refreshing breezes, almost with clock-like regularity, blow in from the sea to keep the summer heat from becoming enervating.

Greek Economy

... on the economic side Greece is one of the poorest countries of Europe. Its natural resources are few, and those that do exist have not been well exploited. No oil has yet been struck, and almost all fuel must be imported from abroad. Here and there lignite of a poor quality is obtained, the best variety coming from a mountainous district of western Macedonia. Except on a small local scale, water power has not been harnessed, though large developments are believed to be feasible along the Achelous river in northwestern Greece and at two or three places in Macedonia. Iron ore of a relatively low grade has been mined in various places on the mainland and in the islands; but because of lack of fuel and other facilities it has to be sent abroad for smelting. Bauxite, chromium, and manganese are dealt with in the same way. A reworking of the refuse from the ancient silver mines at Laurium has yielded modern enterprise some tin and lead. Enery is dug out in small quantities on the island of Naxos, and a natural cement comes from Thera. Marble is present in abundance in many regions, of especially good quality in Attica and on the islands of Paros and Naxos. Mount Pentelicum, not far from Athens, is almost a solid mountain of marble, from which ancient and modern workers have extracted enormous quantities of material. Marble is one of the standard building
materials in Greece, cheaper than wood; marble thresholds and windowills are therefore commonly used, not only in public edifices, but also in private houses—which are usually constructed of stone. In country villages, house and courtyard walls are frequently built of crude brick which the owner himself can make from clay probably taken from his backyard. Most of the Greek mountains have been burned time and again by destructive forest fires, and the supply of timber is wholly inadequate to the country's need. Charcoal burners take their toll of what is left, and new growth on the mountainsides is considerably ravaged and stunted by herds of goats. Lumber must consequently be imported from outside the country and the price range is high.

In view of this general shortage of basic resources, it is not surprising that Greece has not been industrialized on a large scale. Heavy industry is nonexistent. Machines and tools of most kinds and heavy manufactured goods must be procured from abroad with resultant inroads on the foreign exchange available. Before World War II, light industry had established a good foothold, and further development in this direction is possible and likely. Cement, soap, fertilizers, alcohol (formerly nearly all made from surplus production of currants), preserved fruits and vegetables, explosives, glass, roof-tiles, and pottery have been manufactured in increasing quantities. Textile mills had made a good beginning, and paper mills had been started in Ruboes and at Aigion. But production in all these lines (except for cement) still fell short of meeting domestic requirements.

Greece is, therefore, essentially an agricultural country. Some 60% of the population devotes itself to farming and stock-raising, all carried out on a modest scale and to a great extent by hand, without modern mechanical equipment. Individual landholdings are infinitesimal compared with standards in America: the average farm in Greece consists of less than ten acres, most being much smaller (1 to 2 acres), few larger. Nor does the land lie all in
one piece: [They] usually comprises several diminutive fields and patches widely separated and scattered in different directions, and each good only for some specialized crop; wheat, barley, olives, currants, grapes, and the like.

Farm houses consequently seldom stand isolated in the country, each in the midst of its own holding; following the ancient custom which arose from considerations of security, the people most commonly live in compact villages or communities, whence they trudge out on foot at dawn to the particular field which needs attention. In large parts of the country, plowing and sowing, harvesting and threshing are still done in the old time-honored way: Wooden plows drawn by oxen or donkeys are pushed or pulled by hand. Wheat in many areas is cut with hand-sickles. Tied-up into sheaves, it is then carried to circular stone-paved threshing floors at the edge of a village, where the grain is trodden out under the hoofs of horses or cattle which drag a flint-studded wooden sledge behind them, or it may be beaten out by mills wielded by men or women. In either case it is subsequently laboriously winnowed. In some of the more progressive villages—community-owned motorized threshing machines have now been introduced; but except in a few large plains, where the ground is favorable, modern mechanized equipment is unsuitable for general employment, since fields are usually too small to permit maneuvering and often occupy steeply sloping hillsides overlaid with stones or studded with outcrops of rock. Few individuals by themselves could in any event afford to purchase expensive imported farm machinery which Americans take as a matter of course.

Many efforts have recently been made and much can no doubt still be done to improve farming methods in Greece and to increase the production of food. In the past the country has rarely been able to raise more that one half of the wheat required for domestic consumption. A great rise in wheat production was affected from some 50% to about 75% of requirements—during the late
1930's. It was almost wholly brought about by extensive projects for drainage, flood control, and land reclamation carried out largely by American engineering firms, The Foundation Company of New York and the Monks-Ulen Company, in the valleys of the Vardar and the Struma in Macedonia. There are possibilities of still further development in this direction; but the area of reclaimable land is limited, and for an enlarged and growing population it is unlikely that the future will see the gap between production and need wholly covered. To meet this deficit in the pre-war years, certain ready-money export crops were useful. The most important was cigarette tobacco -- especially the so-called Turkish variety produced in Macedonia and Thrace -- which was exported in substantial quantities to the United States, Great Britain, and in the later 1930's more particularly to Germany. Grown partly on marginal lands, which could have yielded little wheat, it brought in an annual revenue appreciably greater than could have been obtained by sowing the same ground to cereals.

The United States took the best and most expensive quality, accounting not only for a substantial revenue, but bringing into the country free foreign exchange in the form of dollars. This American contribution was critical in Greece's financial situation, second in importance only to the remittances from emigrants. Germany, on the other hand took the bulk of the residue of inferior and less expensive qualities; but she paid for it under a barter agreement with a restricted credit in Berlin which could be used only for goods purchased from Germany -- largely outmoded war material remaining from World War I. In this way Germany obtained virtual control of Greek national economy, while the "free" dollars from the United States helped to keep the Greek people alive.

Currants from northern and western Peloponnesus constituted another important item of export, going mainly to Great Britain and the Dominions. Shipments to the United States practically ceased some years ago when a pro-
tective tariff was imposed by Congress to favor California currant growers. The export of olives and olive oil, of figs, and of hides of sheep and goats has also produced a valuable foreign credit balance. Much wine was formerly shipped abroad, especially to France and Italy, but that source of foreign money was largely cut off when the French in 1930, in a concession favoring producers in French Morocco, imposed an embargo on imports of Greek wine.

In addition to these exportable goods, Greece also produces a considerable amount of barley (largely used for hay), Indian corn or maize, and other cereals, vegetables, and a profusion of fruits for home consumption, some silk and cotton, as well as a good many sheep and goats (though not enough to satisfy domestic demands), together with butter and cheese.

Two other sources of income from abroad must be mentioned in any survey of Greece's economic status. One, of minor significance, was derived from the large merchant fleet which has carried the Greek flag, and others, to all the seas. The other, of much greater importance, comes from the substantial remittances sent to their relatives at home by the Greeks who have emigrated to foreign lands, especially to the United States. In normal years preceding World War II the amount of such remittances often exceeded twenty-five million dollars annually.

Greek Communications

Though predominantly an agricultural country, Greece has several cities, including one of considerable size. The largest by far is Athens, the capital, which constitutes the administrative, business, and banking center of the state. In and about Athens are concentrated perhaps one half of all the nation's light industries, and from it radiate the principal lines of transportation. A reasonably good airport at Hassani, only some twenty minutes from the heart of the city, is used by eight or more foreign airlines which provide excellent communications with Europe, Africa and Asia. An American company offers eight
through flights a week in each direction between Greece and the United States. Under normal conditions Greek domestic airlines provide services to Salonica, Yannina, and some of the more important islands. The most recent census -- of 1940 -- records a population of 650,000 for Athens and 330,000 for its port Piraeus. In 1947 it was estimated that the metropolitan district, comprising Athens, Piraeus, and a widespread suburban area, counted some 1,500,000 inhabitants. Since the war and liberation the population has been greatly swelled by a steady influx of refugees from the rural areas where conditions of security and order have left much to be desired.

The second city in the Kingdom is Salonica, the principal port and distributing center for Central and Western Macedonia. In 1940 its population was some 235,000; but in 1947 it was believed to be nearly double that number. Salonica, with a fairly extensive concentration of light industries, contains a rather large laboring element, and has sometimes been the scene of labor troubles and disturbances. It was here at at Cavalla, the port and tobacco mart of Eastern Macedonia, that communism first gained a foothold in Greece.

Other cities that deserve mention are Volos, the chief port of Thessaly; Patras in northwestern Peloponnesus, an export center for currants; Canea and Candia (or Heraklion) in Crete; and Mitylene on the island of the same name, one of the principal shipping points for olives and olive oil.

Internal communications in Greece by steamship, railway, and road, which even before the war left something to be desired in equipment, organization, and operation, were of course completely disrupted by the war and German occupation, and most of the equipment was destroyed. Though much has been done to rehabilitate them since liberation day, services have not yet been adequately restored.

Piraeus, which had become one of the busiest ports in the Mediterranean, surpassing almost all others in tonnage, is the hub of Greek domestic shipping.
From this harbor up to 1939 lines radiated in all directions, providing under
cabotage regulations frequent services to all the principal islands and coastal
ports. The ships employed were for the most part small, generally ranging from
200 to 1,500 tons; and many were badly fitted out and very antiquated, to say
the least, second-hand vessels which had already served a lifetime in the
Channel, the Irish and the North Seas, or elsewhere. Nevertheless they sufficed,
through a very special Greek ability, not to say genius, in the management of
shipping, to maintain all essential communications with fairly regular
schedules. Since World War I a steady progress had been noted in the replace-
ment of old and superannuated steamers with more modern and seaworthy ships
and in the improvement of the services offered. All this achievement was lost
during the recent war and virtually all of the ships themselves were sunk; but
with characteristic initiative and enterprise the Greek shipowners have started
again, almost from scratch, to reconstruct their fleets and to re-establish
their shipping lines. Completion of this program will require some years; in the
meantime the principal services have been at least partially and haltingly re-
sumed under government operation, with such steamships as have become available,
supplemented by motor-driven caiques and sailing vessels.

The Greek State Railway, of standard gauge, with a total mileage of
1,076, comprises a main line running from Piraeus and Athens, on the south, to
Salonica, whence it continues on to Ghevgeli at the Yugoslav border. It has
two principal branches, one of which proceeds northwestward from Salonica to
Florina and Monastir, or Vitalj, in Yugoslavia. The other extends eastward
through eastern Macedonia and Thrace to Alexandroupolis, formerly called
Dedeagatch; here it joins a French-owned railway which runs on to Python,
with connections for Istanbul. Before 1939 a daily express with sleeping
cars made the journey from Athens to Paris in 60 hours. Through sleepers also
provided comfortable services to Vienna, Prague, Berlin, and Istanbul. During the war many bridges and tunnels on the main line were blown up. The engineering problem of reconstruction proved to be a difficult and costly one, requiring considerable time, it involved the relocation of the track through the Othrys mountains around some of the destroyed tunnels. This work has not yet been finished; but passenger and freight services from Athens to Bralo, a distance of 115 miles, have been resumed, and trains have also begun running southward from Salonica to Larissa. There is of course a great shortage of engines and all rolling stock, both passenger and freight, as well as of tools and equipment for the machine shops, and of steel and other materials. In all of Greece the Germans, when they retreated in 1944, left behind only a single locomotive that could be operated.

The Peloponnesian railway, under private management and mainly private ownership, with a total mileage of 500 km, has a line of one meter gauge extending from Piraeus and Athens to Corinth. Thence it continues along the north and west coasts of the Peloponnese by way of Patras, Pyrgos, and Kyperissia to Kalamata; while another line runs south from Corinth to Argos and then on over the mountains, via Tripolis and Megalopolis, to join the other line near Kalamata. This railway, too, suffered much damage during the war, but sufficient repairs have been made to permit the partial resumption of almost all services. Here, too, there is an acute shortage of rolling stock and all accessories.

The Thessalian railways, also privately owned and operated, with a mileage of 126, have a line of one meter gauge connecting the port of Volos on the one hand with Larissa, and on the other with Karditsa, Trikkala, and Kalabaka, at the western limit of the fertile plain of Thessaly. Since most of this line is laid on fairly level ground, the war damage could be repaired with relatively little difficulty, and services have been provisionally re-established, despite a serious shortage of equipment.
The fourth railway in Greece, the Northwestern Railways, requires only brief mention. With a mileage of 45, and a gauge of one meter, it runs from the port of Kryoneri, opposite Patras, by way of Missolonghi to Agrinion in a rich tobacco-growing district of Aetolia and Acarnania. A northward extension to the Gulf of Arta, begun by the Italians during the war, was never completed. This railway suffered no damages from military operations that could not fairly readily be set right; and it is now again in operation.

One of the most acute and serious problems facing Greece today is the inadequacy of the network of highways and subsidiary roads. This is not a matter that can be charged altogether to the destructive effects of the war. It is true that much damage was inflicted on highways and bridges (764 of the latter were blown up) by military and guerrilla operations; but much of it could be, and has been, repaired after a fashion without grave difficulty, and many of the main roads are now in little or no worse condition than they were in 1939.

It is not through lack of interest in promoting the improvement of means of communication or through failure to provide appropriations that the road system is in so deplorable a state; for ambitious and admirably engineered surveys and plans for a nationwide network of trunk and subsidiary highways were worked out by able officials, and in the decade before the war, especially under the administration of General Metaxas, impressive sums of money were provided and expended on actual construction. The failure to get commensurable results must be charged to various causes. Political pressure was perhaps one of the most harmful, since it compelled a wide distribution of the funds available so that as many provinces as possible might get a share. This naturally interfered sharply with the carrying out of a well-coordinated program. Moreover, there seems to have been some slackness in the setting up of proper specifications and in enforcing observation of them through supervision and control of the work in progress. Many of the basic principles
of road-building which have been learned in other countries seem to have been neglected. Another serious fact was the apparent failure to provide for the proper maintenance of roads once they were finished; well-informed circles have told me that all the money provided was expended on new construction and that nothing was left for subsequent maintenance. Greece has unquestionably lagged far behind her Balkan neighbors and Turkey in the care of her road system.

At any rate it is fair to say that in Greece in 1947 there were scarcely twenty-five miles of trunk highways that even under the most clement judgment could be ranked as first-class by modern standards. This is a lamentable state of affairs in a mechanical age when life has come to depend so heavily on motorized transportation. It must be conceded that highway building in Greece encounters some special difficulties not met with in other countries, such, for example, as the scarcity of hard rock that can stand up under wear and tear. There are also many mountains to cross, with difficult problems in engineering, construction, and maintenance. But if a carefully studied long-range program were adopted and strictly followed, with definite limited annual objectives, instead of dispersing efforts for political reasons on projects that remain half-finished throughout all the provinces, the country could certainly in twenty years build up, with funds no greater than those appropriated in the past, a splendid network of permanent highways, and Greece would become a motorist's paradise. Now it is almost the opposite.

The most recent statistics available show 9,840 miles of roads of one kind or another in 1947. The greater part of this extensive network has gone to ruin, or remains in a half-finished condition, or exists only as a project on paper. Not one of these roads can be traversed for any considerable distance with comfort and satisfaction. Most have long unsurfaced stretches, with loose stones and dust or deep ruts or tedious potholes which slow down
traffic to a crawl. There is no proper highway from Athens to Salonica; and even from Athens to Patras one can drive only at serious risk to tires and springs. Motoring through Greece everywhere offers the same hazards. Yet there are reported to be some 40,000 automobiles in the country, trucks and passenger cars; and intrepid bus drivers somehow manage to pilot their laboring vehicles, usually filled to overflowing with humanity, baggage, and livestock, over what are little better than mountain mule tracks, to towns and villages in the remote provincial districts. If the same persistence and ingenuity were applied to the construction and maintenance of the roads, conditions of travel would be greatly improved.
CHAPTER 2

Non-Greeks in Greece

Human Background - the People

Under Turkish domination the Balkan peninsula was long occupied by a varied assortment of peoples with a motley pattern of distribution. Predominant ethnic concentrations tenaciously maintained themselves in the areas where in the course of the 19th century they finally succeeded in establishing their national states. But in their infancy each of these states, Serbia, Romania, Greece, Bulgaria (and Albania much later), contained substantial minorities representing many, if not all, of the other groups, along with Turks and various minor elements; while the intermediate regions, still left under Ottoman rule after the Christian states had emerged, were almost inextricably mixed in their population.

Since the end of the Balkan wars and World War I, when most of the Turkish territory remaining in Europe was liberated and divided among the Balkan states, the confusion has been largely cleared away. The solution came through far-sighted agreements for the exchange of minorities. So far as Greece was concerned, the principal exchanges were with Turkey and Bulgaria. Nearly 400,000 Moslems, mainly from Macedonia, were removed to Turkey, and on the lands they vacated were settled even more numerous contingents of the million and a quarter Greek refugees who fled or were similarly deported from Turkey to Greece. In the same way approximately 90,000 Slavic-speaking Macedonians who chose to adopt Bulgarian nationality went or were shifted to Bulgaria, while some 46,000 Greeks drifted or were transferred in the opposite direction from Bulgaria to Greece. These harsh and radical measures caused untold individual suffering and grief and for a time at least blighted the lives of hundreds of thousands of unwitting and unwilling victims. But they nevertheless less represented a constructive, statesmanlike solution of a problem that could
not have been satisfactorily settled in any other way. A Refugee Settlement Commission, sponsored by the League of Nations, was set up to handle the situation in Greece. During seven years from 1923 to 1930, under the presidency successively of Henry Morgenthau, of New York, Charles F. Howland, of New Haven, and Charles B. Eddy, of New Jersey, it ably planned and directed the settlement of the majority of the refugees who reached Greece, establishing large numbers in rural areas and even more in urban centers.

When these changes had been effected, Greece found herself left with a substantially increased but almost completely homogeneous Hellenic stock. Minorities had not been wholly eliminated, but they had been reduced to insignificant proportions, aggregating less than 5% of the total population. The chief alien elements remaining were some 100,000 Moslems allowed by special agreement with Turkey to retain their holdings in Western Thrace; some 60,000 to 80,000 Slavophones living for the most part in Western Macedonia, where they had chosen to stay and to adopt Greek citizenship rather than to give up their farmlands; and some 70,000 Spanish Jews, concentrated mainly in Salonica in a community which had maintained a prosperous existence for three and a half centuries since its establishment following the mass expulsions from Spain under Ferdinand and Isabella. There were also perhaps some 10,000 Albanians settled largely in the Chemouria district of western Epirus; and a few thousand Koutsovlachs, or Wallachians, partly nomadic shepherds who usually spent their winters with their flocks in the lowlands and their summers in the Pindus mountains. Among themselves they spoke a dialect of Romanian, but their business language was Greek, and they were pretty much Hellenized.

In various parts of Greece, especially in Attica, northwestern Peloponnesus, Euboea, and certain other islands, there is a substantial element of Albanian stock, descendants of immigrants who settled here in the 14th.
15th, and 18th centuries. Some of the most noted patriotic leaders in the Greek War of Independence more than 100 years ago were representatives of this amalgamated vigorous breed. Although even today they still retain a form of Albanian speech for home use, they have become thoroughly assimilated and Hellenized and regard themselves as Greeks. They consequently offer no minority problem.

A similar invasion and settlement by Slavs in the 8th century, which penetrated southward into the heart of the Peloponnesus, though well attested in historical records, has left very few surviving traces either on the physical or the linguistic side. The Greek race throughout nearly a score of centuries has shown an astonishing power to absorb and assimilate alien elements that from time to time established a foothold on Hellenic soil, and to withstand absorption by its conquerors. Romans, Goths, Vandals, Ostrogoths, Slavs, Normans, Saracens, Franks, Turks, Venetians, Genoese, Catalans, Bulgarians, Wallachians, all passed through some part of Hellas, the Turks and Venetians staying for long periods; but the Greek race indomitably survived, maintaining its clear-cut entity; and save for occasional ruined monuments, few vestiges of the successive intruders remain visible on the Greek scene today.

This power of self-maintenance and survival, often in the face of great odds, must be accounted not one of the least remarkable traits of the Greek character. For there is no doubt that in the people of modern Greece we must recognize the descendants of the ancient Greeks; and certainly there are few, if any, other races that can show so long a history of continuous national existence. The theory advanced by Hallermayer, which enjoyed some acceptance a century ago and which held the modern Greeks to be a mongrel Slavic folk wholly unrelated to their classical forerunners, has long ago been rejected as demonstrably false.
A concomitant phenomenon, no less remarkable, is the stubborn survival of the Greek language. The vernacular current in Athens today naturally differs considerably from the classical tongue of the fifth century B.C.: for change is inevitable in any living speech, and only dead languages are fixed and immutable. But fundamentally it is the same as ancient Greek, and the continuity of development is a matter of record. The speech of modern Greece differs little more from that of Aristophanes' time, let us say, than 20th century English from that of Chaucer. Through the centuries of foreign domination and dispersion, a steadfast devotion to their precious linguistic heritage has been one of the important factors that helped the Greeks hold together and maintain their national consciousness.

Another factor, of equal if not greater significance, that always made for unity of spirit through the vicissitudes of more than a millennium and a half that still works for spiritual homogeneity among the Greeks, is the Eastern Orthodox Church. It counts more than 95% of the country's population among its members. For centuries before Greece took her place as an independent state, the Orthodox Church, under the Ecumenical Patriarchs established in Constantinople, in addition to its religious functions served as custodian of the Greek cultural heritage. Like a powerful magnet it drew together to its support all Greeks, wherever they might be dispersed throughout the Near East, inspired them with patriotic nationalism, and encouraged their dreams and hopes for the realization of the 'great idea.' This was the ultimate revival of a Byzantine Empire under Greek hegemony, with a restored church of St. Sophia as its spiritual center. Recognized by the Sultans as the official and responsible representative of all Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman realm, and charged with secular jurisdiction over them in questions of marriage, divorce, inheritance, and education, the Patriarch was a high
political personage; and the church inevitably came to play a political as
well as a religious role. Dominated by Greeks, it always exercised its influence in favor of the Greek cause.

Today, though retaining much of its spiritual leadership, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has lost almost all its political importance along with most of its ecclesiastic domain and its secular prerogatives. The National Church of Greece broke away in 1833 and declared itself autocephalous — a separation sanctioned by a Concordat finally agreed upon in 1850 and 1852. The Bulgarian Church was set up independently under an Exarch in 1870. In 1922 the Serbian Church acquired its own Patriarch, followed by the Romanian in 1925. Even an Albanian Orthodox Church became autocephalous in 1924. These changes were all effected for political and nationalistic motives, and had nothing to do with creed. Although recent years may have seen a considerable decline in piety and devotion, the Orthodox religion in Greece itself is still a unifying force of great strength, contributing much to the solidarity of the population for the Greeks still think down to their children passion's hagae for "The Panjab"

[Signature]
arms shall contribute to the defense of the country. Article 107 defines the
official language of the state. Another article (108) forbids the revision of
the whole Constitution, but prescribes a method for the revision of non-basic
provisions. The final article, 111, states that the maintenance of the Consti-
tution is entrusted to the patriotism of the Greeks.

Chapter 12 finally is made up of 4 supplementary articles, borrowed from
the Constitution of 1927, which deal in some detail with the administration of
the monastic peninsula of Mt. Athos, concerning which Greece assumed certain ob-
ligations in international agreements after the Balkan wars.

The government of the country, based on this liberal Constitution, is
highly centralized, with all real power concentrated in the capital. The King
holds a position somewhat similar to that of the King of England, above parties
and politics. He can act only through his Ministers of State, who are appointed
by him and who form the cabinet; but they are directly responsible to the
Chamber of Deputies. If its course of action is disapproved by the Chamber, the
cabinet is obliged to resign. The Chamber holds the purse-strings, controlling
all appropriations and expenditures.

The cabinet, through which the executive department of the government
functions, is normally headed by the leader of the party which holds a majority
in the Chamber; or, if there is no majority, by the leader of the strongest
element in a coalition. In recent years there has been a tendency to have very
large cabinets. Early in 1946 the ministerial council comprised no fewer than
35 members ranking as Secretaries or Under-Secretaries of State. In the in-
terests of economy the number was subsequently somewhat reduced, but the coali-
tion cabinet of the Populist and Liberal Parties formed in September, 1947,
consisted of 26 Ministers and Under-Ministers. There were separate ministries
of Foreign Affairs, War, Public Order, Navy, Air, Justice, Co-ordination,
Finance, National Economy, Supply, Interior, Public Works, Transport, Commu-
tions, Reconstruction, Merchant Marine, Labor, Welfare, Hygiene, Education, Agriculture, and an Under-Secretariat for Press and Information. The Governor General of Northern Greece held cabinet rank; the Prime Minister had an Under-Secretary; and there were one or more Ministers without portfolio. This is a top-heavy structure to be supported by a small and far from rich country like Greece. It is also too large and unwieldy a body to deal expeditiously with urgent problems that arise. In practice, consequently, it has been customary to form a small inner executive cabinet of five or six members to handle pressing matters, and to convolve the entire council only when questions of general policy had to be decided or approved.

In actual administration the country is divided into 37 districts, or prefectures, through which the executive authority operates. At the head of each prefecture is a Prefect, called a "Nomarch," to whom all executive agencies of the district are responsible. The Nomarchs are nominally appointed by the Minister for Internal Affairs and are responsible to him, though they represent all the Ministries. In reality they seem to have relatively little independent power, but serve mainly as intermediaries, forwarding to Athens for decision the multitudinous problems of the provinces and transmitting the answers, when they come, to those concerned. A great deal of paper work is naturally required, and opportunities for red tape are abundant.

For convenience — and perhaps to pay political debts with high positions — several prefectures have sometimes been grouped together into a larger agglomeration under a Governor General who is responsible to the cabinet as a whole and has the rank of a Cabinet Minister. All governmental authorities in his area, except judicial and military, are subject to the Governor General, and their correspondence with the Ministries in Athens must pass through his office. Since liberation there have been three such Governors General, one for Northern Greece, one for Epirus, and one for Crete. Six other Governors General, of somewhat lower rank,
corresponding to under-secretaries in the Ministry, have had charge, respec-
tively, of Thrace, Eastern, Central, and Western Macedonia, the Aegean Islands, and the Ionian Islands.

This centralized bureaucratic system of administration, under which all questions of any moment to the provinces must be submitted for decision to far away Athens, has inevitably worked to the disadvantage of the outlying districts and even the large provincial cities. They have encountered endless delays in getting their petitions considered and answered, although special agencies have been set up in some departments in Athens to expedite procedure. There have been many cries for a reform of the system, and indeed this is one of the serious problems facing the country today.

At the head of the judicial branch of the government is a Supreme Court, called the "Areios Pagos" or Areopagus. It comprises 24 judges appointed for life and not removable except for cause and by a court decision. The court deals with criminal and civil law, and normally twelve judges sit together on any given case. Corresponding to this Supreme Court are two other bodies, a Council of State and a Supreme Financial Court of Appeals, constituted in a similar way; they concern themselves with specific governmental legal problems as prescribed in the Constitution.

There are nine District Courts of Appeal established in various parts of the country. These courts hear both civil and criminal cases, usually with five judges sitting together.

The lower courts are divided into civil and criminal courts, but the same judges usually sit on both. There are 49 Courts of First Instance distributed over the country, and subject to their respective District Courts of Appeal. In criminal cases three judges sit together with a jury of twelve persons. In civil cases three judges sit without a jury. Below these courts in rank, but
for the most part held in the same places and consisting of the same judges, who sit three together, are misdemeanor courts which deal with minor criminal cases. At the bottom of the scale are justices of the peace who handle civil cases, one judge sitting alone; and Magistrates' Courts, also with a single judge, which deal with petty crimes.

The police system of Greece is established on a national basis. There are two kinds of police, both now responsible to the Minister of Public Order, though they were formerly under the Minister of Interior. One is the gendarmerie, called in Greece "chorophylaki," organized on military lines and armed. It is headed by a Lieutenant General and is responsible for policing the entire country, except four of the larger cities. Before the war it had an enrollment of nearly 12,000 men, normally enlisted for terms of seven years. With headquarters at Athens, the administration was carried out through seven district commands.

The officers and men of the gendarmerie to a great extent stayed at their posts during the German occupation and continued to carry out their functions. Few were cut-and-out collaborators with the enemy occupying forces, and many, at no little personal risk, did what they could to shield their countrymen from mistreatment by the invaders and to assist British (and American) soldiers to escape capture. But in the waning months of occupation they took a fairly active part in protecting Rightist citizens against Leftist attacks and in resisting raids of Communist-led bands of guerrillas. This activity and their loyalty to the established government won for them the bitter hatred of the ELAS forces, which during the civil war in the winter of 1944-45, in an effort to exact vengeance, systematically attacked police stations and killed many gendarmes. Treatment of this kind naturally strengthened the gendarmerie's antipathy toward ELAS and the Leftists and made them feel that their lot was linked with the Royalist and Rightist cause.
A second body, called the "astynomia," or city police, was established in 1920, when a training school with a staff of British instructors was set up at Corfu. It was intended that the astynomia should ultimately take over the task of policing the larger cities, while the gendarmerie retained responsibility for the provincial towns and rural districts. At the present time the city police is actually installed in Corfu, Athens, Piraeus, and Patras. Before the war it was an unarmed organization, following the English model, but since the civil strife in 1945-46 it has carried arms. The men must have served one year in the army, navy, or gendarmerie, with a good record. In accordance with the regulations, all officers must hold a law degree from the University. The city police are organized in two departments, one responsible for public order, including traffic-control, street cleaning, and the like, the other charged with the maintenance of security, prosecution of public offenders, arrest of malefactors, supervision of public morals and other such matters. Neatly uniformed, well trained and competent, the city police in Athens have acquitted themselves in a highly praiseworthy manner, and they deserve much commendation for their handling of the difficult problem of controlling traffic in streets laid out long before motor vehicles were invented. The British Police Mission also deserves much credit for this.

Although nearly all real governmental power is concentrated in Athens, the Constitution provides that purely local affairs shall be handled by locally elected officials. Towns with a population of 10,000 or more, or capitals of Prefectures, are called "demoni" (municipalities). They have a "demarch" (mayor), elected directly by secret ballot and universal suffrage, men over twenty-one years of age and women over thirty being permitted to vote. There are also assessors, or associates, three for small, four for large cities, and a municipal council of elected members, varying in size according to the
population of the city. Smaller towns and villages with a population of more
than 300 are called koinotetes (communities). They are governed in local
matters by a council elected by universal suffrage; and the council chooses one
of its members as president.

These officials have authority only over minor matters of local concern,
and in the communities financial resources are negligible. The municipalities
are somewhat better off, deriving some income at least from the octroi duties
levied on goods brought into their territory in domestic trade. Though much
restricted and subject to interference on the part of the centralized govern-
ment, this system of local self-rule, inherited from Turkish times and not in-
frequently suspended, has been of no little value in contributing to the growth
and strength of Greek democracy.

The working of democratic government in Greece cannot be fully understood
without some knowledge of how the political parties are constituted. A two-
party system, such as that familiar in the United States, is not traditional in
Greek politics. Instead of two relatively large, more or less evenly balanced
organizations, like the Republicans and Democrats on the American scene, there
has usually been a multiplicity of separate small parties and groups, each sup-
porting an individual leader who has sufficient political ambition and magnetism
to attract a following. In the months preceding the elections of March 31,
1946, more than 40 separate political parties and groups were recorded in the
Athenian newspapers. As polling day approached, many of these coalesced tempo-
ricularly with others so that the number actually offering candidates and partici-
pating in the contest was considerably reduced. Even so, and despite the fact
that eight separate parties of the Left and extreme Left abstained from the
elections, no fewer than 15 parties actively entered the lists throughout all
or parts of the country. The use of the system of proportional representation
no doubt encouraged some of the smaller groups to stand on their own, since
they were sure of representation in the Chamber of Deputies in proportion to the number of their supporters.

This multiplicity of parties has inevitably had an adverse effect on the stability of ministerial cabinets. It has often happened that no one party won a clear majority in an election; a government could then be formed only through a coalition of two or more groups, strong enough to ensure a working majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Sometimes five or six or even more parties have joined forces in such a coalition; but it has seldom had a long life, for disagreements and quarrels and jealousies among the various political leaders thus thrown together have usually led to a speedy break-up, necessitating new elections. But as often as not have resulted only in another stalemate.

It is true that from time to time in years before the war there was a tendency for the many small parties to cluster together in larger groups, sometimes in an approximation to a two-party system. This occurred especially during the period when Eleftherios Venizelos was active in the political life of the country. His powerful personality and his appeal to the general intelligence of the people built up a strong party which through two decades repeatedly gained a substantial majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The only method by which opposing politicians could make any headway at all was by uniting to form a vigorous opposition, which took the form of the Populist or Royalist Party. From 1917 to 1936 Greek political life revolved around the opposition of these two groups, though after Venizelos' retirement from active politics, and even before that, disintegrating forces began to assert themselves.

The emergence of the Communists as a political factor might have suggested to the other parties that they would do well to put aside minor differences and join together in larger organizations. But the Communists before the war were not numerous enough to be regarded as a serious threat. In the elections

he and Nicholas Plastiras, both then Colonels, were the principal directors of
the revolution, which forced the abdication of King Constantine and in 1924
brought about the establishment of the Greek Republic.

The Center is constituted by six or more separate parties, all split off
at one time or another from the old Liberal Party founded by Eleftherios
Venizelos. The largest element, still calling itself the Liberal Party, with
Themistocles Sophoulis as its chief, is represented in the Chamber by 48
Deputies elected under its banner; but in the autumn of 1947 it was rejoined by a seg-
ment called the Venizelist Liberal Party, under Sophocles Venizelos, which had
34 Deputies, and by the National Unity Party of 8 Deputies under Pavlos Kanellina-
poulos. Another fraction, which recognizes former Premier George Papandreou
as its leader, is the Social Democratic Party, counting 28 representatives in
parliament.

The Left, which is wholly unrepresented in the Chamber of Deputies, since
it chose to abstain from the elections of March 31, 1946, comprises two separate
groups. On the one hand are the relatively moderate Leftists who have dissociated
themselves from the Communists: they maintain three separate parties called the
Socialist Party -- ELD, the Union of Left Republicans, and the Left Liberal
Party. Their following is probably not very large. On the other hand are the
extreme Leftists organized into five separate parties. The strongest element
here is the Communist Party of Greece (AKK), directed by Nicholas Zachariades.
The other four, under the names Agrarian Party of Greece, the Radical Republi-
can Party, the Socialist Party of Greece, and the Republican Union, each with
its own leader, are minor satellites of the Communists and in every respect
faithfully follow the Communist party-line. How large the Leftist element
would prove to be, if peace and order were restored in Greece and a normal fair
election could be held, no one can say with certainty; but it is unlikely, in
the opinion of competent observers, that they would poll more than 15% of the
country's vote.
When one comes into contact with Greeks today, one cannot fail to be
struck at once by their alertness of mind, a trait which sets them off sharply
from most of their Balkan neighbors. The Greeks themselves have a word for
it; they call a bright man *exypnos*, which means literally "wide awake." Through
all strata of society from high to low, rich to poor, magistrate to peasant,
this quick perception or discernment is widespread and characteristic, and it
sometimes attains general intelligence of an unusual order. It finds expression
in a variety of ways. That keen Hellenic preoccupation with telling of all
things new is still as intense as it was in the days of St. Paul. It shows
itself in a lively interest, not to say inquisitiveness, with reference to
what is going on about one, and it is particularly concerned with persons and
personalities. It leads to what is little short of a passionate interest in politics and political developments, local, domestic, and international. For the Greek par excellence fits Aristotle's definition of man as a "political animal."

It is manifest also in a genuine respect for knowledge and learning and in an eager desire for information of all kinds. Indeed, above everything else the average Greek wants an education, and he is usually very quick to learn.

This nimbleness of mind cannot be entered altogether on the credit side of the ledger in an appraisal of the Greek character; for it frequently carries with it an impatience to deal with fundamental groundwork and details, and an impetuous rush to try unexplored and often unsuccessful shortcuts to the goal. Furthermore, the compelling attraction of something novel can often divert attention from the main task in hand and lead to its abandonment before completion. Greece is strewn with half-finished and abandoned projects. Many failed because the Greeks have almost an abhorrence of anything systematic and methodical; they hate to be bound by rules and regulations and prescribed specifications; and once a project has been planned and initiated, they tend to lose interest in the chore of carrying it out to completion in all its wearisome details.

During the past generation, in spite of considerable political interference, impressive progress has been made in improving the public school system of Greece and in extending the benefits of education to all. Attendance at elementary schools was made obligatory for boys and girls, and the illiteracy rate had been steadily declining. This advance was unfortunately interrupted by the war and German occupation, when for nearly four years the schools were subjected to curtailment or closing. The retarding effects of such a four-year gap in regular instruction and study, extending to all school ages, will inevitably linger on through a whole generation.

No less striking than his lively intelligence is the highly developed individualism of the modern Greek. It is perhaps the most conspicuous of the qualities inherited from his ancient ancestors who invented the concept of
democracy. In moderation it is a good quality: the inalienable rights of man as an individual and as a member of society form the very basis of the democratic way of life. From the outset of their War for Independence in 1821 the Greeks have shown an unswerving devotion to, and a readiness to fight for, their political freedom and their individual liberties. There are no fixed class distinctions in Greece, no inherited order of nobility, no specially privileged groups. Theoretically at least the Constitution provides equality before the law, and equal opportunities are open to all. Peasant boys by hard work, application, and ability have sometimes in the past risen to ministerial positions if not to the actual premiership in the government of the country. Horatio Alger might well have laid the scene of some of his stories in Greece. In their intensely democratic manner of living the Greeks are in many respects more like Americans than are any other people of Europe.

But individualism is frequently if not usually carried to excess, and it is an ever-present threat to real democracy. Indeed it has often led to a negation of one of the basic principles of a truly democratic government. For some Greek political parties are so passionately convinced of the rightness of their own cause and so highly keyed emotionally that they cannot bring themselves, when in a minority, to recognize the decision of the majority of the people. If they are sure of defeat before an election, they often abstain from voting; if worsted when they hope to win, they bring charges of unfairness, try or talk of revolution, and refuse to cooperate. This unwillingness to accept with good grace a majority verdict is a fundamental obstacle to the stable establishment of genuine democratic government in Greece. It is not only the minority of the moment that is at fault, however; the majority is inclined to be equally uncompromising and often forgets that the minority has any rights at all. Governments once installed have almost always forgotten that their tenure is limited, and have shown a tendency towards arbitrariness.
and autocracy. There is a good deal of truth in the remark once made that the political leaders of Greece are often potential dictators or potential revolutionaries, depending on the outcome of the balloting.

Individualism carried to excess sometimes brings other unfortunate consequences in its train. In no small degree it has contributed to the fostering of envy, jealousy, and mistrust among and of the leading personalities of the country. Like Aristides the Just in ancient Athens, some of the greatest men of modern Greece have been rebuffed or cast aside by the populace for no other apparent reason than enmity with their long extolled virtue and success. Tired of hearing them constantly praised, the multitude has preferred to turn to someone new and more exciting.

Most strong individualists, moreover, wrapped up in and deeply convinced of the soundness of their own ideas, have an inevitable tendency to go to extremes. This, too, has had an unhappy effect on the political life of Greece; for except on rare occasions, when a dynamic leader was able to rally the forces of the moderate center, the active political parties have tended to concentrate uncompromisingly toward the extreme right or the extreme left, leaving between them, almost without a vigorous spokesman, the less vociferous and more cool-minded elements. There are times in a democracy when the unity and salvation of the state can be assured only by holding to a course along the middle of the road, when a deviation to one side or the other may bring disaster. In the summer of 1947 Greece was facing just such a crisis, and the restraining and conciliatory leadership of an influential center, had one existed, might have been of inestimable benefit to the country, which otherwise seemed destined to suffer irreparable harm in the apparently irreconcilable clash between the extremists of right and left.

Enterprise and initiative are well-marked features of the modern Greek character, illustrated not only in extensive overseas shipping and maritime
activities, but in commercial and business ventures of all kinds. In finance and banking, Greeks have shown much ability and have achieved international reputations. They have founded and successfully conducted great commercial firms in many parts of the world, often with their own shipping facilities. But a most striking illustration of Greek business acumen, energy, and concentrated industry is to be seen in the thousands upon thousands of prosperous enterprises established by the emigrants who went to the United States and elsewhere. Starting with nothing but their own determination and willingness to work, they have won out against competition of all kinds and have made themselves independent. In most instances success has been gained only through unremitting effort, long hours of toil, and alert initiative. The Greeks are a hard-working people who do not spare themselves in striving to realize their ambitions.

This spirit of vigorous, intelligent enterprise and of wide-awake devotion to the task of getting ahead in private business is conspicuously absent in the governmental administrative services. There are of course many upright, able, and enlightened public officials whose record would compare favorably with that of contemporaries in any other country; but by and large, indifference, inertia, and incompetence are pretty strongly entrenched in the machinery of the state, and, as in many other democracies, there is a luxuriant florescence of red tape. One of Greece's most crying needs is the reorganization and decentralization of the administrative services. Perhaps it is because the salary-scale is so low and advancement unless by favoritism so infrequent that the best minds are not attracted to public service. The same charge, probably with equally good grounds, has often been made in the United States. In fairness to Greece it must be said that after her many centuries of subjection and training in oriental ways she has done remarkably well in attaining the standards she now has.
Enterprise up to a point is an admirable quality; but the Greeks are not infrequently overbold, one might fairly say foolhardy. Impatient to get ahead, they are often ready to take even the most unjustifiable risks; and here enterprise venges on gambling. Games of chance are in fact common throughout the country, and the gambling spirit has an undeniable hold on the Greek people, though perhaps no more so than in England and the United States where betting on horse racing, baseball, football, numbers, and games of other kinds runs into colossal sums.

The Greeks are a proud people and correspondingly sensitive. They take pride in their classical heritage, in their history, ancient and modern, in the progress they have made since they won their independence from the Turks, and more particularly in their achievements of the past generation which saw their country nearly doubled in size, population, and strength. Above all they are proud today of their gallant struggle against the Italians and the Germans in World War II, and they have largely come to believe, perhaps not without some reason, that their contribution marked the decisive turning point in that war.

In recent years there has been a steady growth of nationalism, not of a very aggressive form, nor developed to anything like chauvinism. But it has been perceptible in many ways. There has of late been a certain sensitivity to foreign suggestions and advice, even when they were clearly altogether disinterested; and one has noted a somewhat restive attitude toward the country's indebtedness to foreign capital (without which, in the past, almost no constructive projects on a large scale could have been undertaken and carried out). There is a fairly widespread feeling that it is the moral obligation of Great Britain and the United States to provide in generous measure, free of charge and without strings, all the funds and goods needed to reestablish
the economy of Greece on a sound basis, even better than it was before the war. It must be said, moreover, that this feeling has had a tendency to discourage the intensification of domestic efforts toward recovery.

On the other hand, in their personal relations toward foreigners the Greeks have almost universally shown themselves cordially generous and friendly, as Westerners sojourning in the country have had innumerable occasions to experience. One of the charms of travel in Greece when venturing off the beaten track is the guest friendship unfailingly proffered, a modern survival of the xenia of the ancients.

In another respect the Greeks have abundantly demonstrated their generous and public-spirited nature. Almost all who have prospered in business and become wealthy have taken thought to leave behind some enduring monument or foundation for the benefit of their fellow citizens. In this way innumerable hospitals, sanatoria, schools, and libraries have been established, in many instances in the benefactor’s native town or village; and occasionally there have been larger works in a broader national interest, such as highroads, prisons, and the marble stadium in Athens. A gift to the nation from a private individual, unique in its kind, was that of a battle cruiser presented by George Averoff, a great merchant of Alexandria.

There are many other facets in the versatile Greek character that must be taken into account if one is to reach a real understanding of this high-spirited, lively, ingenious, inquisitive, self-assured and yet self-critical people. But limitation of space precludes an exhaustive catalogue here. In passing, however, mention at least should be made of a keen sense of humor which, like that of Americans, depends frequently upon exaggeration.

In the country districts, with few exceptions, the farmers own the land they till and take pride in ownership, however diminutive their little plots may be. Their almost universal desire to acquire and to hold property individually illustrates clearly the fundamental anti-communist philosophy of the west.
majority of the population. Indeed in this individualistic and essentially unindustrialized state the ground is not normally favorable to the sowing of communist seed. Only intolerable economic conditions, want of food, clothing, and shelter, lack of adequately paid work, resentment of what they believe to be unjust political discrimination and negligence or incompetence on the part of the government, and a fixed, unalterable distrust of the political party that may be in power have made some of the discontented and the dissatisfied susceptible to communist propaganda. Some have been persuaded to join forces temporarily with a relatively small group of professional communists, inoculated and indoctrinated and no doubt directed from abroad, who have hitherto been able to draw recruits mainly from among the propertyless tobacco workers in Macedonia and Thrace and the undernourished laborers in the larger cities.

Rehabilitation of the destruction caused by war, and the restoration of opportunities for work, financial stability, and proper conditions of living, so that the laboring class might be enabled to make both ends meet, would unquestionably go far to eliminate the danger of an overthrow of representative government by internal forces alone.

The general standard of living in Greece has always been low, much too low; and no judgment of the people can be fair if it does not take into consideration the almost incredible poverty under which, with remarkable resignation and good nature, they have struggled for existence and survival. Truly, when all the adverse circumstances are weighed in the balance, the achievements of the Modern Greeks must be regarded as little short of miraculous.
PART TWO

GREEK HISTORY
CHAPTER 2

Historical Background -- Ancient and Medieval

Six thousand years of history have naturally left their marks on Greece. In Greece one treads everywhere on historic or sacred ground. There is hardly a hill or valley, a stream bed or a curving beach that has not some specific connection with the past, some tale of its own to tell. Here a great battle was fought, there a small company made a gallant last stand; below the tumulus yonder some unknown hero lies buried; and this sandy shore was once littered with the sea-tossed wreckage of a glorious naval victory. Everywhere there are low mounds strewn with fragments of pottery or other traces of former habitation, long since forgotten. In building roads, railways, or perhaps digging trenches for the foundations of a house, workmen are almost sure to encounter remains of some earlier structure of long ago. The farmer plowing his field or planting olive trees, the gardener spading his garden may at any moment turn up a treasure trove of ancient coins or a marble block bearing an inscription on some sculptured decoration; or he may suddenly come upon a grave containing jewelry and other objects of interest and intrinsic value.

Surrounded then by abundant tangible evidence of ancestral activities, it is not strange that the people of Greece today are ever conscious of the weight of history that rests on their land. From early school days the glories of the past are drilled into their ears, and the story of ancient Greece, if not learned in all its accurate details, becomes an accepted part of their lives. To almost all it is a constant source of pride, to many also an incubus:

Despite their pride, at any rate, intellectuals have often protested that far too much attention, both in their own country and abroad, is given to ancient Greece and far too little to the modern state which during its first century of independence, they insist, has built up a record of achievement.
in no way inferior to that of their classical forerunners. This feeling of jealousy and resentment toward ancient Greece is fairly widespread; but few have been able -- nor do they really wish -- to escape from the close and direct associations which bind them to the past.

Greece is one of those long-inhabited lands to which the term "cradle of civilization" can properly be applied. When one flies over the country today and sees its relatively great stretches of rugged unproductive mountains and bare rock, and the scant scattered patches of fertile ground, one cannot help wondering what reasons induced man to choose a permanent abiding place where so many difficulties had to be overcome in founding his settlements and initiating his simple experiments in agriculture. Here there was no river like the Nile to bring down its deposit of fresh alluvial soil, with a constant supply of water, under a climate that stimulated prolific growth while kindly nature did most of the work. From the beginning in Greece man had to work to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow.

Long before 4,000 B.C., he was well established in communities and villages dotting the old dried-out Thessalian lake bed and the smaller plains and valleys throughout central and southern Greece. Though he had no knowledge of working metal and therefore possessed no metal tools, he learned to build simple houses with foundations of stone and walls of crude brick or adobe. He became skillful in shaping idols and implements of stone, bone, and wood, adept at making durable pottery for the cooking and storing of his food and drink. He learned to cultivate the land, to sow and harvest wheat and other kinds of grain; he counted among his domesticated animals sheep and goats and cattle, and he had already apparently adopted the dog as his favorite nonhuman companion. He was in short well started on the road to civilization. Since that remote era, with occasional changes in the dominating human stock, Greece has been
continuously inhabited, sometimes up to and beyond the country's capacity to sustain her population.

Archaeologists have recognized clear traces of two or three successive waves of immigration and settlement which preceded the emergence of the Greeks themselves into the light of history. Exactly what these early elements were no one can yet determine, but apart from physical remains, they have left throughout the country a legacy of place-names much like those inherited or adapted by the white men from the Indians in the United States. Each new element on arrival conquered those it found in possession of the land and then proceeded to assimilate, or amalgamate itself with, the survivors. Each, too, made some contribution of its own into the growing fabric of culture. In this way man made his way from the Late Stone Age through the ages of Copper and Bronze in Greece. The most successful pre-Hellenic fusion, which had its home especially in the island of Crete, was able before the middle of the second millenium B.C. to build up a wealthy and remarkable civilization evidently based on sea power. The impressive ruins of the Palace of Minos at Cnossos revealed through the excavations of Sir Arthur Evans have made it well known. It is clear that orderly government with a well-organized central administration was established. A businesslike system of writing and recording (not yet deciphered) was invented, while architecture, painting, and other arts and crafts flourished.

About 1400 B.C., probably as a result of aggressive war, the seat of power was transferred to the mainland, and the fortified royal citadel of Mycenae became the capital of the Aegean world. Here the torch of civilization was kept alight for some three further centuries until the Mycenaean realm was engulfed under a fresh wave of invasion. The newcomers, who had probably
been long preceded by contingents of other Hellenic tribes, were the Dorians. They overran the country and destroyed much of what their predecessors had built. But once again a slow process of fusion and amalgamation set in, and when the mists cleared away the classical Greek race had come into being. Much of its versatility of character is no doubt owed to its multiple ancestral racial strains.

The two centuries from 1100 to 900 B.C. are usually assigned to a formative stage (called the Proto-Geometric Period) during which the final amalgam was being fused. Not much is known about this phase which is often referred to as the Dark Ages. Subsequently, from 900 to 700 B.C., in what is termed the Geometric Period, artists and craftsmen began to assert themselves with growing freedom of thought and expression, and consciousness of their own individualities as Greeks. Patterns built up of geometric motives in a great variety of design are used freely for decorating pottery and other objects; they illustrate the clarity, orderliness, and freshness of the Greek mentality, and a lively interest in all that is new. It is to the latter part of this era that most scholars ascribe the introduction of the art of writing and the rise of epic poetry which culminated in Homer's Iliad and Odyssey.

At this time, too, the problem of overpopulation became acute; it resulted in emigration on a large scale and the gradual settlement of Greeks in Magna Graecia (south Italy and Sicily) in the west, and along the shores of Asia Minor, Thrace, the Sea of Marmora, and the Black Sea toward the east. Innumerable colonies were established in this way, many of which speedily attained prosperity. At first they maintained close filial relations with their parent states, but a few soon set up as independent cities for themselves. Greek civilization thus obtained a lasting foothold throughout the eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, the western fringe of Asia Minor remained essentially a Greek land for nearly three thousand years until the exchange of population with Turkey was carried out after 1922.
This expansion brought Greece into contact with the peoples established along the eastern littoral of the Mediterranean and in Egypt; and return traffic carried home many strange and unfamiliar products and souvenirs which were received and examined with eager curiosity. The exotic patterns excited keen interest which led to imitations and adaptations by Greek artists and craftsmen, who soon introduced modifications and changes of their own that gave a Hellenic stamp to the rapidly spreading new style. From the source and character of the borrowed motives this is usually referred to as the Orientalizing Period; it occupied much of the seventh century B.C.

In the sixth century, called the Archaic Period, Greek culture rapidly evolved, urged on by the peculiar genius of the Hellenic mind which fixed its own mark on all forms of artistic expression in language, literature, and the arts. On the political side this was an age of unrest when kings and aristocracies had given way for a time to dictators (tyrants), but in turn began to be obliged to yield to the people. It was in the fifth and fourth centuries, the Classical Period—peak of excellence, that democracy was developed and flourished most widely throughout innumerable independent city-states, many of which, however, lived under the constant threat of the imperialism of a neighbor. It was a form of pure or direct democracy in which only qualified male citizens had a voice, women and slaves being excluded. Along with democracy, literature and the arts rose to lofty peaks of achievement, and to these two centuries belong many of the names most illustrious in history, philosophy, drama, architecture, sculpture, painting, and the other arts of that time.

Greek culture reached maturity and probably at the same time the beginning of decline.

In the political arena this era was marked by many wars. In the early fifth (500-480 B.C.) part of the 5th century the Greeks, almost united for a brief moment, repelled two Persian invasions and saved Hellenic civilization from destruction.
In the years that followed, rivalries and quarrels among the states frequently turned their warlike activities against one another and led to the dissipation of most of their natural wealth in exhausting struggles, like the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, which ended in the downfall of Athenian power and the succeeding duel between Sparta and Thebes in which the former lost its military preeminence.

Exhaustion paved the way for the successes of the Macedonian conquerors, first Philip, and then Alexander the Great, who established his power over all Greece and by brilliant generalship carried Hellenic political ideas and culture across the entire Near and Middle East to the remote Indus River.

Under Alexander's successors in the 3rd century, his vast empire broke up into smaller segments; but reasonably good administration and the improvement of communications promoted the spread and stabilization of a fairly uniform standardized Hellenistic civilization. In Greece itself there was a steady advance in matters of comfort and amenities of life accompanied by a recession in artistic taste and a decline in creative originality.

In the 2nd century B.C., the Greeks first came into real collision with the growing power of Rome, and before that century was much more than half over, all Greece had fallen under Rome's sway. The capture and destruction of Corinth by Numa in 146 B.C. inaugurated the subservience of Greece to foreign conquerors which was to last almost 2000 years. The first three centuries of Roman rule were, however, relatively easy on the Greeks who were for the most part treated with moderation, in spite of several rebellious uprisings here and there and some errors of judgment in their choice of the sides they backed in the Roman civil wars. Local systems of democratic government were to a certain extent permitted to continue their functions under Roman provincial administration, and some cities like Athens and Sparta were highly favored by most of the Emperors down to the latter part of the second
century of our era. Hadrian was especially friendly to Athens, adorning that city with temples, public buildings, and waterworks. Many other Greek cities similarly enjoyed his favor. The same Philhellenic policy was continued by Antoninus Pius and by Marcus Aurelius who wrote his Meditations in Greek and was an ardent admirer of Greek culture.

In the meantime Christianity, which had first been introduced into Athens and Corinth by St. Paul in A.D. 54, was slowly gaining converts. Progress was far from rapid, and for two centuries pagans and Christians lived side by side, for the most part, so far as Greece was concerned, under reasonable conditions of tolerance. Persecutions of Christians were carried out under the Emperor Decius in A.D. 250 and under Galerius some fifty years later. With the accession of Constantine their position became more secure, and before the end of the fourth century Christianity was permanently established as the religion of the Roman Empire.

After the division of the Empire and the founding of the new capital of the East in Constantinople, Greece for many centuries moved sluggishly through the doldrums. A considerable part of her population migrated to "the city," as the new seat of the government came to be known. Her inhabitants were further thinned through the ravages caused by repeated invasions as well as by pestilence. In this Byzantine period two or three times a century raiders came rushing down through the Balkans slaying and plundering, Goths, Vandals, Ostrogoths, Bulgars, Huns, and Slavs, with an occasional inroad of Arabs and Saracens from the south and of Normans from the west. An influx of Slavs in the eighth century established itself in the heart of the Peloponnesus, where these intruders held on for several generations until ultimately absorbed altogether by the more hardy and enduring Greek stock. Only a few place-names and an occasional blond and blue-eyed peasant now remain to attest
the transient passage of this Slavic strain. Blonds are by no means rare in Greece, and perhaps not all can trace their origins to folk movements from the north in historic times.

At the time of the Fourth Crusade in A.D. 1204, there was a new onslaught from the west, when bands of Frankish crusaders, diverted from their original objective, poured over the Greek mainland and in alliance with Venice fell upon the tottering Byzantine Empire to effect an easy and speedy conquest. Count Baldwin of Flanders was elevated to the imperial throne in Constantinople. Boniface of Montferrat became King of Thessaloniki, while other ambitious nobles and knights carved out for themselves smaller domains which they organized as feudal principalities nominally subject to the Emperor. The Franks in this way extended their rule over the greater part of continental Greece, leaving to the Venetians, who looked out for their own commercial interests, the principal harbors of the mainland and most of the Greek islands. Venice seized Corfu (which she held almost continuously until 1797) and the Ionian Islands as well as Euboea, acquired Crete by purchase from Boniface (retaining it until 1669), and through the Duchy of Naxos, or of the Archipelago, obtained control over the Cyclades, not lost to the Turks until 1566.

The Latin Empire in Constantinople was short-lived, coming to its end in A.D. 1261, but in Greece the Frankish Duchy of Athens held out to A.D. 1311, when it fell to the Catalan Company. These were the survivors of the band, 6,000 strong, which under Roger de Flor had been engaged some years earlier by the Emperor Andronicus II to assist him against the Italians. They maintained themselves in Athens until 1388 when the city and dukedom fell under Florentine domination which endured until 1456. In the meantime the Genoese as rivals of Venice had established themselves in Chios and Lesbos, the former of which they retained for nearly 300 years until A.D. 1566. The Palaiologoi by A.D. 1428
had put an end to Frankish rule in the Peloponnesus and had recovered almost all of that peninsula, (often known by its medieval name as the Morea) for the restored Byzantine empire. But after the siege and capture of Constantinople in 1453, the Turks took Athens in 1456 and 4 years later completed the conquest of the Peloponnesus. With only a brief interlude from 1684 to 1718 when Venice reestablished her rule over large parts of the country, the Turks thenceforth maintained their hold over Greece until the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence in 1821. During these three and a half centuries Venice was the principal rival power in the Eastern Mediterranean and there was an almost constant struggle for supremacy between Venetian and Turk, often breaking out into open warfare.

Throughout this long period of subjection to foreign yoke the Greeks had little or no voice in the conduct of their affairs. It is true that some small measure of local self-rule was usually granted them, especially under Ottoman domination, and it was important in keeping a democratic spirit alive; but their main role was to serve as hewers of wood, drawers of water, and payers of taxes and levies; and in general the people bore with resignation the oppressive demands imposed upon them by one alien ruler after another. For the most part they accepted their lot apathetically and fatalistically and made few serious attempts to revolt. When they called in one foreigner to help them against another, they regularly found it was merely a change of masters — often for the worse. And under the grasping administrators appointed to govern them during the periods when the Byzantine empire held control, they fared little if at all better than under alien overlords.

Something of value — at least on the cultural side — the Greeks must surely have acquired in the course of their centuries of contact with the chivalry of the West. It is not easy to point to anything specific; but the intelligent certainly had an opportunity to meet and to exchange views with the intellectuals who accompanied the conquerors, and such associations must inevitably
have had some effect on the education of the few. In higher circles there
were some instances of intermarriage between western nobles and Greek ladies.
So far as the common people were concerned, on the other hand, there was
virtually no mixture of racial strains. Greeks and Western foreigners kept
largely to themselves and intermarriage was rare.

Much more dangerous to the Hellenic stock were the slow and unspectacular
invasions of Slavs and Albanians from the north. Hostile Slavic raids frequently
laid waste the more exposed regions of Epirus, Macedonia, and Thrace and some-
times they carried on down through Thessaly and Central Greece to Attica and
the Peloponnesus. Both Slavic and Albanian elements swelled the population of
Epirus and Thessaly, the latter of which, for a short time, came under actual
Bulgarian domination. The earliest appearance of Albanian immigrants and
settlers goes back to the end of the 14th century when Pedro IV of Aragon and
Duke of Athens offered exemption from taxes for two years to all Albanians
who would come and settle down in his duchy. Infiltrations continued later into
the northern provinces, and there was another influx into Attica, in the early
years of the 15th century, as well as into the Peloponnesus, where shortly
after the middle of that century no fewer than 30,000 Albanians attempted by
force of arms to drive out the Greeks and to establish their own independence.

In 1770 a further accretion resulted when fierce Albanian troops who had been
brought in by the Turks to put down a Greek uprising (stirred up by Russian
agents) chose to stay permanently on the land after their mission was accom-
plished. By the beginning of the 19th century a substantial Albanian element
was firmly rooted in northwestern Peloponnesus, Attica, Euboea, and some of
the islands off the coast of Argolis. Though they still retained for home use
a form of their Albanian language, the men, at least, likewise spoke Greek
and had been thoroughly Hellenized. Many of them, indeed, became leaders in
the Greek war for liberation from the Turkish yoke, and in other ways they
have been a source of strength to the nation.
During the 18th century when the Turkish empire was gradually waning, the lot of the Greeks had been steadily improving. The blood-tribute -- the impressment every fourth year of one fifth of the male children of the Christians for the sultan's military and household service, after forcible conversion to Islam -- had been discontinued. Peasant serfs had been largely relieved of the obligation of personal service to their land-holding masters in exchange for payment in money. In some districts, especially where the land was not extremely valuable, the peasant cultivators had become virtually owners of the plots they tilled. Little by little trade and the professions had been taken over by the Greeks, and with some competition from Jews and Armenians, a large part of the internal and foreign commerce of the empire had come into Greek hands. Along with it the Greeks had likewise entered into the business of shipping, and had acquired a considerable fleet of sailing vessels which shortly before 1800 had obtained the privilege of operating under the protection of the Russian flag.

On the political side there had also been gains. Local self-government in a small way had been re-established in some parts of the country, and certain favored communities, by special dispensation, had been granted almost full autonomy. Greeks had been penetrating more and more into the Turkish governmental services, in secretarial and administrative positions, where their abilities were displayed and recognized; and not a few attained high rank in the diplomatic field. All this was naturally of considerable benefit to the Greeks. Education, too, which through the preceding century had been precariously kept alive by devoted parish priests and local school masters, was on the upswing. It was of course largely of a private, informal kind, since few proper Greek schools, with systematic instruction, were permitted to operate under Turkish rule. One such school, however, under the sponsorship
of the Church, supported by gifts from the Greek community and bequests from public-spirited citizens, maintained itself in Athens through the entire 18th century. A second, which was endowed sufficiently to provide quarters for its master and twelve stipendiary scholars, functioned from 1750 into the early years of the 19th century. Both schools lost their endowments with the downfall of Venice in 1797. In 1805 there were at least five schools in the Peloponnesus, the best known being at Demetsana in Arcadia.

A very important role in stimulating the revival of Greek education at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century was played by Adamantios Korai's born at Smyrna, of a Chian family, in 1748. After a brief career in business he studied medicine, then settled in Paris, where from 1788 to 1833 he led the life of a scholar, philosopher and author. He was a voluminous writer, publishing a long series of editions of the Greek classics, with prolegomena and commentaries. A vigorous champion of the view that Modern is directly descended from Ancient Greek, he wielded a paramount influence on the establishment of the purist form of the Modern Greek written language.

Imbued with liberal ideas, he conducted an extensive correspondence with intellectuals and statesmen of the day -- among them Thomas Jefferson -- and sought to keep the Greek cause before enlightened public opinion. He was a staunch advocate of independence for Greece, and his "Trumpet Call to War," issued in 1803, was a stirring appeal to revolution.

Through the development of shipping and commerce, contacts with the western European countries had been made, and western liberal thought began to reach Greece and to be interested in Greek problems. The influence of the French Revolution did not fail to contribute greatly to crystallize Greek stirrings and desire for freedom, which finally found expression in the outbreak of the Greek War for Independence in 1821.
This powerful Muscovite urge to gain an outlet on the Mediterranean, which incidentally stimulated and made use of revolutionary movements among the Greeks, established a traditional foreign policy for the czars who four times during the nineteenth century engaged in war against Turkey. In trying to implement that policy they employed the national aspirations of the subject peoples, the church, and all other means they could find. It is interesting to note that the totalitarian rulers of the Kremlin today are using exactly the same methods for the same purpose.

Of great importance in preparing the ground for the Greek Revolution was the work of the Philike Hetaireia, the Friendly Society, a widespread secret organization which counted numerous members among the Greeks throughout the Near East. It was founded in 1814 in Odessa and after some years of struggle for survival succeeded in establishing itself firmly. Seeking a leader of distinction, it offered the position to Count Capodistrias, a well-known Greek from Corfu, who bore an honorary title conferred on his family by Venice. He had entered the diplomatic service of Russia and had represented Czar Alexander I at many international conferences. Count Capodistrias declined the proffer, which was then tendered to Prince Alexander Hypselentes (or Ypsilantis), son of a governor of the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, Prince Hypselentes, who was a Major General in the Russian army, accepted the appointment, and on June 27, 1820, became supreme leader of the Philike Hetaireia.

Plans for a revolutionary rising against the Sultan were formulated, and after some hesitation in selecting the best point of attack, Hypselentes decided to begin operations in Moldavia and Wallachia, the region which is now Romania. Having collected a force in Russia, he crossed the Pruth River into Turkish territory on March 6, 1821. Following some preliminary successes, he entered Bucharest. But the opposition of the native Romanian element, lack of support and supplies, dissenion and incompetence, and a crushing defeat administered by the Turks brought the enterprise to disaster.
Hypselantes fled ingloriously to Austria, leaving his men behind. Their heroism was in vain, and before the summer was out the insurrection was suppressed.

Meanwhile in Greece itself spontaneous risings occurred in many widely separated places. By popular tradition the beginning of the Revolution is counted from March 25, 1821 (old style, Julian calendar = April 6, Gregorian calendar) when the Metropolitan of Patras, Germanos, solemnly raised the standard of revolt at the Monastery of Hagia Lavra, near Kalavryta in northern Peloponnesus. With official sanction March 25 has been adopted as the national Greek holiday, and the Monastery of Hagia Lavra has become a national shrine, like Concord Bridge in the United States.

The Hellenic Revolutionary War lasted eight years. In their first enthusiasm, and taking advantage of the Sultan's preoccupation with an external war against Persia and rebellions in other regions of the Ottoman empire, the Greeks carried all before them, and the greater part of the Peloponnesus and central Greece, except for the fortresses, was soon cleared of Turkish military forces. But the struggle for liberty had brought together a coalition of heterogeneous elements, and it was not long before, following the example set by their classical ancestors, they fell to quarreling among themselves. The Moreotes, from the Peloponnesus, who did much of the actual fighting on land, distrusted the mariniers from Hydra, Spetsai, and other islands who provided the "navy," and disagreed with the representatives from continental Greece. A parallel and overlapping rift also opened between the political leaders, called the Primates, on the one hand, and the military chieftains on the other. At the same time within the parties themselves there were constant bickerings and dissensions arising from personal jealousies and clashing ambitions. It has often been the sad fate of Greece
to be divided internally into bitterly antagonistic camps at moments when unity
and harmony were indispensable to national survival and welfare. Devoting
more attention to personal feuds and civil strife among themselves than to the
fight against the Turk, the Greeks were in no position to withstand the attack
now directed against them. It was led by Ibrahim Pasha who at the summons of
the Sultan came from Egypt with a powerful fleet and army. From 1825 to 1827
he overran Greece, regaining control of almost the whole of the Peloponnesus
and the central mainland, spreading ruin and terror wherever he passed; and the
Greek cause seemed well on the way to being lost.

At this juncture, however, Great Britain, France, and Russia intervened
and called for an armistice. This action was in effect a response to the
pressure of aroused public opinion in Europe. Liberals in many countries had
begun to express freely and vigorously their sympathy for the Greek cause and
their advocacy of the idea of Greece's independence. Committees were formed in
England, Switzerland, Germany, France and elsewhere which held meetings, ob-
tained wide publicity, and collected money and supplies to be sent to Greece.
In England, especially, the movement grew strong. The Lord Mayor of London and
many distinguished personalities openly espoused the Greek side and contributed
substantially to support it. At the same time adventurous spirits from almost
all European countries flocked to Greece where they offered themselves for
active service. They were known as Philhellenes, and many served disinterestedly
and heroically in the armed forces on land and sea. Among them were a few
Americans, such as George Jarvis of New York, who became a Lieutenant General
in the Greek army, and Jonathan Miller of Vermont, who attained the rank of
Colonel. Much more significant in his accomplishment was Dr. Samuel Gridley Howe of
Boston who spent three years in medical and relief work largely among the
civilian refugees.
The most celebrated of all the Philhellenes, however, was Lord Byron, whose wholehearted backing of the Greeks in their fight for independence had a profound influence on liberal thought throughout Western Europe and America. Indeed, it was perhaps one of the decisive factors in the final success of the revolution. Byron went to Cephalonia in the summer of 1823 and bringing with him from London the first instalment of a loan to the Greek government, crossed over to Missolonghi early in January 1824. It was a critical time for Greece, since the country was rent by dissensions and civil war which had almost paralyzed the fight against the Turks. Byron made every effort to reconcile the discordant factions and to bring them together for united action. Neither a military leader nor a politician, he spoke to them in terms of friendly common sense. But he soon fell ill of fever and died at Missolonghi on April 19, contributing his life in Greece's behalf.

The death of Lord Byron drew much attention to the Greek situation. In the United States it stimulated the activity of the many committees which had been formed in all the larger American cities for the purpose of aiding Greece. Campaigns to raise funds were sponsored in Boston, New Haven, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Cincinnati, and many other places, and substantial sums were forwarded to Greece. Much of the money collected in 1824-1825 was delivered to the Greek government and was used for the purchase of munitions. Collections in a second drive in 1827-1828 were for the most part devoted to civilian relief in Greece, which was distributed under the supervision of American representatives on the ground, not least of whom was Dr. Samuel Gridley Howe.

In calling for an armistice in 1827, the idea of the Powers was to set Greece up as a small autonomous state, governed by a prince under nominal Turkish suzerainty. The Greek leaders accepted, but the Turks rejected the proposed truce. An allied squadron of Russian, French, and British men
of war was sent to patrol Greek waters in a demonstration to enforce a cessation of hostilities, but under orders not to bring on an engagement unless attacked. On October 20, 1827, it entered the Bay of Navarino where the Egyptian fleet lay at anchor. Shots fired at a British boat initiated a battle which continued all day and into the night; and when the dawn came, 53 of the 82 Turkish and Egyptian ships had been sunk. This crushing disaster to the Ottoman fleet marked a decisive turning point in the conflict; and the end was further accelerated when Russia declared war against Turkey April 26, 1828. In the treaty of peace signed at Adrianople on September 14, 1829, the war was able, among other terms, to exact Turkish recognition of the Allies' Settlement of the Greek problem embodied in their London protocol of March 22, 1829. In a revision of the protocol on February 3, 1830, the Protecting Powers agreed to establish Greece as an independent monarchical state; and after tendering the crown to Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg, who declined it, they offered it on February 13, 1832, to Prince Otto, second son of King Louis of Bavaria, who accepted.

The new kingdom, though larger than the projected principality, was greatly restricted in size, its northern boundary being fixed along a line extending from the Gulf of Arta on the west to that of Volo on the east. Of the islands, Euboea and the Cyclades were included, but Crete, Samos, Chios, Mitylene, Rhodes, and many others were still left in Turkish hands, and the Ionian group remained under British rule. Thessaly, Epirus, and Macedonia were returned to the Sultan. A substantial majority of all the Greeks was consequently excluded from the new state; and this fateful, short-sighted decision, failing to provide a final solution of the question, inevitably resulted in almost a century of constant disaffection, repeated revolts and disturbances which caused the Protecting Powers themselves and the rest of Europe endless trouble and kept the southern Balkans in a turmoil.
Meanwhile the new-born state was beset with civil wars of rival factions and with political chaos. A treaty between the three Powers and Bavaria, regulating details of the accession of the designated monarch, was drawn up and signed on May 7, 1832; but it was only after the arrival of King Otho (as he was henceforth called) who landed at Nauplia, the provisional capital, to ascend his throne on February 6, 1833, that some measure of public order could be restored. During the revolutionary years the Greeks had held five National Constituent Assemblies which had clearly revealed the difficulties of founding parliamentary government in a country totally lacking in previous experience and training in self rule. The first, which was convened at Epidaurus on January 15, 1822, adopted a liberal-republican constitution. This charter was amended by the second convention which met at Astros in 1823 in an atmosphere of dissension. A third assembly, holding its sessions at Troezen in 1827, enacted a new constitution, proclaiming Greece an independent state, and elected Count Capodistrias as President. The choice of this Corfiote Greek, with an honorary Venetian title, who had served as the Foreign Minister of Czar Alexander, was not fortuitous. It was a token of the strength of Russian interest and influence; and throughout his incumbency the new state invariably leaned on Russia for help in dealing with internal as well as external problems. His administration marked a definite ascendency of the Russophil Party in Greek politics as opposed to the rival Anglophil and Francophil factions. The Fourth and Fifth National Assemblies were called together at Argos in 1829 and 1831. The former accomplished little because of wrangling and civil war, but the latter passed another new constitution. In all these assemblies the representatives of the Greek people had expressed their desire for independence, self government, and a republican form
of regime. The irreconcilable antipathies, jealousies, personal hatreds, rivalries, and mutual distrust of the political and military protagonists had, however, demonstrated beyond doubt the impossibility of finding any properly qualified Greek leader acceptable to his countrymen as a permanent or even temporary chief executive; and the assassination of Count Capodistrias on February 9, 1831, merely confirmed foreign observers in this conviction. It was therefore with reasonable justification that the Protecting Powers chose and installed as King young Otho, a foreigner, scion of the philhellenic Bavarian reigning dynasty. But it must be admitted that their action was taken primarily to safeguard what they believed to be their own interest and with little thought or consideration for the Greek people and their aspirations. In any event the Powers paid no attention to the Greek National Assembly, and the constitution it had promulgated had no standing before the demands of international politics.

Instead of a democracy which they expected, it was consequently an absolute autocratic monarchy the Greeks found imposed upon them when the mists of the revolutionary era cleared away. Since Otho was only 17 years old when he assumed the crown, three Bavarian regents were appointed by King Louis to govern until his son should reach his majority. Though a ministry of Greeks was formed under them, they retained all real power, but discord speedily arose among them, and this, combined with their lack of knowledge and understanding of Greece and its people, made their administration inefficient and unpopular, and prevented real progress toward the permanent constructive solution of the political, economic, and social problems facing the country. In 1834 the capital was moved from Nauplia to Athens. The reason for the move was mainly historical and sentimental, in recognition of the preeminent role played by ancient Athens in the Classical Period. In
1834 it was little more than a wretched village, still in a badly ruined state as a result of the war, and with a population of not more than ten thousand.Only the Acropolis and the Parthenon rising above the wreckage gave it distinction. A new city had to be laid out and constructed, and one of the first buildings was a royal palace for the King, fortunately not on the Acropolis as had originally been proposed. At this time the harbor town of Piraeus consisted merely of three wooden sheds.

King Otho came of age June 1, 1835, and in 1837 himself took charge of the conduct of affairs. By this time the Bavarian Chancellor and Prime Minister had been eliminated, though unofficial advisers remained; but the King in person now presided over the cabinet, and he soon had to bear the unpopularity that had formerly fallen on his foreign counsellors. At this time one act of enduring importance in the cultural and educational life of the country was the founding at Athens in 1837 of the Othonian, now the National and Capodistrian, University. It is interesting to quote a remark of General Metaxas that it was quite in keeping with the impetuous Greek character that the University was created before the country had any system of primary or secondary education.

The Greek Archaeological Society was also established in 1837.

Throughout Greece's first century of existence as an independent state, her people and statesmen were almost continuously engrossed with the problem of liberating their fellow Hellenes who still remained in servitude or subjection under Turkish or other alien rule. Indeed, a final settlement was not achieved until 1947, if then. This question was paramount in the orientation of the country's foreign policy. Disturbances and revolts broke out with frequent regularity in Crete and elsewhere in the unredeemed provinces, where the desire for union with the motherland was irrepressible, and led to harsh measures and sometimes bloody reprisals by the Turks. Public opinion in Greece
itself naturally took a strong stand in favor of these movements and urged the government to action. King Otho sympathized wholeheartedly with the sentiments of his people, and always did what he could, sometimes to the point of indiscretion so far as international relations were concerned; but Greece was impoverished and almost powerless, while the Great Powers thought their own interests lay in prolonging the status quo. Otho's failure to realize any concrete results exposed him to further unpopularity, and, added to the general discontent with his despotic government, finally led to a revolution on September 3, 1843 (September 15 by the western calendar). It was a successful and almost bloodless coup (only one man was killed) which constrained the King to grant the demand for a constitution and a parliamentary regime.

A constituent assembly, the first representative body called together since 1832, met on November 20, 1843. It drafted and adopted a constitution which established a bicameral legislature with an elected House of Representatives of not fewer than 80 members, and a Senate of at least 27 (but not more than half as large as the other house), appointed by the King for life; declared the national Greek church to be autoccephalous, and provided that the heir to the throne must be a member of the Greek Orthodox Church. It contained a bill of rights, and put the government of Greece into the hands of the Greeks themselves. On the other hand, it permitted a large concentration of authority in the capital at the expense of local autonomy.

It is interesting to note that the politicians who competed for power in the subsequent elections were divided into two main groups, and the division was in some respects similar to that which exists today. One party under the pro-English Mavrokordatos believed that Greece should first establish an orderly stable government and should then try to obtain the annexation of the unredeemed provinces. The other, under the pro-French Kolettis, sponsored the wholly divergent view that the country should first seek to expand its
territory by taking in so far as possible all the Greeks still left under alien rule outside the state, and would then be in a better position to proceed to the proper organization of internal administration and the promotion of economic progress and prosperity. Neither party was able to apply its policy successfully.

With numerous, rapid, if not startling vicissitudes of fortune, first under one, then under the second of those parties, and under others, Greece continued on her course through the next two decades, with no territorial and little political gain, but achieving a steady advance in the material and cultural fields. Growing dissatisfaction with King Otho for his inability to produce an heir to the throne, his failure to take advantage of opportunities to bring about the annexation of further Greek territories, resentment of his open sympathy with the Austrians in their war against Italy, and general discontent aroused by the partial suppression of freedom of the press together with other autocratic acts, finally culminated in a series of revolts that blossomed into another revolution, equally bloodless with that of 1843, and on October 24, 1862, King Otho, yielding before popular displeasure, issued a farewell proclamation to his people, and abdicated. Withdrawing to his native land, he died, a few years later, at the age of fifty.

The problem of finding a successor preoccupied public opinion and the attention of the political leaders in Greece. A constituent National Assembly was elected and convened on December 22, 1862. In the meantime a plebiscite was held throughout the country, and Prince Alfred, second son of Queen Victoria, was chosen by an overwhelming majority of the Greek electorate, a nomination ratified by the National Assembly on February 3, 1863. The British Government, however, declined to permit Prince Alfred to accept; and in accordance with the terms of the old protocol of February 3, 1830, which ruled out the appointment of any prince belonging to the reigning houses of the three Protecting Powers, it was also able to exclude the Russo-French
candidate, the Duke of Leuchtenberg, a nephew of the Czar. After much delay and uncertainty on the part of the Powers, and the outbreak of civil disturbances in Greece, Great Britain, France, and Russia finally agreed to the designation of Prince Christian William Ferdinand Adolphus George, of the House of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glucksburg, second son of the Danish Crown Prince (later King Christian IX), a youth of 17. The National Assembly in Athens unanimously ratified this selection; and on July 13, 1863, the detailed terms of the arrangement were set down in a treaty between the three Powers and Denmark, which provided that the prince should assume the crown as George I, constitutional King of the Greeks; Great Britain, relinquishing her protectorate over the Ionian Islands, consented to their union with the Greek state; and the three Powers made some financial concessions in favor of the young monarch.

The most important of these ancillary provisions was the transfer to Greece of the Ionian Islands. Great Britain had held them since 1815 when they came into her possession on the breakup of the Napoleonic Empire. She had given them an excellent administration, had put them in a sound economic condition, had built extensive systems of highroads, and had done much to promote education. It is true that on the political side she had encountered stubborn opposition on the part of a people by nature disinclined to submit to order and regulation and capable of provoking constant vexations difficulties. Nevertheless, it was a notably generous gesture of the British government to turn the islands over to a Greek state and one which it is highly unlikely that any other great power of that time, had it been in possession, would have been willing to make. The acquisition of the Ionian Islands was, of course, a bright feather in the crown of the newly chosen king and gave him useful prestige when he came to ascend the throne.

Disorders had continued in Athens, finally exploding into a bloody civil war, in which two factions of the army were involved; but early in July, 1863,
some measure of peace was restored. At long last on October 30, 1863, King George arrived at Athens, was welcomed by a popular demonstration, and took the oath as constitutional King before the National Assembly.

A draft of the new constitution was prepared by a Committee, and the Assembly devoted many months to its consideration. After the formal cession to Greece of the Ionian Islands June 2, 1864, and the seating of the 54 elected deputies in the Chamber in Athens on August 3, proceedings in the Assembly were somewhat accelerated; but it was only as a result of royal pressure that the constitution was finally adopted. King George accepted it and took a new oath November 28, and the document was published in the official government gazette November 29. It was a very liberal democratic constitution, which provided for a unicameral representative legislative body, the Senate, being abolished. Deputies were to be elected by universal male suffrage for a term of four years, only Greek citizens, 30 years of age or more, who had resided at least two years in their constituencies being eligible. Officers of the army and navy were permitted to become deputies, going into retirement from the armed services during the time of their incumbency. The Greek Church was again declared autonomous, and it was ordained that the heir to the throne must be a member of the Orthodox Church. The powers of the King were clearly defined and were strictly limited to those actually specified in the constitution. Political equality and the rights and privileges of all citizens were carefully safeguarded; and the source of power was declared to lie in the people. Local elections of local officials, mayors, councilmen, etc., were specifically sanctioned. (A Council of State was set up, but this article was repealed by the next chamber as permitted by the terms of the original article; otherwise) the constitution of 1864 remained the law of the land for 46 years until revised in 1911.
Feathering many political storms through his tact, diplomacy, democratic manner, and strict adherence to his constitutional position, King George II, who ascended the throne in 1913, by an assassination attempt in 1919, was that long span there were dark elements of national frustration and humiliation, but there were also periods of exultation and glory; and the King saw his country vastly enlarged in size and population, and greatly advanced in material well-being.

Among the crises faced by King George was a revolt in Crete in 1866-8, which was bloodily suppressed by the Turks. The reaction in the kingdom was intense, and public opinion demanded intervention in behalf of the Cretans, even if it meant war with Turkey. Friends of Greece in the countries of the west demonstrated their sympathy in a material way; and a relief mission once again came from the United States under the leadership of Dr. Haoe. It was at this time that the first American Minister Resident was sent to represent the United States in Greece.

In 1870, not without the instigation and encouragement of Russian intrigue, working in the interests of Pan-Slavism, the Sultan by decree authorized the establishment of an independent Bulgarian Orthodox Church under its own head, called an Exarch, undermining authority and influence of the Greek Patriarchate in Constantinople and dealing a severe blow to Greek national aspirations. This act also precipitated a bitter, sanguinary feud between Exarchists and Patriarchists in Macedonia, which was destined to continue for a generation. An even more shattering blow to Greek hopes, and one that aroused violent popular reaction in Athens, was the Treaty of San Stefano at the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War, which contained clauses creating a great Bulgarian state, incorporating in it what is now Eastern, Central, and Western Greek.
Macedonia. This settlement was subsequently modified, largely through British opposition, by the Treaty of Berlin of July 13, 1878, which reduced Bulgaria to a small autonomous principality and created a second similar state, Eastern Rumelia, also tributary to the Sultan. In partial compensation to the Greeks, in 1881 a small territorial concession was exacted by the Powers from Turkey, and the province of Thessaly, along with the region of Arta, was ceded to Greece.

The next crisis came in 1885-6 when Bulgaria was enlarged by union with Eastern Rumelia. Serbia actually went to war with Bulgaria and was soundly defeated in fourteen days. Intense excitement was aroused also in Athens, where there was a demand for territorial compensation — Crete and part of Epirus — to balance the enlargement of Bulgaria. The Prime Minister, Theodore Deliyannis, mobilized the army in preparation for military action, contrary to the advice of the Powers. The latter thereupon blockaded the Greek coast and forced the resignation of Deliyannis, who had only succeeded in burdening the treasury with a huge deficit.

He was replaced by Charilaos Tsarouhis, one of Greece's most distinguished statesmen, who had already been Foreign Minister and Premier several times. From 1882 to 1885, and again from 1886 to 1890, in relatively long administrations, Tsarouhis devoted himself mainly to the improvement of Greece's economy, especially through financial reforms and the construction of roads and railways. A realist who had lived in England and was an admirer of Great Britain, he was noted for his honesty and straight dealing. In the field of foreign relations he was far ahead of his time when he visited Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania and in 1891 made proposals for a Balkan alliance.

In 1897 Greek sympathy with, and actual participation in, a revolt against Turkish rule which had broken out in Crete a year earlier, led to a brief and
disastrous war with Turkey. The indignation aroused among the Athenian populace by the massacres of Christians at Canea evoked so great a public clamor for armed intervention that the Greek government could not withstand it. Naval and military detachments, under command of Prince George and Colonel Vassos, were sent to Crete in February, and in April irregulars crossed the frontier into Macedonia. Turkey declared war on April 17 and with a well-organized, German-trained army promptly invaded Greece from Macedonia and Epirus. In little more than a month, after several sharp engagements, the Greek forces were thoroughly beaten, and only the intervention of the Powers saved central Greece and Athens from Ottoman occupation. An armistice was signed May 20 and a treaty of peace on December 4 in Constantinople. Except for slight readjustments of the northern frontier, it reestablished the status quo; but it imposed on Greece the payment of an indemnity of 1 million Turkish pounds.

Even before the war the Greek treasury was nearly bankrupt; and special measures had to be taken to meet the new obligations. The solution adopted, though somewhat galling to those citizens who were jealous of infringements of Greece's sovereignty, was immensely beneficial in reviving Greek financial credit and maintaining it for more than a generation. An International Financial Commission was set up on which each of the six great European Powers was represented by a delegate. It was given control over the collection and employment of revenues sufficient for the service of the war indemnity loan and the other national debts. The customs duties levied at Piraeus (and, later, at some other ports), tobacco and stamp taxes, and income from most of the state monopolies were put into the hands of the Commission. During World War I an American delegate was invited to sit with the Board. Though sometimes charged by Greek government officials with arbitrary decisions, the Commission administered its task fairly and impartially, and the value of its service to Greece can hardly be overestimated.
It was in the last decade of the 19th and the initial decade of the 20th century that the clash of national and religious factions reached its height in Macedonia. A general feeling that the end of Turkish rule in southeastern Europe was approaching led the neighboring states to promote and establish claims to share in the ultimate division. Bulgars, Greeks, Romanians, and Serbs were all involved in the disorders and fighting that made Macedonia a hotbed of strife and violence. Bulgarians, directed by a Macedonian Committee from Sofia, made systematic efforts by intimidation and terrorism to impose the Slav position by driving out other nationals. The Greeks also organized to protect themselves, and Serbs, Romanians, and Albanians were active in a similar way, while the Turkish officials looked on with the same complacency as the Christians killed each other off. Intervention by the Powers brought concessions from the Sultan and some reforms in the government, but no real improvement in the situation.

The Young Turk revolution in 1908 had repercussions throughout the Balkans. A new era seemed to have dawned in Macedonia, where Greeks, Turks, and Bulgarians in the first flush of enthusiasm put aside their differences and fraternized. In the parliamentary elections that followed, Bulgarians and Greeks cooperated and agreed on the number of deputies to be allocated to each nationality in a joint slate of Christian candidates. Eight of the eleven seats available were allotted to Greeks and three to Bulgarians. Further afield Bulgaria took advantage of the opportunity to declare her independence of Turkey, while Austria Hungary formally annexed the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovins. Crete was again stirred with the desire for union with Greece, which the Cretan Council indeed proclaimed; but the government in Athens was unequal to the occasion and did nothing. Its failure to act in this instance was perhaps the precipitating cause of a revolutionary coup which was initiated in Athens August 27-28, 1909, by a military league.
Throughout all the preceding kaleidoscopic events King George, leaving to the political leaders the decisions and responsibilities, as prescribed by the constitution, had kept his head, his throne, his sense of humor, and the general respect and affection of his people. In 1909 he faced perhaps his sternest test; but once again his patience and diplomacy and understanding enabled him to weather the storm.

The revolution of 1909 gave the impulse to a rapid development and expansion of Modern Greece. Dissatisfied with the failure to carry out a reorganization of the armed forces after the disastrous war of 1897; displeased with the country's inability to take advantage of the opportunities for the promotion of the national cause offered by the Young Turk movement from which other states, such as Bulgaria, profited greatly; and impatient with the lack of vision and competence in high places, a group of the younger officers in the army formed a military league under the leadership of Colonel Zorbas, overthrew the government in office, demanded and obtained from a timorous Chamber sweeping reforms. The problem of reverting to a constitutional regime, however, was too difficult for the military leaders to solve. In this emergency they turned to Eleftherios Venizelos, the Cretan patriot who had played an active part in the movement that finally brought about Cretan autonomy in 1898. Since then he had for a time served as one of the five councillors under Prince George, the High Commissioner, appointed by the Powers to administer the island as an autonomous state, and he had always been a vigorous supporter of union with Greece. Venizelos came to Athens, surveyed the situation, and advised the calling of a National Assembly to revise the constitution of 1864. He himself was elected a deputy, was named Prime Minister by King George October 18, 1910, and met the obstructive tactics of the old political leaders who opposed him by asking for the dissolution of the Assembly and the
holding of new elections. From these he emerged with an overwhelming majority, and for the next two decades proved himself not only the dominating political figure of Greece, but a statesman of international prestige and influence. His appearance on the scene introduced a freshness, vigor, and authority into public life that infused determination and courage into the people and real hope for the future.

The revision of the constitution was promptly carried out. The basic provisions of the Charter of 1864 were not touched, but many of the other articles were modified. Free and compulsory elementary education was established; a permanent civil service was set up; officers of the armed services were excluded from eligibility to the Chamber of Deputies; and facilitating land reforms sponsored; and a Council of State was recreated and charged with carefully prescribed functions. (A summary of this constitution is given in Chapter 30). When its work of revision was finished, the National Assembly was dissolved, and a normal chamber was elected in 1912.

* For a summary of the Constitution, see Appendix.
Venizelos, with the cooperation of a cabinet composed of able and public-spirited men, turned directly to the vital problems facing the country. The most urgent were the reorganization of the army and the navy, and the rehabilitation of the governmental administrative services; and in both fields amazingly swift progress was quietly made. No less quietly Venizelos entered into negotiations with Bulgaria and Serbia with the object of reaching an understanding for a joint effort to liberate the Christian populations still remaining under Ottoman misrule in European Turkey. Since the Turks had grown weary from recent insurrections in Albania and other parts of the empire and were embarrassed by a costly war with Italy, not yet finally concluded, but which had lost them all their North African possessions and the Dodecanese, the time seemed propitious to strike. The alliance was formed so secretly that almost before the European powers became aware of its existence, and certainly before they could agree on measures to prevent it, the war broke out in mid-October 1912. A warning on the part of Russia and Austria was met with the polite reply that intervention was too late. Little Montenegro was the first, on October 8, to declare war on Turkey. The three other Balkan allies, on October 13, presented in identical terms an ultimatum to the Turkish government, demanding sweeping reforms, including administrative autonomy for the European provinces under Swiss or Belgian governors and essential relinquishment of Turkish sovereignty in everything but name. The next day Venizelos permitted the Cretan deputies to take seats in the Greek Chamber. On October 17 Turkey declared war upon Serbia and Bulgaria, and Greece formally entered the struggle on the 18th with a declaration of war on Turkey.
To the astonishment of European statesmen and military experts, the armies of the Balkan states proved to be better trained, better led, more courageous and enterprising than any one had dreamed; and within a few weeks, surging forward in an unbroken series of victories, they virtually swept the Turks out of Europe. Soon, apart from the Gallipoli peninsula and the approaches to Constantinople, only the strongholds of Adrianople, Yannina, and Scutari remained in the possession of closely besieged Turkish garrisons. The Serbs captured Uskub, renamed Skoplje, and Monastir; the Greeks took much of Epirus, west and central Macedonia along with the port of Salonica and coastal towns to the east, and liberated the principal islands of the Aegean. The Bulgars overran the greater part of Thrace and drove the Turks back to the Chatalja lines just outside Constantinople. Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro signed an armistice with Turkey on December 3, but Greece by arrangement continued fighting in order to maintain her naval blockade of the Dardanelles and the Anatolian coast which largely prevented the movement of Turkish troops by sea. The Greek navy was a potent factor in the triumph of the Balkan allies.

A conference of all the belligerents met in London December 16, but because of delaying tactics on the part of the Turks, when they had reconciled themselves to yielding, the outbreak of a revolution in Constantinople, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro then resumed hostilities, and on February 3, 1913, on March 6 the Greeks under Crown Prince Constantine captured Yannina; but popular rejoicing was soon turned into tragic mourning by the assassination of King George at Salonica on March 18. A few days later, on March 26, Adrianople fell to a combined force of Bulgarians and Serbs; and on April 22 Scutari finally capitulated to King Nicholas of Montenegro; and the Turks, finally requested a new armistice. Meanwhile, again on request of the Turks, a new armistice was arranged on April 19, negotiations were resumed, and on May 30 a treaty of peace was.
Signed in London, by this treaty, Turkey gave up all her territory in Europe to the west of a line drawn from Alimos on the Aegean Sea to Medje on the Black Sea. By the terms of the agreement a separate state of Albania was to be delimited and set up by the Great Powers, who were also to determine the fate of the Aegean Islands and the promontory of Mount Athos. The rest of the ceded territory was made over to the Balkan allies to divide among themselves.

The creation of an independent Albania caused much trouble and disagreement. Austria, with Italian support, held out for boundaries on the north that would shut Serbia off altogether from the Adriatic; and on the south, Italy, with Austrian support, similarly insisted on pushing the Greco-Albanian frontier down to Cape Stylos, opposite the town of Corfu, far south of the line desired by the Greeks. Sanctioned by the Great Powers, this decision led to many years of disorder and fighting in the disputed zone, and to a long continuation of the relations between Greece and Albania.

But it was not only in dealings with the Great Powers that the Balkan states encountered difficulties and disappointments; they also fell into disension among themselves over the division of the booty. Under certain contingencies and in the event of victory, a large part of central and western Macedonia, including Monastir and Ochrida, nearly all of which had been captured and was still being held by Serbian forces. The Serbs believed themselves entitled to some repayment for sending an army of 50,000 to help in the siege of Adrianople, and now blocked by Austrian intervention from extending their realm, as provided in the treaty, to the Adriatic, they urged that it was only fair and just for them to be compensated for that loss by the retention of some of the territory which the Bulgarians claimed. But the latter rejected the Serbian view and demanded compliance with the letter of the treaty. The Bulgarians likewise coveted the port of Salonica, which pro-
vided a fine harbor on the Aegean, and they cherished a sense of grievance
because the army they had sent to take the city arrived too late, two days
after it had surrendered to the Greek forces coming from the west. Even before
the signature of the treaty of peace with Turkey, serious friction had developed
between the Bulgarian and Greek troops in Central and Eastern Macedonia. In
view of the threatening situation, Greece and Serbia on June 1, 1913, signed a
treaty by which for a term of 10 years each agreed to aid the other in the
event of an attack by Bulgaria. Details were regulated in an accompanying
military convention.

Incident succeeded incident, and finally on June 30, 1913, Bulgarian forces,
without previous declaration of war, simultaneously attacked the Serbs at
Chevcheli and the Greek position at Migrita. The suddenness of the assault
gave the attackers an initial success; but when the Greek and Servian armies
were brought into action, they defeated the Bulgarians in one pitched battle after another, and in a few weeks advanced, the Greeks to the
borders of, and the Serbs into, Old Bulgaria. Meanwhile the Romanians on
July 11 joined in the war and marched unopposed into northeastern Bulgaria.
The Turks also took advantage of the opportunity to recapture Ainos on July 15
and Adrianople July 22. Confronted by a hopeless situation, Bulgaria appealed
for peace, and a conference opened at Bucharest July 29. The treaty of peace,
was signed August 10. Bulgaria ceded to Rumania a considerable part of the
Dobrudja district, long desired by the Romanians; made substantial concessions
on the west along the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier, and gave up claims to the
Monastir region of northwestern Macedonia; yielded the port of Kavalla and
Eastern Macedonia as far east as the Nestos River to Greece; and in a separate
treaty with Turkey on September 29 relinquished Eastern Thrace and Adrianople.
Bulgaria thus came out of the war with heavy losses in manpower and smarting
with disappointment because her territorial gains were smaller than she had hoped for. Since that time she has religiously cherished the desire to obtain Western Thrace and parts of Macedonia, and her relations with Greece have been almost constantly embittered.
To Greece the results of the Balkan wars unveiled a fresh vista of future
development and progress. When the final settlements were made, and after
the Great Powers had awarded her most of the Aegean Islands, except those
halted by Italy, her territory and population were vastly increased, and
the whole country felt stirred with a new sense of confidence and consequence.
But the brilliant success held within it a virus which was to poison Greek
life and politics and to cause untold harm to the national interests through
the next two decades; for a rift opened between the two outstanding leaders,
Constantine, the victorious commander-in-chief of the armies, who had suc-
ceeded his father as King on March 18, and Venizelos, the dynamic, far-sighted
Prime Minister, who had laid the foundations and organized the preparations
that made the victory possible. Venizelos' role in stirring up an insurrection
in Crete against the autocratic procedures of the High Commissioner, which had
ultimately led to the resignation of Prince George, Constantine's brother, was
not forgotten by the new King; nor could he fail to remember that he owed
entirely to Venizelos' magnanimity his own reinstatement as commander of the
Greek army, from which position he had been removed by the Military League in
1909. On the other hand Venizelos' experience with what he regarded as the
high-handed unconstitutional behavior of one member of the Gluckenburg family
had undoubtedly left him with a suspicion of, if not prejudice against, the
dynasty.

Clashing personalities, little tolerant of opposition, and fundamental
disagreements on constitutional and other questions served to widen the breach,
and the active, zealous partisanship of each protagonist's entourage gradually
broadened it to a chasm that in the course of a short time penetrated deep...
dividing the nation into two violently antagonistic factions. The murder of King George was peculiarly tragic for Greece; for had he lived a few years longer, it is likely that his unrivaled experience in getting on with Prime Ministers (more than thirty had served under him) and his respect for constitutional procedures would have enabled him successfully to collaborate with Venizelos to the best interests of the country; and the situation in the Near East might have been far different from what it is today.

The discord showed itself quickly. Before the newly acquired provinces could be fully incorporated and consolidated, and the many new diplomatic, political, administrative, and other problems could be adequately dealt with, World War I broke out; and Greece found herself immediately involved in difficulties which sprang largely from the divergence of views of the King and the Prime Minister. Venizelos lost no time in stating publicly and officially that Greek national interests and sympathy lay wholly on the side of the Allies, against the Central Powers, and that the maintenance of her treaty-commitment to come to the aid of Serbia in the event of an attack by Bulgaria constituted the keystone of Greece's foreign policy. The King, chided by his private councillors in opposing every move made by Venizelos, and perhaps influenced by his close friendship and relationship with the Kaiser, whose sister he had married, and who had conferred on him an honorary fieldmarshalship in the German army, and probably also genuinely convinced that Germany would win the war, felt himself obliged to express a sharply dissenting view, insisting that Greece must remain scrupulously neutral.

With growing bitterness the struggle between the two leaders continued through the next three years, and hardly an issue of any importance to the country, whether concerning internal or external affairs, escaped infection. Every gesture made by Venizelos in favor of the Allies was counteracted by the
King with an action equally or more friendly to the Central Powers; every proposal of the Prime Minister to range Greece on the allied side met with a firm royal rejection. The King took the position that on matters of internal concern he must follow the sovereign will of the people; but that on questions of foreign policy supreme authority rested with him alone, and that he was responsible only to God. This was certainly a startling departure from King George's conception of constitutional monarchy. There is no doubt that at the beginning of the war public opinion was overwhelmingly favorable to the western Allies.

In December, 1914, after Turkey had become a belligerent on the German side, Great Britain and France asked Greece to join them in the struggle and promised to give her Northern Epirus in compensation. Further territorial concessions were offered in January, 1915, this time in Asia Minor, but not clearly specified. Venizelos was eager to have Greece cast her lot with the Allies, but the King and the General Staff prevailed in favor of delay. When the expedition against the Dardanelles was being prepared early in 1915, Venizelos believed a golden opportunity lay open to his country, and in a series of three masterly analytical memoranda to the King he proposed that Greece should participate to the extent of an army corps. Two brown councils were held under the presidency of the King, and the second, composed of all former Prime Ministers and the chief political leaders, unanimously approved a somewhat reduced project in which Greek participation was cut down to one division. King Constantine, however, rejected even this, and on March 6, 1915, Venizelos was obliged to resign. He was succeeded as Premier by D. Gounaris under whom the Chamber was dissolved and new elections proclaimed for June 13.

After an intensive election campaign, in which Venizelos himself took no active part, while the royalist factions posed the issue squarely before
the people as a choice between Venizelos and certain war, on the one hand, and the King and peace, on the other, the returns gave the Cretan leader a clear majority of 58, with a total of 184 deputies against a combined opposition of 126. On the pretext that the illness of the King forbade any change in governmental policy, and in spite of a provision of the constitution which prescribed that a new chamber must be called into session within 45 days of the election, Venizelos was prevented from taking office as Prime Minister until August 22, and in the interval Royalist and German propaganda was intensified to the utmost in an effort to change public opinion.

The next crisis was caused by the imminent entry of Bulgaria into the war on the German side, and the consequent appeal from Serbia for aid, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of June 1, 1913. To make good Serbia's inability to provide 150,000 troops as stipulated in the military agreement accompanying the treaty, Great Britain and France were asked and undertook to provide them. Venizelos, believing he had persuaded the King to agree in principle to this proposal, requested the Allies to carry out the undertaking; in the Chamber he declared that Greece would meet her treaty obligation to Serbia, and if in the course of these operations Greek forces encountered Germans they would act as honor demanded. King Constantine thereupon, October 5, 1915, the very day Allied troops began to disembark at Salonica, once again dismissed Venizelos, although the latter had won the election of June 13 on the specific issue of his policy, which had received the support of the people.

He was now succeeded by Alexander Zaimis to whom on October 7 Great Britain offered Cyprus if Greece would join in the war and send help to Serbia -- an offer that was declined -- On November 7 Zaimis resigned, making way for Stephanos Skouloudis, under whom new elections were held on December 19.
Venizelos and his party abstained from these elections on the ground that they were unconstitutional; and the total popular vote was only 200,000 in comparison with the 750,000 recorded in the preceding ballot of June 13. During the winter of 1915-16 the Austro-German and Bulgarian forces swept through Servia, and the heroic remnants of the Serb army retreating through the Albanian mountains to the sea were transported for temporary refuge to Corfu, which the Allies had occupied. This epic retreat and its harrowing accompaniment of suffering stirred public opinion in Greece both to sympathy and fear.

Meanwhile the Allied troops which had been landed at Salonica to help the Serbs had been greatly reinforced and had become a formidable expeditionary force. The immediate emergency they had come to face had been swallowed up in the Serbian retreat, but the Allies decided to maintain their pressure on this newly constituted Balkan front, though it involved numerous political complications.

In the early part of 1916 there were many demands and counterdemands on Greece by the Allies and the Central Powers. Skouloudis declined to permit the Allies to transport the reconstituted Serb army across Greek territory to Salonica. But on May 25 he authorized the surrender to the Germans and Bulgars of Fort Roupel, a key stronghold on the Greco-Bulgarian border; and this was an episode which touched the pride of, and aroused no little resentment among, the Greek people. When on June 21 the Allies presented a stern note demanding immediate demobilization of the Greek army, dissolution of the Chamber, and the holding of new elections, Skouloudis resigned. Zeimi again became Prime Minister on June 23, and demobilization was begun; but elections were deferred when in July and August the Bulgarians invaded and occupied Eastern Macedonia, including the port of Kavalla, where 8,000 Greek troops gave themselves up and were sent to an internment camp in Germany.
This was another great blow to Greek national pride. Rumania's entry into the war on the side of the Allies on August 27 caused intense excitement and unrest in Greece, and Zeimis resigned September 11. He was followed as Prime Minister September 16 by N. Kalogeropoulos, who, however, since he failed to obtain recognition from the Allies, yielded his place to Spyridon Lembros October 10.

Meanwhile Venizelos, convinced that the salvation of his country was at stake and seeing no possible alternative action, departed from Athens September 25, put himself at the head of a revolutionary movement, and in collaboration with Admiral Koundouriotis and General Denglis set up a provisional government in Salonika which at once began to collect and organize an army and promptly declared war on Bulgaria and Germany. He had the support of Crete, most of the Aegean islands, and the new provinces, while the greater part of Old Greece remained faithful to the royalist government in Athens.

The Allies, seeking to prevent civil war, established a neutral zone between the two Greek regimes. At the same time in order to eliminate potential danger to their expeditionary force in Macedonia they brought heavy pressure to bear on the Athens Government, demanding further disarmament, the imposition of various controls, and the surrender of certain kinds of military equipment. A small battle which developed in the approaches to Athens on December 1 when a landing party of British, French, and Italian detachments was fired on, led to a brief naval bombardment, followed by a severe ultimatum and a blockade. The royalists, whose most violent elements had at once turned to assaults on the leading Venizelist leaders in Athens and the looting of Venizelist houses, yielded to all demands of the ultimatum, and agreed to move their entire army to the Peloponnese.
Great Britain formally recognized the Provisional Government on December 19, and appointed Lord Granville as diplomatic representative in Salonica. During the winter the revolutionary movement was strengthened through the acquisition of some further islands, while the Allies discussed among themselves what measures they should take for the definitive settlement of the intolerable situation in Greece. The problem of reaching an agreement was difficult, for Italy's policy was vigorously opposed to Venizelos since she feared he might be able to create a large and powerful Greek state which would be a bar to Italian expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean; while Russia was hostile to any action that tended to set up Greece as a possible rival claimant to her interests in the Dardanelles and Constantinople.

Finally after months of discussion among themselves, and of constant friction with the government in Athens, and after the accession of Zaimis once again to the premiership on May 2, 1917, the Allies sent out as High Commissioner M. Jonnart to solve the problem. His demand that King Constantine abdicate was accepted on June 12, and on the 14th the king departed for Switzerland, leaving his second son Alexander as his successor. Alexander was chosen by the Allies, since it was felt that he would be much easier to control than his older and more serious and stubborn brother George. Some of the principal Royalist politicians were exiled to Corsica; and on June 27 Venizelos was reinstalled as Prime Minister in Athens. He dissolved the Royalist Chamber on December 19, 1915, as unconstitutional, and recalled to life that of June 13, 1915, in which he had a substantial majority. On December 29 he declared war on the Central Powers and Bulgaria. He then set to work to remobilize and reorganize the Greek army, and was ultimately able to put ten fully equipped divisions into the field to aid the Allies on the Macedonian front. They proved to be a decisive factor in the campaign and assisted materially in winning the victories
which at last broke the Axis front in Macedonia and compelled Bulgaria to
ask for an armistice on September 28, 1918. The break-through on this front
was the first element in the military collapse of the Central Powers, which led to the end of the-

The armistice with Turkey, signed at Mudros on October 30, soon followed,
preceding by twelve days the German capitulation on the western front, at

Compiègne.

At the peace conference at Paris, 1919, Venizelos,

With the opening of the peace negotiations at Paris in January, 1919,-

Venizelos was obliged to entrust to subordinates the internal administration
of the country while he himself spent the greater part of the ensuing twenty-
months abroad attending conferences after conference as the representative of
Greece. His constructive statesmanship, ability to resolve complex questions
into their clear essentials, his refreshing directness and frankness, and his
powerful personality raised him quickly to a high and influential place in
the councils of the world's leaders. His cogent arguments as a vigorous
persuasive advocate of Greek claims led to settlements greatly advantageous to
his country. By the Treaty of Neuilly, November 27, 1919, Bulgaria relinquished
to Greece the whole of Western Thrace and Eastern Macedonia with their Aegean
ports, and by the Treaty of Sévres, August 19, 1920, Turkey gave up on the
which yielded extensive territory to the Greeks both in Europe and
European side the Gallipoli peninsula and Eastern Thrace almost up to the
in Asia Minor, was never ratified.

gates of Constantinople, and in Asia Minor, Smyrna, with an extensive hinter-

land populated by many hundred thousand Greeks. In connection with this later-
treaty Venizelos was even able to reach an agreement with Italy for thecession
to Greece of the Dodecanese (except Rhodes, which was to be free, after a
period of years and under certain conditions, to vote on the question of union
with the motherland), as well as an understanding with regard to the Greco-
Albanian boundary. Neither the Treaty of Sévres nor the agreement with Italy
was subsequently ratified.
Meanwhile, in April 1919, with the approval and encouragement of Great Britain and France, and perhaps foretelling an Italian move, Venizelos had sent an expeditionary force into Asia Minor which had occupied Smyrna and its vilayet. Later, on May 11, 1920, Greece was given a mandate by the Supreme Council at Spa to occupy Thrace and northwestern Anatolia, as well as the region of Smyrna. In Asia Minor she confronted a Turkish nationalist regime under Mustafa Kemal Pasha, while the legal Ottoman government still maintained a precarious existence in Constantinople.

It was with great international prestige and with impressive territorial gains, which more than doubled the domain and population of Greece since his assumption of the premiership, that Venizelos returned to Athens (after having been wounded at Paris by two Greek naval officers of royalist views in an unsuccessful attempt at assassination) to receive the welcome of his countrymen. The chamber, before which he laid the two treaties, voted him the thanks of the nation.

Eager to get back to a normal constitutional basis (since the revived parliament of June 13, 1915, had now been in session more than five years), and respecting a promise he had made to the royalists to call for an expression of popular will as soon as it became possible, Venizelos now dissolved the chambers and, stipulating only that the return of King Constantine was not to be an issue, proclaimed elections for November 14, 1920. He felt confident that his unparalleled success in the peace conferences would win him an unquestionable verdict of popular approval. He certainly underestimated the strength of dissatisfaction and ill will which had been aroused by the incompetent and autocratic conduct of his deputies who had governed the country badly during his long absence and who had on occasions weekly permitted their more violent followers to get out of hand. War weariness and ennui with hearing their Prime Minister constantly praised abroad also played
their part. But the decisive factor in the campaign was undoubtedly the death of King Alexander, who on October 25, just twenty days before voting day, succumbed to an infection that resulted from the bite of a pet monkey. This unforeseen event inevitably introduced as the principal issue of the election the question of the succession to the throne. In the short time available Venizelos could find no suitable candidate to offer, while the royalists joyfully seized the opportunity to call for the return of King Constantine. Even so, it was a surprise to the political world to find, when the ballots were counted, that although the Venizelist Liberals, with 120 seats in a chamber of 370, still constituted the largest single party, the combined royalists had won a substantial victory.

Venizelos retired from office and withdrew from politics and his country, while D. Rallis succeeded as Premier. The new government first appointed Queen Olga Regent to replace Admiral Kountouriotis who had been temporarily installed in that position by Venizelos; then held a plebiscite on December 5 in which King Constantine by a tremendous majority was recalled to the throne.

He returned to Athens December 19 and was received with a great popular demonstration. This unexpected turn of events at once alienated the sympathy of France and Great Britain, which had ample cause to remember the King's hostile attitude toward them during the war. They issued a warning to the Greek people before the plebiscite, and served notice after it, that they no longer considered themselves bound by their agreements with Venizelos to provide economic aid to Greece.

The Rallis government consequently found itself confronted by a situation of great difficulty, with a full-scale war still on its hands in Asia Minor -- a war which Royalist spokesmen had previously denounced as a foolish colonial venture of Venizelos, and of which they thoroughly disapproved -- and with all external sources of financial help cut off. The next year and a half were
spent in vain attempts, under one Prime Minister after another (Dallis, 12, Kelegeropoulos, Bonar bills, Tsotopopoulos,none of whom dared risk popular displeasure by giving up the war) to obtain loans in England and France. In June, 1921, after the Greek government had rejected an Allied offer to mediate and try to bring about a peaceful settlement without further fighting, a costly offensive was launched, in the presence of the King himself, against Kemal's army in the interior of Asia Minor. After bitter and heroic fighting over an incredibly difficult terrain, hundreds of miles away from its main bases and with altogether inadequate supply-lines, the Greek army was finally halted in August on the banks of the Sakarya River, almost within sight of Ankara. It was a magnificent military achievement to have penetrated so deeply into the heart of Asia Minor and to have come within a hair's breadth of success; only complete exhaustion coupled with the stubborn, desperate resistance directed by Kemal, deprived the Greeks of victory. A retreat to the earlier positions along the line Eskikébir--Afyon Karahissar followed in September. On November 9, 1921, the conference of Ambassadors of the Powers to whom the question had been referred, rendered a decision awarding Northern Syris to Albania. A forced internal loan, which affected almost the entire population on April 3, 1922, added to the discomfort and dissatisfaction within the country.

Meanwhile the army began to realize that the Allies, who had encouraged the Greeks to embark on the Anatolian venture and had promised to give them support, had withdrawn their help and sympathy and were turning with favor toward the enemy. At the same time the long delay and uncertainty, defeatist propaganda, a growing shortage of supplies and munitions, while the Turks were being generously accommodated in such matters by France and Italy, and sweeping replacements of Venizelist by royalist officers led to some disaffection and a lowering of morale in the Greek ranks. Finally, late in July, 1922, a powerful attack by Kemal resulted in a demoralizing defeat for the Greeks;
and further Turkish pressure toward the end of August turned retreat into a rout and disaster. The Greek forces for the most part abandoned their equipment and fled before the advancing Turks; and only a few units were able to retire in order. On September 10 the Turks entered Smyrna, and four days later the entire Greek quarter was destroyed in a devastating fire. Thousands upon thousands of the Greek civil population, leaving all their possessions behind, escaped by whatever means they could find, and the nearby Greek islands as well as the mainland were flooded by an overwhelming influx of refugees. Before this stream dried up, more than a million persons, chiefly of Greek stock, had sought and obtained refuge on Hellenic soil. The commanders of American destroyers stationed at Smyrna transported many of the unfortunate refugees to places of safety in the Greek islands.

The small part of the army which had succeeded in maintaining its entity, stopping only long enough on Chios and Mitylene to reorganize, proceeded to Larissa, whence it sent an ultimatum to Athens (where the government had already resigned on September 1) and a new cabinet had been formed by Trikoupis, demanding the immediate abdication of King Constantine. Since no alternative presented itself, the demand was accepted; and the King, cast in the role of a scapegoat, and this time expelled by his own people, ended his days in exile, leaving the crown to his eldest son George, and departed on September 27 for Sicily, where he died at Palermo January 11, 1923.

The revolutionary movement under Colonels Plastiras and Konstas took control of the country, and Charalambis was Prime Minister for a day and was followed by Kondilis who held office provisionally while efforts were being made to find a politician enjoying public confidence to organize a government. Zeising declined, and eventually on November 27, Constanas took over the Premiership, while Plastiras became Head of the State. In the meantime, Greece
continued for a time to hold one piece of territory which might have been useful when the terms of the peace came to be discussed in the conference that opened at Lausanne November 29, 1922. This was Eastern Thrace, where the army maintained its positions firmly until compelled by an Allied ultimatum, the Greek army, which was holding Eastern Thrace under the command of General Pangalos, this army probably could have and would have taken Constantinople, had the Allies permitted; instead they categorically vetoed the proposal.

In Athens a revolutionary Commission of Inquiry charged the resigned royalist government with criminal responsibility for the disaster in Asia Minor, and seven Ministers along with the Commanding General were speedily brought to trial before a special court martial of eleven members. After proceedings lasting two weeks the accused were found guilty, including the General, were sentenced to death and promptly shot by a firing squad on November 25. The execution of five political leaders, including three former Prime Ministers and two ex-Ministers, not only caused a painful sensation within Greece itself but was followed by a reaction highly unfavorable to Greece on the part of public opinion in Europe. Great Britain broke off diplomatic relations with the revolutionary government. Venizelos' stand, too, came in for some criticism as representative of Greece at the Lausanne Conference, where peace was being negotiated, he had refused to intervene while the trial was in progress, and his telegraphic protest when the verdict was published reached Athens too late. The execution of the Ministers was not, however, directly chargeable to Venizelists' revenge on the royalists; for only two members of the court of eleven that passed the sentence were Venizelist officers. This harsh and unprecedented treatment of political officials, whether guilty or not, not only left a blot on Greece's record, but deepened the rift dividing the Greek people and sowed the seeds of
further personal feuds and hatreds which continued to cause trouble in the years that followed.

The new regime was confronted by innumerable problems. Among these two most urgent were the negotiation of a treaty of peace with Turkey and the organization of constructive measures to care for the hundreds of thousands of helpless refugees who had already come and continued to pour into Greece from Turkey in Asia. The peace conference met at Lausanne November 29, 1922, and, in addition to the Allies besides the belligerents, the Greeks and the United States were represented. With some interruptions caused by excessive Turkish demands, the conference prolonged its labors until July 24, 1923, when the treaty was signed. By the terms of this agreement which fixed the Maritza River as the boundary; Greece gave up all of Eastern Thrace, returned to Turkey all the islands of Imbros and Tenedos, and abandoned all claims to territory in Asia Minor. At the same time Turkey recognized Italian sovereignty over the Dodonessas and Kastellorizo; while Italy abrogated her commitments of August 10, 1920, to cede these islands to Greece.

On January 30, 1923, in The Lausanne Conference an agreement was made for an exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, With some supplementary attachments of July 24, it provided that all Moslems residing in Greece, except those in Western Thrace, should be removed to Turkey, while all Greeks living in Turkey, except those "established" in Constantinople before October 30, 1918, should be shifted to Greece. The respective governments were to take over the lands and other property left behind by those who departed, and there was to be an ultimate balancing of accounts. In order to help Greece deal with the problem of caring for the refugees thus thrust upon her to the number of more than one million, the League of Nations in a protocol signed at Geneva September 29, 1923, established a Refugee Settlement Commission, composed of two foreign and two Greek members -- appointed respectively by the League.
and the Greek government -- to operate under the auspices of the League, which also extended its sponsorship to a loan needed by Greece to finance the undertaking. The protocol stipulated that one of the foreign members, and president of the Commission, must be an American. Three American appointees, successively rendered distinguished services in this position: Henry Morgenthau, from September 29, 1923, to December 1, 1924; Charles P. Howland, from February 7, 1925, to September, 1926; and Charles E. Eddy, from October 15, 1926, to 1930 when the work of the Commission ended. Sir John Campbell and later Sir John Hope-Simpson were British members of the Commission who contributed greatly to its success. Beginning its activity in Greece on November 11, 1923, and building up a large and competent Greek staff, the organization spent seven years in a carefully planned intensive effort which brought about the permanent settlement of nearly one million refugees in rural districts and in urban communities.

This obligatory exchange of nationals, which meant the uprooting of hundreds of thousands of unoffending families, the shattering of their whole scheme of life, and the breaking of age-old associations and connections, was admittedly an extreme and harsh measure, causing incalculable individual hardship and suffering; but under the circumstances no other solution seemed adequate or possible. The departure of the Moslems and to a great extent also of the Slavic-speaking elements in the northern provinces -- in conformity with a similar reciprocal agreement contained in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria signed at Neuilly November 27, 1927 -- rendered one invaluable service to the Greek state, at any rate; for when the exchange had been completed and the incoming settlers of Greek race had been established on the vacated lands, Greece found herself occupied by an almost homogeneous population of Hellenic stock and of the Eastern Orthodox faith. The achievement of absorbing so quickly a sudden increment amounting to one quarter of the country's previous inhabitants is one that deserves the highest admiration. The new blood has also in many ways proved beneficial to Greece.
While this great work was getting under way, the political leaders of the state were concerned with many other matters. A reform of the calendar, which probably could have been brought about only by a revolutionary regime, was affected when the Gregorian calendar was officially adopted on February 16, 1923, which became March 1. This change finally received the sanction of the Church when approved by the Ecumenical Synod on March 14, 1924.

An incident precipitated by Italy aroused no little excitement and indignation. On August 27, 1923, an Italian General Tellini and some members of his staff, engaged in delimiting the Greco-Albanian boundary, were murdered just inside the Greek frontier. Before the facts could be ascertained by investigation, Mussolini in an immediate ultimatum demanded satisfaction and a large indemnity; and, dissatisfied with the conciliatory Greek reply, directed the Italian fleet at once to seize Corfu. After a bombardment of the unfortified town by which Italian and Greek refugees were killed, the city was occupied on August 31. Greece appealed to the League of Nations, which in due course rendered judgment condemning Greece to pay an indemnity of 50 million lira, but requiring the Italians to evacuate Corfu, which they did on September 27.

The problem of returning to a constitutional regime also engaged the attention of the revolutionary government. Taking advantage of the uncertainties of the situation, a group of high army officers, including Colonel John Metaxas, attempted a royalist counter revolt on October 21. Vigorous effective action, especially on the part of General Kondyli, suppressed the rising in Macedonia and in Attica within a week; but it caused a surge of republican sentiment in the country and particularly in the army. A general election was held on December 16 from which the royalists abstained: it yielded a chamber in which the Venizelist Liberals held a large majority over the more extreme republicans.
Strong antimonarchist feeling in the army and navy led Colonel Konatas to advise King George to leave the country for a time while the constitutional issue was being decided. The King promptly departed on December 19, and on the following day Admiral Kountouriotes was appointed and took the oath as regent.

After a long sojourn abroad, and in response to an invitation from all parties in the Chamber, Venizelos now returned to Greece on January 4, 1924. Preferring to play the part of a political adviser, he at first declined the premiership; but yielding to pressure of circumstances he was soon induced to become Prime Minister again. Disagreements with the more radical Republican elements in the Chamber affected his health and spirits and on February 4 he resigned the office to his former aide-lieutenant, George Kaphandes, and soon presently withdrew from the country. Kaphandes in turn gave way in a few weeks, on March 9, to Alexander Papanastassius, an ardent Republican, who took office, and thereafter the more extreme Republicans assumed control, and on March 10. On March 25, Greek Independence Day, he persuaded the Chamber to pass an act abolishing the monarchy and proclaiming Greece a republic, and the decision was ratified by a large popular majority (758,742 to 325,322) popular in a plebiscite, held on April 13. Admiral Kountouriotes was named President of the Republic.

A National Assembly, convened May 19, undertook the task of framing the new constitution a draft of which had been prepared by a committee; but discussion of minor details caused difficulties and delays. In July disagreements forced Papanastassius to resign, and he was succeeded by T. Sophoulis, who in October was followed by A. Michalekopoulos as Prime Minister. The latter retained power through the ensuing eight months, a period of relative quiet, very useful to the country. A notable event of this administration was the signing of a contract with an American engineering firm, the Olen Company, for the con-
vention of a modern system of water supply for Athens, involving the erection of a great dam and the creation of an artificial lake as a reservoir in the hills above Marathon.

On June 25, 1925, General Pangalos by a bold and bloodless coup d'état made himself Premier and secured a vote of confidence from the Chamber, which thereupon adjourned until October 15, leaving a parliamentary committee empowered to pass needed legislation, subject to later approval. In October, however, Pangalos dissolved the Chamber. He published an edited version of the new constitution, in 117 articles, which had not yet been approved by the Assembly. Concentrating all power in his own hands, he declared himself dictator on January 3, 1926, and suppressed the new constitution. Admiral Kountouriotis, displeased with the turn of events, resigned as President on March 19. Pangalos, by somewhat devious manoeuvres, had himself chosen President in an unopposed election held on two Sundays in April; and after a long search, found a subservient Prime Minister in a former moderate royalist, Vateras.

In the summer of 1926 a powerful personality re-entered the political arena, and, without bloodshed in a swift military coup, deposed the dictator, Pangalos. This was General Kondylis, who had already on previous occasions played the part of Deus ex machina. He announced that his purpose was to get Greece back on a proper constitutional course, and that after holding new elections as soon as possible, he would turn the government over to the party designated at the polls. Admiral Kountouriotis on August 24 consented to resume his position as President of the Republic. In sharp fighting on September 9, which resulted in many casualties, Kondylis crushed the Republican Guard, a bodyguard organized by Pangalos, but which had assisted in the overthrow of the latter. One of its leaders was Colonel N. Zervas who was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.

After Kondylis had proclaimed a second version of the new constitution—
were held on November 7 under the system of proportional representation, which
Kondylis imposed by decree. The returns gave the three different republicans
parties together 126 seats, the two former royalist groups 63 and 54 respectively,
or a combined strength of 117; the communists won 9 seats, and 34 went to
various other small parties or independents. Since no party was strong enough
alone to undertake the task, an ecumenical cabinet was formed under A. Zeimis
which took office December 4, when Kondylis, true to his promise, retired to
private life.

The ecumenical government, becoming a coalition cabinet after reorganiza-
tions caused by the resignation of the representatives of the Populist-
An all-party government was formed in August 1927 and
Party on August 11, 1927, the withdrawal of Hapaxentasis on February 2,
1928, and of C. Kaphenderis on May 25, remained in office until July 2, 1928,
This relatively long tenure, much
a period of 19 months, during which constructive work was done in an atmosphere
of relative calm and Greek international finances, in particular, were
placed on an orderly basis through debt settlements negotiated with Great
Britain, the United States, and France under the able administration of George
Kaphenderis, Minister of Finance. Venizelos returned to Greece on April 18,
1927, and took up his residence in retirement in Crete. On June 2 after con-
siderable pressure had been exerted by the President of the Republic to
accelerate proceedings, the new republican constitution was at last adopted --
a highly democratic and liberal charter.

Continuing disagreements in the cabinet finally led to a crisis, and it
was thought advisable to revert to party government. Venizelos, who had
resumed leadership of the Liberal Party and returned to active political life,
became Prime Minister July 3. The Chamber was dissolved and a general elec-
tion was held August 19 on the basis of the majority system and not on the
result was that of proportional representation. Venizelos won a sweeping victory, giving him
203 Liberal and Republican deputies in a chamber of 240. He formed a cabinet which with some replacements of personnel maintained itself in power nearly four years until May 21, 1932, the longest consecutive tenure of any government since Venizelos' first accession to the premiership in 1910. Like the preceding administration, this was a welcome interlude from the internal disorders and revolutions which had troubled the country in the recent past. Though disillusioned by the treatment accorded him since 1920, wearied by disappointments, stricken by occasional illness, and by no means the vigorous, enthusiastic idealist who carried all before him in 1910, Venizelos gave the country a good stable government, and much progress was recorded in the settlement of many problems in international relations as well as on the domestic scene.

In conformity with the provisions of the new constitution establishing a second legislative body, a senate was constituted and began to function as a conservative check on the lower chamber. In its composition it included a heavy majority of Venizelistos, seated April 21, 1929, for long terms. The two chambers in joint session on June 3 elected Admiral Koutrouliotes President of the Republic, thus giving him the mantle of constitutionality. Some six months later he retired, and on December 14 A. Zaimis was chosen as his successor.

In 1930 the immense task of the Refugee Settlement Commission was nearly completed, with the establishment of almost one million refugees in town and country, that the Commission could wind up its affairs and leave to responsible officials of the Greek Government what continuing problems still remained unadjudicated. In the economic life of the country steady advance and development were manifest, although Greece felt acutely the effects of
the unparalleled worldwide depression that set in during 1929, which seriously affected Greece's ability to pay the interest on her foreign loans, a question destined to become more and more vexatious. The great project undertaken by the American Union Company for providing Athens with a modern water supply was now brought to completion at this time.

In the realm of foreign affairs, Venizelos strove to improve the relations of Greece with her neighbors. Already on September 23, 1928, he was able, having gone to Rome for that purpose, to sign with Mussolini a treaty of friendship and conciliation between Italy and Greece. By quiet persistent efforts and a convincing demonstration of peaceful intentions, capped by a personal visit to Athens in October 1930, which was returned the following year when Ismet Pasha, the Turkish Prime Minister, came to Athens, he finally succeeded in settling all serious outstanding problems with Turkey, and in creating a real basis of official friendship, not merely formal, but even cordial, between the two states. With Yugoslavia, too, Venizelos was able to come to amicable agreement on many questions that had long been troublesome: a free zone in the port of Salonica under Greek sovereignty, but with various privileges, was made available to Yugoslavia on generous terms, along with special facilities in the use of the railway to the frontier station of Chevgheli, though the line itself remained in the possession of the Greek State. The time had not yet come to reach a friendly understanding with Bulgaria; for the Bulgarians still cherished too strong a resentment toward Greece because of the territorial awards made by the Treaty of Neuilly to permit a real reconciliation.

During this period an unofficial movement for better mutual understanding and a closer association of the Balkan States, with a view toward a possible ultimate federation of some kind, gathered increasing momentum. Promoted enthusiastically by Alexander Papanastassiou, leader of the idealist Greek Republican, it found support in Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Romania; and
annual Balkan conferences began to be held, the first in Athens in October, 1930, the second in Constantinople a year later. Efforts were made to bring Bulgaria into the association, but the latter was not yet ready to join wholeheartedly in the aims of the movement.

Increasing opposition in the Chamber, especially concerning the system of proportional representation as used in elections, and to a proposal to restrict the freedom of the press, led to Venizelos' resignation on May 21, 1932. After two successive elections, General Plastiras, fearing that the Royalists would overthrow the Republic, attempted a revolutionary coup. It failed and he fled the country. But his hasty, unconstitutional action once again stirred ill will and hard feelings, and dealt a blow at the very form of regime he was trying to safeguard.

Charges and counter charges were now rife concerning the alleged share of Venizelos in the Plastiras rising. Finally a group of gangsters in a car made a murderous attack on Mr. and Mrs. Venizelos. The police failed to make an arrest, reporting that the assailants could not be traced, while Venizelists asserted that the perpetrators were well known and had the protection of a high police official. Disorderly scenes in the Chamber induced Venizelos and his supporters to withdraw from its sessions, and they threatened to stay away until the government would guarantee their security and the exercise of their rights. Tsaldaris, the new premier, was genuinely desirous of a reconciliation, and solved some of the difficulties by declaring a general amnesty.

In the international field, Tsaldaris continued the conciliatory policies of his predecessor. He concluded a Greco-Turkish pact of friendship, the foundation for which had been laid by Venizelos in 1930.
government also discussed questions with Yugoslavia and made trade agreements with Soviet Russia and Albania.

Most of the year 1934 was taken up with bitter party strife; the Populist government having control of the Chamber being in constant conflict with the Venizelists who held a majority in the Senate. In a temporary truce on October 19, in a joint meeting of Senate and Chamber, Zaimis was elected for another six-year term as President of the Republic. Dissatisfied with the failure of the government to apprehend and punish his attackers, Venizelos in October withdrew again from the Chamber and sought retirement in Crete.

So far as Greece's relations with her neighbors were concerned, the most important event of 1934 was the signature on February 9 of a Balkan pact in which Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Rumania mutually guaranteed the security of the existing Balkan frontiers, and agreed to consult one another on all problems affecting their respective interests. Bulgaria and Albania refused to join the agreement, though Bulgaria declared her readiness to cooperate in a pact of non-aggression.

On March 1, 1935, the strife between the two parties in Greece came to a head in another revolutionary movement led by extreme Republican elements in the army and the navy, who were convinced that their opponents were plotting to overturn the republic and re-introduce the monarchical system. It was an act that inevitably hastened the event they aimed to forestall. By a tragic mistake of judgment -- in the opinion of many of his friends -- Venizelos, who apparently had little or nothing to do with the planning of the insurrection, put himself at its head when it had already become apparent that it was doomed to failure. Perhaps, as asserted by some of his defenders, he did so in order to take upon himself the chief responsibility and thereby relieve some of his followers of severe punishment. In any case, by vigorous measures, in which General Kondylis again played a leading part, the government was able
speedily to suppress the revolt, while Venizelos and many of his companions escaped to Cassos and Rhodes. During the next few months the government gave its chief attention to investigations and the framing of measures for the exemplary punishment of the guilty. Two generals and one or two other officers were condemned to death and executed, but nearly all the ringleaders had succeeded in escaping abroad. Many officers of the armed forces and of the civil service were dismissed, and there was a general hue and cry against the Venizelists. The Senate, which was still controlled by the Liberals and Republicans and which had offered considerable opposition to the government’s program, was abolished on April 1 by a vote of the Chamber. That body itself was then dissolved and new elections were proclaimed.

After the elections, in which the Republicans abstained, Tsaldaris They were held on June 9, with the Republican elements abstaining; and the Royalists won 243 seats, General Kondylis’ party 37, General Mavrommatis 7, while 6 independents were also elected. This Chamber met on July 1, calling itself a National Assembly, and authorized the government at its convenience to conduct a plebiscite. Yielding before the criticism and pressure of the ardent extreme Royalist faction, Tsaldaris resigned on October 10, and was succeeded as Premier by General Kondylis, who was also named Regent. Kondylis, who on entering politics had been an uncompromising republican, had now become a convinced monarchist. In response to his urging, the Assembly declared Greece to be again a monarchy, but it was agreed that the return of the King should be deferred until the verdict of the people was heard. The plebiscite, held on November 3, and very efficiently organized by the army, gave an overwhelming majority for the restoration to his throne of King George, who since his exile in 1923 had been living for the most part in England.

The King returned to Athens November 25 and was welcomed by a popular demonstration. In his first proclamation he made it clear that he proposed to follow a strictly constitutional course, and that his aim was to reconcile
political discords and unite the country. With this purpose he insisted --
against the vigorous advice of General Kondylis -- on declaring a general
amnesty, not excluding Venizelos himself. Kondylis, in violent disagreement
with this policy, resigned, and was replaced as Prime Minister by Constantine
Demertzis who headed a non-partisan cabinet. It dissolved the Assembly
and fixed new elections for January 26, 1926. Venizelos strongly exhorted the Liberal
Party to accept the reestablishment of the monarchy, to take part in the
elections, and to cooperate fully in the restoration of national harmony and
unity.

The system of proportional representation was still prescribed, and the
elections, which passed off quietly and without untoward incidents, gave no
party a working majority. Indeed the situation was only further complicated
since the Liberals, now under the leadership of Sophoulis, won 127 seats and
with the 15 Republicans and Agrarians, had a total of 142 deputies; while the
Populists under Tsaldaris had 69, and with the 63 more strongly Royalist
supporters of Kondylis and Theotokis, 7 of Metaxas, and 4 Macedonian
Monarchists had an aggregate of 143. This situation left the Communists, who had
elected 15 deputies, with an actual balance of power in the Chamber of 300.

Neither the Royalist nor the Liberal politicians dared to take the responsibility of making
a deal with the Communists for their parliamentary support.

This was the first time that the Communist party made itself felt to any
appreciable extent in Greek politics. The whole Communist strength was
concentrated in the north of Greece in the tobacco districts, where thousands
of refugees lived on the seasonal employment of tobacco picking and were in
their idle months easy prey for international communist organizers. The latter,
being the most experienced saboteurs and subversive leaders to be found in
Greece at this period, became the leaders of the "resistance" groups later on.
One of them was Markos Vafiades, the "General" Markos who blossomed forth as

After the elections in January, 1936, many weeks were spent in fruitless discussions and negotiations seeking a workable combination. Sophoulis was chosen President of the Chamber, and finally on March 15, Demertzis succeeded in constituting a cabinet, with General Metaxas as Deputy Prime Minister. The latter became Premier when Demertzis died on April 13. Like its predecessor, this, too, was frankly a "service" government, the understanding being that new elections would be held in October, when it was hoped that one party or the other would attain a workable majority. The Chamber met and gave the government a vote of confidence, then recessed for 5 months, leaving as its representative a large parliamentary committee with the approval of which, and subject to ultimate ratification, the government was authorized to issue legislative decrees necessary to carry on the administration.

During the early months of 1936 several of the Greek political parties lost their leaders through death. General Kondylis died on January 31; Venizelos (who had relinquished leadership of the Liberal Party, but was still the outstanding political figure in Greek politics) on March 18 at Paris; Demertzis on April 13; and Tsaldaris on May 16. None left behind a young and vigorous successor with the prestige and capacity of a magnetic leader; and the way was thus clear for General Metaxas, whose small party had only 7 representatives in the dissolved Chamber.

Early in May Metaxas attended the Seventh Balkan Conference, held at Belgrade, where he endeavored to limit Greece's obligations under the Balkan Pact. More momentous in its influence on Greece's economic position was the visit to Athens in June of Dr. Schacht, German Minister of Economics, since it resulted in a trade agreement by which a large part of Greece's tobacco and mineral production was diverted to Germany in exchange for manufactured goods to be purchased there. Greece in this way soon came to be enmeshed in the German
economic web, and her imports from Great Britain and the United States fell off sharply.
Metaxas encountered much difficulty with the parliamentary committee appointed to act during the Chamber's recess. The committee, which the political parties kept alive through disagreements and dissensions to an extent that blocked constructive legislation, also hampered the government in its efforts to deal with labor troubles and strikes. A great strike, undoubtedly fomented by communist agitators, who employed all their well-known tactics of sabotage and subversion, broke out in northern Greece, and was only ended after considerable bloodshed, by the use of military and naval forces. Proposed action by the government to make arbitration compulsory and to control the funds of labor unions led the union leaders to retaliate by announcing a general strike for August 5, 1936.

Metaxas thereupon took matters into his own hands. On August 4, in a series of decrees which he persuaded King George to sign, he proclaimed martial law, dissolved the Chamber (which was in recess), and made himself dictator. He quickly consolidated his position, abolished parliamentary government, outlawed all political parties, and set up a frankly totalitarian regime, which he maintained until his death on January 29, 1941. From the outset he made it clear that he proposed to govern in the best interests of the people and the country, as he conceived them, and that he would tolerate no opposition. He laid out a broad program of reform in all the major fields of public activity. In one sphere he envisaged a substantial increase in the efficiency and the power of the armed forces both on land and sea (which he sternly interdicted from interference in political matters) and he initiated the construction of a new fortified line of defense along the northern frontiers. He also sponsored measures to promote industrial growth and expansion and to stimulate production; and he embarked on a long-term project for the improvement of communications through the building of roads. Taxes were raised and more effective methods
of collecting them were introduced, though no change to a more equitable system of assessment was attempted. K large loan was obtained from the German government, and through an extension of the trade agreement Greece became more and more dependent on the German economic system. In the field of labor, Metaxas took strong paternalistic action: he fixed minimum wages, established an eight-hour day, with certain guaranteed holidays, initiated a form of health insurance, and imposed obligatory arbitration in all disputes between capital and labor, to prevent industrial strikes. He also invoked vigorous measures against communist agitation and propaganda. At the same time, he conciliated many of the recently settled refugees by substantially lightening the burden of the debts they owed the Greek state for their lands and houses.

It is perhaps still too early for a final verdict on General Metaxas, but the following critical appraisal by an impartial and independent foreign observer, who came to know him well, is highly illuminating.

"Although no politician, Metaxas was by all odds the strongest character and the ablest man in Greek public life at this time. He was not a pro-German, although he had studied in Germany, and was known as "der Klein Molke." and he was not influenced by Hitler. He was a student of history, and the ideas he tried to put into practice during his dictatorship had been thought out by him years before Mussolini or Hitler appeared on the scene. He was no imitator. All tyrannies must be alike in certain essentials; they must do certain things or they cannot hope to survive. Metaxas showed his originality in what he did not do. He knew all about Paeisistratus, Pheidias, and the other tyrants of ancient Greece. He believed that what the Greeks need chiefly is organization and discipline, and that the best regime for such a people is the beneficent dictatorship. Metaxism had its respectable roots in Greek history. Metaxas was a genuine Greek, as genuine as Venizelos or anyone else, but of the race of the tyrants. His one fundamental error was trying to put the Greek character in a strait jacket. When the war came, he believed the democracies would win in the end and that Greece would ultimately gain by her initial sacrifices."
It was only natural that Metaxas' arbitrary and totalitarian course should arouse a great deal of resentment, if not open opposition. All the former political leaders who ventured to express adverse opinions, and some others who were merely suspected of cherishing opposing views, were summarily arrested and exiled to the Aegean islands. One of them, Andreas Michalakopoulos, who had served as Prime Minister in 1924-1925, and was a distinguished figure in his own right, died as a result of his summary removal while seriously ill. The Metaxas dictatorship was not a bloody one, indeed it was notably mild. But an occasional accident, like the death of Michalakopoulos, did its standing a great deal of harm, perhaps all the more because it was unusual.

The press was subjected to strict censorship, not only negative, but positive; for the newspapers were required to publish many articles presenting the dictator's views on controversial matters. Local officials throughout the country, whose sentiments toward the regime were known to be critical or merely distrusted, were removed and replaced by reliable henchmen. Civil service employees were accorded the same treatment. There is no doubt that a very powerful undercurrent of hostility to the dictatorship spread through the country -- a land in which the ordinary citizen sets a high value on freedom of speech and criticism and on his personal liberties; but leaders were lacking to inspire and head a revolt, and effective police methods overrode resistance. Some minor uprisings were attempted, the most serious in Crete in 1938, but all were promptly put down.

Superficially the country seemed quiet, and with exceptionally good harvests in 1937, 1938, and 1939 conditions of living were considerably improved and there was an increase in material prosperity. But it was not an altogether healthy state of affairs, and had there been no threat of danger from outside, or had there been popular and strong leaders to take the initiative, an internal explosion would probably sooner or later have occurred.
So far as foreign policy was concerned, Metaxas made no change. He tried to cultivate friendly relations with Greece's Balkan neighbors. In May 1932, the treaty of friendship and neutrality with Turkey was signed. Ismet Inönü, Prime Minister of Turkey, paid a visit to Athens, which Metaxas returned later in the year by going to Ankara. Metaxas also attended a meeting of the Council of the Balkan Entente at Ankara in February 1933. The Turkish Premier, accompanied by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, again came to Athens in April, where on the 27th a treaty of friendship and neutrality between the two countries was signed. What certainly looked like the most important achievement of this period was the signature at Salonica on July 31, 1938, of a treaty of friendship and non-aggression between Bulgaria and the states constituting the Balkan Entente. Bulgaria agreed not to try to change the established boundaries by force, but to refer disputes with her neighbors to arbitration. In compensation the Balkan states consented to abrogate some clauses of the Treaty of Neuilly, and Bulgaria was permitted to rearm. This highly encouraging development seemed to offer good hope that the Balkan countries might ultimately be able to settle their serious differences and join together in a more or less closely united front. But further negotiations in 1939 found Bulgaria still unwilling to accept the territorial status quo and to adhere to the Balkan Entente.

Meanwhile Greece was rudely startled by the threat of a new danger when Albania was invaded without warning on Good Friday, April 7, 1939, by strong Italian military forces which speedily marched inland, seized Tirana, the capital, and took possession of the country. In a formal reassurance to the Greek Prime Minister Italy disclaimed hostile designs on Greece; but public opinion in the country was stirred with alarm, and in face of the new peril from outside, active discontent with the dictatorship of Metaxas was temporarily laid aside. Great Britain and France helped to calm the situation somewhat by official declarations, on April 13, that they would come to the support of
Greece in the event that she were attacked and forced to fight to defend her integrity and independence. But measures were immediately taken in Greece to bring the army into the best possible condition and to increase its equipment and stock of munitions; and the summer was one of heightening tension.

When World War II broke out in September, Greece found herself in a difficult situation. Caught in the barter system, she was now economically almost wholly dependent on Germany; but public sentiment was altogether on the side of the western Allies. The people passed many anxious moments wondering which way Metaxas would turn, whether he would link his lot with the Axis dictators or recognize the strength of popular feeling that Greece's fortune was bound up with that of the democracies. He decided on the latter course, although his first and most careful attention was directed to the problem of keeping Greece out of active participation in the war and doing nothing that could offend either side. The Balkan States consulted together on joint measures to be taken in facing the issues raised by the war; and in a meeting at Belgrade on February 4, 1940, the signatories of the Balkan Pact agreed to extend their entente in its expiration for a further term of seven years.

Metaxas succeeded for a time in maintaining neutrality, but as 1940 wore on the situation became increasingly more tense, especially with the collapse of France and Italy's entry into the war on the Axis side on June 10. Mussolini's formal statement that he had no intention of dragging his neighbors into the conflict -- with specific mention of Greece -- failed to allay Greek fears; and incidents soon occurred to augment the general alarm in the country. On July 12 three Italian planes bombed and machine-gunned the Greek lighthouse supply ship "Orion" off Crete and also attacked the destroyer "Hydra" which had hastened to the rescue. On July 20 a similar unprovoked assault was made by Italian aircraft on the destroyers "King George" and "Queen Olga" patrolling in the Gulf of Corinth and on Greek submarines in the harbor of Naupactus. The
Greek revenue cutter "Ar" was next made the target of six bombs dropped by Italian planes on August 2 between Aegina and Salamis, and on August 15 the passenger ship "Pianta" off Crete was likewise assailed from the air. On the same day the Greek light cruiser "Elia," lying at anchor at Temos, where it was participating in the religious festival of the Assumption, was torpedoed and wrecked by an Italian submarine, with many casualties; and the next day Italian planes attempted to bomb two Greek warships proceeding to the aid of the survivors at Temos. During this period there were countless violations of Greek neutrality by Italian aircraft which flew at will across the country between Italy and the Dodecanese and constantly passed over the border from Albania.

In the autumn anti-Greek propaganda in the Italian press took a violent turn; and the campaign of intimidation culminated at 3 A.M. on October 28 when an ultimatum was delivered to General Metaxas by the Italian Minister in Athens, demanding permission for Italian troops to enter Greece to occupy certain unnamed "strategic points," and setting a time limit of only three hours for the answer. Metaxas in his verbal reply informed the Italian representative that he regarded the ultimatum as a declaration of war. Italian troops, in any event, invaded Greek territory from Albania at 5:30 A.M., and the war was on.

In an unparalleled tide of popular indignation and patriotic enthusiasm, the whole nation rallied to the defense. The troops along the Albanian frontier gave ground slowly before the Italian aggression while mobilization was speeded. The fascists advanced southward along the Epirote coast with a diversionary feint eastward toward Florina, threatening Salonica, while a blow intended to be vital was directed through the almost impassable mountains of the Pindos range against the key position of Metsovo which controlled the newly built road running between Epirus and Thessaly. It was a bold plan which, if successful, would have cut northern Greece into two and opened the way for the invaders into the Thessalian plain. But the Greek troops, quickly brought to the decisive
point under good leadership, and fighting over an incredibly rugged terrain with irresistible dash and valor, which more than made up for their sad lack of equipment, succeeded in checking the elite Italian Alpinist forces and turning them back in retreat. It soon became a rout, with heavy losses in men and material. This retirement compelled the right and left wings also to withdraw within the Albanian border, followed by the Greek army in close pursuit. In a few weeks the Greeks, pressing on, captured Korytse (November 27) and Pogradets (November 30) on the east; secured the highway connecting Epirus and Macedonia in the center; and on the west took Santi Quarante (December 5), Argoskastro (December 8), and Cheimhre (December 23).

Later in the winter, in spite of bitter cold and deep snow, for which they were not prepared, the Greeks made good an advance, straightening and shortening their lines which they held firmly against strong Italian counter-attacks. Shortages of manpower, munitions, and food alone prevented the Greek forces from breaking through into the central Albanian plain and cutting the Italians off from their principal ports of supply. It was a humiliating blow to the prestige of the fascist leaders, who had expected an easy conquest with much glory and little or no resistance. Instead they found their army bottled up in an inhospitable mountain region, handicapped by inadequate lines of communications and unable to push forward against a resolute and confident adversary who had infinitely higher morale. The difficulties and the physical hardships faced by the insufficiently equipped Greek troops were far greater, but their spirit and determination to win against any odds inspired them to truly heroic efforts. This "Albanian Epic" was followed with the most intense and anxious interest by the entire Greek people, who backed their defenders with all they had to give. And the united national effort to maintain its liberty and independence against unwarranted fascist aggression has established itself endur-ingly in Modern Greek tradition.
What the final outcome would have been had the Germans continued to keep aloof from the conflict, no one can say. The superior material resources of Italy might have turned the scale in the end, although Greek confidence and the low morale of the fascist army might conceivably have led to an Italian debacle in the spring. But this was not to be. Metaxas, at the height of his reputation as the leader of the Greeks in their desperate struggle to preserve their freedom, fell a victim to overwork and illness and died January 29, 1941. He was succeeded as Prime Minister by Alexander Koryzis, a banker of respected standing, under whom the war effort was continued vigorously and the country's policy was maintained without change. A violent Italian thrust delivered by eight divisions after long preparations and in the presence of the Duce himself (March 9-15) was repulsed decisively with heavy casualties to the attackers.

Greece had been suffering severely, however, from constant raids by Italian planes which dropped bombs for the most part on undefended cities. Patras, Corfu, Yannina, Canea, Salonica, and many smaller places were badly damaged in this way, almost exclusively in non-military areas. One of the cruelest acts was the bombing of Larissa on March 2, the day after the city had been shaken by a devastating earthquake. There was much loss of civilian life here and elsewhere. The small Greek air force, aided by a valiant squadron of British Spitfires, put up a good fight and inflicted much punishment on the Italian planes while also effectively disrupting Italian supply lines.

In the early spring the situation took an ominous turn when Germany began to concentrate troops in Rumania and along the Bulgarian border, and it became clear that the Nazis were preparing to take an active part on the Balkan front. They were somewhat delayed when the quisling government of Yugoslavia, which had weakly agreed -- under Nazi pressure -- to join the Axis, was overturned by a revolt of the people who insisted on resistance. Meanwhile Greece, determined to continue the fight even against the major Axis partner, had turned
to Great Britain in accordance with the terms of the latter's declaration of April 13, 1939, guaranteeing Greek territorial integrity in the event of an unprovoked attack. The British responded loyally, and sacrificing the advantage they had recently won in North Africa, they detached some of their best troops and promptly organized an expeditionary force of some 60,000 men to help Greece. They began to arrive on March 5, ironically enough under the eyes of the German military attaché who was still in Athens since relations with Germany were.

On April 6 when German preparations were completed, an ultimatum was handed by the German Minister in Athens to the Greek Premier; but Greece refused to yield. In a few hours Nazi troops invaded Greek soil through the Monastir Gap, driving across Southeastern Yugoslavia from Bulgaria; they also penetrated the "Metaxas Line" facing Bulgaria; and yet another column descended on Salonica from the north against a heroic Greek defense. They came in great numbers, provided with abundant tanks and mechanized equipment, and with an immense air force which at once began to bomb Greek harbors and lines of communications. With the greater part of their army needed and employed in facing the Italians in Albania, the Greeks had only scanty, inadequate reserves to meet the new onslaught, and the British contingent which had reached the front was little more than a token force. Outnumbered by a foe possessing vastly superior armament and power, they nevertheless fought grimly and doggedly, British and Greeks together. But they could only retire from one line to the next, delaying the German advance as much as possible.

The main Greek army had begun to withdraw from its positions in Albania; but before it could detach itself completely and take up a new line in Epirus a fast-moving German column swept in behind it and occupied Yannina on April 23. At this juncture, with all hope of establishing a tenable front gone, and in order to avoid further useless loss of life, General George Tsolakoglou, Commander in Epirus, capitulated to the Germans, acting on his own initiative and responsibility without authorization from the government in Athens. The latter,
indeed, had for the moment almost ceased to exist; for Karyzis, the Prime Minister, committed suicide on April 19, and the following three days were spent in unavailing efforts to get together a new cabinet. Finally on April 22, after several others had failed, Admiral Alexander Sakellariou became Deputy Prime Minister, with the King himself temporarily acting as head of the government; but the premiership was almost immediately taken over by Emmanuel Tsouderos, a former Governor of the Bank of Greece.

Since Athens was already directly threatened by the rapid German advance, King George and the members of the cabinet departed on April 22 for Crete, where they proposed to establish a temporary capital from which to continue directing the country's struggle against the Axis forces. In view of the fact that there was now no longer any possibility of holding a defensive line on the Greek mainland, the British, with the understanding and full approval of the Greek government, began to evacuate the country in order to save as much as possible of their expeditionary force. In spite of relentless German air attacks on ships and harbors, they succeeded in bringing off by far the greater part of their troops, though most of their equipment had to be abandoned. The evacuation was begun on April 24 and completed by May 1.

The Germans entered Athens April 27, and in a few days speedily overran the Peloponnesus. Save for some small units that made good their escape to Crete, the Greek army was now broken up and disintegrating. Demobilization was ordered in a decree issued by the cabinet which General Tsolakoglou on his arrival in Athens from Epirus was induced to form on April 30 under the tutelage of the German authorities. The men, rank and file, were permitted, after laying down their arms, to return to their homes by whatever means they could find, and were not rounded up as prisoners of the German Army. This was no gesture of generosity, though the Germans at first attempted to make it out to be such. By not taking the Greek army prisoner, the Germans spared themselves the expense of looking
after some 300,000 helpless men, and by casting them back upon the collapsing Greek economy contributed greatly to accelerate the starvation which followed.

After some weeks of preparations the Germans on May 20 embarked on one of their most sensational exploits of the war, their airborne attack on the island of Crete. In spite of obstinate resistance on the part of the relatively small British and Greek forces available to oppose them, the invaders quickly established a foothold and by June 1 were masters of the island. King George with the Prime Minister and some other members of the cabinet succeeded in escaping to Egypt, where they set up headquarters as a government-in-exile. At this point Greek history divides into two streams.

In Greece itself General Tsolakoglou headed the first of the so-called quisling governments which functioned nominally under ultimate German control. He retained the premiership until November 1942, when he was succeeded by Dr. Constantine Logothetopoulos, a professor in the Medical School and former Rector of the University of Athens. In April 1943, the latter gave way to John Philias, son of a former prime minister and a politician himself, one of the leaders of the People's Party, who held office until the eve of liberation in October 1944, when the Germans withdrew from Greece. These were not independent governments free to lay down policies of their own, but were wholly subservient to the German masters of the country; and the members of the cabinets were regarded by the majority of the Greek people as collaborators with the enemy. Nevertheless each in his way, whether pro-German or not, probably did what little he could to salvage something from the wreckage in the general interest of his country.

The German occupation brought complete ruin to Greek economy. Physical assets were destroyed on a large scale, production in all fields of effort fell off sharply, agriculture suffered heavily, from war damage, breakdown of security, lack of equipment, seed, and fertilizers. Light industries ground almost to a halt except in times required by the occupation forces for military
purposes. Communications were thoroughly disrupted. Accumulated stocks of food and other goods were virtually exhausted, largely through seizure or purchase by the Germans. Thousands of refugees fled from the country districts to the cities for safety. Unemployment was prevalent everywhere. During the winter of 1941-2 there was a real famine, and many died from actual starvation. Living conditions sank far below any previously known. The Germans and Italians forced the quasiling governments to issue an endless stream of paper money and runaway inflation followed. The currency in circulation rose from 19 billion in April 1941, to 6.5 quintillion drachmas in 1944, when 50 billion drachmas had the purchasing power of one American cent. All faith in Greek currency was lost, and the gold sovereign became the recognized monetary standard. British and American services dropped great quantities of gold pounds into the country to support the guerrillas and sabotage operations against the occupying forces; and the Germans, too, used thousands of gold sovereigns for their own purposes. Prices came to be quoted in gold and gold equivalent, since there was no other standard that could be trusted.

Outside Greece the government-in-exile also retained its title and strove to prepare for the day of liberation. It was accorded diplomatic recognition by the western allies and was the beneficiary of real sympathy from all quarters of the free world. Tsouderos held the premiership first at Cairo, then in London, then once again in Cairo until March 1944, when he yielded his position to Sophocles Venizelos. After a brief tenure, the latter was replaced in April 1944, by George Papandreou who was still in office when the government-in-exile finally returned to Athens on October 18, 1944.

Much happened both internally and externally during the three and a half years of German occupation to heap misery on the Greek people and to kindle the flame of dissension and strife which flared up into civil war after liberation. The source of discord still afflicts the country, paralyzing all efforts toward
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recovery and rehabilitation. A good deal of the trouble stems from that tragic
and fatal weakness in the Greek character which has manifested itself repeatedly
from ancient to modern times -- that exaggerated individualism which has often
shattered all possibility of harmony and unity and fostered discord to the detri-
ment of national interests. But before passing severe judgment one must in
fairness make some allowance for the depressed psychological state, not to say
psychosis, in which the Greek people, leaders and followers alike, in exile as
well as in the homeland, found themselves when the German conquest was completed.
The stupifying speed and the crushing impact of the Nazi invasion, together with
the magnitude of their own disaster, left the Greeks stunned and bewildered.
From the heights of glory and jubilation in victory over the Italians they
were suddenly hurled down to the depths of utter defeat and despair. In the
confusion and disruption that followed, each man felt obliged to look out for him-
self and had little time to consider others. Deprivations and personal losses-
caused discontent and made him want to blame some one, preferably the govern-
ment and the politicians who somehow must have betrayed him. As hardships and
sufferings increased, it was easy for mutual suspicion and distrust to flourish,
leading to envy and recrimination, passion and hatred. And there can be no
doubt that astute communist agents took full advantage of the opportunities
offered by the situation to stir up further disunity and to promote their own
political aims. Indeed, had it not been for this disturbing factor, some sub-
stantial measure of cooperation and unity would surely have been achieved long-
ago, and the situation of Greece today would be very different from what it is.
equipped, organized into brigades, and schooled under British instructors. One
brigade fought with distinction under Montgomery at El Alamein and participated
in the pursuit of Rommel across North Africa as far as Tunis. All usable ships
of the Greek navy which had been saved from German air attacks were kept in
active operation and rendered gallant service to the Allies in the eastern
Mediterranean.

Apart from its military effort the government-in-exile was also able to
contribute to the relief of the famine-stricken population of Greece. The
sufferings of the Greek people during the calamitous winter of 1941-42, when
untold thousands died from actual starvation, had speedily become known through-
out the world. Yielding to the pressure of world-wide opinion, the belligerents
of both sides, after long negotiations, in which the United States and especially
the Department of State played a principal part, were finally induced to approve
an unprecedented agreement which sanctioned the shipment of food, carried in
Swedish vessels, chiefly from Canada and the United States, to Greece. The
terms provided that these supplies, safeguarded from military seizure and use,
should be distributed by the International Red Cross, working through Swiss and
Swedish representatives on the ground. Despite innumerable difficulties this
humanitarian undertaking was successfully carried out, reflecting credit on all
the belligerents and the participating neutrals; and it effectively removed the
spectre of a second winter of famine.

The government-in-exile likewise kept the Greek cause before the western
Allies and the world and laid the basis for claims to some preferential treat-
ment in the settlements at the end of the war. Although utterly defeated by
the Nazi juggernaut, the Greeks, with some justification, came to believe, as the
war went on and Hitler's attempt to conquer Russia in the summer of 1941 failed,
that they had contributed substantially to the final victory of the Allies.

They had succeeded by their resistance in delaying the German machine and
throwing out of gear the plans for crushing Soviet military power before the
winter season. This belief is still a source of pride to Greeks of all political parties, but most agree in thinking that the Soviet Union has not adequately recognized its indebtedness.

During its first year on foreign soil, in peregrinations extending from Egypt to South Africa, the United States, and London, the government-in-exile had few if any direct contacts with its countrymen who were shut in and isolated behind the barrier of German occupation. By May 1942, when the government moved its seat back to Cairo, communications and traffic in both directions between Egypt and Greece had been well organized under British military supervision. Allied intelligence officers and groups of saboteurs were frequently landed on Greek shores or mountains, and many persons were brought out from Greece on the return journey. All this traffic was strictly controlled by the British at the Egyptian end and in the course of time by guerrilla organizations on the Greek side. The government-in-exile had no independent channel of its own, but was obliged to get all its information through the British services. A fairly clear account of what had been happening in Greece now became available, at any rate.

Public sentiment had turned sharply against the King and the government-in-exiles. The people felt that they had been abandoned and left to their fate, and that King George and his cabinet ministers, living in security and comfort, or even luxury abroad, had done little or nothing to ameliorate the lot of those they had deserted. Agreeing with this view, many leaders of the pre-war political parties had met and signed a protocol in March 31, 1942, declaring their opposition to the King's return until a plebiscite could be held in which the people should be given an opportunity to decide whether they wanted him back or not.

When the Greeks began to recover from the shock of the German invasion and conquest, their innate spirit of independence and opposition to restraint reasserted itself. Men who had gotten into trouble with the authorities, many
and even some Communists, many adventurers, many downright rascals, as well as some men of strong feelings, took to the hills from which they launched occasional raids, sometimes under British direction, on German and Italian lines of communication and lightly guarded supply depots. They were much like the klephts of the revolution, except that they came to be better organized. At first, operations were carried out sporadically by separate small bands, each directed by its own bold leader. By the summer of 1942 many such groups were active; in spite of severe repressive measures taken by the occupation authorities the numbers continued to grow, but it was long before attempts were made to combine these scattered resistance forces under some kind of centralized command.

In late September 1941, a political organization called EAM (Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon - National Liberation Front) was formed in Athens by six leftist political parties. One of these was the Communist Party of Greece; three others, an Agrarian Party, a United Socialist Party, and a Republican Party, were closely affiliated with the Communists and in all important issues followed the communist party line; the remaining two were independent Socialist parties rather far to the left. Each party appointed a representative to sit on a central committee which governed EAM. Many Liberals and Republicans also joined the new organization, the announced aims of which were to rally all elements of the nation to resistance against the Germans and collective opposition to the puppet government. An intensive campaign of propaganda throughout the country enlisted much popular support and before summer of 1942 countless local units had been established in all the more important cities, towns, and villages, with an organizational system modelled on that of communist cells. In April 1942, a military branch was created under the name ELAS (Ethnikos Leikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos - National Popular Liberation Army), first constituted by separate guerrilla bands acting on their own, and later, in 1943, more or less loosely consolidated under a central direction. The most noted leader,
who set up headquarters in the Pindus Mountains in 1942, was a communist called himself Ares Velouchiotis. Among others who eventually held high commands were Colonels Sarafis and Bakirdjis.

Almost contemporaneously with EAM, another civilian political movement was started in the autumn of 1941 by a group of EDES (Ellinikos Dimokratikos Ethnikos Syndesmos -- Greek Democratic National League), and it also proclaimed a program of resistance to the German occupation forces. In the course of time it undertook to sponsor guerrilla operations; and in the early summer of 1942 it came to be represented in the field by Napoleon Zervas, a former officer of the Greek army and sometime co-commander of General Pangalos' bodyguard who later assisted in that dictator's overthrow. He established headquarters in Epirus and proceeded to recruit a body of fighters.

Both EAM and EDES with their armed branches were brought into being with the expressed purpose of harassing the German military forces in the country, and for a time each concentrated its attention on that objective and kept to its own district. Both were recognized and subsidized by the Allied (British) GHQ in Cairo and were employed when possible to assist in sabotage of the enemy's installations, such as the blowing up of the railway bridge over the Gorgopotamos near Thermopyles on November 26, 1942. Both likewise enjoyed the general sympathy of the Greek people. EAM in particular made rapid strides, and by the end of 1943 its civilian supporters comprised a large part if not the majority of the country's population, while its armed guerrillas came to number, it is estimated, some 20,000 men, the maximum for which weapons and equipment could be found. It was a more dynamic and confidence-inspiring movement than EDES, which had a more conservative tinge, lacked political emissaries with missionary zeal, and was led by a field commander with a somewhat tarnished reputation as a result of the turncoat role he had played in 1926 and his subsequent activities. Nevertheless
Zervas succeeded ultimately in gathering about him some 5,000 armed followers, as many as he could equip.

ELAS and EDES were the largest and most important, but they were only two of many similar guerrilla organizations that came into existence on all sides. Very few, however, were able to operate with more than a strictly limited local scope. Relatively little was done against the Germans, but clashes between guerrilla bands became increasingly frequent, and many of the smaller groups were broken up or absorbed by ELAS. British officers during the spring and summer of 1943 strove to reconcile disagreements among the bands and to achieve some measure of harmony and cooperation for a concerted campaign of sabotage on a large scale. An agreement was drawn up in July 1943, by which all the principal bands engaged themselves to work together under the supreme authority of AEQ, Cairo; but it was not signed by ELAS and was soon broken. The object was to create the impression that the Allies, after completing their conquest of North Africa, were preparing to invade Greece; and so to deceive the Germans into sending reinforcements to the Greek front and not to Italy. The plan had some success.

The ELAS high command, however, declined to permit its forces to take part in this enterprise; and its evasive manoeuvres along with other evidence convinced the British observers that the communist ministers of the ELAS organization were unwilling to use their men in guerrilla operations against the Germans, but were deliberately conserving their strength with the ultimate object of seizing control of all Greece when the Germans should retire from the peninsula. This view was soon rather widely shared among the Greeks, and many members of ELAS, who were startled by the fear of communist domination, quietly withdrew from the organization. They had observed that the more moderate liberals and Republicans in the higher offices were more and more clearly becoming figure-heads deprived of real power which fell increasingly into the hands of
extremists; and behind the latter, but still keeping well in the background, were the communists, whose voice was the determining factor in deciding the organization's policies. Further evidence, both of a political and a military character, accumulated during the second half of 1943 and early 1944 to confirm suspicions that EAM-ELAS was aiming at complete domination of the country. Meanwhile the British, in April 1943, ceased supplying arms to EAM but continued to supply them to EDES.

On the political side a delegation representing the resistance movements, mainly EAM, with Elias Tsirimokos, head of the ELDO Party (Enosis Leitikis Demokratiss-Union of People's Democracy), as one of its chief leaders, went to Cairo and made the first official contact between the guerrillas and the government-in-exile. The mission made many specific demands on the government for recognition and assistance, and in strong terms insisted that the King should not return to Greece until after the holding of a plebiscite. The government sent the delegation home without a satisfactory answer, but Greek circles in Cairo now had a clear picture of the strength of the resistance movement and of the principal role being played in it by radical but non-communist leaders. In the following months the EAM directors devised a plan to bring pressure on the government in Cairo. It matured in the formation in March 1944 of a Political Committee of National Liberation, which was in effect a provisional government in the mountains. It was presided over successfully by Colonel Bakirdjis and Alexander Svolos, men of moderately leftist views; but they were little more than puppets, since actual control rested with the communists in the background.

On the military side the collapse of Italy had wide repercussions on the eastern side of the Adriatic. Italian troops in Greece were largely overawed and kept in hand by the Germans; but some units disintegrated, giving up or selling their arms which ultimately found their way to the guerrillas. One entire Italian division marched up into the Pindos Mountains, where it surrendered to ELAS detachments with all its equipment. ELAS in this way obtained a windfall of rifles, ammunition, and even artillery, which it refused to share
with other guerrillas. Indeed with this new armament ELAS began a ruthless attack on all other guerrilla bands in an effort to eliminate them and to establish its own supremacy. It succeeded in destroying most of them, and it almost drove Zervas and his EDES forces out of Epirus. Only the timely arrival of fresh munitions, supplied by the British, enabled the hard pressed EDES army to beat off the attack; but early in 1944 Zervas was again in control of his Epirus district.

On February 12 in the presence of British and American officers a truce was signed between the two organizations, and the territory in which each might henceforth operate against the Germans was demarcated. This was the so-called Plaka Bridge agreement. It marked the end of open civil strife; but neither side trusted the other, and each felt obliged thereafter to keep a large part of its effective on guard against the other.

It had become manifest by this time to the few observers both in Greece and abroad who were careful to distinguish facts from propaganda that ELAS was no longer primarily a resistance movement, but was a tool in the hands of the communist party by which it intended to secure complete control of the country when the war ended. Wherever ELAS predominated -- and it now held large sections of the provinces, free from molestation by the Germans -- it introduced the principal forms and methods of communist authoritarian government. Political and a typical Communist dual system of political and military commissars held the chief power, and peoples' courts were set up. No criticism or opposition was tolerated, and those who offended in this respect were relentlessly hunted down, mistreated, or executed. Collaborationists were pursued with such end of whom were no doubt some of whom some may have been guilty, but many were innocent of anything but anti-communist sentiments. Royalists were also subjected to constant threats and attacks and their houses burned. Since the Blasites were fanatically anti-their constant threats and attacks Royalists and burned their houses, monarchists. How many were actually killed, it is difficult to estimate, but the number was certainly not small; and the seeds of innumerable blood feuds were implanted far and wide. As the power of EAM and ELAS spread through the
countryside, hardly a village escaped its bloody incidents, and the stories of the barbarous cruelties and savagery practised are legion.

The defection of their Italian allies left the Germans in Greece with greatly depleted manpower. To meet their need, they resorted in the autumn of 1943 to the recruitment of Greeks who were organized into so-called Security Battalions under former officers of the Greek army, subject to German commanders. These battalions were formed primarily for action against the guerrillas and to protect lines of communication. They were armed and equipped by the Germans and were approved by the quisling government. For the most part they consisted of volunteers who were ardently anti-communist in sentiment and regarded the guerrillas as worse than the Germans. The Security Battalions, which probably never had an enrollment of more than 5,000 men, did in fact considerably restrict the activities of ELAS, and an especially savage hostility grew up between the two organizations. Though few actual battles took place, there was constant minor skirmishing, with pursuits and counter pursuits, during which much brutality was inflicted on the country villages, where each group punished the helpless inhabitants, alleging that they had aided the other side. The rural districts probably suffered vastly more from the depredations of these rival bands than from the acts of the Germans; and many new blood-feuds sprang up in the wake of this barbarous inhumanity. That the guerrilla movement found the Security Battalions a real obstacle is clear from the vindictive hatred ELAS came to cherish against them, and from its unrelenting efforts to exterminate them. In the summer of 1944 the problem of the Security Battalions was raised as a political question which had to be faced by the government-in-exile.

The establishment of the Provisional Government in the mountains was perhaps an answer to the temporizing attitude of the government-in-exile and the king’s unwillingness to issue a clear statement saying that he would await the verdict of a plebiscite before attempting to return to Greece. But the
policy-directors of EAM now carried the fight to closer quarters, aiming a further and sharper blow at the exiled regime. During the summer and autumn of 1943 traffic between Greece and Egypt had been steadily increasing. Among those who crossed the Aegean were many missionary agents of EAM who infiltrated into the Greek armed forces undergoing training in Egypt and Lebanon -- both of the army and the navy. Republican and anti-monarchist feeling was predominant in the services, and serious disaffection had already been expressed with the government's rather conservative stand. One such crisis had been weathered through the removal of certain loyalist officers. The new arrivals soon established EAM cells in most of the army units and on many of the ships and zealously promoted the EAM program. By emphasizing anti-royalist propaganda they were able to acquire considerable influence in the Republican League which had grown up in the army with the aim of eliminating monarchy from the post-war regime in Greece. A revolt was planned, and when it became known that the Greek First Brigade was on the point of being sent to Italy to participate in the war, a mutiny broke out on April 1, 1944. It began in the navy but spread immediately to the troops, and for a few days the situation was critical. The mutinous elements presented three principal demands: that King George should agree to stay away from Greece pending the result of a referendum, that the government-in-exile should be reorganized on a broader basis, recognizing and taking into the cabinet some or all of the members of the Provisional government in the mountains; and that the army and the navy should be purified by the dismissal of reactionary officers and men.

The government-in-exile refused to yield to the mutineers, but Tsouderos resigned as Prime Minister and was replaced by Sophocles Venizelos, a Liberal Republican, son of the great Eleftherios Venizelos. He found that he was unable to prevail on the Republican League in the army to call off the mutiny, since
it had now virtually passed into communist control. The revolt was, however, suppressed. Admiral Petros Voulgaris, who was named naval commander-in-chief, succeeded with few casualties on April 22 in recovering all the ships that had been taken over by the mutineers. The next day the First Brigade surrendered to a British force which had been surrounding it. Order had already been restored in the smaller units, and the revolt was over.

The mutiny did grave harm to the Greek cause. To no small degree it alienated sympathy and friendship from abroad, and it reduced foreign trust in Greece almost to the vanishing point. But among the Greeks themselves the repercussion was even more serious; for it stirred up bitter recriminations, animosities, and hatreds and led to further discord instead of the unity so much needed. Those few who understood the situation could see that communist agitation was largely responsible, but much blame could also fairly be attributed to faulty leadership and intransigence.

The army was now drastically reorganized. Leftist and republican elements were thoroughly weeded out, and from the remainder a new brigade was formed, staffed almost exclusively by officers of royalist sentiments. This brigade ultimately saw service in Italy, fought in the battle of Rimini, and came to be called the Rimini Brigade.

In the political reaction, Sophocles Venizelos resigned from the premiership of the government-in-exile, making way on April 23 for George Papandreou, a former Liberal who had broken away from that party and founded a Social Democratic Party of his own. He had recently come to Egypt from Greece, having been brought by the British in the hope that he might be able to persuade the various parties and groups to join together in some kind of coalition government. A project had already been formed for a general political conference, and invitations had been extended to all the parties and guerrilla organizations in Greece to send delegates, the British having agreed to provide the transportation. The meeting was finally convened on May 17 in the Lebanon with some 25 delegates
in attendance. All the more important parties and resistance organizations were represented; EAM-ELAS by no fewer than six spokesmen, only one of whom was a member. The presence of the British Ambassador in a house nearby, though he did not participate in the deliberations, no doubt had some influence on the conference. After several days devoted to exchanges of views and debate, an agreement was finally formulated, drawn up in terms so general that all the delegates were willing to subscribe. The Lebanon Charter contained eight articles laying down the policies to be followed by the new coalition government to be formed under Papandreou, who was to continue as Prime Minister.

In the coalition the Liberals were given five ministries, the Popular Party three, and five were left open for nominees of EAM; while the remainder went to smaller groups and parties.

Papandreou reconstituted the government-in-exile along these lines when he returned to Cairo. But for a long time the posts assigned to EAM remained vacant; for on reaching home from Lebanon the EAM delegation failed to obtain ratification of their action in signing the agreement. Finally after considerable bickering and an attempt to force Papandreou to resign as Premier, and after exacting from the government in Cairo a denunciation of the Security Battalions as public enemies, EAM designated its nominees and sent them to Egypt, where they took office on September 2. Three were Socialists and two Communists.

The Provisional Government in the mountains was then dissolved. Two days earlier the Liberals had resigned from the cabinet in protest against the Prime Minister's action, without informing the Ministerial Council, in making a secret trip to Italy late in August to confer with Churchill. The conference apparently settled political details connected with the coming military entry into Greece; and it was also agreed that the government-in-exile should move temporarily to Italy to await the moment for return to Athens.

The shift was made early in September. Let in the month a conference was held at Caserta where General Sir Henry Wilson and Lt. General, Scobie had a
late in September meeting with Prime Minister Papandreou and the commanders-in-chief of the two principal guerrilla organizations in Greece, General Serafis of ELAS and General Zervas of EDES. Agreements were reached on many points on September 28. The guerrillas recognized the authority of the government under Papandreou and undertook to adjust their own plans with a view to concerted action against the German enemy. Papandreou agreed to place all Greek armed forces under the orders of the Supreme Allied Military Command which had designated General Scobie as its representative in Greece; in this capacity General Scobie issued orders fixing the spheres of activities of the two guerrilla organizations and making each responsible for its actions in its district. Disputes subsequently arose regarding most of these matters. Meanwhile the Germans had already begun to withdraw from Greece, and the liberation of the country was progressing; finally on October 19 the government under Papandreou was able to establish itself in Athens, on Greek soil.
CHAPTER VII

Liberation and the Civil War

British Forces in Greece

British troops, disembarking in late September and crossing northern Peloponnesus entered Athens on October 15, 1944 and were welcomed with general enthusiasm. It was little more than a token force that came, with only some 3,000 fighting effectives. The United States had declined to join substantially in the operation, limiting its participation chiefly to a share in transport and relief. Allied observers on the scene had vainly urged the need for a much stronger expedition. The contrast between the liberation of Greece and the Soviet liberation of the rest of the Balkans is a striking one. The Russians, who had well evolved post-war plans when the western Allies had none, liberated three fourths of the Balkans with overwhelming forces. They saw to it that in the political vacuum caused by the retreat of the Germans, governments of the kind desired by the Soviets were not only set up in the capitals, but were enabled to reach out and control the provinces. The British "liberated" Greece with only a handful of men and gave the government they brought into Athens no effective cover under which even to begin to establish law and order. The country districts were dominated by guerrilla bands which bore no allegiance to the central government and were determined to evict it if possible.
As a result, when EAM discovered that the British were bringing in so few troops, ELAS heavily reinforced its units in and about the capital. Small as the British force was, it constituted the only possible agent for countering ELAS, and Papandreou was therefore obliged to lean heavily on the advice of the British command. Meantime, while British purposes were being assessed, communist members of the government did everything they could to sabotage all efforts of the other members to extend military control and to improve the economic situation.

After its arrival in Athens, the government, with the feeble resources at its command, tried to master the situation. Security, the reestablishment of law and order, were the most vital and pressing problems it had to face and there was little to work with. The whole machinery of government was rusty from disuse and lacked many essential parts. The vast task of rehabilitation of a country stripped bare and devastated, with its economy shattered, its systems of transportation and communication wrecked, its currency worthless in a runaway inflation, its morale tottering, demanded instant thought, action and organization. A far more able government than the one in power, even if united in its own councils and able to count on the united support of the entire nation, would have found its path beset by almost insuperable obstacles. Papandreou's cabinet was not of the heroic mould required. Of its 24 mem-

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bers, six were representatives of the EAM, including two staunch communists whose paramount aim was undoubtedly to secure control of the state for their own party. There were other political rifts. It is not strange that little was accomplished; indeed, it is remarkable that any progress at all was made. One action of at least some temporary value was taken fairly promptly; that was the issuance of a new currency to replace the old.

In the very first days of liberation, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration made its appearance on the scene and began to bring in food, clothing, and other much needed emergency supplies. During the first unsettled months while civil war was going on, relief operations were conducted under military control by a special organization called Military Liaison, headed by an American, Brig. General Percy Sadler. Even while actual fighting was in progress, efforts were made to move and distribute available relief supplies where required. These supplies not only saved the civilian population from starvation in many parts of the country, but had considerable effect in bolstering the economic situation.

After a short interlude of popular rejoicing and celebration following liberation, new dissensions and contentions speedily developed among the Greeks, as the division
between the factions of the Right and Left became more sharply drawn. Each feared and charged that the other was aiming arbitrarily to seize control of the country. EAM refused to disband its army ELAS unless the government would at the same time disband the Royalist Rimini Brigade and the "Sacred Company", a unit made up wholly of former royalist officers which had fought in Africa and had never faltered in its loyalty to the King and his government. Although the Rightists felt strongly that it was intolerable for an opposition faction to maintain its private army when the machinery of the state was able again to function, the government indicated some willingness to arrange a compromise even on this issue, but events overtook the final settlement of this question.

The Athens Incident

Tension mounted to a high pitch as hostility between the two factions increased, while ELAS forces were occupying strategic positions in and about Athens. Finally General Scobie, as Allied Commander in Chief, issued a peremptory order calling for the disbandment of ELAS forces by December 10. EAM responded with announcements of a great popular demonstration to be held in Constitution Square in the heart of Athens on December 3, and with the proclamation of a general strike to begin the next day. The government first gave its permission for the holding of the demonstration, then late on the night of December 2 rescinded it. At this time the EAM
representatives in the cabinet resigned. EAM refused to call the mass meeting off, saying that preparations had already gone too far to be stopped. Indeed, efforts were intensified to make the demonstration as big as possible.

When a vast crowd, mainly unarmed but angry, assembled on Sunday morning, December 3, and attempted to make its way into the square, the police barred the approach; incidents ensued, the police opened fire and though most of them had only blank cartridges, a few used live ammunition and the firing continued for some time. When the crowd scattered before the fusillade, civilian victims, including women and children, lay on the ground—the number variously reported as being from 12 to 24. A sharp reaction followed; the police withdrew to sheltered positions, while the square filled again with indignant supporters of EAM, excited to passionate animosity against the police. In the course of the afternoon and evening, ELAS detachments went into action and began systematic attack on the outlying police stations in the city. Many were captured and the defenders killed or executed when taken prisoners; others were relieved and evacuated under the protection of British units against which the members of ELAS refrained from firing.

In an ultimatum issued on December 4, General Scobie ordered ELAS to cease fighting and to withdraw altogether from Athens. Two days later ELAS launched an attack on government buildings in the center of the city, but was repulsed.
A few British soldiers assisted the defending government troops and in the course of the day British planes dropped bombs in areas where ELAS had disregarded the order to evacuate the city. The British were inevitably drawn into the struggle in support of the government which, as the legally constituted regime, Britain considered herself bound to defend, both because of her special treaty relations with Greece and because the British army was responsible to the Allied High Command for the maintenance of order in this area of operations while the war against Germany was still going on. General Scobie acted under direct instructions from Churchill himself. It was not his fault that he had so few men, but he was to blame for their being too widely scattered to be effective.

Skirmishing and sniping continued for some days, and on the night of December 15-16, ELAS delivered a series of sharp attacks on the British positions, but they were beaten off. At the beginning, General Scobie's forces had been far outnumbered by the effectives of ELAS and had only been enabled to hold their widely separated positions through their superiority in tanks and armored equipment, but following a visit by Field marshal Alexander substantial reinforcements now began to arrive. No offensive on a large scale was started, however, until all hope of a peaceful settlement was exhausted.

In the first days after the fighting, Papandreou had
wanted to yield the Premiershipt to the leader of the Liberal party, Sophoulis, but the British government, acting through King George who was still in London, urged his remaining in office, hoping still that he might be the one who could form a government uniting all parties. But Sophoulis had no faith in the coalition and continued to hold himself and his party aloof.

Mr. Churchill's Mission

On December 25, Prime Minister Churchill himself, accompanied by Foreign Secretary Eden, came to Athens and assembled the chief political leaders including those of EAM-ELAS in a conference. But neither side was in a mood for conciliation and the Communist spokesmen still refused to disband their troops and give up their arms. No real basis of agreement had been reached when Churchill departed, but a solution was posed at this conference: that Archbishop Damaskinos was to become Regent and that the King was to agree if Churchill could persuade him to do so, not to return until recalled by his people.

The British thereupon moved forward resolutely with their greatly increased power and after some hard fighting succeeded in little more than a week in driving out of the city all armed ELAS units. In their retreat, they indulged in plundering and destruction and carried away with them some ten to fifteen thousand hostages arrested among the civilian
population in the districts of Athens under their power. Their brutal mistreatment of these hostages, many of whom were murdered under revolting conditions of cruelty and malevolence, created a great revulsion of feeling among the Greek people and led to the wholesale alienation of popular sympathy from ELAS.

While the battle for Athens was going on, other ELAS divisions invaded Epirus from their Pindus bases and by the end of December practically annihilated the EDES forces under General Zervas who with some of his men escaped to Corfu. ELAS was pressing on all sides to carry out its general plan to seize control of the entire country.

The Regency and the Varkiza Agreement

On his arrival in London, Prime Minister Churchill convinced King George II that he would be well advised to appoint a regent and renounce any attempt to return to his country until the people in a referendum had expressed a desire to have him resume his throne. On this, at least, all the leading politicians in Athens had expressed agreement. In compliance, the King designated Damaskinos, Archbishop of Athens and Head of the Greek National Church, to be Regent and on January 1, 1945, the latter took the oath of office. Papandreou's resignation was accepted and General Plastiras, who enjoyed widespread public confidence, formed a cabinet composed mainly of conservative Republicans.
ELAS forces began to retreat from Athens on January 6 and their reserves to disintegrate. The leaders realized they had been beaten and applied to General Scobie for an armistice. The terms of the truce prescribed that ELAS forces should withdraw from Attica and Boeotia and the immediate neighborhood of Salonika; that all prisoners and hostages should be released and that a permanent settlement should be made without undue delay in direct negotiations with the Greek government.

The conference was held at Varkiza on the seacoast near Athens and on February 12 a formal peace, the so-called Varkiza Agreement, was signed by three representatives of the government and by three delegates of EAM, including George Siantos and Demetrics Partsalides who were the actual leaders of the Communist Party, and EAM, during the absence from the country of their chief, Nicholas Zachariades, interned by the Germans at Dachau. ELAS bound itself to give up its arms and to disband its military forces within a fortnight; while the government promised to declare an amnesty for all political offenses committed in the course of the civil war, and to respect constitutional civil rights. A plebiscite was to be held as soon as possible to settle the question of the regime, followed by the election of a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution. In this connection it was agreed that the Allied Powers should be requested to send observers to verify "the genuineness of the expression of the popular will".

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Within the time limit fixed, ELAS demobilized its army and turned in more than the minimum number of arms of all categories stipulated in the agreement. Some weapons were undoubtedly retained and hidden by nonconformist individuals and some die-hard units of the army fled across the frontier into Yugoslavia. In a movement which, had it been carried out in force immediately on liberation, might have prevented the civil war, British detachments now quickly spread out through the country and occupied the principal provincial cities and towns to maintain order until Greek government forces could take over. For this purpose, the government used a national guard organized by conscription, the formation of which had begun during the fighting in Athens. If not altogether a royalist organization, it was uncompromisingly anti-communist; and wherever its units went, they treated the Leftists with severity to say the least. They were ultimately replaced by the gendarmerie which had been reorganized and trained by a British police mission. They, too, were Rightist in their views, but much less arbitrary than the national guard.

The extraordinary ferocity displayed by both factions of the Right and Left in the actual fighting and the brutality exhibited in their treatment of prisoners and hostages and in wreaking private vengeance, clearly reflect the fact that the attempted revolution was a social as well as a political movement. The struggle was waged with almost ré-
igious zeal and fanaticism. It inflicted deep wounds on the body politic which for a long time to come may be a potential source of further discord and danger.

In facing the almost insuperable problems raised by the civil war, the general devastation and destitution of the country, acute need of food and clothing, amid economic chaos and constant political turmoil, one cabinet after another met defeat and had to give up the task. General Plastiras, a vigorous opponent of Communism but a staunch advocate of a republican form of government, became much disgruntled and finally resigned when consistently blocked by the British Military organizing mission from preventing what he regarded as the Greek army's conversion into a purely royalist machine. Also he knew the folly of trying to make "peace" with the Communists and felt frustrated because he could not get the British to support an all-out war against ELAS right up to the northern border. Had such a project been carried out, there would have been no Communist strength left within Greece to sabotage her national defense against frontier attacks, and there would have been a much earlier clarification of Soviet satellite guilt in aiding escaped Elasites to attack their country. Plastiras succeeded in fact in offending the British by his independence and stubbornness, and the monarchists by his republicanism. He was succeeded
April 9 by Admiral Voulgaris who headed a non-political, non-partisan cabinet of little strength which made a heroic though unavailing effort to improve the economic situation.

It was decided that the order of the plebiscite and the elections envisaged in the Varkiza Agreement should be transposed and that the elections should come first. This decision was approved, if not actually recommended, by Great Britain, France and the United States. The elections were set for January 20, 1946. On October 9 Voulgaris resigned and for a short period in October, failing to find a suitable successor, the Archbishop-Regent himself assumed the premiership. Another weak government followed which was unable to handle with authority the economic and political problems that confronted it. On November 19, the British virtually imposed the appointment of Themistocles Sophoulis, veteran head of the Liberal Party, as Prime Minister. The Labor government had sent Hector McNeil, Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, to Athens in an effort to help straighten out the political situation in Greece. McNeil decided that if a real coalition of all the principal parties could not be achieved—and the Populists balked at this solution—the next best was to have a government formed by a union of all elements of the center.
Sophoulis, who had a consistent record of opposition to Communism, thus came into power with a republican cabinet under the aegis of British favor, and with an assurance of financial aid in checking the growing inflation which was threatening to destroy Greek economy. A British economic mission was sent out to study the whole situation and a loan was granted.

The Elections of March 31, 1946

The date of the elections had been 

 postponed, but under considerable pressure from the Allied governments Sophoulis was induced to set March 31 as the new date. He himself desired a further deferment, believing that conditions were not yet suitable. Throughout the country there was considerable disturbance and crimes of violence, springing chiefly from political causes, were of almost daily occurrence. Wherever the Rightists dominated, they mistreated and intimidated adherents of the Left, and wherever Leftists held a preponderant position, they exercised a similar reign of terror over supporters of the Right. The division cut through all ranks of the Greek people who were largely constrained by events and partly perhaps by national temperament to range themselves with the extremists of one side or the other; and the moderates who remained in the center were few. Since there was no prospect of appreciable improvement in the situation, and neither the Sophoulis government nor its predecessors had

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been able fully to reestablish the rule of law and security, Great Britain, France and the United States, which had promised to send representatives to observe the elections, were convinced that it was best to get an expression of the will of the people without further delay.

The Royalist parties, assured of their following in the country, would have welcomed the adoption of the majority system, but Spathoulis, after much consideration, decreed the elections should be held under the system of proportional representation which was more usual in Greece. The adoption of this electoral system is undoubtedly responsible, in a large part, for Greece not developing the tradition of a two party system in politics. Instead of two more or less evenly balanced organizations, like the Republicans and Democrats on the American scene, there has usually been a multiplicity of separate small parties and groups, each supporting an individual leader who has sufficient political ambition and magnetism to attract a following. In the months preceding the elections of March 31, 1946, more than 40 separate political parties and groups were recorded in the Athenian newspapers. The use of the system of proportional representation no doubt encouraged some of the smaller groups to stand on their own, since they were sure of representation in the Chamber of
Deputies in proportion to the number of their supporters. As polling day approached, many of these coalesced temporarily with others so that the number actually offering candidates and participating in the contest was considerably reduced. Even so, no fewer than 15 parties actively entered the lists throughout all or parts of the country, despite the fact that eight parties, comprising all the Left and the extreme Left, called upon their adherents to refrain from voting and did not name candidates.

This peculiarly Greek political method, which seems irrational to the American mind was no new device; as we have seen parties, both of the Right and Left, when convinced that they had no chance of winning in an election, had not infrequently urged their adherents to refrain from voting, sometimes charging unfairness afterwards. Fully cognizant of their minority status, the parties of the extreme left made full use of the weapon they found ready to hand; in the elections of March 31, 1946, they abstained from voting and declined to recognize the verdict of the ballot. So far as the communists themselves were concerned, there was nothing new or startling about this, since they have everywhere constituted a small minority and have imposed their will by force. But in Greece they were undoubtedly able to take into their camp numbers of non-communist dissenters who could not bring themselves to recognize the decision of the majority. This unwillingness
to subscribe to one of the fundamental principles of democratic government is also an old story in Greece, springing in part from the strong individualism that is characteristic of the Greeks. It is striking that so ardent an advocate of constitutional procedures as Venizelos had himself on occasion advocated abstention from voting, and twice had even resorted to revolution rather than yield when he felt utterly convinced he was in the right. Indeed, there is a good deal of truth in the contention that political leaders in Greece are often potential dictators or revolutionaries depending on the outcome of the balloting.

AMFOGE

AMFOGE, the Allied Mission for Observing Greek Elections, reached Greece shortly after the middle of February. It consisted of 294 British, 169 French and 692 Americans, for the most part military officers but including a good many civilians. The Soviet Union had declined the invitation to participate in the mission. Before Election Day, teams visited the majority of polling places in the country, checked precinct installations, lists of voters and registrations, and made house to house canvasses on a basis adequately designed to permit scientific sampling. On election day they watched the actual voting and the counting of ballots in as many places as their personnel were able to cover. The mission's task was not to supervise or interfere, but merely
to observe. However, its presence undoubtedly exercised a calming influence. The elections were carried out quietly throughout the country with only a few isolated instances of disorder, and resulted in a victory of the Rightists.

The Mission's report pronounced the election fair and valid in spite of some intimidation, interference on a small scale with voting; and the abstention of some 40% of the registered voters who for one reason or another did not go to the polls. In all previous normal elections in Greece, the average abstention had been 25%. From other evidence collected, the Mission's sampling experts estimated the strength of those who abstained out of leftist sentiment at approximately 15%, which is probably very close to the actual fact.

The Mission's considered verdict held that the results were a genuine and valid expression of the will of the majority. The fundamental question at issue was clearly understood by the Greek people; it was a choice between totalitarian communism and the maintenance of Greek independence. The outcome was in its larger sense a clear-cut victory for independence, and it was with a firm anti-communist mandate that the new parliament took office. The election also indicated beyond any doubt that the people regarded the monarchical system as being, under the conditions existing, their strongest safeguard against the communist menace.
Political Party Alignments

It may be well here to indicate the relative position of the more important parties as they exist today. The constitution had been suspended under the Metaxas dictatorship and all political parties "abolished". This probably facilitated their dedication when they finally re-emerged to more contemporary issues than those represented by the old Venizelist-Royalist controversies. Since the elections, political sentiments in Greece have in general maintained a triple division of Right, Center and Left.

At the extreme right is the National Party of Xites, perhaps rather to be classified as a fighting agency than as a political party; it has no representatives in the Chamber. Next are the Nationalist Party and the National Party of Greece, with 7 and 25 Deputies respectively, the latter under the leadership of General Zervas who commanded EDES during the occupation. The core of the Rightist group is the Populist Party (the old Laikon Komma, or People's Party) which elected 144 Deputies. Its titular leader is Constantine Tsaldaris. Cooperating with it, but independently organized and managed, are some 6 other parties of the Right, for the most part splinter groups. The largest of these, with 28 deputies, is the National Liberal Party led by General Stylianos Gonatas, a former Liberal and Republican who it will be remembered was with Nicholas Plastiras, principal director of the revolution.
which forced the abdication of King Constantine and brought about the establishment of the Greek Republic in 1924, following the disaster in Asia Minor.

The Center is constituted by six or more separate parties, all split off at one time or another from the old Liberal Party founded by Eleftherios Venizelos. The largest element, still calling itself the Liberal Party, with Themistocles Sophoulis as its chief, gained 48 seats in the Chamber in 1946. In the autumn of 1947 a segment called the Venizelist Liberal Party, under Sophocles Venizelos, with 34 Deputies and the National Unity Party of 8 Deputies under D. Kanellopoulos rejoined the main body of Liberals. Another fraction, which recognizes former Premier George Papandreou as its leader, is the Social Democratic Party, counting 28 representatives in parliament.

The Left, of course wholly unrepresented in the Chamber, since it chose to abstain from the elections, comprises two separate groups. On the one hand are those who are relatively moderate and who have dissociated themselves from the Communists; they maintain three separate parties called the Socialist Party--ELD, the Union of Left Republicans, and the Left Liberal Party. Their following is probably not very large. On the other hand are the extremists organized into five separate parties. The strongest element here is the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), directed by Nicholas Zachariades. The other four, under the names Agrarian Party of
of Greece, the Radical Republican Party, the Socialist Party of Greece, and the Republican Union, each with its own leader, are minor satellites of the Communists and in every respect faithfully follow the Communist party-line. How large the Leftist element would prove to be, if peace and order were restored in Greece and a fair election could be held in normal times, no one can say with certainty; but it is unlikely, in the opinion of competent observers, that they would poll more than the 15% of the country's vote, which AMFOGE estimates accorded them in the election of March 31, 1946.

Among the parties represented in the Chamber, the Populist Party was the largest and best organized. Since it had obtained a substantial plurality and, with the cooperating Royalist and Rightist parties, an actual majority of the House, it properly proceeded in April 1946 to form, in conformity with the provisions of the constitution, a government under the premiership of its leader Constantine Tsaldaris, a nephew of Panagiotis Tsaldaris, prewar leader of the Populist Party. His government's appearance to explain its program before the initial meeting of the National Assembly on May 13, 1948, signalized the first resumption of parliamentary rule in Greece since the beginning of the Metaxas dictatorship in 1936.

Plebiscite on the Return of the King

One of the first actions of the Tsaldaris government
was to set September 1, 1946 as the date of the plebiscite which was to determine the question of King George's return. The Allies were again invited to send observers. Great Britain and the United States accepted and sent out a mission which after careful investigation found that the electoral lists by and large had been satisfactorily revised. The referendum was held on the day set, with only minor disturbances and by a decisive majority the King was recalled to his throne. The result reinforced the march election as evidence of the conviction of the majority of the Greek people that at that time the only possible safeguard against Communist domination lay in rallying about the King and the monarchical regime. Many ardent Republicans cast their ballots in favor of the King for that reason. King George made his official reentry into his capital on September 28 and was welcomed with restrained enthusiasm.

The conduct of the plebiscite was much criticized, and it is not unlikely that there was exaggeration of the votes in favor of the King, but this did not materially affect the result.
Nothing could show more clearly how completely internal is the question of monarchy versus republicanism in Greece. In the past, the Greek people themselves have dealt with it, first in one way then in the other; and they are capable of dealing with it in the future when they choose, if they are left free to do so. Certain newspaper correspondents, after a sojourn of a day or two in Athens and with little or no knowledge of the historical background, have sometimes expressed the view that the reestablishment of the monarchy and the return of King George II in 1946 were imposed upon an unwilling people by Great Britain. This is the line followed by communist propaganda and it is very wide of the truth. The choice was made by the Greek electorate itself in a free election, but the factor which perhaps did more than anything else to bring about the decisive verdict was the activity of international communism, which had aroused and alarmed the Hellenic people with its threat of absorbing Greece into the Soviet-dominated totalitarian sphere, and extinguishing individual liberty. If monarchy was imposed by anyone, it was by the communists themselves.

Actually the whole monarchist-republican controversy in Greece today is an anachronistic issue of the past which has little real relation to the contemporary vital problems of the country, except insofar as it may obstruct the united national effort necessary to maintain the integrity and inde-
pendence of the state and to save it from becoming a victim of soviet-inspired totalitarian aggression. The old feud has been deliberately revived and exploited by communist propaganda. It has been dragged across the scene as a red herring to distract attention from the crucial issue, which is plainly whether or not Greece is to survive as an independent nation. The constitutional system is under no serious threat today except from the communists within and without the Hellenic borders.

Since 1863, monarchy has worked reasonably well in Greece and except for brief lapses during World War I and under the dictatorship of General Metaxas, it has not stepped out of the framework of constitutionalism. In the United States there is a widespread prejudice, to which some of our newspapers do not scruple to cater, holding that monarchy is inseparable from autocracy and is the enemy of democracy. This view reflects the thinking of more than 150 years ago, and has not adjusted itself to subsequent developments. Some of the most firmly safeguarded and genuine democracies in the world today, as in Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries, are monarchies, but in each the conduct of affairs is entirely in the hands of the elected representatives of the people. Though different in many ways, democracy in those countries is no less real than in America. The King is the social head of the nation, but he has no political
power and can act only through the people's chosen spokes-
men. This is true also in Greece, where the rights and pre-
rogatives of the 4ing are carefully prescribed and limited
by the constitution, which declares that the source of all
power lies in the people.
CHAPTER VIII
The Paris Peace Conference

Greece in the Postwar World

Premier Tsaldaris went himself to Paris to the conference which convened in 1946 to press his country's claim to reparations and to territorial concessions from Bulgaria and Albania. Once again the interests of Greece were entangled in the larger pattern of power politics. Her position in relation to the emerging East West conflict soon became apparent and claims on her neighbors were treated in relation to it rather than on their merits.

A glance at the map will reveal at once the supreme strategic importance of Greece's position, so far as the Eastern Mediterranean is concerned. The impoverished little land of Hellas offers in itself little incentive to aggression, but her position athwart the main channel of commerce between East and West offers the key to the domination of the entire Near East, with its fabulous oil resources and indispensable facilities for the development and control of world-wide aviation routes.

The modern rulers of Russia have inherited a policy of national expansion from the days of the czars and have fallen no whit behind in their zeal to gain their objectives.
They too want the straits, to ensure access to the Mediterranean, and "warm water" ports; and they have developed to a fine art the method of interference with the affairs of neighboring countries which has been a part of Russian policy since the days of Catherine the Great. Trained agents were at work in Greece before the war doing all they could to attract recruits to communism, and arouse hostility against the government.

If a Soviet directed bloc made itself the arbiter of Greece's destiny and established sufficient air bases, it could close off the Western from the Eastern Mediterranean; cut a main artery of world communication and the life-line of the British Commonwealth of Nations; regulate all traffic to and from the Black Sea and impose its will on the political and economic life of all Near Eastern peoples.

Soviet policy has found willing agents and tools in the satellite governments established in the states along the northern borders of Greece. The Bulgars still cherish dreams of the "Greater Bulgaria" which Russian diplomacy sought to create for them by the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878. Even after three unsuccessful, not to say disastrous, attempts to achieve this purpose by war, they are still imbued with a passionate desire to extend their borders to the Aegean coast, and to establish their sovereignty at least over Western Thrace and Eastern Macedonia. The lack of
ethnic claim to these territories, since the exchange of population carried out after World War I, has not cooled their ardor. To promote these claims and defend themselves against Greek counterclaims, the Bulgars sided with communist guerillas in Greece and aided their rebellion against the government.

Yugoslavia too has territorial aspirations she would like to satisfy against Greece. For a generation, Yugoslavs have coveted the port of Salonika on the Aegean. The concessions made after World War I, establishing a free zone in the harbor and facilitating Yugoslavia's use of the railway to the frontier at Ghevgheli did not satisfy them; and their demand for physical ownership of the railway and part of the port were rejected. The ensuing disputes from time to time caused no little friction. The communist government of Yugoslavia has, therefore, like that of Bulgaria, its own reasons for supporting the Greek guerrillas, as the establishment of a strong and independent Greece would unquestionably bar her way to the port of Salonika.

Under a communist dictatorship, Albania is likewise bitterly hostile to a democratic Greece. She has advanced no new demands for territory—perhaps restrained by the dictates of international communist policy—but has been aggressive in defending her title to the strip of southern Albania, which the Greeks refer to as "Northern Epirus" and to which
they have laid claim persistently on the basis of the
ethnic character of its population, since the original es-
tablishment of Albanian frontiers in 1912. Albania believes
that her retention of the disputed district will be assured
by a victory of communism in Greece and therefore she also
has actively supported the guerrillas.

The validity of the Greek territorial claims may
perhaps be questioned, and in any case the Western Powers
were not prepared to promote them against Russian opposition.
Changes on both the Bulgarian and Albanian boundaries were
therefore rejected. Nor did Greece receive any real satis-
faction in regard to reparations, being awarded less than
a tenth of her demands against Bulgaria, and the collection
of even that seemed highly dubious. Her claims against Italy
for damage in the Albanian war were likewise reduced, to a
mere four percent. It was, however, agreed at a subsequent
meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the "Big Four" that Italy
should cede the Dodecanese Islands to Greece and this was
carried out in 1947.
United Nations Investigation of Border Incidents

Even more ominous in its implications for Greece than her disappointments in regard to reparations and territorial adjustments was the unconcealed hostility of the Soviet and other Slavic representatives. At the Peace Conference in Paris and in the United Nations Security Council at Lake Success, they made charges that Greece was staging border incidents and stirring up trouble against her northern neighbors. These charges were proved to be wholly false. The Greek government has been almost abjectly careful not to give provocation to its neighbors through any actual incident, though the free and uncontrolled Greek press has been guilty at times of embarrassing effusions. One cannot fail to be impressed by the striking similarity of these Soviet-sponsored charges to those, equally unfounded, put out by the Italian Stefani Agency and others immediately preceding Italy's attack on Greece in 1940.

To counter these charges, the Tsaldaris cabinet, on December 3, 1946, laid before the Security Council of the United Nations formal charges that Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were directly supporting and assisting the guerrilla movement in Greece in its attack on constituted authority and were
thus fostering a threat to international peace. The Council on December 16 voted to send a commission to investigate the situation on the ground. The United Nations Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents was composed of representatives of the eleven members of the Security Council. With a large staff it reached Athens on January 29, 1947 and after spending three weeks in hearings there, proceeded to Salonika. The Greek government facilitated the enquiry in every possible way but the Commission had, throughout its proceedings, to contend with obstructive tactics on the part of the Russian and Polish delegates and with the uncooperative attitude of the Albanian, Yugoslavian and Bulgarian governments.

When the Commission had accomplished what could be done on Greek soil, it left behind at Salonika a Subsidiary Group to represent it in the investigation of continuing border incidents, and moved on to Sofia. Six meetings were held there from March 26 to 28, and seven in Belgrade between March 30 and April 2. The Commission then went to Geneva to draw up its report in a neutral atmosphere. In this document, which was signed on May 23 and presented to the Security Council on June 27, the conclusion that Yugoslavia and to a lesser extent Albania and Bulgaria, had supported the guerrilla warfare in Greece was approved by eight of the eleven members. A recommendation that the
Security Council establish a new commission to investigate frontier violations, hear complaints, use its good offices for the settlement of disputes concerning frontier violations, make studies and investigations, and report to the Security Council was endorsed by a vote of nine to two.

Meanwhile, the Subsidiary Group left behind at Salonica held numerous meetings and conducted many investigations of incidents along the border. The evidence it collected showed clearly that the Greek guerrilla movement was being encouraged and assisted by Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania, "the governments of which all refused any genuine cooperation with the Subsidiary Group in the execution of its duties as an organ of the Security Council".

A careful perusal of the proceedings in the Council will show clearly that the entire communist dominated bloc was wholeheartedly backing Greece's northern neighbors in their support of the guerrillas. The bitter criticism voiced in the press, on the air, and in the United Nations against Britain and the United States for aiding the Greek government was an index of the resentful recognition in communist circles that their designs were being frustrated.

The Security Council between June 27 and August 19, 1947, devoted many sessions to the consideration and discussion of the Commission's report. The debate was long and acrimonious. Constructive proposals for a solution of the
problem along the northern Greek border were approved by the Council by a vote of nine to two, the only opposition being that of the Soviet Union and Poland. Three times, on July 29 and August 19, the Soviet Union exercised its power of veto, blocking the will of the great majority of the Security Council.

The question was not, however, shelved. In an attempt to obtain action, the United States delegation brought it before the General Assembly of the United Nations. There was much discussion in the General Committee, in the Political and Security Committee, and in the Administrative and Budgetary Committee of the General Assembly, during which the Soviet representatives, assisted by those of the other Slavic states, made every effort to obstruct and prevent action. Finally the Greek frontier problem was brought before the General Assembly of the United Nations on October 20. Two days were occupied in further debate, and on October 21, the Assembly, by a vote of 40 to 6, with 11 abstentions, adopted a resolution establishing a special Balkan Committee of 11 members. Its purpose was essentially to continue the work of the Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents and to attempt to find a solution of the problem of the Greek border. The Soviet Union and Poland declined to participate in the work of the Committee; places were left open for them but remained unclaimed.
With the entire bloc of communist nations warmly espousing the cause of the guerrillas in Greece no one could mistake the character of the struggle. It had become clear that communist totalitarianism had mobilized its forces for a determined attempt to bring into its orbit the one country still remaining independent in the Balkans, the survival of which constituted a serious obstruction to the realization of more far reaching plans. The strategy was not that of an open war against Greece. It was based on the support of a fifth column within the country, the anticipated victory of which could be represented as the triumph of an internal movement of the people. The method had been applied with gratifying success in Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland and was to be used when the time came in Czechoslovakia. The only difference was that in all those countries immense Soviet occupation forces were in a position to exercise complete control and were prepared to assist governments of the kind approved by Moscow.

The Maximos Regime in Greece

The failure to obtain Northern Epirus and a rectification of the frontier with Bulgaria was a bitter disillusionment to the Greek people. Their politicians had led them to believe that the Western Powers would take a strong friendly
stand in support of Greece's cause, and the government was also freely blamed by its opponents as being at fault in not presenting Greek views more forcefully and successfully. Affairs within the country were not progressing well either. More and more bands of Leftists, especially in Macedonia, were taking to the mountains from which they conducted raids on the villages below, plundering and burning houses of Rightists, attacking police stations and other government offices.

The pre-election government of Sophoulis had in pursuit of its policy of conciliation released from detention a large number of prisoners held in jails throughout the country. Theoretically, only those accused of political offenses were liberated, but actually, in cases connected with activities during the occupation, the borderline between criminal and political actions was not easily definable. By a liberal interpretation, those set free included some accused of major crimes as well as political transgressions. The Rightists were naturally indignant over the release of men whom they regarded as traitors and villains of the worst sort, and the extremists did not hesitate to take the law into their own hands. Consequently, many of the liberated prisoners, afraid of punishment from their fellow citizens if they returned to their homes, drifted away to guerrilla centers.

The most disturbing factor in the situation was the
accumulating evidence of outside aid to the guerrillas. Supplies reached them from the other side of the Albanian, Yugoslav and Bulgarian frontiers, where they also found refuge and were trained and re-equipped when circumstances made it necessary for them to flee before pursuing detachments of Greek troops. Villagers known to favor, or suspected of favoring, the established regime were roughly manhandled, brutally murdered, or carried off for ransom or for forced service in the guerrilla ranks. Police and the reorganized army eventually took the field against the guerrillas and restricted their operations considerably, but gained no conspicuous successes. On the other hand, no real efforts were made to suppress the Rightist bands which on their side continued, terrorizing and killing supporters of the Left and even of the Center. Almost equally harmful to the maintenance of peace and order was the officially sponsored measure of arming civilians who were organized in Rural Security Units (Mònades Asphaleias Ypaithrou, known as MAY): only certified Royalists were armed in this way, and they speedily took advantage of the opportunity to deal harshly with their Leftist fellow-villagers. Refugees from such persecution in the rural districts, especially in the Peloponnesus and in Central Greece, constantly streamed into the larger towns and cities for protection; but these numbers were small compared with the scores of thousands driven by terror from their farms in Macedonia and Thrace, where the principal Leftist guerrilla forces operated.
In the economic field little constructive improvement was achieved by the government, and it also faced political difficulties in spite of its large majority in the Assembly. The royalist groups were divided by many private jealousies, disagreements and quarrels. Opposition papers which appeared without hindrance were filled with violent attacks on the government's policies and the partisan spirit of its administration. There was a good deal of quite justified criticism of the royalists for condoning and defending all excesses of their own extreme factions while condemning acts of violence by the other side. In view of the need for national unity to confront the desperate internal situation and the growing threat of Communist danger from abroad, clamor began to be raised for broadening the basis of the government so as to make it more representative of all the people of Greece.

Yielding to this increasing pressure, the Tsaldaris cabinet resigned on January 28, 1947, and made way for a coalition ministry headed by Demetrios Maximos, a retired banker, who had been minister of Foreign Affairs under Panagrotis Tsaldaris in 1933-35, and had represented Greece in the negotiations leading to the Balkan Pact. Tsaldaris remained as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and the real power was still in his hands. The cabinet was composed for the most part of Populists and conservative Royalists, but it included also representatives of three small parties of the Center and two independent parties of the Right. Only the Liberal Party led by Sophoulis declined to participate.
The Truman Doctrine

Shortly after its accession to power, the Maximos govern-
ment directed an urgent appeal for economic aid to Presi-
dent Truman and the Secretary of State. It was delivered in
Washington on March 3, 1947. At about the same time, the
British government notified the American authorities that it
had decided to withdraw its military forces from Greece and
could no longer continue financial assistance.

Great Britain had "carried the ball" for the democracies
for nearly two and a half years following the liberation, and
was no longer able to support the burden this imposed. Greek
wars in the past have for the most part been financed through
loans from abroad. Foreign capital, grudgingly granted and
under oppressive terms, provided the sinews of war for the
Greek Revolution of 1821. The ill-starred clash with Turkey
in 1897 brought about a collapse of Greece's financial struc-
ture which led to the imposition of an International Financial
Commission vested with control over a large part of the coun-
try's revenues. Foreign loans again made possible the train-
ing and equipment of the Greek army for the Balkan Wars and
World War I; and the monetary cost of Greece's participation
in World War II was largely met in the same way through Brit-
ish aid. Since liberation, the British government has pro-
vided enormous sums for the reorganization, equipment and
maintenance of the Greek army. No account is yet available
of the substantial expenditures for these purposes in 1944-45;

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but in 1946-47 the British contribution was the equivalent of 150 million dollars.

We have seen that the British forces in Greece were small as compared to the Russian armies of occupation in other Balkan countries. But it was only their vigorous armed intervention in 1944 and 1945 and their continued presence and policing, that had bolstered up the post liberation cabinets and enabled them to maintain a precarious hold on affairs and to keep the country from being taken into the Soviet sphere by a small communist minority.

The Greek request received prompt attention in Washington. Convinced that the foreign policy and the national security of the United States were "involved", and that the "survival and integrity of the Greek nation" were "of grave importance in a much wider situation", President Truman in a message to the Congress on March 12 recommended the immediate grant of substantial aid. A bill providing for the allocation of 300 million dollars to Greece, about half to be spent for military supplies and equipment, was passed by the Congress, and commissions were set up to supervise the expenditure of the sums voted. Primary responsibility for carrying out the programs was assigned by the President to the Secretary of State. An additional 100 million dollars was allocated to aid Turkey, all to be used for military needs. Should Soviet power ever establish itself in Greece, Turkey would be caught
in the grip of powerful pincers on the west and on the east and might next be forced to yield, and the countries of the Near East would soon follow.

The decision to assist Greece marked a memorable turning point in the foreign policy of the United States, which for more than a century, had scrupulously refrained from interference in the internal affairs of European Nations. The debates in the House of Representatives and the Senate revealed the serious situation faced by our government. The sober import of the commitment was plainly stressed by President Truman and Secretary of State Marshall. The United States as a nation has grown up and become one of the greatest—if not the greatest—of the world powers today. The change of policy toward Greece was a recognition that with this leading position goes a corresponding responsibility, and in a non-partisan action supported by our two political parties, we officially accepted the charge.

From the beginning, it was made clear that our purpose in coming to the assistance of Greece was to enable that country to maintain its territorial integrity and independence and to restore its shattered economy and resume a place as one of the self-sustaining free nations of the world.

Although prompted by no imperialistic ambitions, our action was by no means a purely altruistic gesture to
help an unfortunate foreign people in distress. It served
definite notice to the nations of the world that we believe
that our own vital interests are bound up with the situation
in Greece, and that we are determined to safeguard our way
of life against international forces which threaten to de-
stroy it.

The debate in Congress witnessed both American prefer-
ence for action within the framework of the United Nations
and fear that that organization had not grown to a stature
which would enable it to obtain rapid and effective results.
The assistance act specifically provides that, if the Security
Council or The General Assembly finds that action taken by the
United Nations makes continuance of American aid unnecessary
or undesirable, the President is directed to withdraw our as-
sistance in whole or in part.

The American Mission for Aid to Greece

The American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG), com-
posed largely of technical experts in economics, finance,
industry, labor and other fields, was promptly organized.
Dwight Griswold, former Governor of Nebraska, was appointed
Chief of the Mission, and on July 15 he and some members of
his staff arrived in Athens. By the end of September the
American civilian personnel in Greece numbered 128. A de-
tailed agreement had been drawn up and signed by Lincoln
MacVeagh, American Ambassador to Greece and Tsaldaris, specifically defining the purposes for which the grant was to be used and conferring wide powers on the American Mission.

The position in which the Mission found itself was a novel one, and there were few, if any, guiding precedents. The whole operation was to be carried out openly, under the searching light of publicity and full information given to the Greek and American people. The United Nations was to be regularly apprised of all developments and there was no doubt that the progress of the enterprise would be observed with the keenest attention by other governments, both friendly and unfriendly.

In inaugurating the program, the administration found itself in fact somewhat embarrassed by the generally unfavorable tone of the press in the United States in its comments on the incumbent Greek regime. The reports carried in many newspapers were not of a kind to inspire American public opinion and the taxpayer with confidence. The futile endeavors of the Maximos regime to re-establish order in the face of a minority's subversive opposition made it hard to see the broad contours of the picture. The legend of a "democratic" EAM, fighting to "free" Greece from "monarcho-fascism" and a British-supported "bloody Glucksburg", survived well into 1947, both in Britain and America. The rise of the Labor.
Party in Great Britain, the persistence of Anglophobia in the United States, and the ostrich-like desire in both countries not to see new dangers arising after the war was thought to have been won, were all expertly exploited by Moscow-directed propaganda.

The Greek political scene was indeed thoroughly bewildering to an unfamiliar observer. The innumerable parties, their relatively insignificant differences on basic questions of policy and their disproportionately violent emotional estrangements and animosities were difficult for Americans to comprehend. Greece's political problems were to a great extent rooted in history, the product of converging forces of the past, of Greek character and temperament, and of external pressures. The brief historical survey given in these pages has shown how the powerfully developed individualism of the Greeks has always operated as a centrifugal force in their political life, and fostered a tendency to disunity which has manifested itself disastrously in times of crisis. Internal strife nearly wrecked the Greek cause in the struggle for independence against Turkey, and on subsequent occasions did grave injury to the national interest. It would undoubtedly have been of enormous benefit to Greece if, following the example set in some other liberated countries, all the political parties had joined together in an
agreement to lay aside their rivalries for a term of years and to collaborate patriotically and loyally in the re-establishment of security and the rehabilitation of the national economy. The failure of the anti-communist groups to do so was not the fault of any one party individually. All the responsibility must be shared by all.

Officials in Washington were better informed than the American public generally. They were under no illusions regarding the character of the struggle being waged in Greece and saw it for what it was, an opening move in a Soviet plan for expansion. They knew the weakness of the Greek government and the difficulties with which it had to contend. They hoped and advised that a national coalition cabinet might be formed of all the sound and patriotic forces of the country. But under the circumstances no other choice was possible than to support the government in power, since the only real alternative in sight was not a perfect democracy but a ruthless dictatorship of the Left under the aegis of the Kremlin.

In his message to the Congress on March 12, President Truman stated:

"The extension of aid by this country does not mean that the United States condones everything that the Greek government has done or will do. We have condemned in the past, and we condemn now, extremist measures of the right or the left. We have in the past advised tolerance, and we advise tolerance now."

Acting Secretary of State Acheson, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 24, put the
matter clearly. American option in Greece, he said, under the conditions prevailing was not a choice between a perfect democracy and an imperfect democracy. The question is whether there will be any democracy at all. If the armed minority that now threatens Greece's political and economic stability were to gain control, free institutions and human freedom would disappear and democratic progress would come to an abrupt halt.

The fact has too often been overlooked that the government in power at the time of the inauguration of the Truman Doctrine gained office as a result of an expression of popular will in free elections. The reorganization which established the Maximos coalition was effected in accordance with constitutional practice and there was no violation of democratic principles. It was a legally constituted government, answerable to the elected Chamber of Deputies, which had power to vote it out of office at any time. There was here no ground on which a charge of fascism could be seriously entertained.

This regime conscientiously endeavored to maintain policies wholly unknown in countries under fascist and totalitarian rule. Freedom of speech, of the press, and of the assembly was not suppressed in the principal cities, or even seriously curtailed. Metropolitan newspapers enjoyed as much liberty as the press of the United States. Greece still
remained the only state in the Balkans where opposition papers might freely appear and be distributed, and there were no restrictions on their criticism of the administration. Even the Communist Party was allowed to publish and circulate its official daily organ, regularly filled with unbridled abuse of the government and praise of the guerrillas; nor did it refrain from inciting its readers to actual rebellion. There was no censorship of letters and telegrams, telephone conversations were not tapped; those who wished might listen without fear to any radio transmission they chose. In short, despite the existence of a subversive civil war, citizens without discrimination could still enjoy most of the essential rights and privileges that come with democracy. These were vital facts which were somehow largely overlooked by critics who were not fully aware of the fundamental issue of the international drama they were observing. They might have done well to pause for reflection on the world of difference between Greek political life and that prevailing in the Soviet dominated lands to the north.

Lack of Unity in Greek Politics

Though the post-liberation governments in general, and the cabinet under Maximos in particular, must in fairness be cleared of the charge of fascism, it is obvious that they did not have the strength or the competence to deal effect-
ively with the pressing problems of security and rehabilitation. They were signally unsuccessful in achieving the unity of the nation's constructive forces demanded by the situation. This failure was in the final analysis a failure of leadership. It was in large part a result of the political vacuum created by the Metaxas dictatorship and perpetuated by the war and German occupation. For nearly a decade normal political life had been suppressed. The more dynamic leaders of the 20's and 30's had died--most of them in 1936, and the principal party leaders remaining were exiled under Metaxas. Under the adverse conditions that followed there was little or no chance for young men to obtain the experience and training that might enable them to rise to positions of recognized prestige and influence. There was no statesman great enough, with character and personality sufficiently strong and compelling, to inspire universal confidence. A Trikoupis or an Eleftherios Venizelos might perhaps have succeeded in rousing the nation to join together in a united front, but men of their stature were not to be found. This was, then, the material with which the United States had to work in applying its program of aid to Greece with the hope of preserving the integrity and independence of the country and saving it from absorption under communist dictatorship. All the elected representatives of the people were nationalists, unalterably opposed to communism, and all
were convinced that Greece's best interests were bound up with those of the Western Democracies. But on almost all internal questions, dissension and discord, suspicion and rivalry stood in the way of genuine cooperation and harmony. More than two and a half years of struggle had failed to bring the anti-communist elements of the country together. Confronted by a united and implacable foe, they still found themselves unable to sacrifice or put aside their own party interests and compose their differences in behalf of the commonwealth. The Liberals, the chief opposition party, stubbornly refused to participate in the Maximos government as the Populists had to cooperate in the pre-election government of Sophoulis. It was evident that some degree of political solidarity on the part of the patriotic Greeks had got to be achieved if the program of American aid was to succeed in its purpose, and the problem for America was to find some way of persuading the Greek politicians on their own initiative and volition to compose their disagreements and to bring about the strongest possible combination of their constructive and creative forces.

**Intensification of Guerrilla Warfare**

The many unsolved problems confronting Greece at the time when the American Mission arrived in Athens were closely

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interrelated and all inseparable from a general scheme of rehabilitation. They fell, however, roughly into three categories, security, politics and economics. The question as to which should have priority of attention was no longer seriously debatable, for the alarming intensification of guerrilla warfare amounting to a state of civil war in the spring and early summer of 1947 made it clear that law and order must be reestablished if Greece was to survive as a free nation.

If the struggle had been a purely internal one it would have been settled long before. The government had by far the stronger forces, and as we have seen, the real communists were relatively few, although it is true that they had rallied around them many of the discontented and economically submerged. But this was not primarily an internal fight, as was proved by the findings of the United Nations Commission of Investigation. The Greek frontiers with Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, have a total length of some 520 miles, and run for the most part through rugged mountainous terrain. To seal them up effectively and prevent altogether the passage of supplies to the guerrillas by land and air would require the deployment of a huge army and the use of a substantial air force. Obviously this was a task far beyond the unaided
power of national Greece. It could only be undertaken—since the United Nations organization was still unprepared for so great an enterprise and a favorable resolution was in any event certain to be blocked by a Soviet veto—through effective military assistance from the western democracies. Hopes and appeals for such aid, if not officially sponsored by the government, had begun to be expressed very generally by individuals and the press in Athens in the summer of 1947. There were also at this time constant rumors that the rebels were planning to set up a government of their own and proclaim an independent state in the mountains.

When AMAG began its survey of the situation, the number of guerrillas in the field could not be accurately determined. Estimates by those who were best informed ranged from ten to fifteen thousand, the latter figure being the more probable. To Americans far away, this force might not seem large enough to constitute a danger of the first magnitude in a state with a population of seven and a half million. Under normal circumstances a strong government might well have been able to crush such a rebellion with relatively little difficulty. But conditions after the war were far from normal and successive governments had been weak, irresolute and lacking in resources.

For the maintenance of national security, the government had at its disposal an army of 120,000 men. Some
20,000 of this number were new recruits in the process of training, and about 24,000 were assigned to the various regular and special services. The combat strength was consequently not more than 76,000, organized for the most part in seven divisions. One might think even this an adequate force to deal with 15,000 guerrillas, but the actual situation was not simply a matter of numbers. Apart from their main concentrations in the north, the guerrillas maintained numerous diversionary bands in central Greece, some in the Peloponnesus and a few even on certain of the Aegean islands. All these bands actively harrassed their local districts and offered a constant threat to communications by road and railway. The chief routes had to be protected and the supply lines of the army, which was spread on a wide front from Epirus to Thrace, had to be properly safeguarded, with the result that most of the combat troops had to be detached and left behind to garrison important centers and keep supply lines open. A disproportionately small number of fighting men was available for aggressive operations against the larger concentrations of the rebels along the northern border.

Guerrilla tactics were shrewdly devised to embarrass and frustrate the government's counter operations. Scattered about in innumerable small and large bands, mostly in the
Epirote, Macedonian and Thracian mountains, but under a
more or less coordinated system of command, and with supplies
arriving from across the borders, the rebels were able to
cause widespread havoc and disorder. By day or preferably by
night, they descended to the lowlands to attack lightly de-
fended towns or villages or small outposts. For the most
part, they avoided engagements with armed troops and harried
the civilian population. They used modern rifles, machine
guns, hand grenades and occasionally mortars, and before
leaving they strewed the roads with land mines. Sometimes
whole villages were destroyed, and regularly the houses of
non-communists were burned down to the accompaniment of
looting, killing and abduction. The whole Macedonian coun-
tryside was gradually devastated and some 150,000 terror-
stricken peasants were driven to abandon their farms and flee
to the larger cities for safety.

If pursued by strong bodies of troops, the guerrillas
dispersed in small bands to their almost inaccessible mountain
hiding places. This irregular warfare could not be kept up
indefinitely with a constant trickle of munitions and equip-
ment from beyond the frontier, but while this supply line was
kept open there was little possibility of stamping it out.
On the other hand, it is true that the guerrillas were to a
great extent contained within their inhospitable mountain
areas and were prevented from holding possession of any im-
portant towns or centers of population.

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Disappointment was manifested in Athens over the failure of the military campaign against the guerrillas and both the government and general staff came in for sharp criticism. Many observers believed that the high command was at fault and that the army was not being led with the aggressive vigor required by the situation. Political considerations had to a considerable extent governed the appointment and removal of officers. Many had for one reason or another been placed on inactive duty, and the republicans feared that a deliberate attempt was being made to shut them out and turn the army into a purely royalist instrument. All this inevitably affected morale. In its rank and file, however, the army was a good fighting machine, well trained by the British, who had reorganized and re-equipped it, and contributed since liberation to its financial support to the extent of several hundred million dollars.

The formation of guerrilla bands was not, as we have seen, an exclusive monopoly of the Left. The vicious hatred that had flared up before between the communist-controlled ELAS forces on the one hand, and EDES, the Security Battalions, the gendarmerie, and other rightist groups on the other, was fanned into flame by savage attacks and counter attacks, reprisals and counter reprisals, in the course of which the defenseless rural population bore the brunt of the loss and
suffering. Passion reached a high pitch throughout the country and desire for revenge became deeprooted and spread far. Lack of strength was shown by both the Tsaldaris and Maximos governments in dealing with the Rightist terrorization, which was most intense in the Peloponnesus and which helped to swell the numbers of refugees streaming to the cities. The situation was further aggravated by the partisan activities of the state sponsored Rural Security Units (MAY) and by lack of strict control of the gendarmerie who as we have seen were strongly Rightist and often high handed in their treatment of their opponents.

Under these circumstances, it would seem that little short of a miracle could restore the rule of law and order, and make it possible for the deadly adversaries to live peacefully side by side. No such development was discernible to AMAG upon its arrival in Greece. The united efforts of the nation had not been rallied to face danger from civil war and the critical internal economic condition. The coalition government had not been able to concentrate in itself a union of the best minds of the country, but under Rightist domination pursued a strongly partisan course. Not only had it failed to crush the guerrilla movement, but by its own methods it had also widely offended public opinion.

Shortly after the establishment of the Maximos government, Napoleon Zervas had taken charge of the key
Ministry of Public Order, and inevitably his presence perpetuated the bitter partisanship that had grown up between his EDES forces and those they had fought. There were wholesale arrests of political opponents who, without trial, were deported to exile in the Aegean islands. Some estimates put the number of those arrested at 8,000 and some run far higher. (The Twentieth Century Fund's Report on the Greeks mentions the figure 26,000 as having been arrested by February 1947) In the so-called purification of the public services too, many state employees other than communists, were dismissed for political reasons.

Security Committees operating with summary procedure under an antiquated statute, and courts martial, inflicted many death sentences throughout the country. In fear of the government's harsh treatment of their party foes, many non-communists were forced from their homes and joined the guerrilla forces as the lesser of two evils.

The Sophoulis Government

Demands for the reorganization of the cabinet to make it a more real union of the nation's constructive forces began to be heard frequently during the summer of 1947. The Greeks had become highly sensitive to the approval of American public opinion, but AMAG on its side found it embarrassing to be involved with what seemed to be a highly partisan administration. Finally on August 23, the repre-
sentatives of the Center, encouraged by AMAG to believe that they would be acting in accord with the wishes of the United States government, resigned and brought on a cabinet crisis. Nearly a week was spent in a vain effort to form a genuine coalition with the inclusion of the main group of Liberals, but Sophoulis was obdurate in refusing unless his terms were met. He insisted on being made Prime Minister and on being given an opportunity to try a more conciliatory policy toward the Left instead of the "dynamic" policy which the Royalists had been applying without success. Unwilling to yield his position as leader of a large majority and impatient with the fruitless discussions, Tsaldaris on August 29 suddenly formed a cabinet of his own party.

It was only a stopgap, however, which failed to satisfy public opinion, and negotiations among the political leaders continued. At last on September 7, realizing that if nationalist Greece was to retain America's interest and support, she could not remain politically divided, Tsaldaris agreed to relinquish his rights as majority leader, and to accept the conditions laid down by Sophoulis. The latter was consequently at once sworn in as Prime Minister, with Tsaldaris as Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs. For the first time, Populists and Liberals were cooperating, with the former preponderating, in the cabinet. The leaders
of the small Center parties were left out, but all gave their parliamentary support to the new coalition, and Sophocles Venizelos soon brought his splinter party back into the Liberal fold.

Sophoulis immediately proclaimed his program of conciliation to the Leftists. He invited all the guerrillas to come down from the mountains and surrender their weapons, and he promised them a general amnesty under strong guarantees. This was not a new proposal; a similar amnesty, including provision for foreign observation, had been offered (at the suggestion of the United States, when the Security Council's Commission was preparing its report at Geneva) by the Maximos government. The only novelty lay in the fact that the offer was now made by a Liberal. But he immediately became a "Rightist" and a "Fascist" in communist propaganda. Some few guerrillas responded and gave themselves up; others doubtless would have liked to do so, but could not escape the vigilance of their Communist leaders, under whom operations were continuing more intensively than ever. After some two months, Sophoulis concluded that conciliation was of no avail, and announced that henceforth the government would use all means at its disposal to crush the rebels by force. In mid-October, the government suppressed the publication in Athens of the daily communist newspaper Rizospastis (Radical) and
the closely allied *Eleftheri Ellada* (Free Greece). Both had long been conducting anti-government and pro-guerrilla propaganda and had been openly inciting revolt against the legally constituted regime.

In the late autumn of 1947, the guerrilla warfare in Greece began to take a more sinister turn. Much of it was obviously under central control and direction, and the name of "General" Markos appeared more frequently. He was already known as a communist agent, active in fomenting strikes in Salonika in 1936. Guerrilla tactics changed somewhat. There was a tendency to concentrate the subversive forces into larger bands than heretofore. This was perhaps an answer to Sophoulis' proclamation of a general amnesty, which clearly caused the communist leaders to keep a closer watch on their men to prevent desertion and surrender. At the same time, a more vigorous policy of impressment of young recruits began to be applied. Whenever a village was raided, the young men were rounded up and carried off and forced on threat of death to join the band. Those once enrolled who escaped and gave themselves up were tortured and killed, if recaptured, and their families were sought out and mistreated. Terrorization, too, was intensively organized, and the unfortunate rural inhabitants subject to constant attack were driven in increasing thousands to seek refuge in the cities. By the end of the year, it was estimated that some 420,000 refugees had fled.
from their homes to the greater security offered by the large municipalities. The problems of housing and feeding this mass of indigent humanity took on alarming proportions. The whole campaign was evidently planned to disrupt orderly life and create chaos—ideal conditions for the spread of communist doctrine and propaganda. Moreover, one cannot avoid the conclusion that there was a coordinated project of military and political pressure on Greece.

Shortly before Christmas, armed forces of guerrillas, some coming from Albanian territory, made a concerted attack on Konitsa, a provincial town to the north of Yannina. After some ten days of severe fighting, government troops succeeded in beating off the attack and relieving the garrison of the town which had been besieged. Some of the assailants were driven back across the Albanian border. Meanwhile on December 24, a clandestine radio—claiming to broadcast from Greek territory, but actually located in Yugoslavia—addressed to the Greek people a proclamation announcing the formation of an independent government with "General" Markos as Prime Minister.

"Taking into consideration the pressing need of our people", the preamble declared, "due to the suppression of its independence by the Americans, a Provisional Democratic Government has been formed". Among its objects the first listed was

"To continue the struggle by all possible means, to intensify it, and to liberate
"the country from foreign imperialists and their native lackeys, for the victory of Democracy and the independence of the whole country".

Another object was

"To strive for reconciliation......and to reestablish friendly relations with all the democratic peoples".

The proclamation was signed by Markos, as Prime Minister and Minister of War, and by seven others who held the rest of the portfolios in the cabinet. So far as known, the names were those of recognized communist agents and agitators. This "government" had obviously intended to establish its seat in Konitsa, but because of the failure of the coordinated military operations, it was unable to make good a foothold on Greek soil.

The attempted coup had at least one advantage for Greece. It put aside the mask and brought clearly into the open the communist character of the guerrilla movement. There could no longer be any doubt as to the nature of the struggle being waged against the Greek government and the Greek people.

The "Democracy" mentioned in the proclamation of course meant the type of government actually functioning in Soviet Russia and her satellite states, and the "democratic peoples" with which friendly relations were to be reestablished, were primarily those of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, from which the attack on Greece was being launched.
The United States in January 1948 issued a statement making known its view that recognition of the Provisional Government by other governments would have serious implications and would be clearly contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Special Balkan Committee of the United Nations General Assembly also passed a resolution declaring that in its judgment such recognition would constitute a threat to the peace.

The year 1948 thus began for Greece with a clear-cut definition of the issue at stake. It was not merely an internal rebellion of a small but stubborn minority that threatened the state. The country was the object of an attack, aided and abetted from beyond the frontiers by the Soviet-controlled satellites, by the forces of international communism which aimed to extend their sway over the entire Balkan peninsula. And it was only through the moral and material help of Great Britain and the United States that Greece had been able so far to maintain her territorial integrity and independence.
The United States and Greece lie far apart, separated by an ocean and most
of the length of the Mediterranean. Because of this physical remoteness there
have been few opportunities for clashing interests; and serious conflicts of
views have seldom arisen to ruffle normal amicable relations. The American
Government in the past has always looked on Greece with friendly sympathy, but
has invariably followed a policy of non-interference in Greek affairs. There
have been times, indeed, when the Greeks, needing political support, would have
welcomed a less aloof isolationist official attitude; but by and large they have
respected the American principles of non-intervention and have felt they could
count on America at least for benevolent advice without ulterior motives.

It was John Quincy Adams, as Secretary of State under President Monroe,
who first specifically formulated this American determination not to be involved
in Balkan politics. He found occasion to do so when on August 18, 1823, he
answered a request for the establishment of diplomatic relations and aid
which had been presented through the American Minister in London by a representa-
tive of the provisional Greek Government, then engaged in war for liberation
from the Turkish yoke. In his reply Adams made it clear that although deeply
sympathetic with the Greek cause, the United States Government was bound by its
fixed policy of neutrality to refrain from taking sides in any European political
conflict. Daniel Webster, on January 19, 1824, introduced a resolution in the
House, calling on the President to appoint an agent or commissioner to represent
him near the Greek Government. Webster made a stirring and celebrated speech
on behalf of Greece and was ably seconded by Henry Clay and other colleagues.
Strong isolationist opposition, led by Representatives Randolph, Poinsett, and
others, and supported by Adams, persuaded the House to reject the resolution. In
the following year, however, when he became President himself, John Quincy Adams designated a diplomatic Agent, William C. Somerville, who in September 1825, was instructed to proceed to Greece to make contact with the Greek Government and to report on the situation as he found it. This was the first diplomatic recognition of the new Greek state by any country. Somerville set off on his mission but fell ill enroute and died early in 1826 in Paris. No successor was appointed, and the project was abandoned. A few years later, however, in 1833, in reply to a request from the Protecting Powers, the United States recognized Greece as a sovereign state under King Otho. In 1836 the first treaty between the two countries was signed; and in 1838 Gregory A. Perdicaris was appointed as the first American Consul in Athens.

Although unwilling to commit itself officially to any interference in the struggle of the Greeks against Turkey, the United States Government looked with tolerance, not to say favor, on the private initiative of American citizens in projects to help Greece gain her liberty. Many of our leading statesmen, including President Monroe, Jefferson, John Adams, James Madison, and John Quincy Adams himself, freely expressed their personal sentiments of friendship and their hopes for the success of the Greek cause. In one way or another almost all gave their support to a widespread popular movement to aid the Greeks in their fight for freedom. Committees headed by men of distinction and influence were set up throughout the country, notably in Boston, New Haven, New York, Albany, Philadelphia and Cincinnati, but also in many other places. They organized mass meetings, where eloquent addresses were delivered; obtained wide publicity in the press, which was almost wholly pro-Greek; issued publications of their own; and sponsored a vigorous campaign for the collection of money and supplies. In 1823-24 substantial sums were raised, more than $40,000 in New York alone, the greater part of which was transmitted to Greek representatives in London who used it to purchase guns and munitions. Lord
Byron's whole-hearted espousal of the Greek cause and his untimely death at Missolonghi had a profound effect in stirring up American interest and sympathy.

Relatively few Americans joined the devoted band of philhellenes who flocked to Greece from other countries to participate actively in the fighting. Several, however, rendered invaluable services in a military capacity. One was George Jarvis, of New York, who went to Greece in 1822 and ultimately became a Lieutenant General in the Greek army. Another was Jonathan P. Miller, of Randolph, Vermont, who with some financial assistance from the Committee in Boston reached the scene during the winter of 1824-5, and eventually held the rank of Colonel in the Greek forces. Others deserving of mention were George Wilson, of Providence, an ex-gunner in the American navy, whose courageous conduct in action against the Turks in Greek waters won well-merited recognition; and James Wilson, of Baltimore, a negro cook, veteran of Decatur's expedition against the pirates of the Barbary Coast, who volunteered for service in Greece and in emergencies left his cook's galley and played a heroic role in naval engagements.

The most distinguished American philhelle, however, was Dr. Samuel Gridley Howe, of Boston, who spent more than three years in Greece from 1825 to 1828. His activities were varied and widespread. He organized the medical service of the Greek navy, assisted in building a hospital, and was able to obtain from the United States greatly needed medical supplies and equipment. He also turned to civilian relief and was the first to deal systematically with the problem of caring for the innumerable destitute refugees, especially women and children, who had fled from the areas overrun by the Turks. For this purpose he set up a relief center on the island of Aegina, where he has left a permanent monument in a great mole protecting the harbor. He planned this to be built in the belief that it was demoralizing to distribute relief for a long period unless the beneficiaries in return could be occupied in carrying out some use-
ful employment. Archaeologists of the present day regret that some other task was not chosen, for under Dr. Howe's direction the stone blocks for the mole were largely taken from the foundations of an ancient temple. Later Howe established a colony of refugees in a new town or village of their own which he laid out and constructed in the neighborhood of Corinth, and which he named Washington- tonia, in honor of the American hero. The food and clothing distributed under Dr. Howe's supervision came from the United States, provided mainly through the efforts of the Boston Committee, which also sent out Dr. John D. Russ as assistant-to-Howe. Many shiploads of supplies were dispatched during 1827-8, paid for by the collections in a new country-wide campaign for funds which yielded gratifying results. The relief committees in the United States had now changed their policy, and instead of turning over funds and supplies directly to the Greek Government (to be used for military purposes), they restricted them to civilian relief and arranged to have the distribution organized and carried out by American representatives on the spot. In this way Colonel Miller, after leaving the Greek army, became the agent on the ground of the New York Committee.

Apart from humanitarian contributions, aid of other kinds for the Greek cause was also obtained from the United States. A New York firm built two frigates for the Greek Government. In its financial aspect the transaction was not free from scandal reflecting on the American side; because of the excessive cost of the ships the Greeks could afford to take only one; the other being sold to the United States Government. But in the autumn of 1826 the frigate Helias set sail for the Mediterranean. Not a little assistance was rendered, furthermore, by American shipyards in fitting out and equipping Greek privateers to prey on Turkish shipping in the Aegean. One such vessel, for example, was provided by Thomas Handasyd Perkins of Boston.
A squadron of the United States navy was maintained in the Mediterranean during the years of the revolution and was frequently seen in Greek waters. Its primary duty was to safeguard American commerce with South Europe, North Africa, and the Near East, but it kept a close eye on the situation in Greece. The navy's active intervention was sometimes urgently sought by the Greek Government, and rumors of its impending participation in the contest were occasionally spread; in actual fact, however, the American naval commanders never departed from a policy of strict neutrality.

In not a few instances they rescued and aided civilian victims of both sides.

The enduring effects of American missionary movements played a role in Greece during the troubled times of the Revolution. The most enduring effects of their activities were almost certainly not those gained through the presence of missionary agents in the country, although one of the latter, the Reverend John Henry Hill of New York, in 1831 founded at Athens a school for girls, which has been of incalculable benefit to generations of Athenian women. The Hill School still survives in Athens on the ground where it was originally established, and it continues to function along the lines laid down by its founder. Dr. Hill was likewise the principal founder and builder of the English Episcopal Church in Athens, which was old enough to celebrate its centennial of service in 1943. Also in the field of education, but even more powerful in its influence, however, was the work of the American printing press set up at Malta by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. In little more than a decade, from 1822 to 1832, it issued and distributed through the Near East some 350,000 printed volumes. A great many were bibles, grammars, and textbooks in Modern Greek, which contributed substantially to the fixing of the style and the orthography of the language that came to prevail in the new-born state. It was the language based on the classical model as advocated by Adamantios Korais. Before the revolution there were in Greek lands no presses on which books could be printed in Greek. Works in the Greek language were procurable only from Greek publishers abroad, in
Paris, Venice, Vienna, and other European cities. After the outbreak of the revolution, one of the first acts of the government was to establish a printing press. It began at Argos, then was moved to Corinth, Hydra, Nauplia, and Aegina, then back to Argos. Two or three private presses also came into being, but they operated at first on a modest scale, with limited capacity, and lacked the resources of the Mission Board's plant at Malta.

A good many orphan children who escaped from the massacres on the island of Chios and in other places were brought to America for education and often adoption. Some eventually returned to their native land, but not a few remained in the United States and acquired American citizenship. One ultimately became a high officer in the United States Navy and had a son who attained to the rank of Rear Admiral. Another, Gregory Perdicaris, entered the American consular service and was sent to Greece in 1838 as the first United States consul accredited to that country, as above noted.

With the establishment of Greece as a sovereign state and the end of need for emergency relief, intensive American concern for the Greeks waned. Some Americans remained in the country, however, engaged in missionary and educational work. The latter was permitted and welcomed, but missionaries found themselves much restricted by regulations forbidding proselytising, and for the most part moved on to other fields. The Reverend Jonas King, who stayed behind, became involved in legal difficulties over the expropriation of some land he had purchased, and was tried and found guilty of disrespect to the Greek church. The Jonas King affair in 1853 developed into a minor incident. The vigorous intervention of the American Minister in Constantinople, who was sent to Athens by the American government on a special mission to look into the matter, failed to win co-operation from the Greek authorities; but in time the difficulty was settled, Dr. King was released and received compensation for his property, and friendly relations between the two countries were not affected.
The insurrection in Crete, which broke out in 1866 in a fight for liberation from Turkish rule and for union with Greece, aroused another wave of philhellenic sentiment in the United States. The heroic defense of the Arkadi monastery by the Cretans, under the Abbot Manesis, who, when finally overwhelmed, blew up the powder magazine, destroying friend and foe alike, and the savage measures of repression applied by the Turkish commander, Omar Pasha, in 1867, stirred American public opinion. Again pro-Greek committees were formed in New York and elsewhere to collect money and supplies for the relief of the civilian refugees, many of whom — to the number of 50,000 — fled for safety to the Greek mainland. Dr. Howe headed another mission to distribute aid in Greece. In 1866 President Andrew Johnson had transmitted a message of good will and sympathy to the Cretans, and had urged the Greeks to send a diplomatic representative to Washington. On June 16, 1868, Mr. Charles K. Tuckerman of Boston took up his duties as the first American Minister Resident accredited to Greece. In a public address in Athens in 1868, he also expressed friendly sympathy with Greece and the Greek desire to extend the country's territory. These were expressions of personal feelings, however, and there was no change in the traditional American policy of non-intervention in European disputes. Official relations remained cordial, nonetheless, and when diplomatic relations were broken off between Turkey and Greece in 1868 and the American Minister in Constantinople, after other powers had declined, was asked to take charge of Greek interests in Turkey, he accepted without hesitation. The situation was eased without resolving into armen.

An event of profound importance for the promotion of cultural relations between the United States and Greece took place in 1882, but passed off quietly with little fanfare and attention. This was the founding of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, set up by the Archaeological Institute of America and some of the country's leading universities. Its purpose was to
serve as a center for American classical scholars seeking to acquire a first-hand acquaintance with Greek lessons and to obtain training in archaeology. For more than 65 years the School has maintained its activity, and as a friendly meeting place of Americans and Greeks at the intellectual level, has contributed much to foster mutual respect and understanding.

Greece's ill-fated war with Turkey in 1897 gave the next occasion for a demonstration of philhellenism in the United States. Once again moral and material assistance was forthcoming, but the first interest of the American people was soon diverted to the Caribbean and the far East as a result of the war with Spain.

Shortly after this time a movement began which greatly intensified relations and contacts between Greece and the United States. This was the migration on a large scale of surplus Hellenic population to the new world. The Greek countryside, based on an agricultural economy, but with wholly insufficient land worth cultivating, was heavily overpopulated, and the standard of living was low. The opportunity to go to America to make a better living opened a new horizon to the impoverished Greek peasants. Not a few had already made the venture, and the enthusiastic reports they sent home, accompanied by substantial remittances, induced great numbers of their countrymen to follow their example. In the first quarter of the present century a great flood of emigrants, chiefly from the provincial towns and rural districts, crossed the Atlantic and poured into the United States. Their number in the course of 25 years reached a total of nearly 400,000, while during the same period about 160,000, for one reason or another, returned to Greece. The net departure of more than 240,000 persons from the country aided Greek economy in two ways: on the one hand it was relieved of the burden of supporting them, and on the other it soon profited from the large volume of foreign exchange they began to send back to their families and relatives in the homeland. The economy of Greece speedily
adjusted itself to the new situation brought about by this continuing shift of population, and it suffered a rude shock when in 1924 the United States adopted an immigration system on a quota basis which in effect virtually excludes Greek immigration.

In the meantime the Greeks in America had adapted themselves to their new surroundings and prospered, and with their rise in economic standing and in education, especially in the second generation, they began to have some influence on public opinion. This became apparent during World War II when the well-organized Greek War Relief Association, largely under Greek-American management, became a powerful factor in raising funds for the relief of suffering in war-devastated Greece.

The Balkan wars in 1911-12 attracted the serious attention of the American people, and public opinion strongly favored the Greek side. The brilliant successes of the Hellenic armies were followed with keen interest; but in view of the evident competence of the Venizelos administration, then in power, and the lack of need for emergency relief, no large-scale movement to collect money and supplies was set under way. Some individual Americans did, however, participate in activities of the Red Cross behind the front. An interesting feature of this conflict was the devotion to their native land of Greek-Americans, who went back to their native land in thousands and volunteered for active service in the fighting. Many of them thereby lost their American citizenship and were never able to return to the United States.

In the summer of 1914, shortly before the beginning of World War I, relations between Greece and Turkey became strained almost to the breaking point. The Turks, unwilling to accept the decision of the Powers awarding the Aegean Islands to Greece, and with the prospect of strengthening their navy by the acquisition of two German warships, began to persecute and expel Greeks from Asia Minor and seemed to be threatening to resume the war against Greece. At this juncture the United States rendered a signal service to Greece by selling to her
two battleships, the Idaho and the Mississippi, which were no longer needed in the American navy. Delivered promptly, these vessels, though old, gave Greece decisive naval superiority over Turkey and induced the latter to put a stop to the hostile demonstrations in Asia Minor and to agree to negotiate a settlement. It was a successful stroke by the Venizelos government, and Greek public opinion also expressed warm gratitude to the United States. On their arrival the ships were welcomed with enthusiasm, and were rechristened Lemnos and Kilkis.

Up to the end of World War I American interest in Greece through nearly a century had been sentimental and philanthropic. After that it became more complex. The humanitarian side was by no means neglected; on the contrary, American relief activities increased vastly in scale. The American Red Cross in 1918 and 1919 distributed great quantities of food and clothing through many parts of Greece where there was need, especially in Macedonia, which had suffered much from the war and occupation. A few years later, in 1923-4, a second Red Cross mission from the United States helped substantially in a critical emergency to alleviate the plight of thousands of refugees uprooted from their homes in Asia Minor. Medical aid was also rendered over a long period by the American Women's Hospital which set up a central clinic in one of the suburbs of Athens where women and children were treated by a competent American and Hellenic staff. The American Near East Relief Organization likewise played an important role, especially in caring for orphaned children. Nor should the services of the American navy be forgotten: many refugees among the thousands who after the disaster crowded the quays at Smyrna in 1922 owed their lives to the commanders of American destroyers who took them aboard and transported them to the Greek islands.

In the field of education, too, post-war American interest in Greece manifested itself. Along with the refugees from Anatolia came two American schools
which had long operated in Turkey but now saw themselves faced by the necessity of restricting and altering their activities or moving from Turkish territory. They chose the latter course. A school for girls at Smyrna, conducted under the auspices of the American Board, transferred itself to Greece where it obtained a charter and with funds raised in the United States was able to erect a group of buildings in the suburb of Helleniko, near the seashore not far from Athens. It is now known as Pierce College. In the same way an American Missionary School at Marsovan, in Turkey, removed itself to Salonica where it incorporated an already existing school for girls and built a new plant. Under the name Anatolia College, it now functions under an American president with an American and Greek faculty. An institution of a different kind is the American Farm School which was established in Salonica in 1904 by Dr. John H. House when Macedonia was still under Turkish rule. Under Greek sovereignty it still continues to function as a training school in modern methods of agriculture and stock-raising.

Yet another educational institution is Athens College which was founded through joint Greek and American initiative in 1925. Greek benefactors contributed money to construct and equip part of a large building on a fine site at Psychiko in the outskirts of Athens, and an American Board of Trustees is custodian of endowment funds raised in the United States. The school has now become affiliated with the Association of Near Eastern Colleges which includes sister institutions in Beirut, Istanbul, and Sofia. Athens College has a faculty of American and Greek instructors.

That these institutions are highly regarded among the Greeks and that the opportunity of studying in them is greatly prized may be concluded from the fact that all four are crowded to full capacity and have had to restrict enrollment because of lack of classroom space and facilities.
In the field of business, also, there was a considerable expansion of American interests in Greece in the years following World War I. American tobacco companies had already become an important factor in Greek economy, purchasing large quantities of the choicest cigarette tobacco grown principally in Macedonia and Thrace. Many companies maintained representatives and buyers in those districts, and several had invested heavily in capacious warehouses, where substantial stocks of tobacco could be worked over, cured, and stored. The tobacco sold to the United States brought annually to Greece some ten million dollars in free foreign exchange.

The Standard Oil Company also set up a district office in Athens and built storage tanks along the shore near Piraeus. About the same time the American Express Company established a bank in Athens and opened a travel office. Of great importance to Athens and Greece in general was the appearance on the scene of the Ulen Company of New York under contract with the Greek state. This American company built a modern water supply system for Athens, requiring the erection of a great dam and the creation of an artificial lake in an upland valley above Marathon, and the construction of a large tunnel to carry the water to the city, and of distribution reservoirs, and the laying of mains. The completion of this project, carried out speedily and efficiently by American engineers employing Greek labor, was of incalculable benefit to the cities of Athens and Piraeus, which hitherto had been obliged to get along with a primitive and wholly inadequate water supply, still utilizing in part an ancient aqueduct built by the Emperor Hadrian in the second century after Christ.

The Monks-Ulen Companies similarly undertook in 1929 a great project for drainage and flood control in the Struma Valley in Macedonia, where several hundred square miles of fertile soil were reclaimed for cultivation and a wide
expense of malaria-infested marshland was rendered relatively safe. A few years earlier, in 1925, the Foundation Company of New York was given a contract for a similar enterprise of reclamation in the Vardar Valley near Salonica, where a large area of useless swampland was drained and made available for farming. The work of these American engineering firms contributed in no small measure to the notable increase of cereal production in Greece, which in the seasons of 1937 to 1939 far surpassed all previous records.

An even greater and more far-reaching plan was also under serious study by American hydraulic engineers. This was a bold project to develop the potential water power of the Acheloös River in northwestern Greece. A survey on the ground had revealed that the undertaking, though costly, was probably feasible and that power might be produced on a scale sufficient for the needs of a large part of the country. A contract for a restricted project was actually signed, but before actual work could be started, World War II broke out, and the Acheloös River development was put aside.

World War II brought Greece a brief moment of glory and acclaim when she hurled back Italian aggression; but it was followed by grim disaster and untold misery under enemy occupation. Reports of the suffering of the Greek people during the winter of 1941-2 when many died from actual starvation aroused warm sympathy throughout the United States, and when the Greek War Relief Association was organized to collect money and supplies to aid the civilian population of Greece, public response was widespread and generous. Through the combined efforts of many agencies and men, and with the substantial and indispensable assistance of the Department of State, agreements of all the belligerents concerning were obtained and the way was opened to deliver food, clothing, and medical supplies to the needy in Greece, in spite of a rigorous blockade. Cargoes carried in neutral Swedish ships, which were allowed to pass un molested, were received and distributed by the International Red Cross under the super-
vision of a staff of Swiss and Swedish citizens, and free from seizure by military authorities. This unprecedented arrangement worked well, and thousands of tons of food and clothing reached their destination in safety. The government of Canada donated the bulk of the wheat, the other supplies were provided mainly by the Greek War Relief Association, and the shipping charges were advanced by the United States.

As the war neared its end and the Germans withdrew from Greece, the Allied Powers bent every effort to relieve the want and distress of the Greek people. To care for the problem of aiding the countries liberated from Axis occupation, the United Nations had already set up a special agency, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Funds for UNRRA were provided by the member nations, each, with few exceptions, undertaking to pay a quota fixed in proportion to its national income. The American quota ($2,700,000,000) was naturally by far the largest. The relief of Greece was the first project undertaken by UNRRA. In its early stages, immediately following liberation and during the civil war, the program was administered under allied military control, — called Military Liaison, or MIL, — but in April, 1945, UNRRA was permitted to take operations into its own hands. By December 31, 1946, the organization had brought into Greece food, clothing, medicines, and other supplies and equipment to a total cost of some 341 millions of dollars. The bulk of this came from the United States, and Americans formed the largest element in UNRRA's staff. The Greek War Relief Association, and the Near East Foundation, with funds raised in the United States, undertook more specialized relief projects, and help of many kinds came from various other organizations. The substantial share contributed by the United States in this great effort of mass relief was altogether in keeping with the American humanitarian tradition toward Greece since going back to the time of the Greek revolution.
The United States is represented by an Embassy and a Consulate General in Athens, and by Consulates in Salonica and Patras. Before the war the diplomatic mission had the rank of a Legation; but in 1943, while accredited to the Greek government in exile at Cairo, it was elevated to an Embassy. The American Minister from 1933 to 1941 was Lincoln MacVeagh of Connecticut, who after a period of duty at other capitals was reassigned to Greece as Ambassador, and served in that capacity from 1943 to 1948.
PART THREE

THE ISSUES OF GREECE
Chapter VIII

Security Problems

The exhausting military efforts against Italian and German aggression, followed by three and a half long years of subjection under the harsh and arbitrary rule of Axis occupying forces, Germans, Italians, and Bulgarians, brought great damage and misery to Greece. Hundreds of villages were almost totally demolished during the months of fighting by merciless bombing from the air and, during the occupation, by ruthless reprisals. Harbor installations in the principal ports were blown up and ruined, and all means of communication, monopolized for military purposes while the war continued, were methodically and thoroughly wrecked when the enemy concentrated on the Germans retreated in the autumn of 1944. They had given particular attention to the demolition of railway tunnels, bridges, rolling stock, and highroads. Greek shipping lost two thirds of its tonnage through bombings and the action of submarines. Accumulated stocks and reserves of supplies of all kinds were seized or purchased and dissipated. Production, both agricultural and industrial, was greatly curtailed, if not stopped. Actual starvation afflicted the country, especially during the calamitous winter of 1941-42, while unemployment rose to a high ratio, and normal civilian life was altogether disrupted.

The complete collapse of the Greek economy was accelerated by the systematic undermining of a state financial system, for administration had largely broken down and taxes could not even be assessed or collected. Under German and Italian pressure the quisling governments had recourse to the printing press as their only source of income; and the mere bank notes it turned out, the less they were worth. As circulation of unsecured paper currency mounted, runaway inflation inevitably followed. At the time of liberation, in October, 1944, bank notes with a face value of one hundred billion drachmas lay scattered about the streets,
not worth picking up; their actual purchasing power was hardly that of a cent and a half in American coin.

Along with economic dissolution there was a corresponding fall in morale which had consequences no less tragic. Education from the primary to the highest stages was largely interrupted, standards of conduct and of social relations were shaken. After the exaltation of victory over the Italians, the demoralizing effects of the speedy military debacle when the Germans overran the country induced feelings of bewilderment, frustration, and despair. Self-confidence gave way to helplessness; each individual felt thrown on himself and lost faith and trust in his neighbors. There was little incentive to work. Respect for law and order had suffered gravely, and there was a general distrust of governmental authority.

This was the situation in October 1944, when, immediately following liberation, the government-in-exile entered Athens and attempted to take over the administration of the country. Even a strong and united cabinet under a resolute, vigorous leader with the undivided support of the nation might have found the problems facing it almost insuperable. But the government under Papandreou was a pitifully weak coalition of various parties from which the Liberals had withdrawn and in which dissension was rife. It had no extensive popular support, and it was unable to provide real leadership. It included six ministers representing EAM, the National-Liberation Front, two of them being avowed Communists. Outside the capital almost the whole of Greece was dominated by the fairly well-organized, communist-directed ELAS forces, the leaders of which were determined to seize control of the state. The Allied liberating army under General Schoebel was merely a token force, altogether inadequate to help the government promptly to establish its authority over the whole country. Even its hold over Athens itself was precarious, to say the least.
Under the chaotic conditions prevailing, rent by political discord that soon broke out into civil war, too feeble in its lack of a military arm to impose its jurisdiction, and confronted by a bankrupt economy, the government could make almost no headway toward a solution of the multitudinous urgent problems clamoring for attention. The remarkable thing is not that so little was accomplished, but that anything at all could be achieved. With British help, and in spite of all difficulties, two constructive measures of some temporary value were initiated. One provided for the reestablishment of an army and a police force, trained by British instructors; and the other was the issue of a new currency to replace that which inflation had rendered worthless.

It is unnecessary here to summarize the account given in Chapter 7 of the civil war and of the vicissitudes of the various governments that one after another followed Papandreou's cabinet. But the foregoing brief resume of conditions prevailing in Greece at the time of liberation may be useful as a background for an understanding of the distressing situation that still faced the country with intensified urgency in the summer of 1947 when American aid to Greece was being inaugurated. The paramount vital problems of security and political and economic rehabilitation had not yet been solved. In the two and a half years since Greece was liberated, the British and the United States governments, UNRRA, and other agencies and relief organizations had poured into the country more than six hundred and fifty million dollars worth of food, clothing, and medicaments, together with other supplies and material, for the most part contributed by the United States and the British Commonwealth. The very influx of consumer goods had to a great extent met the emergency needs of the country and kept the people alive. But in some aspects conditions had deteriorated instead of improving, and prospects for the future were growing steadily more alarming. Guerrilla operations had developed into a renewal of civil war; political unity was still unrealized; a new inflation threatened the
economic life of the country, and production had not been adequately revived.

The reestablishment of Greece as an independent self-supporting sovereign state -- national survival itself -- was still tottering in the balance.

It was not through lack of intensive efforts that comparatively little progress had been achieved. In spite of all difficulties and obstacles, many serious attempts had been made to work out plans and programs for rehabilitation both on the part of the Greeks themselves and on the part of friendly foreign governments and advisers. For two years the UNRRA Mission had been in close contact with the Greek government; its ablest technical experts had made numerous studies of general and particular problems and had submitted their considered judgment and suggestions. The American group sent out in 1945 by the Foreign Economic Administration had carried out intensive investigations in the fields of economics and transportation and had presented detailed reports and recommendations. A British Economic Mission in January 1946, following a long series of similar earlier conferences at high levels, and after a thorough survey of conditions then prevailing, had drawn up specific proposals for measures to improve Greek economy and to combat a threatened inflation. These resulted in the appointment of a permanent currency committee which included one British and one American member. In 1946 a distinguished body of scientists representing the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization had made a broad survey with particular reference to the needs of Greek agriculture and had published a notable report with far-reaching suggestions for action. The American Mission, headed by Mr. Paul Porter in January 1947, had re-examined the whole problem of rehabilitation and had drafted a long report which contained many

On the Greek side, various planning groups, advisory committees, and other organizations had been started from time to time. A separate Ministry of Rehabilitation was organized in 1946, and members of its staff have published
able studies of, and projects for, rehabilitation in all its major aspects.

Many of the other Ministries established special sections for the study of reconstruction problems, and a high council of technical experts in many fields was also set up. Its report, covering a wide range, dealt with transportation, restoration dealing with such fields as industry, public utilities, mines, utilization of national resources, reconstruction of destroyed buildings, and other matters. Its general plan envisaged not merely the establishment of conditions approximately equal to those prevailing before the war, but provided for ambitious further development on a broad scale, which called for the expenditure of sums amounting into billions of dollars (all of which would, of course, have to come from outside the country).

This program, though well thought out, was out of line with stark post-war reality.

All the governments which had successively come to power since liberation, professed, and undoubtedly felt, a paramount interest in the rehabilitation of the country and recognized the vital necessity for speed. All designated boards of their own to make studies and plans, and all sought foreign expert advice. But all were so preoccupied with party politics, strategy and strife, and with the innumerable urgent day-by-day demands of post-war administration that they had little time to spare for carrying out a coordinated program of long-range reconstruction, through which alone Greece might hope to recover her place among the free and self-governing nations of the world. And the intensification of communist-led guerrilla warfare early in 1947 added a further obstructive complication.

In certain fields of activity some welcome progress had been made. Agricultural recovery presented the brightest picture, for approximately 90% of the tillable land had again come under cultivation. But in 1947 the ravages of civil war sadly interfered with farming in many districts; and an unparalleled
drought had a disastrous effect on the wheat crop. The railways with assistance from abroad made steady progress in repairing their tracks, bridges, tunnels, and equipment and were able, partially at least, to resume services. Coastal shipping, under government operation and with a mounting deficit, after a fashion began to meet the most urgent needs for domestic water-transportation; while private ship owners, with government help, proceeded with the building up of their merchant fleet toward its pre-war standard. In small industries, too, private enterprise, with some public aid, managed to raise employment to approximately 70% and production to almost 60% of the pre-war average.

On the economic and financial side, however, the picture could be painted only in somber colors. Governmental income was far below expenditure, even without considering the crushing cost of maintaining a large military establishment and carrying on war against the guerrillas. Tax assessments and collections had not yet been brought back to pre-war effectiveness, and the whole system of public finance and accounting still followed antiquated methods. Roads were generally in a dismal state, and land transportation was wholly inadequate to the demands. National resources were not being fully exploited. Buildings destroyed during the war had not yet been rebuilt. The administrative services of the government, in considerable part at least, were out of date in organization, wasteful, and inefficient. The low scale of salaries and wages for civil servants and private employees was disproportionate to the high cost of living. Inflation had long had a foot on the country's threshold, and business had no confidence in the national currency. In short, Greece was drifting along at the verge of bankruptcy.

The vital task of rehabilitation was enmeshed in a web of component problems, all calling for the earliest possible solution, and all mutually interdependent. There was no general agreement about where to begin. Many felt
After the British had served notice that they could no longer continue their support to Greece, the Greek government appealed for aid to the United States. The American Congress passed an act authorizing the AMAG (American Mission for Aid to Greece*), in July, 1947. The Mission's purpose was clear and specific; it was to help Greece maintain her integrity and independence and to rebuild her economy to a self-sustaining basis, thereby saving herself from being drawn into the communist orbit. The decision to assist Greece marked a memorable turning point in the foreign policy of the United States which for more than a century had scrupulously refrained from interference in the internal affairs and disputes of European nations. It was a frank recognition that our own vital interests were involved in the preservation of Greece as an independent nation, and at the same time one under the form of government desired by the vast majority of her citizens. (The position in which the American Mission found itself was a novel one, and there were few if any guiding precedents. The whole operation was to be carried out openly under the searching light of publicity. Full information was to be given the Greek and American people; and the United Nations organization — not yet able itself to take over the responsibility for the undertaking —

* See Appendix.
was to be kept regularly apprised of all developments. The actions of the
Mission and the progress of the enterprise were also certain to be observed and
studied with the keenest attention by other governments, especially those of
European countries, both friendly and unfriendly.

In view of the international importance of the program of American aid to
Greece and the need for Americans to know clearly to what the United States is
committed, it has been judged useful to publish in Appendix C of the texts of the
official documents relating to the project. They include (1) the Greek Govern-
ment's request for assistance, (2) Public Law 75 (80th Congress, 1st Session),
(3) the reply of the United States to the Greek Government's request, (4) the
Greek Government's outline of its recovery program and expression of a desire
for a detailed agreement, (5) the United States' acknowledgment, (6) the detailed
agreement between the two countries on aid to Greece, and (7) the agreement on
United States relief assistance to the Greek people.

With the arrival of the American Mission at Athens, it was inevitable that
the United States should become involved in the many difficult, vital, unsolved
problems that confronted Greece. These problems, though closely interrelated and
interlocked and hardly separable in the overall scheme of rehabilitation,
nevertheless when analyzed for the most part readily fell into place in the
fields of security, politics, and economics. The question as to which should
have priority of attention was no longer seriously debatable, for the alarming
intensification of guerrilla warfare in the spring and early summer had made
it clear that if Greece was to survive as a free nation, law and order must be
reestablished without delay. A more detailed consideration of the principal
problems may be useful in giving a picture of the actuality that faced the
United States when she entered upon the Greek scene; of what, in other words,
we had to work with in Greece if we were to use her successfully as a bastion
of liberty, both in her interests and in ours.
CHAPTER XI
SECURITY PROBLEMS

The problem of security has first claim to attention. Both in its external
and in its internal aspects it was largely a legacy of the past. It may be best
• to start with a consideration of the external aspects.

By the summer of 1947 Greece had become a battleground between democracy
and communism. If it had been a purely internal struggle, the civil war would
have been settled long before in favor of democracy; for the government had by
the latter far the stronger forces, while the real communists were relatively few and
possessed only meagre resources of their own. It is true that they had managed
to rally around them a good many of the dissatisfied and the economically
submerged, along with other malcontents, adventurers, and miscreants; but communist
ideological principles have always been abhorrent to the great majority of the
Greek people. With their intensely developed individualism and their inborn
desire to acquire and to hold property, the Greeks offer no more receptive ground
to communist doctrine than do Americans.

But this was not primarily an internal fight; it was being waged with the
active support and encouragement of Greece's northern neighbors. This fact
was clearly established by the report of the United Nations Commission of
Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents. Sent out by the Security
Council to investigate Greece's charge that these neighbors were helping the
Greek guerrillas and thus fomenting trouble and threatening the peace, the
Commission, after long and painstaking investigation on the ground in Greece,
Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, found that the charges were essentially sustained by
the evidence collected. In the words of the report, "On the basis of the
facts ascertained by the Commission, it is its conclusion that Yugoslavia and,
to a lesser extent, Albania and Bulgaria have supported the guerrilla warfare in Greece." This conclusion was endorsed by eight of the eleven members of the Commission, the French delegate abstaining, and only the Soviet and Polish delegates voting against the view of the majority. By a vote of nine to two the Commission recommended that the Security Council should establish and maintain a new commission to investigate continuing violations of Greece's frontier, hear complaints, endeavor to help settle disputes about border violations, and keep the Council informed.

Throughout all its proceedings, from beginning to end, the Commission had to contend with obstructive tactics on the part of the Soviet and Polish delegates and with the uncooperative attitude of the Albanian, Yugoslavian, and Bulgarian governments. The same tactics of obstruction were used by the Soviet and Polish representatives in the Security Council itself, and constructive action was blocked by an uncompromising Soviet veto on July 29. A careful perusal of the proceedings in the Council, including all the intemperate utterances of the spokesmen of the Soviet Union and its satellite states, will convince any impartial reader that the entire communist-dominated bloc was wholeheartedly backing Greece's northern neighbors in their support of the Greek guerrillas. There can be no doubt that the policy-makers of international communism were aiming at the absorption of Greece into their sphere; and the bitter criticism voiced on the air, in the press, and in the United Nations against Britain and the United States for aiding Greece was an index of the resentful recognition by communist circles that their plans were being frustrated.

Russian interest in Greece is no new thing. In Chapter 4 we have seen that already in the time of Catherine II, in the late 18th century, Muscovite policy aimed at breaking through to warm water on the Mediterranean and at
acquiring mastery of the straits and control of navigation to and from the
Black Sea. This marks the beginning of a period of rivalry in the eastern
Mediterranean between Russians and British which was to persist with varying degrees
of intensity right down to the recent war. Indeed, none of Catherine's successors
lost sight of this fundamental Russian objective, which was an underlying factor in
four successive Russo-Turkish wars. Nor were any means neglected that might possibly
aid in promoting these aims. Agents were dispatched to incite internal discord and
rebellion among the Greeks. Neighboring states were encouraged to support
movements against the established government. The resources of diplomacy and
intrigue were employed in projects for the partition of Turkey. The Orthodox
Church, too, was exploited in an effort to spread Russian influence through the
Balkans. The czars had obtained recognition as the protectors of the Christian
subjects of the sultan; and the Russian monastery on Mt. Athos became a center
of political intrigue operating through the church.

The modern rulers of Russia have inherited and adopted the same national
policy of expansion. They, too, want the straits and an outlet on the Mediterra-
enean; and they have fallen no whit behind the czars in their zeal to gain
their objectives. They have made use of the same methods, though perhaps more
efficiently planned and organized. Trained agents planted in Greece before the
war did all in their power to attract recruits to communism and to arouse
hostility against the government of the country. Some were experts in sabotage
and subversion and skilled organizers of strikes. But they were still relatively
weak, and the resolute measures taken by the Metaxas government held them in
check. During the war and occupation, when dissatisfaction with the quisling
governments was acute and hatred of the Germans made it patriotic to defy
authority, while the economic life of the country was slipping into chaos, the
communist leaders took advantage of the opportunity to promote their cause. By
their initiative, though they kept themselves deliberately in the background,
a resistance front was formed which gained widespread popular support. The next
The first step was to organize a fighting arm, ELAS, over which the communists had complete, if veiled, control.

In the course of time it became apparent that the real aim of the ELAS chiefs was not to harass the Axis occupying forces, but to eliminate all rivals and conserve strength in order to seize control of the state when the Germans should withdraw. When it proved impossible for them to take over the country without fighting, they did not hesitate to loosen civil war to achieve their aim. When that, too, failed, put down by British arms, the communists signed a truce, disbanded their army, and gave up most of their weapons — more, indeed, than they had contracted to yield in the treaty. But some were certainly retained and hidden, while several thousand unorganized men fled with their arms across the border into Yugoslavia, where they received friendly welcome and care. From that time on, Yugoslavia (and to a lesser extent Bulgaria and Albania) has constantly befriended its communist fellow-ideologues in Greece and has helped them organize guerrilla operations against the Greek government. That they did so with Soviet approval and encouragement goes without saying; for no political activity is carried on by the satellite states without the sanction of the Kremlin.

It is clear that the church also has been used to support Soviet political aims in Greece and the Balkans. There can be little doubt that the supreme authority in Moscow had this purpose in mind when it permitted the reestablishment of the Russian church toward the end of the war. In recent years, as in the time of the czars, considerable intriguing has been going on around the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul, and the Soviet rulers no less than their predecessors would like to bring the Patriarchate under the hegemony of the Church of Russia. Their hand has been recognized by some observers in the reported resignation of the Patriarch Maximos. If they are unable to get their own candidate installed, it is possible they may try to take away the prestige of the Patriarchate and vest it in Moscow. It
is reported that Russia has already been wooing the impoverished Patriarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem with liberal donations and might win their help in inducing a large part of the church to look to Moscow rather than Istanbul for spiritual guidance. All this, of course, a purely political matter from the point of view of the Kremlin, domination of the Near East being as much of an objective for Stalin as it ever was for the czars, and orthodoxy still being something to work with in that region.

This powerful traditional Russian urge to break through to the Mediterranean and to expand toward the south has been vigorously reinforced and intensified through the use of international communism, which has the still more ambitious program of imposing its will on all Europe. The Kremlin’s hostile attitude toward real democracy in Greece is thus clearly understandable. Greece, as a troublesome obstacle in the way of communist Soviet expansion.

In the satellite states beyond the northern Greek frontier, Soviet policy has found willing agents and tools. The Bulgars still cherish dreams of the "Greater Bulgaria," which Russian diplomacy sought to create for them in 1878 by the Treaty of San Stefano. Even after three unsuccessful, not to say disastrous, attempts to achieve this purpose by war, they are still imbued with a passionate desire to extend their borders to the Aegean coast and to establish their sovereignty at least over western Thrace and Eastern Macedonia. The lack since 1920 of any ethnic claim to these territories has not cooled their ardor. For the promotion of their aims and in defense of Greek counter claims, they have severely taken the side of the communist guerrillas in Greece and have aided and abetted them in their rebellion against the government elected by the Greek people.

Yugoslavia, too, has territorial aspirations which she would like to satisfy at the expense of a free Greece. For a generation the Yugoslavs have
coveted the port of Salonica on the Aegean. After World War I the Greek govern-
ment made considerable concessions to Yugoslav interests by establishing a free
zone in the harbor of Salonica and by facilitating Yugoslavia's use of the
railway to the frontier at Ghevgholi. But Yugoslav demands for physical owner-
ship of the railway and part of the port were rejected, and ensuing disputes
from time to time caused no little friction. After World War II the communist
government of Yugoslavia saw in the struggle between communism and democracy for
supremacy in Greece a favorable opportunity to further its own desires. It has
therefore consistently supported the Greek guerrillas, has given them refuge,
has provided arms and equipment, has permitted them to use Yugoslav territory as
a base of operations, and has conducted a violent campaign of propaganda against
the established regime in Athens. The rehabilitation of a free Greece would
obviously bar Yugoslavia from acquisition of the port of Salonica.

Under its communist dictatorship, Albania likewise is bitterly hostile to a

[Handwritten note: "democratic Greece. The Albanians have advanced no demands for territory
now in Greek possession. Their attitude is no doubt in part inspired by instruc-
tions from the headquarters of international communism, and in part by an
aggressive defense of their title to a strip of southern Albania to which the
Greeks since 1912 have persistently laid claim, based on the ethnic character
of its population, under the name of Northern Epirus. Albania believes that her
retention of the disputed district will be assured by a victory of communism in
Greece, and she has therefore actively assisted the Greek guerrillas in their
efforts to overthrow the government of an independent Greece.
With the entire bloc of communist nations -- all of course taking their
signals from the supreme control-tower in the Kremlin -- thus warmly espousing
the cause of the guerrillas in Greece, and sitting no opportunity to demand and
blame the government in Athens, which was elected by popular vote -- the
Greek people, no thinking observer could mistake the character of the struggle]
in progress. It was crystal clear that communist totalitarianism had mobilized its forces for a determined attempt to bring into its orbit the one country still remaining free in the Balkans, the survival of which constituted a serious obstruction to the realization of more far-reaching communist plans. The strategy was not that of an open war against Greece. It was based on the energetic support of a subversive fifth column within the country, the anticipated victory of which could be represented as the triumph of an internal movement of the people. It was just such a strategy that had been applied with gratifying success in Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland, and was to be used when the time came in Czechoslovakia. The only difference was that in all those countries immense Soviet occupation forces were in complete control, prepared to assist governments of the kind approved by Moscow to establish and maintain their authority.

In Greece there was no Soviet army. The western democracies had shown their interest in and their sympathy for the Greek people by shipping in vast quantities of food and other supplies -- mainly contributed by the British Commonwealth and the United States -- which had removed the immediate danger of starvation and relieved the most acute want. But it was only the vigorous armed intervention of Great Britain in 1944 and 1945 and the continued presence of a relatively small British force that had bolstered up the post-liberation cabinets and the government elected by the people in the national elections of March 31, 1946, and enabled them to retain a precarious hold on affairs and to keep the country from being taken into the Soviet sphere by a small communist minority. After "carrying the ball" for the democracies for nearly two and a half years following liberation, the British government early in 1947 gave notice that it was no longer able to bear the burden of supporting Greece, and it was then, as we have seen, that the American Mission was established.
Realizing the gravity of the situation and the importance to the democratic world of maintaining an independent Greek nation, President Truman laid the matter before the Congress, which accepted the responsibility and enacted legislation, approved on May 22, providing American aid to Greece.

It was in such an international atmosphere, with the security of the Greek state clearly threatened from abroad by communist aggression, that the American Mission took up its task with the object of helping Greece preserve her independence and integrity and keep from being drawn behind the "iron curtain."

On the internal side, too, the problem of security was to a great extent an inheritance from the past. Some of the characteristic features of guerrilla warfare could be traced back to age-old Greek tradition. Other elements had roots in the strife and rifts that split the country during World War I. Intercene conflicts during World War II and the German occupation naturally sowed innumerable seeds of the present and future troubles. Economic and social conditions undoubtedly played their part. But by themselves, even all together, it is unlikely that these factors could ever have brought into being the present organized rebellion. However, effective leadership was, in this instance, provided by the small but determined Communist Party of Greece, which incited and fomented disaffection and kindled the flame of civil war.

It was not a war of formal engagements and battles on a large scale, but an irregular guerrilla movement in which innumerable bands, operating from almost inaccessible mountain retreats, raided and harried the countryside, villages, and the lines of communication below. Guerrillas are no new phenomenon in Greece. For centuries, in times of dissenion and economic distress, bold, adventurous, and lawless spirits have taken to the hills from which they have launched depredations on the peaceful inhabitants of the surrounding districts and have exacted tribute from travellers who came within their reach. They were known as "klephts" (meaning literally "thieves" or "robbers"), and their profession was a recognized one, feared and execrated, but at the same time regarded with some admiration. During the revolutionary
war for independence from Ottoman misrule (1821 to 1829) "klephts" took an active part in the fighting and were credited with many a notable exploit against the Turks. Markos Botsaris, Odysseus, Athanasios Diakos, and Theodore Kolokotronis were among the best known, whose victories are commemorated by monuments in various parts of Greece today. An extensive cycle of kleptic ballads grew up among the people who cherish them as favorites still. These songs, extolling the spirit and courage of the "klephts," have done much to clothe the brigand's life with glamor.

After the Revolution, in the reign of King Otho, brigandage became a scourge of the country and had to be suppressed by military operations. Similar epidemics broke out from time to time during the long rule of King George I, but in the past fifty years respect for law and order gained much headway and "klephts" became far less numerous than bandits in large American cities. During the Axis occupation, however, the old tradition was revived. Among the hundreds and thousands of men who were out of work, who had no shelter, whose economic prospects were wrecked, who were wanted by the authorities, who resented restraint, were tempted by a predatory life, or recruited by propaganda and therefore fled to the mountains, there were undoubtedly some who were inspired by kleptic folklore. Some of these were also have been motivated by hatred of the Germans and a desire to strike a blow for freedom. As related in Chapter 6, communist organizers were early in the field and prompt to take advantage of the opportunity; and little by little most of the bands were brought into ELAS under a centralized communist direction. Only the anticomunist EDES, under General Zervas' command, was able to hold out effectively against it. When the communist attempt to seize control of the state by force through civil war was frustrated in 1945 and the ELAS units surrendered their arms and were disbanded, most of the men returned to their homes, but many irreconcilables fled to Yugoslavia, and others again
sought refuge in the mountains. These elements formed the core of the new guerrilla movement which began to gather momentum toward the end of 1946 and grew menacing in the spring of 1947.

The kleptic tradition was only one of the many factors responsible for the threat to internal security. The great political controversies which began in the time of World War I also left a heritage of dissension. Perhaps its most harmful effect was to encourage a feeling -- already latent in Greek character and temperament -- of disrespect for constitutional democratic processes.

In any real democracy, citizens must accept, with as good grace as possible, the result of a fair election, even if it goes against their desires. It is not possible for democratic government to work successfully when a minority obstinately refuses to acknowledge the rule of the majority. On the other hand, a majority in power in a democratic state should also remember its obligation to treat a minority with reasonable consideration and to admit that it, too, has some rights. Political leaders in Greece have sometimes failed to meet these tests. When defeated at the polls, they have in some instances turned to non-cooperation and even to revolution. Political parties, too, when convinced they had no chance of winning, have not infrequently abstained from the election and have urged their adherents to refrain from voting. Even Venizelos himself on occasion recommended such a course to his followers, and he personally led two revolutions.

Abstention was one of the chief weapons used by all the parties of the extreme left (fully cognizant of their minority status) in the elections of March 31, 1946, and they declined to recognize the verdict of the ballot. So far as the real communists were concerned, this was of course nothing new and nothing startling, since they have everywhere constituted only a small minority group and have always imposed their regime by force. But in Greece they were undoubtedly able to carry with them into the guerrilla camps some non-communist dissenters who could not bring themselves to bow to the decision of the majority
of the voters. This unwillingness to subscribe to one of the fundamental principles of a democratic form of government is an old problem in Greece; in the past it has done no little harm to the state, and it may still cause difficulty in the future.

The bloody internal feuds stirred up during the three and a half years of German occupation were much more potent in their effect on postwar security conditions in Greece than the domestic quarrels of a generation ago. Were the bloody internal feuds stirred up during the three-and-a-half years of German occupation? The vicious hatred that flared up between communist controlled ELAS on the one side and EDES, the Security Battalions, the gendarmerie, and the Xites on the other, fanned into flame by savage attacks and counterattacks, reprisals and counterreprisals, in the course of which the defenseless rural population bore the brunt of the loss and suffering, will not soon be forgotten. The struggle had all the characteristics of a class war which it was. Passions reached a high pitch throughout the country. In almost every village the adherents of each side were at one time or another terrorized by rape, brutality, and murder perpetrated by the supporters of the other. Desire for revenge and vengeance became deep-rooted and spread far. Under these circumstances it would seem that little short of a miracle could bring about a speedy reestablishment of respect for law and order sufficient to make it possible for former deadly adversaries to live again peacefully side by side. Little prospect of such a development could have been discernible to AMAG on its arrival in Greece in July 1947. On the contrary, guerrilla bands were growing more and more numerous in the mountains and their cruel tactics more barbarous than ever.

The formation of bands was not an exclusive monopoly of the Leftist side. In some parts of the country, especially in 1946, lawless Rightists, too, had taken to the hills from which they carried out raids on the houses of those they regarded as their political opponents in neighboring villages. Such
activities, with which the government failed to deal sternly, caused alarm and
disturbance here and there, notably in the Peloponnesus, and swelled the stream
of terrorized refugees to the cities. Compared with the widespread guerrilla
operations of the Leftists, however, these Rightist outbreaks, though equally
brutal, were relatively insignificant. But there could be no doubt that the
class war had been resumed.

The pre-election government of the Liberal Party, in 1945-46, in accordance with its program, released from deten-
tion a large number of prisoners who were being held in jails throughout the
country. Theoretically only those accused of political offenses were to be
liberated, but actually, in cases connected with activities during the occupation
and the subsequent civil war, the borderline between political and criminal
actions was not easily definable. In consequence, by a liberal interpretation,
those who were set free included not a few who were charged with major crimes
as well as political transgressions. Rightists were naturally indignant over
the release of men whom they believed to be out-and-out murderers, felons, and
traitors of the worst sort, and extreme Rightists did not hesitate to take the
law into their own hands. Many of those let loose, afraid of punishment from
their fellow citizens if they returned to their homes, drifted away to guerrilla
centers and resumed their hostile acts against the government of their country.

Separately and together the various factors surveyed in the preceding pages
had contributed enormously to make disruption and chaos prevail in post-war
Greece, but without some guiding and coordinating leadership these diverse forces
might have spent themselves largely in localized efforts. Coordination and di-
rection were, however, provided by the Communist Party of Greece. It was a small
party, but inspired by the same fanatical zeal that marks its counterparts in
in prewar times a reasonably strong government might well have been able with relatively little difficulty to crush such a rebellion, if it were nothing more than a purely internal movement. But conditions after the war were far from normal; the successive governments were weak and irresolute, lacking resources and little reliable power to enforce their authority and their decisions. Furthermore, and this was the most alarming feature, it had become manifest that the revolt was being systematically encouraged, supported, and supplied from outside the country and unmistakably formed the aggressive spearhead of international communist expansion.

The guerrilla tactics were also shrewdly devised to embarrass and frustrate the government's counter operations. Scattered about in innumerable small and large bands, especially in the Epirote, Macedonian, and Thracian mountains close to the frontier, under a more or less coordinated system of command, and with organized lines of supply from across the borders, the rebels were able to cause widespread havoc and disorder and to disrupt communications throughout northern Greece. For the most part they avoided engagements with armed troops and harried the civilian population. By day and by night, preferably the latter, they descended to the lowlands and carried out attacks and raids on lightly defended villages, towns, and small outposts. They used modern rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, and occasionally mortars, and before leaving they strewn the roads with land mines. Sometimes whole villages were destroyed, and regularly houses of non-communists were burned down to the accompaniment of looting, terrorization, abduction, and slaying, and the list of human victims steadily grew. After each foray the guerrillas withdrew in haste and, if pursued by strong bodies of troops, they dispersed in small units or groups which made their way to their almost inaccessible mountain rendezvous. There, safe from organized pursuit, they reassembled, obtained fresh supplies, and prepared to make a raid in another direction. Without a constant trickle of munitions and equipment from depots
beyond the frontier, this irregular warfare could not be continued indefinitely; but so long as the supply lines were kept open, there was little possibility of stamping it out.

The frontiers between Greece on the one side and Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria on the other, for the most part running through rugged mountainous terrain, have a total length of some 520 miles. To seal them up effectively and to prevent altogether the passage of supplies to the guerrillas by land and air would require the deployment of a huge army and the use of a substantial air force -- a vastly greater array than the post-war Greek governments could possibly muster. Obviously this was a task far beyond the unaided power of national Greece. It could only be undertaken -- since the United Nations organization was still unprepared for so great an enterprise, and a favorable resolution was in any event certain to be blocked by a Soviet veto -- through abundant, effective military assistance from the western democracies. Hopes and appeals for such aid, if not officially sponsored by the government, had begun to be expressed very generally by individuals and the press in Athens in the summer of 1947.

For the maintenance of national security the government had at its disposal an army of 120,000 men. Some 20,000 of this number were new recruits in the process of training, and about 24,000 were assigned to the various regular and special services. The combat strength was consequently no more than 76,000 men, organized for the most part in 7 divisions. One might think even this an adequate force to deal with 15,000 guerrillas. But the actual situation was not a simple comparison of numbers. Apart from their main concentrations in the north, the guerrillas maintained numerous diversionary bands in central Greece, some in the Peloponnesus, and a few even on certain of the Aegean islands. All these bands actively harassed their local districts and offered a constant threat to communications by road and railway. The chief routes had to
be protected, and the supply lines of the army, which was spread from Epirus to Thrace on a wide front against the guerrillas in the north, had to be properly safeguarded. The result was that most of the combat troops had to be detached and left behind to garrison important centers and to keep the principal lines of communication open. Under these circumstances only a disproportionately small number of fighting men was available for aggressive operations against the larger concentrations of the rebels along the northern border, and there was of course no possibility of closing the entire frontier itself.

It is not surprising, therefore, that little decisive progress could be made toward the suppression of the rebellion. On the other hand it is true that the guerrillas were to a great extent contained within their inhospitable mountain areas and were prevented from gaining and holding possession of any important towns or centers of population, but they were able to continue their destructive raids on unprotected villages. The whole Macedonian countryside was gradually being devastated, and some 150,000 unfortunate and terror-stricken peasants had already been driven by fear to abandon their farms and flee to the larger cities for safety. There were of course many minor clashes and skirmishes between army detachments and bandits and occasionally actions on a larger scale. Many guerrillas were killed, taken prisoners, or induced to give themselves up; and the army, too, had its quota of casualties. But on the military side the situation was essentially a stalemate, while the best interests of the Greek nation were suffering incalculable harm, and the vital problem of rehabilitation was not receiving the attention it demanded.

Considerable disappointment was manifested in Athens over the failure of the military campaign, and both the government and the general staff came in for sharp criticism. Many observers believed that the high command was at fault and that the army was not being led with the aggressive vigor required by the situation. To no little extent political considerations had governed the
removal and appointment of officers. Many for one reason or another had been placed on inactive duty, and the republicans feared that a deliberate attempt was being made to shut them out and to turn the army into a purely royalist instrument. It was clear that there was some dissatisfaction and intriguing among the officers, both the ins and the outs, and inevitably this had come to affect morale. In its rank and file, however, the army was a good fighting machine. It had been well trained by the British, who had reorganized and re-equipped it, and who since liberation had provided financial support to the extent of several hundred million dollars. That support was taken over by the United States under the program of American Aid to Greece; and even before the Mission arrived, a report was current in Athens that the Greek government would at once seek assistance to increase the size of the army.
CHAPTER 12

POLITICAL PROBLEMS

The post-war world found both people and political leaders sadly divided. There were wide differences of view as to what direction foreign policy should take. Most Greeks

The vital need for a concerted national effort to achieve the speedy rehabilita-

tion of the country essential to its survival, security, and restoration as a self-sustaining and sovereign state, found Greece's post-war political leaders and her people sadly divided. There were few if any really fundamental differences of view (except on the part of the Communists) with regard to the general orientation Greek foreign policy should take; and most Greeks (with the same exception) heartily advocated the broad objectives of rebuilding a shattered economy, recreating endurable living conditions, and reestablishing the authority of the state and public finance. But internal political rivalries and controversies, based largely on old issues that had long since lost their timeliness, still continued to generate an atmosphere of suspicion, antagonism, and dissension, which made genuine cooperation almost unattainable. This paralyzing lack of unity, at a moment when agreement and harmony were indispensable, if a free Hellenic nation was to endure, constituted the most acute and disturbing political problem that faced Greece after liberation. More than two and a half years of struggle, first by one party and then another, failed to solve it; and the general elections of March 31, 1946, had not resulted in bringing the anti-communist elements of the country together. Confronted by a united and implacable foe, they still found themselves unable to sacrifice or put aside their own party interests and compose their differences in behalf of the commonweal:

This was the situation that A.N.A.C encountered when it took up its duties in Athens in July 1947, and the United States became involved in the political problems of Greece. The American concern was clear and specific. It was to help the Greeks rally and unite all the constructive forces of the country in a
supreme national endeavor to withstand communist aggression and to save Greece from being absorbed, against the will of the great majority of her people, into the totalitarian sphere. What the United States hoped for was to have the Greeks of their own volition and on their own initiative form a government broadly representative of all the freedom-loving elements of the population—a government strong enough and enjoying sufficient prestige and authority to be able to mobilize the entire resources and manpower of the country for the maintenance of its integrity and liberty. Such a government could also be expected to deal successfully with the enormous task of restoration and rehabilitation.

America had no interest as a nation in the intricacies of Greek politics, nor did she hold a brief for one political party or another, except insofar as they might help those who threatened Greek independence and integrity. We held no brief for one particular Greek political party or another, and their quarrels were of no national concern to us, save as they might affect our own security. What was important for us was not the triumph of this or that faction, but the preservation of Greece within the orbit of the western democracies. The urgency of this latter aim, which is vitally connected with our strategic position as probably the world's greatest power, and with the maintenance of our standard of living, both physical and moral, is of course the only reason for our involvement in Greek internal affairs. Until our government realized this stake of ours in Greek integrity and independence, our interest in Greece was purely sentimental and philanthropic. The change in our government's attitude in the early spring of 1947 was therefore enormous. We could no longer see Greece as a playground or battlefield of politics unrelated to ourselves, except as we might know and like some Greek or Greek-American. We must see it as a critical spot in our own defense against powers whose strategic position would be vastly improved were Greece to fall into communist hands. These were the considerations that led the government of the United States to send AMAG to Greece in the summer of 1947.
The Greek political scene, when viewed from close at hand, was complex and thoroughly bewildering to an unfamiliar observer. The innumerable parties, their relatively insignificant differences on basic questions of policy, and their disproportionately violent emotional estrangements and animosities were difficult for Americans to comprehend. Like the problem of security, Greece's political problems, too, were to a great extent rooted in history, the product of converging forces of the past, of Greek character and temperament, and of external pressures. To gain some insight into the situation that presented itself to the view of the American government's representatives, it is necessary to turn back to historical events, briefly recorded in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, and to survey them against the background of the inherent Hellenic nature and its idiosyncrasies. Already mentioned, a powerfully developed individualism, no doubt inherited from ancestors of classical times, has always operated as a centrifugal force on the life of the Greeks. It has stimulated personal rivalries and jealousies and has fostered tendencies toward separation and division, the latter have manifested themselves most harmfully in time of stress and crisis. Internal discord of this kind, breaking out into actual civil war, almost wrecked the Greek cause in the struggle for independence from Turkey (1821-2), and on subsequent occasions in the 19th and 20th centuries has done grave injury to the country's national interests. It is this individualistic outlook that has brought into existence the multiplicity of political parties, which as a result of disagreements have split off from a parent stem, or under ambitious politicians have sprung up independently, to the number of ten, twenty, thirty, and sometimes even forty; and it has often raised almost insurmountable obstacles to real cooperation. The impetuous Greek temperament, moreover, is easily stirred up to go to extremes, and when emotionally aroused is disinclined to make concessions or to accept compromises, however reasonably they might be. Moderation is a rare
virtue in Greece, and partisans of the Center have seldom had great popular support, since they can offer little that is exciting enough to attract adherents. The Greeks take their politics seriously, not to say passionately, and they find it difficult to accept gracefully the result of an election that goes against their views. They consequently cling tenaciously to issues of the past and are ready to fight for them long after the particular questions involved have ceased to bear any useful relation to the present or future.

Much of the political dissension in Greece today can be traced back to the conflict which came to a head during World War I between Eleftherios Venizelos, Chief of the Liberal Party, and King Constantine, the history of which has already been recounted. Nothing could show more clearly than that history how completely internal is the question of monarchy versus republicanism in Greece. In the past the Greek people themselves have dealt with it, first in one way, then in the other; and they are capable of dealing with it in the future when they choose, if they are left free to do so. Travelling newspaper correspondents, after a sojourn of a day or two in Athens and with little or no knowledge of the historical background, have sometimes expressed the view that the reestablishment of the monarchy and the return of King George II, in 1946, were imposed upon an unwilling people by Great Britain. This is the line followed by communist propaganda, and it is very wide of the truth. The choice was made by the Greek electorate itself in a free election; but the factor which perhaps did more than anything else to bring about the decisive verdict was the activity of international communism, which had aroused and alarmed the Hellenic people with its threat of absorbing Greece into the Soviet-dominated totalitarian sphere, and extinguishing individual liberty. If monarchy was imposed by anyone, it was by the communists themselves.

Actually the whole monarchist-republican controversy in Greece today is an anachronistic issue of the past which has little real relation to the contemporary
vital problems of the country, except insofar as it may obstruct the united national effort necessary to maintain the integrity and independence of the state and to save it from becoming a victim of Soviet-inspired totalitarian aggression. The old feud has been deliberately revived and exploited by communist propaganda. It has been dragged across the scene as a red herring to distract attention from the crucial issue, which is plainly whether or not Greece is to survive as a free nation. Constitutional democracy is under no serious threat today except from the communists within and without the Hellenic borders.

Since 1863 monarchy has worked reasonably well in Greece; and except for brief lapses during World War I and under the dictatorship of General Metaxas, it has not stepped out of the framework of liberal constitutional democracy. In the United States there is a widespread prejudice, to which some of our newspapers do not scruple to cater, holding that monarchy is inseparable from autocracy and is the enemy of democracy. This view reflects the thinking of more than 150 years ago, and has not adjusted itself to subsequent developments. Some of the most firmly safeguarded and genuine democracies in the world today, as in Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries, are monarchies; but in each the conduct of affairs is entirely in the hands of the elected representatives of the people. Though different in many ways, democracy there is no less real than in America. The King is the social head of the nation; but he has no political power and can act only through the people's chosen spokesmen. This is true also in Greece, where the rights and prerogatives of the King are carefully prescribed and limited by the constitution, which declares that the source of all power lies in the people. The royalsists by and large are fully as democratic as the republicans, and equally jealous of their democratic rights. To call a man a fascist for no other reason than that he is a royalist is mere vituperation; one may hear it every day in the anti-Greek propaganda of Soviet-dominated international communism.
One of the most frequently repeated charges made against the post-war governments in Greece by the Soviet representatives in the United Nations, by the press and radio in Moscow, and by the radio, press, and political spokesmen of internationalist communism in all the satellite states, is that they were "monarchofascist" regimes that systematically oppressed and terrorized the "democratic" elements in the country. What the communists actually mean when they say "monarchofascist" is nothing more nor less than "anti-communist," and when they speak of "democratic citizens" they are referring solely to their own fellow-ideologists and supporters. Interpreted in this sense the Soviet charges do represent a fact, namely that all the successive Greek cabinets since liberation have recognized the alarming totalitarian threat looming on the northern horizon, and have done what they could to oppose and resist aggressive communist pressure. In however much their methods may have been subject to criticism, taking this course, they were merely trying to carry out their duty to the vast majority of the Hellenic population to which communist ideology is repugnant.

In their weakness they may sometimes have used methods that are not regarded with favor in the United States and Great Britain, and in their life-and-death struggle to preserve their country's independence they may not always have conformed in every respect to the principles cherished in the more secure western democracies. Certain British and American newspaper correspondents have contributed not a little to give the post-liberation governments of Greece a bad press and a bad name, though this has not been wholly their fault. In view of the demand of the home press for exciting spot news and comment in keeping with already existing prejudices. Lacking a real understanding of the country, its history, its people and language, unfamiliar with democratic processes that have grown up out of traditions and customs and environments wholly unlike those of their own lands, many of these writers could only too easily be misled by partisan informants. Furthermore, the confusion and stress and uncertainties attendant on a rather
feeble administration's endeavors to reestablish order out of chaos in the face of a ruthless, subversive minority's opposition were ill-calculated to let observers see the forest as distinguished from the trees. Certainly very few have made it hard to see the broad contours of the picture in their true perspective, and some apparently still fail to realize the truth of what has been going on in Greece.

The legend of a "democratic" EAM, fighting to "free" Greece from "monarcho-fascism" and a British-supported "bloody Glücksburg," survived well into 1947, both in Britain and America. The rise of the Labor Party in Great Britain, the persistence of Anglophobia in the United States, and the ostrich-like desire in both countries not to see new dangers arising after the war was thought to have been won, were all expertly exploited by Moscow-directed propaganda. If Greece had passed behind the iron curtain in 1944, almost the whole of American opinion, as represented by the press and radio, would have hailed it as a victory for democracy. The same views prevailed in 1945; and even in 1947 and 1948 some well-known commentators were still dubious regarding our support of the "corrupt" Greek government. It was not partiality which blinded United States opinion (though it may have played some role in England, where the Labor Party has a deep communist fringe), but rather a tendency to accept interpretations which would relieve us of all necessity to do anything about what was going on, and which were of course designed for that very purpose.

When it prepared to inaugurate the program of aid to Greece in 1947, the American administration found itself somewhat embarrassed by the generally unfavorable tone of the press in the United States in its comments on the incumbent Greek regime. The reports carried in many newspapers were not of a kind to inspire American public opinion and the taxpayer with full confidence in the civilian government in Athens. Even the wholly unprejudiced reader and listener, far from contact with reality in Greece, could hardly fail to conclude
that where there was so much smoke there must be some fire. American officials in Washington were better informed than the general public. They understood the situation and were under no illusions regarding the character of the struggle being waged in Greece. They saw it for what it was, an opening move in a Soviet plan for expansion. They knew the weakness of the Greek government and the difficulties with which it had to contend. They advised and hoped that a national coalition cabinet might be formed of all the sound and patriotic forces of the country. But under the circumstances no other choice was possible than to support the government in power. In his message to the Congress on March 12 President Truman stated:

"The extension of aid by this country does not mean that the United States condones everything that the Greek government has done or will do. We have condemned in the past, and we condemn now, extremist measures of the right or the left. We have in the past advised tolerance, and we advise tolerance now."

Acting Secretary of State Acheson, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 24, put the matter clearly. American option in Greece, he said, under the conditions prevailing was not

"a choice between a perfect democracy and an imperfect democracy. The question is whether there will be any democracy at all. If the armed minority that now threatens Greece's political and economic stability were to gain control, free institutions and human freedom would disappear and democratic progress would come to an abrupt halt."

Most of the post-war governments in Greece did in fact by their policies and acts lay themselves open to a certain extent to charges of arbitrary use of their powers. Arrests of those suspected of anti-administration political views were made in considerable numbers in 1946 and 1947, and many through the formal or
informal suspension of their constitutional rights were summarily exiled to the islands. Government weakness was also shown by the state-sponsored arming of Rightist civilians who were loosely organized throughout the country as "Monades Asphaleias Ypaithrou" (Rural Security Units, known as MAY from the initials of their Greek name), and theoretically responsible to the nearest army or police authorities. A similar lack of strength was exhibited in the failure of the Tsaldaris and the Maximos cabinets to suppress the Rightist guerrilla bands which were active especially in the Peloponnesus. The gendarmerie, too, were not so strictly controlled as desirable; though for the most part well trained and efficient, they clearly in some instances acted in a high-handed manner toward political opponents of the party in power. In the so-called purification of the public services, some state employees, apart from Communists, were dismissed for political reasons; and the governments generally gave too much attention to the game of party politics.

It would undoubtedly have been of enormous benefit to Greece if, following the example set in some other liberated countries, all the political parties had joined together in an agreement to lay aside their rivalries for a term of years and to collaborate patriotically and loyally in the reestablishment of security and the rehabilitation of the national economy. The failure of the anti-communist groups to do so was not the fault of any one party individually. All must share the responsibility. But the Communists bear the guilt of starting the civil war.

American readers should be reminded -- and this was not adequately emphasized in the press reports -- that the government in power when AMAG arrived in Greece gained office as the result of an expression of popular will and not through a coup. It was an elected representative government, responsible to a constitutional Parliament. The elections, held on March 31, 1946, were carried out under the direct observation of a large impartial Allied Mission (including 692
Americans) which pronounced them reasonably fair and valid, in spite of some intimidation, abstention, and interference on a small scale with voting. The Mission's considered verdict held that the result represented the true and genuine will of the majority of the Greek people. In the judgment of the Mission's disinterested technical staff of expert statisticians -- a judgment based on a mass of detailed information which was collected in representative precincts throughout the entire country -- abstention for political reasons did not exceed 15% of the total number of qualified voters. This proportion probably indicated the full combined strength of the parties of the extreme Left, including the Communists, whose adherents were instructed by their leaders (foreseeing certain defeat) to refrain from casting their ballots. The fundamental question at issue was clearly understood by the Greek people: it was a choice between totalitarian communism and the maintenance of free institutions under a liberal democratic constitution. The result was in its larger sense a clear-cut victory for the latter view, democracy, and it was with a definite anti-communist mandate that the chosen parliament took office. The verdict also indicated beyond doubt that the people, under existing conditions, regarded the monarchical system as their strongest safeguard against the communist menace.

Among the parties represented in the Chamber, extending from Left Center to extreme Right, and all anti-communist, the largest and best organized was the Populist Party of the Right. Since it had obtained a substantial plurality and, with its cooperating parties, an actual majority of the House, it properly proceeded in April 1946, in conformity with the provisions of the constitution, to form a government under the premiership of its leader, Π. Tsaldaris. In February 1947, responding to pressure of public opinion, which called for a broadening of the basis of the government in an attempt to unite the nation in the fight against the guerrillas, Tsaldaris' cabinet resigned and a new coalition
ministry was formed under the presidency of Π. Maximos. It was made up of representatives of seven different parties, the Populists still retaining full control. The Liberals under Π. Sophoulis alone refused to cooperate; otherwise the coalition embraced all the principal parties in the Chamber. The reorganization was effected in accordance with constitutional practice, and there was no violation of democratic principles. It was a legally constituted government, answerable to the elected Chamber of Deputies, which had power to vote it out of office at any time. There was here no ground on which a charge of fascism could be seriously entertained.

This regime conscientiously endeavored to maintain policies wholly unknown in countries under fascist and totalitarian rule. Freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly was not suppressed in the principal cities, or even seriously curtailed. Newspapers enjoyed as much liberty as the press of the United States. Greece still remained the only state in the Balkans where opposition papers might freely appear and be distributed. There were no restrictions on their criticisms of the administration. Even the Communist Party was allowed to publish and circulate its official daily organ, regularly filled with unbridled abuse of the government and praise of the guerrillas, and it did not refrain from inciting its readers to actual rebellion. There was no censorship of letters and telegrams. Telephone conversations were not tapped. Those who wished might listen without fear to any radio transmission they chose. In short, despite the existence of a subversive civil war, citizens without discrimination could still enjoy most of the essential rights and privileges that come with democracy.

These were vital facts which were somehow largely overlooked by critics who were not fully aware of the fundamental issue of the international drama they were observing. They might have done well to pause for reflection on the world of difference between Greek political life and that prevailing in the
Soviet satellite lands to the north, where the latest models of Moscow-produced totalitarian regimes were on display. For if the government elected by the rejected Greek people was to be rejected, the only real alternative in sight was not a perfect democracy (which does not exist anywhere), but a ruthless dictatorship of the Left under the aegis of the Kremlin.

Though the post-liberation governments in general, and the cabinet under M. Maximos in particular, must in fairness be cleared of the charge of fascism, it is obvious that they did not have the strength or the competence to deal effectively with the pressing problems of security and rehabilitation. They were signally unsuccessful in achieving the unity of the nation's constructive forces demanded by the situation. This failure was in the final analysis a failure of leadership. It was in large part a result of the political vacuum created by the Metaxas dictatorship and perpetuated by the war and German occupation. For nearly a decade normal political life had been suppressed. The more dynamic leaders of the 20's and 30's had died—most of them in 1936; and the principal party leaders remaining had been exiled by Metaxas. Under the adverse conditions that followed there was little or no chance for young men to obtain the experience and training that might enable them to rise to positions of recognized prestige and influence. There was no statesman great enough, with character and personality sufficiently strong and compelling, to inspire universal confidence. A Trikoupis or an Eleftherios Venizelos might perhaps have succeeded in rousing the nation to join together in a united front; but men of their stature were not to be found.

This was, then, in the field of government and politics the material with which the United States had to work in applying its program of aid to Greece, with the hope of preserving the integrity and independence of the country and saving it from absorption and enslavement under communist dictatorship. All the elected representatives of the people were nationalists, unalterably opposed to communism, and all were convinced that Greece's best interests and fate were
bound up with those of the Western Democracies. But on almost all internal
questions, dissension and discord, suspicion and rivalry stood in the way of
genuine cooperation and harmony; and the chief opposition party stubbornly re-
 fused to participate in the government. The United States had already in a
friendly spirit earnestly advised all the party leaders to sink their differences
and join together in a united stand to save Greece from disaster. It was evident
that some such political solidarity on the part of the patriotic Greeks was
indispensable if the program of American aid was to succeed in its purpose.
The great problem from the American side was therefore to find some way of per-
suading the Greek politicians on their own initiative and volition to compose
their disagreements and to achieve the strongest possible combination of their
constructive and creative forces.
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

It was under a staggering burden of economic problems that Greece emerged from the war and the civil strife that followed it. Despite all efforts of government and individuals and much help from abroad, disappointingly little progress toward a permanent solution had been achieved by the summer of 1947. More than two and a half years after liberation Greek national economy was still largely in a state of collapse. The slowness of recovery to a considerable extent reflected the state of complete exhaustion in which the country came out of its ordeal, though internal discord and the guerrilla uprising were perhaps more potent factors in retarding the work of rehabilitation. The most acute problem resulted directly from the destruction of physical assets through military action, sabotage, and reprisals during the war and occupation and from the breakdown of morale during a long period of subjection; but not a few of the difficulties go back to Greece's lack of natural resources and her failure to exploit adequately those that do exist.

A survey of conditions prevailing when the war ended has already been given, and it will be remembered that the country was almost stripped of food, clothing, and other necessities, while the wheels of its productive life had virtually stopped revolving. UNRRA and many other organizations promptly moved in to meet the emergency problems of relief, and the immediate danger of starvation was soon dispelled. UNRRA and the government were also able to give substantial help to start the revival of agriculture. But the larger needs of long-term reconstruction lay outside the scope of the relief organizations; and it was with reference to such matters as well as the problem of security that AMAG was charged with developing its program of assistance. Apart from the immediate necessity of equipping and supplying the Greek military forces so as
to enable them to reestablish law and order, the urgent wants were many and varied.

One of the most essential and pressing was the restoration of the country's system of transportation and communication, without which there could be no real revival of production and distribution. The principal ports had suffered a vast amount of damage. Quays, wharves and warehouses had been demolished by explosives, and the harbors were partly blocked by the submerged wrecks of ships that had been bombed and sunk. At Piraeus and Salonica the entrance and some sections of the harbor had been provisionally cleared, but facilities for unloading and loading were far below requirements and storage sheds were sadly inadequate. A substantial program of repair and rebuilding was necessary before imports and exports and goods carried in domestic coastal shipping could be properly handled. Traffic with ports in the Gulf of Corinth, along the western coast, and on the Ionian islands was also handicapped by the blocking of the Corinth Canal. Before departing, the Germans had blasted into it nearly a million tons of rock and debris from the steep sides of the cutting; and each end had been further sealed by a scuttled ship. The task of reopening this channel, which makes the route from Piraeus to the western coast some 200 miles shorter than by sailing around the Peloponnesus, was too costly for the Canal Company to undertake, and the Government was likewise unable to provide the funds.

The war damage done to the Greek railways has been briefly discussed in Chapter 1. Apart from the systematic destruction of track, viaducts, tunnels, and stations, most of the rolling stock was taken away or burned or otherwise put out of commission. After liberation, earnest efforts were made to effect necessary repairs so that service could to some extent be resumed. The principal lines in the Peloponnesus were fairly soon restored to operation, temporary bridges being installed over the Corinth Canal and elsewhere, while new trackage, in the form of a Y, was laid to carry traffic around the longest viaduct in the
mountains opposite Achladokampos. This had been very efficiently blown up, and steel to rebuild it was not procurable. A great shortage of equipment has imposed many restrictions on service, but some motor-driven cars had been put into condition by 1947 to transport passengers in small numbers at least, between Athens and Patras, Pyrgos, Kalamata, and Tripolis on regular schedules.

In Macedonia and Thrace, too, provisional repairs had permitted the resumption of operations on the greater part of the system, though they were much restricted and handicapped by the lack of rolling stock. A further complication was added by the action of guerrillas who in frequent raids made constant attempts to sabotage the railways and disrupt communications. Conditions were so unsettled that working parties required armed protection, the more important bridges, tunnels, and stations had to be guarded, and trains regularly carried military escorts.

The problem of rehabilitating the main line of the State Railway from Athens to Salonica was much more difficult. By 1947 local traffic for a distance of 50 to 100 miles or more at each end had been restored, with engines and other equipment provided in part by UNRRA and in part obtained from surplus material of the American army. But the middle section of the line, which crosses two mountain ranges, with many tunnels and high viaducts, had been so effectively damaged that its repair constituted a major enterprise of engineering and finance. The reopening of this main artery of communication between Athens and Salonica, the capital of Macedonia, was one of the country's most urgent needs.

It was rendered the more imperative by the deplorable state of the country's network of highways, an account of which has been given in Chapter I. The jotted trunk road connecting the two cities still lacked an essential link where a field track had long lain awaiting conversion into a proper highway across Thessaly, and the portions already in existence were in a woeful condition of disrepair. The same situation prevailed to a greater or less extent
on all of the principal routes, everywhere. Of an approximate aggregate of 10,000 miles of roads, some 2,500 -- or about one fourth -- because of their strategic and commercial importance were classifiable as main highways. Of this total again, hardly more than one tenth, or roughly 250 miles, could be described as basically in a reasonably good condition, and scarcely more than 1% could qualify as really first-class. Secondary roads comprised some 3,500 miles, and the rest were for the most part country lanes and cart tracks, altogether unsuitable for modern motor traffic. The ravages of war had contributed much to the disruption of the nation's highways, and the continuing guerrilla movement, especially in northern Greece, aimed its sabotage particularly against culverts and bridges and strewn the land routes with mines. The restoration -- not to say re-creation -- of an adequate road system was thus one of the most crucial problems facing post-war Greece, and a condition sine qua non for the general rehabilitation of the country and its economy. But the rebuilding of a million miles of modern highway was an enormous task, at the moment far beyond the financial possibilities of the Greek government.

In other branches of transportation and communication also there were many needs of new construction and modernization. The country's airports all required attention. This was primarily true of the smaller landing strips in the provinces, where the improvement of facilities was of immediate value to military operations by the air force against the guerrillas. The telegraph and telephone services had likewise suffered considerable damage during the war and required substantial assistance in order to reestablish their lines.

The housing situation offered an immense and urgent problem in a different field. During the war innumerable villages were laid in ruins -- the number is believed to run well into the thousands. It has been estimated that 155,500 houses were totally destroyed by bombing from the air, military action, and by German and guerrilla reprisals up to the end of 1944, while more than 40,000
were seriously damaged. The magnitude of these losses, which rendered nearly 200,000 buildings uninhabitable and deprived almost one eighth of the country's population of homes and shelter, was appalling. A program of new construction, on a scale adequate to meet the emergency, would have strained the resources of a rich and powerful state even in times of peace and order. For post-war Greece, financially bankrupt, with most of her physical assets wrecked, and her internal security menaced by totalitarian aggression, it posed a staggering and almost impossible burden. The successive governments since liberation found themselves able to do little or nothing toward the permanent rebuilding of the demolished houses and communities, though some temporary shelters were provided. Meanwhile the spread and intensification of guerrilla activities brought further devastation, since the Communist strategy concentrated on creating chaos and panic by ravaging villages, burning houses, and driving the unfortunate peasants to flee for their lives, and adding to the human food burden by the loss of crops.
The task of reviving the country's production had likewise met with
difficulties, and the results achieved fell far short of what was needed.
The most encouraging progress had been marked in agricultural production, from
which more than half the population of Greece gained its livelihood; but industry
was slow to resume the position it had occupied before the war.

Greek agriculture had made rapid strides in the decade and a half preceding
the war. The area under cultivation was extended almost to the maximum limit
permitted by the physical nature of the country. In Macedonia, works of drain-
age and reclamation, in which American engineering firms participated, had re-
stored to use several hundred thousand acres of fertile soil. Stimulated by a
high protective tariff, the production of wheat had risen from some 300,000 tons
in 1924 to 980,000 tons in 1938 when it covered 65% of domestic needs. The
production of pulses had leaped from 35,845 tons in 1920-1 to 160,000 tons in
1939; that of potatoes from an average of 46,000 tons in the middle 1920's to
171,400 tons ten years later; and that of other vegetables in the same period
from 60,000 to nearly 320,000 tons. There were corresponding increases in the
production of fruits of many kinds. Cotton, too, had risen from 9,120 to
47,500 tons, sufficient for all domestic demands. Olive growers produced
120,000 tons of olive oil each year, and the tobacco crop was firmly established
as the mainstay of Greece's export trade. Agricultural products constituted
83% of the total exports of the country. The table on page 00 shows the actual
and relative acreage devoted to the principal crops.

This relatively flourishing progress suffered an abrupt check during the
war. Many cultivated areas were abandoned because of lack of machinery, fodder,
and fertilizers; crops and livestock were seized by the occupying forces;
machinery wore out and could not be replaced; and work on all reclamation projects
was interrupted. Altogether, production dropped to less than 50% of pre-war
figures. After liberation immense efforts were made by the whole farming population
and the government; and the substantial aid of UNRRA, which imported from abroad large quantities of agricultural machinery, seed, fertilizer, and livestock, cultivation in 1945 was brought back to 65%, in 1946 to 85% of the area tilled before the war. In 1947 it kept pace, but the yield suffered severely because of a calamitous drought and because of the insecurity prevailing in the northern provinces, where civil war drove thousands of farmers from their lands.

With peace and security restored, Greek agriculture could quickly get back into its stride and equal its pre-war record. But even more is needed under present conditions, and that is one of Greece's most vital problems today. Production must somehow be increased. It cannot be raised indefinitely through expansion of the area under cultivation, since the physical limits in that direction have almost been attained. By rehabilitating war-wrecked reclamation works, by new drainage projects in some places, and by irrigation in others, some additional acres can be brought under tillage and made to yield their quota. But the real answer for the long future seems to lie in the general introduction of more intensive modern methods of cultivation, more efficient use of the land already available, and the application of more effective measures for collecting the crops and distributing them where most needed. The whole matter is one that calls for education on a large scale, education that can penetrate into the little communities and hamlets and reach the small farmers themselves and win them over to new ways. Even so, and under the most favorable conditions, Greece can hardly hope to become altogether self-sufficient in producing her own food supply. But she can approach it, and through the judiciously regulated production of luxury crops like tobacco, figs, olive oil, and a few other commodities for export she can probably eke out a precarious subsistence. In pre-war years some 3.5% of the arable land in the country (208,000 acres) was planted in tobacco, but it yielded 14% of the total
agricultural production and nearly 50% of all Greek exports in value. With the proceeds from the sale of tobacco abroad -- chiefly in "free" dollars from the United States which was the best customer -- it was possible to purchase and import many times the amount of wheat that could be grown on the same land. Tobacco is, however, a luxury item, subject to fluctuating demand, and a national economy could not safely be built too largely on so uncertain a foundation. In any event a radical improvement of the low standard of living now prevailing in Greece must depend on more than agricultural factors; the development of industry up to and beyond the stage to which it had risen in the late 1930's is likewise essential.

It is not heavy industry that is involved, but light industry, represented in numerous small mills, workshops and factories, scattered about the country, though chiefly concentrated in the larger cities. Before 1922, industry hardly existed at all, but the sudden arrival at that time of some 1,200,000 refugees from Asia Minor and other regions gave the needed impetus. Under favor of a protective tariff policy small factories began to flourish, and by 1939 they had on their payrolls more than 150,000 employees and were producing almost 80% of the manufactured goods needed and used in the country. This was a development of fifteen years. It was a notable achievement, all the more remarkable in the fact that only some 23% of the raw materials required had to be imported; and it demonstrated what Greek enterprise could do under relatively peaceful conditions and with some fairly long periods of reasonably stable government. How relatively small Greek industry was appears clearly from the statistics of employment given above, which show that less than 8% of the country's population was dependent on it for a living. Industry was still in an early stage of evolution, for the most part it concerned itself with the production of simple processed foods and textiles for domestic consumption, and there was little suitable for export.
But this budding light industry suffered a staggering setback during the war and occupation. It was not that the plants and buildings were *thoroughly* wrecked and the machinery rendered useless or carried away. Some damage of this kind was undeniably done, but a survey made by UNRRA after liberation showed that some 90% of factory buildings were still serviceable along with 88% of their mechanical installations. Most of these enterprises, however, except those turning out goods and materials considered useful by the German and Italian military authorities, were forced to shut down for lack of raw material and power, and because of the collapse of Greek economy. Their trained personnel was largely turned adrift and scattered, and the momentum was lost.

After liberation it was hoped that Greek industry might quickly step back into production, but despite grants of substantial loans by the government, many difficulties made recovery slow. Shortages of power and of raw materials, the breakdown of transportation, monopolization of imports and distribution by UNRRA and the government, or at least the imposition of onerous controls, the uncertainties of the labor situation, and the beneficent effects of the civil war -- all were cited by defenders of the manufacturers as retarding circumstances, while government spokesmen implied that the industrialists themselves were at fault, especially because of a notable unwillingness to invest their own private capital in their enterprises. In any event it was estimated that production in 1945 barely equalled one third that of 1939, and in 1946 approximately 57%. A considerable further increase was expected in 1947 when employment in the Athens-Piraeus area rose to 20% of the figure for 1939; but output did not altogether keep pace with employment. At midsummer of 1947 prices of finished goods were so high in comparison with prevailing wages and salaries as to be virtually prohibitive to the great mass of the Greek people. This was of course mainly the inevitable accompaniment of an unnerving inflation which sprang from the unsatisfactory state of public finance and which undermined trust in the
national currency. Manufacturers were naturally reluctant to risk investments in the production of goods that had to be sold for drachmas, unless they could adjust prices with reference to more stable standards of value.

Altogether then the speedy resuscitation of Greek industry to a position in which it could play its indispensable part in the national rehabilitation and help to make Greece more nearly self-sustaining, offered complex though not insoluble problems in finance, labor, psychology, and other fields. The possibility of a future development toward real industrialization seemed remote, to say the least; it is virtually precluded by the lack of natural resources, especially in the way of fuel. In the absence of oil and coal, sufficient power could be obtained only through ambitious hydroelectric installations, which might be realizable and perhaps even feasible on the western slopes of the Pindus range, but would be extremely costly and could not be undertaken without a product of this kind was already on foot before the war, for the development of the deposits in the Delphi region was a matter of inescapable, but it is a prospect which lies beyond the horizon yet.

Of more immediate practicality could be the introduction of methods and processes to facilitate the commercial use on a large scale of the relatively abundant deposits of lignite which are found in various parts of the country. For the most part it is a malodorous product, of low thermal quality, which suffers rapid deterioration under storage. During World War I and in later emergencies it had to be used when coal was unprocureable, and there has been a large enough continuing demand to require an average annual production of 108,000 tons. Hitherto lignite mining has been carried on as a seasonal enterprise and only in the most primitive way. If modern methods and machinery were introduced and if the lignite could be deodorized, concentrated, and turned into briquettes, easily storeable and usable, Greece's acute fuel problem could be to a great extent solved, and a serious demand on the meagre supply of foreign exchange would be relieved. This is a challenge to technology.
The exploitation of Greece's mineral resources could likewise be revived and made more efficient. Here, too, it was mainly a question of capital, the procurement of up-to-date machinery, and the application of contemporary techniques. Many mines were wrecked or dismantled by the retreating Germans, and new equipment was generally needed for post-war rehabilitation. An exhaustive evaluation of the country's mineral wealth has yet to be made; but there is reason to believe that abundant quantities of iron, iron pyrites, nickel, lead, beuxite, chromium, magnesite, zinc, and other ores exist in various parts of Greece. Some of these have been shown to be of a grade and quality permitting profitable working. There is virtually no metallurgical industry -- chiefly because of the lack of coal -- and almost all ores that were mined before World War II were shipped abroad in an unworked state. The table on page 50 indicates the production of minerals in 1938 in thousands of tons and in dollar value. Some 920,000 tons of ore were exported, bringing into Greece in return foreign exchange or credit to the amount of about 3,320,000,000. This constituted only some 5% of all Greek exports; with proper organization and stimulation a considerably greater volume could no doubt be produced.

The restoration of the principal systems of transportation and communication, the rebuilding of the houses demolished during and after the war, the maximum expansion of production in the agricultural and industrial fields, and the more systematic exploitation of mineral resources were only some of the numerous facets of the general problem of national economic rehabilitation. There were innumerable others. But there were also many almost insurmountable obstacles that stood in the way of constructive progress. One of the worst was a demoralizing inflation which had gripped the country. Inflation was nothing new. It had been endemic since the German occupation, in the final phases of which it reached fantastic heights when shoppers even in order to purchase insignificant trifles had to carry baskets filled with large bundles of nearly worthless banknotes. The currency in circulation reached the
incredible total of 6,500,000,000,000,000 drachmases with no security to back it. Naturally the public lost all confidence in this paper; no one could afford to keep it long, since it depreciated day by day; everyone who had any surplus beyond immediate needs tried at once to exchange it for goods or for something with more permanent value.

The presence of a considerable amount of foreign gold in the country led quickly to its unofficial adoption as the best actual standard. During the war thousands of gold sovereigns and napoleons were dropped from British and American planes to the guerrillas to be used for financing resistance and sabotage against the Axis occupation forces. The Germans, too, brought many gold sovereigns into Greece for use in their own operations. In the course of time most of this gold trickled through to the financial centers in the larger cities, especially Athens. In the flood tide of inflation it became the only stable monetary measure on which the people felt they could safely count. Its relative scarcity in the face of widespread demand gave occasion for a substantial supervaluation: in the autumn of 1944, for example, the sovereign was quoted as equivalent to 35 or more American paper dollars, parity being nominally only a little more than 8. Even if actual gold was not available, accounts, agreements, and prices could be kept and reckoned in sovereigns, settlements being made at the rates current when transactions were completed. Gold psychology rapidly established a hold on the Greek people and gold- hoarding was practised as widely as conditions permitted. In every walk of life, from operators of big business to servant maids, all who could possibly do so began to salt away their savings and what they could spare into gold sovereigns or napoleons to which they clung tenaciously.

The replacement of the worthless inflated currency by a new issue as soon as possible after liberation for a time relieved the situation. The new drachmases were backed by English gold made available by the British government, and for some months the officially established rate of exchange with reference to the
pound and the dollar was maintained. By the summer of 1945, however, it had slipped sharply in the open market and a new inflation was threatening. A readjustment of the rates of exchange raised them from 500 and 150 for the pound and the dollar to 2,000 and 500 respectively, but with the growing rise in circulation the inflationary movement persisted. At the end of January 1946 a further revision became necessary and the official rates were multiplied by ten, to 20,000 and 5,000. By this time public confidence had again evaporated, and a gold fixation was entrenched more firmly than ever in the Greek mind. All business transactions on a large scale, contracts, leases and rents for long terms, were negotiated in terms of gold.

The fall of the drachma continued slowly but inexorably. In spite of efforts to enforce the prescribed rates of exchange and to suppress clandestine dealings, the open market maintained itself and flourished, and at midsummer 1947 those willing to take slight risks were able to cash checks at 8,000 to 9,000 drachmae to the dollar. Meanwhile prices of consumers' goods were steadily rising, keeping well in advance of the declining drachma; and the gap between wages and salaries on the one hand and the cost of living on the other was constantly widening, with consequent discontent and unrest among employees and workers. The effect on industry, too, was disheartening; for those who still possessed capital -- usually hoarded in gold or in safe physical assets -- were wholly unwilling to invest it in enterprises that promised returns only in drachmae in which they had no faith.

The causes of this ruinous inflation were manifold. Many of them have already been touched on in preceding chapters, and a brief summary will be sufficient here. In its larger aspect it was of course the direct result of the deliberate German policy during the occupation of wrecking the nation's economy, carried out in the wholesale destruction of property, the stoppage of production,
the exhaustion of all reserve stocks of vitally needed goods and supplies, and the annihilation of public finance. Called to deal with such a situation the post-liberation governments were enormously handicapped by the breakdown of administrative machinery throughout the country, and the lack of regular and adequate sources of income, not to mention the mounting pressure of a civil war. The assessment and collection of taxes, which had been virtually abandoned during the occupation, had to be reintroduced, and state finances had to be reestablished. But these were complicated matters that could not be put in order overnight. Meanwhile, countless demands for funds necessary to get the machinery of government once again in operation had to be met; and means had to be found to bring in from abroad essential and indispensable materials and supplies. In this emergency only two immediate sources were available: foreign loans and credit, and the continued printing of paper currency. And the latter naturally gave further impetus to the expanding inflation.

These were the financial difficulties against which Greece was struggling when INAG arrived in Athens. The grant of American aid was a substantial help in a time of peculiar stress, but it could not promise a complete cure of the ills afflicting the country. Recovery in the long future must rest mainly on the Greeks themselves. But the possibility of initiating many constructive measures with American assistance was freely discussed by the press and by citizens of all ranks, and not a few specific suggestions had been made by foreign economic advisers.

To meet this threatening financial situation, various proposals were made. One emphasized the need for a thorough reorganization of state finances, the introduction of a strict, centralized budgetary control. A plan which placed the whole management of the nation’s finances in the hands of a single agency or ministry responsible for collection, budgeting, and disbursement, and which eliminated all independent, semi-independent, special, and
extraordinary funds hitherto administered separately by other organizations and ministers, would unquestionably have a wholesome effect in promoting the country's financial health.

A deep-going reform of the whole structure of taxation, with a more equitable distribution of the tax burden, was also proposed, and there seemed to be room here for some improvement. There was a great disparity between direct and indirect taxes which together have regularly constituted the greater part of the government's revenue. Of the total revenue from taxation in the year before the war, indirect taxes made up 67.9%, direct taxes 19.5%, and a mixed group consisting mainly of stamp-, transportation-, and transfer-taxes the remaining 12.6%. The indirect taxes were those on consumers' goods, a substantial part of which was collected in import duties. Since these were high and affected almost all articles of primary need, such as food, clothing, fuel, and the like, it was obvious that they laid a disproportionately heavy load on the poor and the laboring classes. The duty on wheat and flour in 1935, for instance, amounted to 70% of the foreign market value; and the average import duties on food and clothing came to 49.1% of their cost at the place of origin. It was calculated that a typical working-class family of 6.2 persons paid out 42% of its income in taxes. The annual per capita national income, which before the war was estimated at approximately $30 (compared with some $450 in the United States), was believed in 1946 to have sunk to about $45 (as compared with $1,200 in the United States).

Direct taxes comprised in part what we call assessments on real estate and property in the United States (although in Greece they are payable only if the property produces an income), and in part an overall tax on income. The latter, which is theoretically designed to apply particularly to the wealthy group of citizens, was still, however, largely undeveloped in Greece and was one of the least productive revenue measures since it brought in only a small fraction (less than 10%) of the total state revenue. A comparison with practices in the
Another field in which it was believed proper exploitation might aid

Corruption.

ship were chartered with escaping both Greek and American taxes by lying the

would be of great help to the national economy. And some owners of these

the boom in sea transportation and the free foreign exchange thus obtained

for a relatively generous share in the large profits that were being earned during

by the Greek Government. If secured only fair that the share should come in

made small down payments and the balance was secured by mortgages guaranteed

100 Liberty ships' most of which had already been delivered. The purchasers

the agreement of the United States to sell to the Greek shipping companies

were. A large part of the reparation program was rendered possible through

substantial aid to the shockwave in repairing the tonnage lost during the

profits of Greek shipping when it initially received. The Government had

revenue was a measure to secure for the State a more reasonable share in the

One of the most promising proposals for tapping new sources of profit

the capacity to pay.

interest and increase the State revenue without unduly oppressing the taxpayer.

is Greece for a constitutional change that would secure operation of the public

system in transport and taxes. In any event there was only one opposition to

national recovery, it is difficult to compare the wide difference between the two

United States. Where the Federal income taxes yielded nearly two-thirds of the
innumerable historic associations breathe life into every prospect. Incomparable monuments of the past lend distinction to many famous sites still bearing classical names; and museums are filled with treasures of ancient art. Visitors can almost always rely on a benevolent sun and a friendly climate that can hardly be matched in any other European country.

But a heavy initial investment is required before the tourist business can be developed to yield its maximum economic advantage to Greece. Roads throughout the country will have to be rebuilt to conform to contemporary standards of motor travel; railway and steamship lines will have to renovate their equipment and improve their services; modern hotels and restaurants will have to be constructed in the more important provincial centers to provide accommodations beyond reproach in cleanliness and reasonable comfort; landing facilities at harbors and airports will have to be well organized; up-to-date motor vehicles will have to be made available; competent interpreters and guides will have to be trained; and interesting accurate guidebooks will have to be published in various languages. These improvements should be affected in step with the steady recovery in Western Europe, in which our customers must rely.

The most serious and costly of these requirements is the modernization of the roads; and in this respect much was expected from the program of American aid. There was at any rate little hope that Greece from her own meager resources could make rapid progress toward this end. Before 1939 some advances were noted in the erection of modern hotels in certain provincial towns. These efforts lost their momentum during the war and occupation when much equipment was removed or destroyed, and some of the buildings suffered a good deal of damage. After liberation the Department of Tourism, a semi-independent organization which was revived and placed directly under the authority of the Prime Minister, speedily resumed its work. It encouraged owners to renovate their hotels at some of the best known ancient sites; and the government undertook to help with loans at low interest rates. The other desirable mentioned in
the preceding paragraph must presumably for the most part await a more favorable
time, when peace and order shall have been reestablished; but the sooner they

Foreign and Greek advisers, in the summer of 1947 and earlier, had also
strongly recommended the taking of vigorous specific measures to counteract
the menacing inflation. They advocated effective suppression of the open market
and illicit exchange transactions, a centralized state regulation of all im-
ports and exports, the provision of adequate supplies of consumers' goods, the
imposition of price-, wage-, and rent-controls, and the reorganization of ration-
ing in a more systematic way. There were differences of view on details, and not
all the experts gave the same advice; but those who understood the situation
agreed that decisive action was necessary along the lines mentioned. But most of
the measures proposed were of a kind sure to encounter determined opposition
among the groups likely to be particularly affected and sensitive to new encroach-
ments on their pocketbooks. Nearly all the financial supporters of the political
parties would find themselves touched, and any political party government would
be reluctant to sponsor reforms that threatened to cost it the friendship of its
chief patrons. Furthermore, rigid controls of exports and imports, of prices
and rents and wages, with annoying restrictions and regulations, would inevitably
be unpopular among large sections of the public, impatient of restraint, in a
land where individual liberties and prerogatives are so highly cherished. Under
these circumstances it seemed to some observers that the arrival of AMAG
offered a golden opportunity to bring about far-reaching reforms; since much of
the responsibility and unpopularity could be shifted to the Mission's shoulders.
The parties in power in the government might feel safe in risking the political
consequences.

Even with the strictest state-managed economy and the loyal cooperation
of the whole people, willing to do its share and to bear the necessary sacrifices,
it was obvious that Greece's road to recovery would be no short and rosy path.
living. This is an inexorable fact from which there is no escape. As already pointed out, almost all available arable land is now being tilled, and there is no possibility of any great expansion of the cultivated area. Development along the line of intensive farming is practicable and may ultimately yield welcome increases in production. But even with a maximum achievement in this direction and a fortunate run of "bumper" crops, Greece can never hope by her own agronomy to keep all her citizens well-fed, well-clothed, well-housed and contented with their lot. Supplements to national income from the merchant marine, from the tourist trade, and from other sources will help; but not sufficiently to make the country self-sustaining.

The only feasible solution -- barring a radical reduction in population -- appears to lie in a turn toward greater industrialization. The extraordinary difficulties in the way of such a course, chiefly caused by lack of fuel and power, have already been mentioned. Besides the invention of some method for the efficient utilization of lignite, an indispensable requisite would be the installation of hydroelectric works on a large scale. Such a project would demand on the one hand an enormous capital investment, far beyond the present financial capacity of Greece; and on the other hand the application of highly specialized science and technical skill. In both these fields Greece might well turn to the United States for help. There should be no insuperable obstacles in the way of interesting American capital; indeed recent post-war development suggests that the time has come when the maintenance of a durable international economy can be assured only through the extensive foreign investment of dollars. The American dollar will now presumably have to take over the international role played by the pound sterling in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. American technology, too, through its stupendous achievements before and especially during the war has become a potent world force, competent and ready to face constructive tasks of almost any magnitude.
In appealing to the United States for help to meet her problem of over-population, Greece will have some right to expect a favorable answer; for American action is indirectly if not directly responsible for the acute malaise oppressing the Greek demographic situation today. During the first and second decades of the twentieth century, as has already been pointed out, Hellenic emigration to the United States, starting as a small trickle, swelled to a flood-tide. From 1900 to 1924 nearly 400,000 persons from Greek cities, towns, and villages pulled up stakes and crossed the Atlantic to seek better living conditions in the "promised land." Some ultimately returned to their native heath, but the movement caused a shift in numbers which had a profound effect on conditions in the homeland. Greek economy was not only relieved of the burden of supporting them, but soon began to benefit from the increasing volume of remittances in dollars they sent back to their relatives and dependents. This period, which was really the heyday of modern Greek economic prosperity, came to its end in a double crash. On the one hand, the military disaster in Asia Minor in September 1922 resulted in a sudden inundation of Greece through the arrival of some 130,000 refugees, for the most part penniless and without means of livelihood; and on the other hand, the American Congress passed new and stringent immigration laws founded on a system of quotas by which immigration from Greece was soon cut down from a maximum of more than 36,000 to exactly 307 individuals a year. These two events dealt crushing blows to Greek economy. The second undoubtedly had a more lasting injurious effect than the first which, indeed, in the long run proved to be a source of advantage rather than of harm.

It is of course undeniable that the United States had a perfect sovereign right to determine its own policy toward immigration and to apply it through such laws as Congress saw fit to enact. No one could dispute America's authority
to fix the terms of admission of prospective citizens, to choose those she
wanted, and to bar all those she considered undesirable. On the legal side, it was a domestic matter and no one was deprived of rights and privileges inalienably his. No foreign state had juridical grounds or treaty agreements on which to base complaints or protests -- few of the homelands as a matter of fact took more than a casual interest in the fate of emigrants who departed from their native shores.

But from a broad moral point of view it is not easy to shake off all re-
sponsibility. By our own action or negligence we had permitted to establish and perpetuate itself a system to which several impoverished countries of Europe, whether they realized it or not, had gradually been led to adjust their economic life. Through no fault of their own the contentment and well-being of their people had come to depend on it. The sudden abolition of this established order could not fail to have repercussions in far countries. None was harder hit than Greece whose national economy was already strained to the utmost with the problem of caring for the refugees from Turkey and of absorbing into the body politic an increment equal to 25% of her entire population. Some generous, understanding recognition of the added burden which our action placed on an already overloaded economic system would not have been inappropriate. It might have taken the form of financial aid as a loan or gift to help tide over the critical emergency. It is true that America did subscribe her quota (it was only £2,300,000) of the loan sponsored by the League of Nations for the settle-
ment of the refugees; but the money came from private individuals and not from the United States government. In acknowledgment of our unwitting share in shaking Greece's economic stability and complicating her demographic problem at a time when she had to meet great stress from another direction many years ago, it might be a felicitous gesture if we could someday make possible, through
private investment or government financing, or both, the creation perhaps, or some enterprises of similar scope—shall we say—of an Achelous Valley Authority, which might open a new era of Greek industrial development and prosperity.
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PROBLEMS

Though the problem of raising the extremely low standard of living that prevails in Greece is largely an economic one, dependent on the restoration and improvement of Greek economy as a whole, it has also its general social aspects which cannot be overlooked if American assistance is to be effective in preserving Greek integrity and independence. American ideas have already had a widespread influence among the Greek people in stimulating a demand for some amelioration of their living conditions. Thousands of emigrants, now residing in the United States, through letters or visits to the homeland have described American ways of life. They have aroused envy among those not fortunate enough to be able to migrate across the Atlantic and have stirred eager desires and longings for a share in the comforts and conveniences the outside world seems to offer. Though still not very articulate, these emotions have led to considerable dissatisfaction with the hard lot which is almost universal for dwellers in the Greek countryside. Discontent with the scanty amenities their native land has been able to provide them has undoubtedly influenced many essentially loyal and national-minded Greeks to lean more and more toward the Left in disgust with what they believe to be the indifference and incompetence of their rulers, and to sympathize with or even to join actively in the guerrilla movement without enquiring too closely into the ultimate aims of its Communist leadership. This is one of the most difficult and disturbing complications in the Greek situation today; and until some solution can be worked out, offering Greece's discontented elements some real hope for the future, international Communism will continue to enjoy an exceptionally fertile field for exploitation.
Where Greece's depressed economy takes on its most compelling social aspect is perhaps in the problem of housing. As already noted, some 150,000 buildings -- for the most part private houses -- were totally ruined and more than 40,000 partly destroyed during the war. Except in the larger cities, up to midsummer 1947 relatively few of these structures had been rebuilt by private enterprise and almost none by the government. Consequently conditions of housing especially in some of the country districts were in a desperate state.

By the summer of 1947 more than 150,000 homeless and destitute refugees had thronged into the larger towns and cities, where the government was presented with a formidable and steadily growing problem of relief. Food had to be supplied and, as far as possible, shelter of some kind; but the living conditions which most of these unfortunates, uprooted from their own abodes, had to endure were indescribably bad. Those who were lucky moved in on relatives, friends, neighbors, wherever they could find a place to stay; others were quartered in whatever empty buildings could be commandeered for the purpose. Overcrowding and miserable discomfort were the order of the day. The government's inability to meet the exigency with prompt and commensurate measures exposed it to criticism and aroused dissatisfaction; but there was also stirred up an increasing hatred of the guerrillas who were responsible for aggravating the evil. The problem of housing was still in an acute unsolved state when AMAG arrived in Athens, and the hopes of Greece were pinned on American help.
Americans, accustomed to household comforts and luxuries and to the facilities provided at the turn of a switch by manifold electrical appliances, would find it difficult to imagine even the possibility of existence under the average housing conditions that fall to the lot of some millions of dwellers in Greek villages today. Most of their houses are single-storied structures of one or two rooms, built of stone or crude brick. As a rule they have earthen floors, relatively few windows -- often without glass panes -- little furniture, no running water or plumbing, no light except from candles or tapers, and no proper means of heating. In the summer families usually sleep outdoors in the courtyard, spreading their bedding on boards laid across trestles; in the winter they huddle together indoors in one of the rooms, perhaps using the other to stable their goats or to house their poultry. Beds are by no means universal; certainly if the family is large there are not enough to go around. Cooking is frequently done in a homemade dome-shaped oven set in a corner of the yard. Most of the daylight hours are spent in manual toil, and there is little time for recreation or reading. Not one house in a thousand, ten thousand has a radio set. It is true that, through the systematic use of DDT in a country-wide campaign, carried out by the governmental hygienologist
with the assistance of UNRRA and WHO, insect pests have been largely
eliminated as a hazard in Greek villages; but this improvement, follow-
ing in the wake of the war, cannot yet be regarded as anything but
temporary. Houses in the cities are by and large less primitive than
those in the country; but modern bathrooms are almost equally rare in
the workers' quarters, where standards are only slightly above those
in the rural areas.

What to do about this situation, at once so fundamental and so
widespread, is indeed a question. But it is a question which must be
answered. The American Mission for Aid to Greece has allocated large
sums for housing reconstruction, and this is a good beginning. But the
necessity of spreading the appropriation widely and of producing as many
housing units as possible will naturally preclude the erection of Ameri-
can houses equipped with modern conveniences. At best the program
as planned can create, where there now are none, a considerable number
of new houses, of types corresponding to the lowly standards prevailing
before the war.

Moral and Psychological Conditions

Hardly less acute than the problem of housing is that faced by
contemporary Greece in the moral and psychological conditions that were
brought into being by the long German occupation. Under the stress of
defeat and subjection to a hated conqueror whose harsh and unfeeling
rule imposed untold hardships and deprivations on the mass of the
population, moral sensitivities were blunted and the old traditional
standards of right and wrong were disrupted. Before the war Greece
may have been afflicted with her share of crime; but it was largely in
the field of petty misdemeanors and delinquencies, while major crimes
of violence and robbery were relatively infrequent. The vast majority
of the people were peaceful and law-abiding, and one might travel freely through the country, even in the remotest mountain districts, without the slightest fear or risk. Since the war the situation has radically changed. The unruly spirit of disrespect for law and order stirred up during the occupation has now yielded an appalling increase of major crime -- brigandage, robbery, arson, and murder. In prewar days reports of burglary, safe-cracking, and hold ups caused a seven days' sensation, and automobile thefts were almost unheard of; today felonies are a commonplace, reported each day in the press; and no motor car is safe, if left unguarded more than a minute or two.
The chaotic state into which the economic and social life of the country had fallen during the occupation and after liberation undoubtedly induced many recruits to join the guerrilla ranks. The free and easy adventurous career of a brigand, with the excitement and opportunities for booty, offered a tempting alternative to the drab existence in town or city, where good jobs were scarce, labor underpaid, work dull and uninteresting, and the housing situation desperate. Ethical standards had deteriorated greatly as a result of the oppressive conditions of living under the German yoke. It came to be considered patriotic to pilfer and steal and carry off what could be looted from the hated conquerors, while the soldiers and workers who lived under the Nazi regime were subjected and destroyed to property, which caused difficulty to the ease and satisfaction. When the Germans withdrew from the country in the autumn of 1944, those elements which for years had practiced sabotage and robbery under the cloak of patriotism continued their activities more vigorously than before, since the machinery of law enforcement was greatly weakened. But now they turned their attention against the British liberating forces, the foreign relief organizations, their own government, and their fellow citizens.
Though serious efforts in law enforcement have succeeded in reducing crime to a considerable extent (and as we have seen, have also driven many criminals to join the guerrilla camps in the mountains), the evil is too widespread and too firmly established to be rooted out in short order and by half-hearted measures. What is needed is not only a re-inculcation of moral principles through education, but a radical improvement of the conditions of subsistence in Greece. For it is essentially the intolerably low standard of living now prevailing which has stimulated the great increase in crime and fostered its many attendant ills, including prostitution, in the cities and larger towns.

EDUCATION

Education in Greece faced serious problems even before the war, and the disorganized conditions of the occupation period merely added complications. Here again the United States is in a position to make a most important contribution.

The Greek Constitution provides that elementary education be compulsory and free. There are 30,000 teachers and other employees in the national school system, all subject to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Education. They are sadly underpaid, often inadequately trained, but by and large devoted and hard working. In this post-war world they have had to carry on under discouraging conditions -- inadequate equipment, overcrowding, lack of continuity in educational policy, occasional political interference. School buildings suffered heavily during the war -- some destroyed by enemy action, more wrecked by the uses of occupying forces (as hospitals, barracks, supply depots). In extreme cases, authorities close schools for lack of a building.

The Greeks have made little progress to date in rebuilding and re-equipping schools. As a gesture of friendship in connection with this shorter range problem, the New York public schools sent to Greece in 1946-1947 large numbers of desks, blackboards, and other schoolroom furniture. But the long range needs of Greece
demand a constructive program and reorientation of methods, carried through by wise and understanding Greek educators. Here again the United States can play a part by helping to train such men for their task.

The United States has already left its impress on Greek education through the establishment of several American schools. There are two in the capital, functioning on the primary and secondary levels: Athens College for boys, and Pierce College for girls. Each enjoys enthusiastic support from a growing body of alumni. In Salonica there are also two: Anatolia College, coeducational through the eighteenth or twentieth year, and the American Farm School which trains boys and young men in agriculture and stock raising. These schools have met some opposition and jealousy on the part of comparable Greek schools, but on the whole have had remarkable success and have regularly received far more applications for enrollment than they could possibly accept. They are purely educational in character, patriotic but not propagandistic, and follow the curricula prescribed for comparable Greek schools, supplemented by a sound foundation in English. Alumni of Athens College had a splendid record during the war in the service of their country. If these institutions are permitted to continue their work unhampered in the future, they may be counted on to produce their full quota of enlightened leaders of the Greek nation.

In the field of higher education, Greece has two universities. The University of Athens, called the National and Cepodistrian University, was founded in 1837 and had an enrollment of more than 25,000 in 1946-47. The University of Salonica, established in 1926, included some 5,000 students. The study of engineering and

1 With Faculties, or Schools, of Theology, Philosophy (Humanities), Law, Physical and Mathematical Sciences, and Medicine.

2 With Faculties of Philosophy, Law and Economics, and Physical and Mathematical Sciences.
applied science centers in the Polytechnic Institute in Athens, also tracing its beginnings to 1837. Of roughly the same university grade are the Huzareios Theological Seminary (1843), the Superior School of Political Sciences (1930), the Superior School of Economics, and the School of Agricultural Sciences. Except for the last named, these institutions are all subject to the Ministry of Education.

The University of Athens and the Polytechnic Institute have long traditions and take just pride in their past achievements. Some of their methods will strike American educators as strange. One obviously needed reform lies in the curriculum of the University's Philosophy Faculty where present custom requires each student to attend lectures by every professor, a burden of 48 classroom hours a week for many students. One reason for this emphasis on attending lectures is apparently the lack of adequate textbooks in Greek in many subjects. Changes here and elsewhere in higher education will no doubt come in Greece, and they will need inevitably to come from within.

The lack of doctors and the inevitable war-time isolation from rapidly changing medical practices abroad pose another serious problem in higher education. Many young Greeks are eager to complete their medical studies abroad and are deeply disappointed when overcrowded American medical schools are unable to accept many who apply. Here again the United States could make a significant contribution in bringing Greek medicine abreast of the developments of the war years.

One of the leading Greek-American fraternal organizations in the United States recently took a step in this direction when it announced a project for building a large and thoroughly modern hospital, constructed from top to bottom on American lines and including, in its beginnings at least, an administrative, professional, research, and nursing staff made up largely of Americans. Even before the war
Greek hospital accommodations were far from adequate: the ratio between hospital beds and population was one to 570 as compared with one to about 115 in the United States (1938). The standards maintained, particularly in nursing, were greatly inferior to those taken for granted in America. And of course the situation has further deteriorated as a result of the war. Most of the hospitals were taken over by the military -- Greek, German, Italian, British in succession. Much equipment was lost, medical supplies were largely exhausted, and UNRRA and other agencies have been able to help only on a temporary, relief basis.

But it is not only the Greek medical profession that has turned with hope to the United States. Specialists and students in the other sciences, in technology, in the humanities have also been looking across the Atlantic, eager for a chance to see and learn. By the thousands they have sought admission to American universities and the financial aid which would permit them to attend; but again the post-war overcrowding of the universities has meant, most unfortunately, that only a few have succeeded in coming. American consular officers in Athens issued only 245 student visas in 1946 to applicants aiming to pursue higher education in the United States; during the first eight months of 1947, the number was only 106. On the Greek side, the principal difficulties contributing to this result have been lack of funds and the refusal of permits to leave the country to many men of military age.

This is a most disappointing situation. Here is a unique opportunity for young Greeks to expose themselves to American ideas and educational practices and to carry back to their own country elements valuable in the rethinking of their educational problems and the modernizing of their educational system along the lines of their national traditions and needs.

The University of Athens had something of this same objective in view when in 1946 it established a professorship of American History and Culture. The purpose is to designate an American scholar of distinction, or a succession of visiting professors, who would lecture in various fields of learning representative
of American scholarship. Unfortunately the chair has been vacant, since there are no funds available to pay an incumbent's salary. This is surely a purpose worthy of an endowment, preferably large enough to provide a reciprocal exchange of distinguished spokesmen who could, on the one side, enlighten American universities about intellectual activities in Greece and, on the other side, the University of Athens and Greece in general about corresponding developments in the United States. A program of this kind could not fail to have stimulating effects in fostering the development of intellectual and cultural relations between the two countries.

LIBRARIES

Greece can be proud of a number of outstanding libraries and collections. The National Library in Athens is probably the largest and certainly one of the oldest, having been founded at Aegina in the earliest days of Greek independence. The Library of the Chamber of Deputies, corresponding to our Library of Congress, is especially rich in its collection of old periodicals and newspapers. The island of Chios possesses a notable library of some 75,000 volumes, with many rare works on Chian history; it was established by one of the leading Greek intellectuals at the time of the Greek Revolution. A similar collection at Corfu, comprising more than 70,000 volumes dealing largely with the Ionian islands and containing numerous irreplacable treasures, was totally destroyed by Italian bombs during the war.
Other more specialized libraries in Athens are those of the Greek Archeological Society and of the foreign Archeological Schools, French, German, British, and American. The last named also includes the Gennadeios Library, a remarkable collection of books on Greece, with many fine bindings collected by the late John Gennadeios, for many years Greek Minister in London; it is housed in a marble building erected with fund from the Carnegie Corporation.

All the libraries mentioned are open to students and to the qualified public, and a few occasionally permit books to be taken out by scholars. But in all Greece there is nothing to correspond to the public library familiar in any American city, where the average citizen can find and borrow what reading matter he likes. This is a serious situation in Greece today in the face of an almost pathetically eager interest in books and magazines. Most Greek publications would seem very inexpensive to Americans in comparison to the prices they are accustomed to pay at home; but under present conditions the majority of Greek readers can ill afford to spend money for books. Unless they think a work is likely to be a great hit, publishers in Athens commonly limit their editions to 1,000 copies. An indication of the keen demand for a lending library and a convenient reading room is given by
America, written in the English language. And yet its reading room is continually crowded with 500 to 600 or more visitors daily, and approximately one-third of the volumes in the collection are normally out on loan. A similar library providing books in Greek would undoubtedly do a land-office business.

The American Book Center, in a friendly gesture, has presented a large number of books to be apportioned among Greek libraries which suffered damage and loss during the war. Some 190 volumes have already been delivered, and a second shipment of 140 boxes is on the way. These volumes are for the most part in the English language. Another gift of good will has come from the American Library Association, which presented to the National Library in Athens more than 700 volumes of scientific and other works published in America during the war years, and to that library and other institutions full sets of American periodicals issued during the same period. All these books in English are of course beyond the range of the general public; but they are highly appreciated in literary and scholarly circles for their own intrinsic value and as a token of American interest in and sympathy for Greece.

Greek libraries in general are badly behind the times in methods of cataloging and shelving. It would perhaps be too much to expect the adoption of a complicated Dewey system or the system worked out by the Library of Congress, with their elaborate card catalogs arranged by author, title, and subject. But much could be done in the way of modernization along more simple lines. The difficulty is that in all Greece there is no school for the training of librarians. It would certainly be a great gain for the country—aid for foreign users of
its libraries—if a small but select number of bright young men and women, through the award of scholarships or special grants, could be given the opportunity to take a thorough course of training in an American library school.

With their keen interest in hearing and telling of all things new, the Greeks are naturally eager to keep abreast of scientific and cultural developments in other countries. Foreign literature is in lively demand in Athens, where the intellectual and highly educated classes are largely concentrated. They are often remarkable linguists, at home in the principal European tongues, which they can read and speak as easily as their own. But the mass of the people must depend on modern Greek alone, and their interest in publications from abroad can be satisfied only through translations. Many foreign works, especially French and German as well as the English classics, have been turned into Greek and are available in one form or another. Since the end of the war a half dozen American books have been published in Athens in Greek editions, one or two being novels, the rest works on American life and history. It is reported that they have had a fairly good sale. But on the whole very little has been done in translating American works, and the American classics are almost unknown to the Greek people at large. The converse is also true; few if any modern Greek writers are familiarly known or even accessible to Americans in English versions. An exchange might be profitable in both directions.

On the Greek side there is an extensive literature of great variety. Many novelists are active, several of whom have shown outstanding creative ability and originality. There are also not a few able playwrights, the best of whom have focused their attention on Greek themes and scenes which they know intimately. Poetry, too, has flourished—especially during the German occupation, it might be added—but true poetic genius is no more common in Greece than in other
countries. Writers in the fields of politics and economics have made useful contributions, and particularly notable monographs have appeared dealing with history and the history of art. In the era between World Wars I and II Greek publishers produced two multi-volumed encyclopedias, each of which contained much material not to be found elsewhere. Toward the end of the same period no fewer than three publishing firms were engaged in issuing rival editions of the ancient Greek classics; all series alike were designed to provide in each volume the original text, a facing translation into modern Greek, and critical and explanatory notes. One of these sets had grown to contain 100 fascicules before the war stopped production.

At present, as between Greece and the United States, there is no established channel through which the publication in either country of representative worthwhile works of the other may be developed. Most Greek authors would be delighted to have a book published in the United States. The chief obstacle is the lack of financial backing; but there is almost equal difficulty in obtaining an acceptable translation. When it comes to the publication of American books in Greece, competent translators are easy enough to find; but there is little prospect of monetary return, since editions in Greece are small and cash profits are infinitesimal. The problem is one that might well be considered by some foundation interested in the development of close cultural relations between the United States and Greece.

PRESS RADIO, FILMS

Since liberation the Greek press as a whole has been remarkably friendly to the United States. With few exceptions—chiefly extreme leftist—the newspapers have commented with respect on American policies...
in general, and with graduated enthusiasm on recent American policy toward Greece. Echoing the Moscow propaganda line, the official Communist organ in Athens has bitterly assailed the program of American aid, and has charged the United States with interference with Greece’s internal affairs, and with embarking on a campaign for the establishment of world-wide capitalistic imperialism. Many editorial writers in Athens are intelligent, highly trained politically, and gifted with the ability to express their views clearly and forcefully. There are also several excellent cartoonists, one of whom must rank high in any international comparison. On the whole, the newspapers are organs or mouthpieces of political parties; and party considerations are not lost from sight in comments on the international and domestic news of the day. Since they are for the most part in straitened financial circumstances, dependent on a small circulation, with relatively little revenue from advertising, Athenian papers can rarely afford to maintain many permanent correspondents abroad. Several have regular representatives in London, only two or three in the United States; and most American news comes by way of London or Paris or is picked up from radio broadcasts. Negotiations to introduce a full Associated Press service have hitherto failed because of the prohibitive cost under present conditions. The United States Information Service, the Office of War Information, founded by OPA and operating under the Department of State since 1946, the past year and a half, though not supplying spot news, has provided abundant background material along with full texts of official statements and documents. As a result, the Athenian, and to some extent the provincial, press has consequently given much of its scant space to articles on American politics and life, as well as on scientific and cultural developments in the United States.

So far as the Greek newspaper world is concerned, there are no serious Greek-American problems. But in view of the present intensive American interest in Greece and need for an understanding cooperation
on the part of the Greek people, it might be profitable to invite a representative group of Greek journalists, with all expenses paid, to visit the United States. The experiment was tried to considerable advantage by all in its dealing with the press of other countries. An extended tour enabling intelligent Greek newspaper men to see American life at firsthand and to observe the working of American democracy could have a stimulating influence in revitalizing democratic ideas in their homeland.

Domestic Greek radio broadcasts in the summer of 1947 said by well-informed listeners and judges to have had little appreciable effect on public opinion. Under state control, the programs provided information, entertainment, and propaganda in favor of the government in power. The number of receiving sets in the country was relatively small—estimated from 40,000 to 50,000—and almost all were in the hands of the upper middle and the well-to-do classes of society. The high cost of radio sets puts them beyond the reach of the great mass of the people, and villagers in the country and the poor in the cities could be reached only through loud speakers set up in cafés and other public places. Once a week the United States Information Service sponsors a half hour of American music and entertainment, and each night a quarter hour is given to the relay of a program of news in Greek from New York, the Voice of America. It is purely factual, dealing with current events in the United States and rather fully with the meetings of the United Nations Organization and its subsidiary bodies.
Direct shortwave broadcasts from American stations could be picked up only with difficulty, depending upon atmospheric conditions, and by an almost negligible number of receivers.

In the field of motion pictures, American ascendancy—on a basis of volume at least—as well established in Greece as in most other free countries. In 1946 some 80% of the films imported into the country came from the United States. Soviet production in its Athenian run drew the record attendance, and some English films were highly popular; but in the aggregate they offered little competition with pictures from Hollywood. It is chiefly from this latter source that the larger Greek public forms its conception of American life and manners. Under a controlled economy there may be severe restrictions on film-imports, like those recently imposed in certain other countries; and the motion picture producers will presumably have their troubles and complaints. But these are business problems not likely to have serious effect on relations between the United States and Greece. In addition to the normal commercial pictures and features, Athenians have had an opportunity to see many documentary films in numerous showings arranged by the United States Information Service. Some of these, illustrating the more sober and constructive side of American life, have been received with great favor, and it is clear that Hollywood has no monopoly on the interest of the Greek theatergoer.
Archeology as a Cultural Link

This little country of Greece, afflicted with so many domestic and external troubles, has one paramount distinction which gives it a unique place among the nations of the world. Here in these bare and austere surroundings was born and flourished that classical culture which laid the firm foundation of our modern Western civilization. It was here that man first conceived those ideas and ideals of self-rule by the people which, along with the name itself, have come down to us to form the touchstone of contemporary democratic government.

Here too were formulated those noble thoughts and aspirations in philosophy and literature which have provided inexhaustible inspiration to the thought and intelligence of succeeding centuries. It was in this milieu likewise that man's feeling for beauty attained a remarkable freedom and purity of expression flowering in a creative art that has aroused the respect and admiration of all following generations which have had the privilege of becoming familiar with it.

Apart from some portion of their blood, their bodily and mental characteristics, and their language, which though modified and simplified survives still essentially the same, the classical Greeks have bequeathed to their descendants of our day an even more conspicuous heritage. These are the monuments and other physical remains that linger on through the landscape wherever one turns. Many still stand above ground; others lie buried deep beneath the accumulation of long ages. It is this wealth of antiquity, already disclosed and familiar, or yet undiscovered and unexplored, that has made Greece an incomparable center for classical archeology, and a friendly meeting ground of international scholarship. In this field of research and study, Greeks and nationals of many other countries have long collaborated in amicable emulation and mutual help. Greece has been generous in allowing foreigners to take a large share in the excavation of her ancient sites. It was the Greeks who first gave a more or less
systematic sponsorship to the archaeological exploration of their country, through the founding of the Archaeological Society of Athens in 1837, only a few years after national independence had been won. Less than a decade later, in 1846, the French School at Athens was established; it was followed by the German Archaeological Institute in 1874, the American School of Classical Studies in 1881, the British School of Archaeology in 1886, the Austrian Archaeological Institute in 1897, and the Italian Archaeological School in 1902. These institutions have been attended through the years by hundreds of students who, besides undergoing a course of archaeological training, have made themselves familiar with Greece and her people. On their return to their several countries, they have uniformly been accorded nomenclature carried with them a deep sympathy for things Greek. This has been especially true of the alumni of the American School, who now occupy chairs of classics and archaeology in universities and colleges from one end of the United States to the other.

In Greece the American School has been an outstanding representative of American culture for more than sixty years. It has made for itself a place in the intellectual life of Athens and the country, and has striven to set and maintain worthy standards of American scholarship. Its chief fields of excavation are at Corinth, where since 1896 it has steadily proceeded with the task of laying bare the center of what was one of the largest and wealthiest cities of classical Greek and Roman times; and in the heart of Athens, where since 1930, it has been uncovering the agora, the main public square below the Acropolis and the Areopagus, about which Athenian vital activities for many centuries revolved. Each of these excavations has yielded interesting discoveries, architectural, sculptural, epigraphical, ceramic, and of other kinds, which have shed new light on various aspects of life in ancient Greece; and the School has published a long series of detailed reports and monographs. Both undertakings were interrupted for several
years during the war, but work has now been resumed; and in September 1947 preparations were under way for the construction of a museum, financed from a grant by the Rockefeller Foundation, to house the material recovered from the Athenian Agora.

The war and occupation had a paralyzing effect on archaeology in Greece. With the outbreak of hostilities, the Greek Archaeological Service at once set about moving all valuable exhibits from the museums and placing them in underground bombproof shelters. Few if any antiquities from public collections were actually carried off or destroyed in the course of the conflict. The empty buildings, however, were in certain instances taken over and used for other purposes. Some of them were subjected to considerable damage, especially during the civil war, when almost all windowpanes were shattered, and the National Museum in Athens, for example, suffered 72 direct hits from shells thrown by mortars. Since liberation, nearly three years ago, relatively little has been done to restore the museums to proper condition and to re-install the exhibits. In Athens, through the initiative of its director, the Byzantine Museum has been put once again into good order. The Benaki Museum, under private administration, has also been completely rehabilitated. The small museum at Piraeus was formally reopened and rededicated at the end of early in September 1947. Temporary exhibitions have been set up in a few rooms of the National Museum at Athens, but the older half of the structure is still a wreck. The Acropolis Museum was in 1947 an empty shell. Except at Corinth, where the American School has restored to good working condition the museum it created some years before the war, the most important provincial museums, too, at Delphi, Olympia and Candia, continue to await repair and reconstruction.

This long delay in archaeological rehabilitation -- which forms a striking contrast with the rapid progress made under somewhat similar conditions in Italy -- is the result of many and varied causes. The chief difficulty, however, has been the lack of money to pay the formidable costs involved. With
soaring prices and an inflated currency, the appropriations made available by the government—which had to meet endless demands for what had to be judged far more urgent purposes—have been a mere pittance in comparison with the minimum really needed. A partial disruption or perhaps decay of the Archaeological Service in the post-war years, and a certain lack of enterprise and constructive vision in high places are cited by Greek critics as contributory factors in the retardation of recovery. It is true that there have been serious losses of personnel without compensatory replacement, and it is true that no broad program of reconstruction has yet been made public—if indeed it has been elaborated.

To many friendly observers, archaeology seems to offer one of the easiest and most direct channels through which Greece can assure herself a tide of good will, along with moral and material help, from all the enlightened countries of the world. A great opportunity certainly lies open in this direction. But there is need for a reorganization and liberalization of the archaeological administration which is still governed in part by rules, regulations, and procedures laid down a century ago, and which operates on a narrow and restricted scale. Three things are essential if any constructive change is to be brought about. First, the topmost leaders of the government and the country must be aroused to a realization of the immense potential benefit the full realization of her archaeological resources can offer Greece, and also to the fact that proper exploitation requires a commensurate investment. The Service of Antiquities must no longer be treated as a stepchild to be nourished on the pitiful scraps and crumbs that can be wrested only with difficulty from the meager budget of the Ministry of Education. It should be liberated from its financial servitude and set up with a high budgetary priority. And there is every reason to believe that, working in close cooperation with the Tourist Organization, it will produce abundant dividends both in good will and cash
from abroad.

With a proper solution of its financial problems, the administration itself could be rehabilitated and reorganized. Greek archaeologists are a modest and unassuming body of scholars, who are accustomed to being treated with scant consideration by the politicians and who seldom raise their voices loudly in protest. A more aggressive course might bring better results. There is an urgent need for the recruitment of young personnel to instill new life and vigor into the service and to restore its confidence in the lasting value of its work. But new personnel cannot be picked up at random; it must be carefully selected and trained; and only the assurance of a future career with adequate compensation and security of tenure can attract the bright and intelligent young men who are needed. In the matter of systematic training, in which little or nothing has been done in the past, there is room for a well-thought-out and well-applied program; and in such an undertaking the foreign archaeological institutions would no doubt be happy to cooperate. For the classical antiquities of Greece, although she naturally has special rights, are in a broad sense not exclusively a national possession of the country in which they happen to be found: they belong to the world, and the whole world is interested in their care.

And this leads to the third requirement which I think is equally necessary, namely, some liberalization of the Service's attitude toward the export of antiquities. Almost without exception, Greek archaeologists hold the view that every ancient object brought to light within the country is a sacred and indispensable treasure which must under no circumstances be allowed to get into foreign hands. The result of this view, translated into policy, has been harmful. Almost every museum in the country has become cluttered up with duplicates, by the hundreds and thousands, and with pieces of minor importance for exhibition-purposes.
In most instances they have been relegated to unlit store-rooms or cellars, where they have lain for years covered with dust and cobwebs, gradually deteriorating and decaying to no profit of any sort. It is a sad failure to exploit a land potentially rich in great works of art. They should be brought into the light, and made accessible to foreign museums and also to the public, who, if we are to be believed, would become an active instrument of propaganda, in the world, attracting intelligent attention to Greece and stimulating interest in her past along with good will toward her present culture. There is enough material lying untended and mouldering in Greek museum store-rooms, or discarded in museum courtyards, to fit out hundreds if not thousands of study-collections that could be used to great advantage wherever ancient history, classics, and archaeology are taught.

A law was enacted a decade or two ago permitting the exchange and sale of duplicates; but no one has had the courage to assume the initiative in applying it. The Greek archaeologists have refused to take the responsibility, on the ground, they allege, that the law does not provide for the use for archaeological purposes of the money so obtained, but no serious effort seems to have been exerted to have the law amended.

This narrow attitude has had another harmful effect. The restrictive laws dealing with the chance discovery and with the sale of antiquities have been rather badly framed and have been unintelligently enforced by the police. Peasants living in the country have told me that when they accidentally come upon an ancient object, whether of marble, pottery or whatever it might be, they find themselves in an awkward dilemma. If they turn it over to the police as the law prescribes, they are as likely as not to be arrested and clapped
into jail for illegal possession, while the object itself is invariably confiscated. If they retain it and try to sell it secretly, they also risk arrest and a harsh penalty. Consequently, they say, in many instances, especially when the piece is large, they hastily rebury it. An owner who finds antiquities on his land and promptly declares them is legally entitled to compensation equal to half the value of the objects discovered. The appraisal is made by a committee set up for the purpose. Since in actual practice the award is usually only a small fraction of the real value, many Greeks — who have a keen eye in business ventures — will prefer to take the risk of selling to an illicit dealer for a much higher price. In this way most of the valuable antiquities accidently brought to light get into the hands of clandestine agents and are ultimately smuggled out of the country to fetch high prices abroad. If government officials were able and willing to pay immediate fair compensation, with a minimum of red tape, and to guarantee the finder immunity from arrest and prosecution, the Archaeological Service would undoubtedly have a chance to acquire nearly all the more important things found. Sales to other museums and collectors of the items not desired might yield almost enough income to finance this whole class of transactions.

Archaeological problems of this kind are largely of domestic concern; but they have some bearing on relations in the cultural field between Greece and many foreign countries. American museums, educational institutions, and admirers of Greek culture would naturally be much pleased if some change were made that without detriment to Greece might enable them to acquire representative collections in the realm of classical art. There can be no doubt that the ultimate effect of such a development would be altogether beneficial to Greece's interests.