DEMOCRACY AND THE ATHENIAN EPIGRAPHICAL HABIT

In his lectures for the distinguished Martin Series at Oberlin College, Benjamin Meritt commented on the proliferation of stone inscriptions in Attica from the 5th century B.C. onward. This development, he suggested, was to be linked with the origins and elaboration of democratic practices in the Athenian state at this time:

The principal reason for the abundance of such documents was the democratic form of government of the Athenian people. The business of government was everyone’s business, and the publication of many details of all sorts of transactions shows a general desire to let everybody know the acts of government.

Meritt’s basic position, that during the Classical period the Athenian state produced an unparalleled number of inscriptions, and that this production reflects a democratic ethic, continues to be very influential (even if in recent publications the argument is not always cited). Meritt supported this position in several ways. First, he claimed that “the habit of writing” in ancient Greece was a special quality of “democratic centers,” and maintained that in Athens there was a correlation between fluctuations in democratic sentiment and the number of preserved inscriptions. Second, he suggested that Athenian inscriptions often included an unambiguous statement of their democratic function—certain phrases that are appended to inscriptions and that explain the motive for their erection. In this article I refer to these as “formulae of disclosure.”

Meritt devoted only four pages to the issue of democracy and writing, in the context of his general discussion of “lettering.” The suggestions and arguments he put forward have never been thoroughly reviewed. Here I look at the documentation for Meritt’s two arguments: I first examine the evidence for the number of preserved Attic inscriptions and for the relationship between the number of inscriptions and the political system of Athens. I then evaluate certain statements in the inscriptions that seem to suggest a connection between the practice of inscribing texts in stone and the ideology of the democracy. As will be seen, Meritt’s basic narrative of the development of “the habit of inscribing things on stone” in the Athe-
nian democracy remains largely unexceptionable. His argument, however, that ancient Greek democracies produced more writing than other states and that an “abundance of documents” uniformly indicates a democratic ethic, their absence the contrary, is far from impervious to criticism. Fluctuations in the number of preserved inscriptions may mirror differences of ideology. As will become apparent, however, the decipherment of the nature of that ideology must ultimately rest on some criterion other than the merely quantitative. Much more persuasive is his appeal to the formulae of disclosure. Even this evidence, however, is not without problems.

The ideological character of epigraphical writing in Athens is a complicated issue. If the Athenians erected more inscriptions than other contemporary Greek states, what does this mean? Is the imbalance in the provenience of surviving Classical inscriptions entirely accidental, or does it reflect a peculiarly Athenian obsession with the written word? Athens was also a large and prosperous city: urbanism, trade, wealth, demographic changes, bureaucratic exigencies, and the extent of literacy are all relevant to the problem. In the 5th century B.C. Athens was the seat of an empire, and imperial pretensions surely played a part in the production of inscriptions. The cultural and intellectual ascendance of Athens in the Greek world from the Classical period on should not be neglected in considering the problem. In the Hellenistic and Roman periods production of inscriptions was influenced by the survival of a civic tradition, an idea of the glory of the Athenian past. Athenian production of monumental texts was “over-determined”; it had many causes. Still, the ideology of the democracy doubtless played an important part in motivating the Athenians to inscribe their texts, and the connotations of Athenian state inscriptions were surely democratic. Athens was (at the least nominally) a democracy. Therefore, to the extent that official writing in Athens was associated with the state, ipso facto it had democratic connotations.

Even if one allows that Athenian public writing must have had democratic connotations, the practical, political consequences will have been various. Writing, in both its narrower political manifestations and broader social uses, can have various ideological implications: it can be and has been imagined as a weapon of authority and exploitation, or as an instrument of equalization. Since the 1940s it has been common to understand Athenian inscriptions as manifestations of a modern democratic ideology, that is, as vehicles of information. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, there has been a shift in opinion: increasingly scholars have emphasized the latent ways in which writing undermines the manifest principles of the Athenian democracy. Specifically, it is pointed out that writing is an exclusionary medium of communication.\(^5\) It requires little imagination to see how writing might be used both as a vehicle for communication and as a means of exclusion. Writing has no intrinsic qualities that make it oppressive or liberating in all situations. The political meaning of writing lies in what people and societies and political regimes make of it, that is, in its historical situation.

The Athenian production of inscriptions was not restricted to official state texts. The most common type of inscription in ancient Athens, as in practically all societies, was the epitaph. Inscriptions also documented the

activities of private associations, recorded commercial transactions, and marked property boundaries. The social use of monumental writing may or may not be prompted by democratic ideology. Moderns at least tend to imagine that a democratic use of texts must necessarily promote the use of reading and writing at a broad social level (and consequently the United States, for example, subsidizes public education). As far as we know, the Athenian state did nothing to encourage an unofficial, nonpolitical production of inscriptions among its population. It is clear, however, that public inscriptions did influence the appearance and language of many unofficial monumental texts.

Following this train of thought, it might be objected that the focus of this essay should be widened to include the social and political implications of writing generally; that is, that the problem of the political meaning of writing extends to all forms of writing in any medium. Admittedly there is a practical and therefore arbitrary reason for concentrating on stone inscriptions from Classical Athens: such texts have survived in far greater numbers than have other types of texts. The ancient Athenians wrote on a variety of materials, including wood, papyrus, leather, cloth, ceramic, and metal. These materials were used for many different kinds of texts, including official political documents. Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons stone has proved to be the most enduring of all fabrics. Certainly the bulk of the surviving Athenian writing that actually dates to the Classical period is preserved in stone, but it seems unlikely that the preserved inscriptions are typical of the variety or quantity of writing that was produced in ancient Athens. A focus on them may be dangerously misleading. In another way, however, inscriptions do provide a unique access to social attitudes toward writing. Unlike most other ancient forms of writing, inscriptions were permanent fixtures in the public space and so they were manifestly consumed (which is not to say read) by all of those who occupied this space—rich and poor, slave and free, male and female, literate and illiterate. They consequently provide a different kind of evidence for an assessment of the general political significance of writing than do texts that were kept apart from the public space, for instance, literary texts or bureaucratic accounts or labels on pots.

THE ATHENIAN EPIGRAPHICAL HABIT

I borrow the phrase “epigraphical habit” from the title of an article by Ramsay MacMullen; I use it to mean simply the practice of erecting inscriptions. Documentation of this habit poses straightforward problems that admit of straightforward factual answers: How many Athenian inscriptions have survived? Does the number of inscriptions show significant variation over time? How does the number of Athenian inscriptions compare with that of other, contemporary Greek city-states?

The Athenians made use of writing to an extent unparalleled elsewhere in the ancient Greek world. Most Greek texts known from the Classical period via the manuscript tradition stem from Athens, and the majority of the texts that have been physically preserved from the period have
been discovered in the territory of Athens. This extraordinary quantity of preserved texts has given the city of Athens a preeminent position in the modern historiography of Classical Greece. As the best known of the Classical city-states, it has repeatedly been used as the point of departure for generalizations about the rest of Greece. Traditionally historians have imagined that the opposite is true as well: that Athens made greater use of writing than other states because it was more important—and in taking this position they are following an ancient tradition that goes back to such prestigious authorities as Thucydides.\footnote{Thucydides, in the funeral oration (2.41), links Athenian greatness with the practice of writing. For the complexity of the thought, see Hedrick 1995. For criticism of modern “Atheno-centricism” see, e.g., Gehrke 1986; van Andel and Runnels 1987; and Cartledge 1993.}

Attempts to estimate the number of published Greek inscriptions can never be better than provisional. In its general outlines, however, the quantity of preserved Athenian inscriptions relative to those of other Greek city-states is not in doubt. There is something inerent and remarkable about the sheer number of inscriptions preserved from ancient Athens. The first volume of the second edition of the corpus of Attic inscriptions in the series Inscriptiones Graecae (IG I\textsuperscript{2}; published 1924) was devoted to inscriptions that were produced before the end of the 5th century B.C. It contained a little more than a thousand inscriptions. The second and third volumes of the second edition, \textit{IG II–III}\textsuperscript{1} (1913–1940), contained all later inscriptions, and included about 13,500 texts. There have been substantial gains in the past century. The third edition of the first volume (\textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{2}) has now appeared (fasc. 1, 1981; fasc. 2, 1994); it contains approximately 1,500 inscriptions. At a minimum, then, there are about 15,000 Attic inscriptions. Such an estimate, however, would be far too conservative; it does not account for the substantial additions to the number of inscriptions from the 4th century and later. Excavations in the Athenian Agora alone since the 1930s have yielded well over 7,000 inscriptions. A notion of recent gains can be gleaned from the collection of Attic inscriptions provided in \textit{SEG} XXI (1965), perhaps the single most useful \textit{printed} supplement to the inscriptions collected in \textit{IG} II–III\textsuperscript{1}.

The most complete database of Attic inscriptions now available is on the CD-ROM produced under the auspices of the Packard Humanities Institute and the Cornell Greek Epigraphy Project. The Attic inscriptions collected on the PHI-6 disk as of 1991 comprised 24,596 inscriptions; 627,334 words (not including acrophonic numerals); 216,705 lines.\footnote{In preparing this paper I used the 1991 version of this disk, PHI-6, updating it with the \textit{SEG} through vol. 44, 1994. The updated version of the database, PHI-7, was issued in January of 1997. The new disk includes little new Attic material, and there would be little change in the counts that I provide here.} By comparison, the \textit{Iliad} alone contains 115,477 words. In evaluating these numbers, however, it is necessary to allow for the many duplications of inscriptions that are found on the disk. For example, many \textit{IG} texts and revisions of the same in \textit{SEG} are included as separate items; some pptyan inscriptions from \textit{IG} II\textsuperscript{1} and their reedited versions from \textit{Agora} XV are found. Some inscriptions occur in up to three separate versions: an ephebic text, for example, may be reproduced in the collections of \textit{IG}, \textit{SEG}, and Poulliloux’s collection of inscriptions from Rhamnous.

A reasonable but not too conservative estimate of the number of Attic inscriptions currently known would probably be in the region of 20,000. The distinctiveness of the size of this corpus emerges when it is compared to the number of inscriptions brought to light by investigations elsewhere in Greece. It is difficult to estimate the total number of published Greek inscriptions. To my knowledge, no one has bothered since the days of August
Boeckh to make a systematic count, city by city, of known Greek inscriptions. His collection, the *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* (*CIG*; published 1828–1877), contained not quite 10,000 inscriptions. As of 1991 PHI-6 included 82,572 inscriptions. Allowing for gaps in the collection, we might guess that the total number of published Greek inscriptions is somewhere in the vicinity of 100,000. If that estimate is even vaguely accurate, Attic inscriptions would account for about 20% of the total—an extraordinarily high percentage. Even if the total were twice as high, Attic inscriptions would still account for a remarkable 10% of the whole. In any event it is certain that no Greek city-state has yielded the same number of inscriptions as Attica. Of the collections for the largest and best-known sites, the *Fouilles de Delphes* includes only about 2,000 texts. The *Inscriptions de Délos* contains fewer than 3,000 inscriptions, and the majority of these we owe to the Athenian colonists who populated the island after 166. Fewer than 4,000 inscriptions are known from Ephesos. In sum, more inscriptions are known from Athens than from other regions of ancient Greece.\(^\text{13}\) Whether or not these numbers should be ascribed to something like a “democratic ethic,” there does appear to be some peculiar connection between the practice of erecting inscriptions and the city of Athens.

The number of Attic inscriptions preserved fluctuates over time. It is impossible to provide an exact tabulation of inscriptions according to period. In many cases the date of a particular inscription is unknown, or ascertainable only in the most general way. And there are other difficulties. Dates, as reported in *IG* and elsewhere, are formally inconsistent: some are listed according to year (e.g., 454/3 B.C.); others by century (e.g., IV/III B.C.); still others by period (e.g., *Romana aetate*). Furthermore, there is no reliable up-to-date corpus of the Attic inscriptions. Despite these problems, it is possible to arrive at a general estimate.

To obtain a sense of the total number of preserved Athenian inscriptions and how that number changes from period to period we can look at the PHI-6 database. Totals by century are represented on Figure 1. The two totals for quarter-centuries and less than quarter-centuries are represented in Figure 2.\(^\text{14}\) In considering Figures 1 and 2 it is important not to be misled by the treacherous comfort of precise numbers. As noted, the current version of PHI-6 contains many duplicates. Furthermore, certain periods, especially the 5th century B.C., have attracted disproportionate attention from epigraphists: in these periods the number of reeditions (and accordingly duplications in PHI) will be greater, and the total number of inscriptions for that period will therefore appear to be greater than it really is.\(^\text{15}\) The chance discoveries of archaeology may also have produced some anomalies in the count for given periods. For example, the count of inscriptions for the years 260–240 B.C. was very high, due to the chance find of the cache of cavalry tablets from the Kerameikos, each of which has its own date and entry in PHI-6.\(^\text{16}\) When the tablets from this cache were counted as “1,” however, the total for that period was consistent with the totals for the rest of the 3rd century.

Despite these distortions and exaggerations, Figures 1 and 2 provide a general picture that confirms expectations. There is a substantial increase in the number of Attic inscriptions in the 5th century B.C.: the PHI disk
includes 2,036 inscriptions dated to this century. The figure is obviously inflated (cf. the total included in IG I); even if we decreased this figure by a quarter, however, no other Greek region has yielded a comparable number of texts for this period. Attic inscriptions of the 4th century B.C. are by far the most numerous. Some 6,549 inscriptions from the PHI collection are dated to this period. If we reduce that total by a quarter or third to allow for inflation, it still exceeds the totals yielded by most ancient Greek states in their entire histories. Predictably there is an upsurge in the number of inscriptions in the 2nd century A.C., an increase that probably reflects the philhellenism of the Roman emperor Hadrian.
The distribution of particular kinds of Attic inscriptions may, but need not, follow the same pattern as the corpus as a whole. A graph of the distribution of Attic epitaphs looks much like the graph of the total number of inscriptions. Substantial numbers of epitaphs are found first in the 5th century; the vast majority date to the 4th century. Some official, state inscriptions are distributed according to the same pattern. The earliest-preserved decree dates to about 508 B.C., the latest to around A.D. 220 (Fig. 3). Significant numbers are found first in the 5th century B.C.; the majority are dated to the 4th century B.C. The number of known texts declines in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Other kinds of inscriptions have a different pattern of distribution. Prytany inscriptions are found over a period of seven centuries, from the 5th century B.C. to the 3rd century A.C.: the earliest known dates to 408/7; the latest to A.D. 231. Most prytany inscriptions date to the period of the high Roman Empire (Fig. 4). Ephabetic lists are first found at the end of the 2nd century B.C. The latest date to the 3rd century A.C. Most belong to the 2nd century A.C. (Fig. 5).

Caught up in the pleasure of compiling lists and examining charts, we should not lose sight of our goal: to gauge the ancient Athenian production of inscriptions. So far I have been speaking only of the numbers of preserved inscriptions. It remains to be seen whether there is some correlation between the rate of preservation and the rate of production. Determining these rates is impossible. Let us take an example about which we are relatively well informed. Mogens Hansen collected almost 800 decrees of the Athenian Assembly for the period between 403 and 322 B.C.: 488 of these have been preserved on stone; a further 68 are cited in these inscriptions; another 219 are quoted or otherwise mentioned in literary sources. Hansen estimates that the Assembly met around 3,000 times during this period and passed on the order of 30,000 decrees. In principle, from the end of the 5th century, all of these would have been recorded in the Athenian archive, the Metron, probably on papyrus (Aesch. 3.187; Dinarchus 1.86). There is no way of knowing, however, what percentage of these decrees was ever inscribed in a more permanent medium to be displayed publicly. Selection of decrees to be erected frequently seems haphazard. Thus, although it is possible in this case to have some notion of the relationship between the number of decrees extant and the number originally passed, there is still no indication of how many of the decrees that were passed were ever actually erected.

The same problems pertain to inscriptions that relate to finance. Many of these documents are extant. Even so, we will never know what percentage of such texts have survived, because the Athenians did not systematically publish or even collect figures pertaining to the finances of the state. As Moses Finley pointed out long ago, most economic inscriptions in antiquity had a “monumental” function: they were erected selectively, not so much to convey the content of the financial records as to demonstrate by their physical presence the public character of Athenian finances; these inscriptions were displayed more to be seen than to be read. Since the number of texts that were originally erected cannot be estimated, the rate of preservation cannot be calculated.

18. IG I' 1; II' 1077–1078.
19. The major publication is Agora XV, on which I base my figures. For the political nature of the Boule in later times, see also Geagan 1967.
20. For these texts, see Reinmuth 1971; Pelekis 1962; and Follett 1976.
Figure 3. Chronological distribution of Attic decrees. After IG II

Figure 4. Chronological distribution of prytany inscriptions. After Agora XV

Figure 5: Ephebic lists by century. After IG II'1960-2291
In conclusion, I can imagine no defensible way of estimating, even roughly, the total number of inscriptions erected in ancient Athens or any other Greek state. On the other hand, the huge difference in the sizes of the surviving corpora seems to suggest that the Athenians produced far more inscriptions than did other, contemporary Greek states. It is possible to suggest some mitigating circumstances. Athens was never destroyed so utterly as was Corinth. In some states, metal was the preferred medium for public texts, and metal is far more liable to be melted down for reuse than stone is to be destroyed. It is also possible that the number of inscriptions known is at least in part a function of the focus of modern investigation: because of its reputation Attica has always attracted more attention from archaeologists than the rest of Greece. Furthermore, in the past century, Attica has become by far the most densely populated region of Greece. This urbanization has hastened the destruction of antiquities in certain respects, but it has also often contributed to a more thorough exploration of Attica. It is thus barely conceivable that a larger percentage of Athenian inscriptions has been preserved or recovered than from other Greek states. I do not think, however, that appeal to such relatively trivial and haphazard differences of preservation or recovery can account for the huge discrepancy between the number of inscriptions from Athens and the numbers from all other Greek sites. The number of existing Athenian inscriptions almost certainly reflects a historical difference in the level of production.

THE EPIGRAPHICAL HABIT OVER TIME

Many, perhaps most, of the Greek city-states have left to posterity some inscriptions. Inscriptions occupied the public space of the city, along with other meaningful objects; all such things might be described generically as monuments. This use of the public space of the city for the display of monuments is one of the more remarkable features of Graeco-Roman civilization. The origins of the habit in Greece seem to be bound up with the rise of the city-state. It would not be correct to characterize the earlier Mycenaean civilization of Greece as in any way given to the public display of monuments, whether uninscribed or inscribed. Writing in particular was an esoteric tool of a Mycenaean “bureaucracy”; it was sequestered from the general population, and employed almost exclusively for the ends of the palatial economy. Mycenaean practices of writing might serve as a textbook illustration of Lévi-Strauss’s contention that writing has developed hand-in-hand with civilization as an instrument of political and social oppression. Writing can be and was used in many ancient states, in Greece and elsewhere, before and after the Classical period, for a variety of political purposes: to inform, commemorate, intimidate, and control.

What sets Athens apart from other ancient Greek city-states is not the existence of its epigraphical habit, but the extent of this habit. The meaning of the great size of this corpus of inscriptions is not straightforward. A strict enumeration of the number of inscriptions that an ancient state has produced is a clumsy and inadequate gauge of the extent of popular
government within that state. Many nondemocratic states have erected inscriptions in great numbers. The civilizations of the Near East and Egypt erected large and impressive inscriptions—and their example may have had an influence on the states of Greece. The political connotations of these monuments, however, were certainly not “democratic.” The Romans have left a greater bulk of epigraphic texts to posterity than any Greek state, more than all of the Greek states combined; the city of Rome alone has yielded far more inscriptions than Attica. No one, however, has consequently accused the town on the Tiber of inclining toward Athenian-style democracy or of attempting to use public writing to promote some kind of democratic sentiment among its subjects; quite the contrary. In the New World, the Maya indulged their epigraphical habit to an unparallelled extent, but no anthropologist has claimed that these inscriptions are an index of their democratic political arrangements.

The reasons for this explosion of public writing in Attica are far from obvious. As I understand him, Meritt would attribute the practice to Greek democracies in general. At the beginning of his discussion of inscriptions and democracy he alludes to “the democratic centers” of Greece and to “Athens in particular.” Clearly enough, there were democracies in Greece other than that at Athens. If the publication of texts was a hallmark of Greek democracy, why did no other democracy produce a comparable number of inscriptions to Athens? Where are the public documents of Syracuse? Chios, it is often remarked, may have had a democracy before Athens; at least one Chian inscription of the 6th century B.C. (Meiggs-Lewis, no. 8) mentions “public” institutions. One inscription, however, early though it may be, is insufficient to establish a general principle of democratic writing in Chios. The habit of inscribing texts in stone is more of an Athenian phenomenon than an ancient Greek democratic phenomenon, and so the simple equation of epigraphical habit with democratic polis is wrong.

29. For a general survey, see, e.g., Martin 1994. On the differences between the political and physical situations of writing in the various civilizations of the Bronze Age and the world of Classical Greece, see Vernant 1982, pp. 23–25, 52–54; and Detienne 1988b, 1988c.

30. According to Gordon (1983, p. 8), the number of Latin inscriptions (presumably not including the voluminous Roman inscriptions in the Greek language) can be estimated, at a minimum, as somewhere in excess of 200,000. By 1902, CIL VI alone had reached a count of about 26,000 inscriptions. The corpus of Early Christian inscriptions from Rome (ICUR) has lemmata approaching 37,000.


32. Anthropological work on Mayan literacy and society is relevant to the issue of Athenian literacy and society. Adrienne Mayor first brought these discussions to my attention. For a popular summary of recent work, see Bower 1993; Houston and Stuart 1992 (note particularly their discussion of “recitation literacy,” p. 591); cf. further Brown 1991.

33. Meritt 1940, p. 89. In fairness I should point out that in the rest of his discussion Meritt restricts himself to Athens alone. For a comparable point, see Detienne 1986, pp. 29–30; Thomas (1992, p. 132), contrasting the paucity of inscriptions from oligarchic Corinth and Sparta, agrees that “there does seem to be a correlation between the number of public documents in a polis and the degree to which its constitution was democratic.”

34. For Greek democracies besides Athens, see Arist. Pol. 1291b7–13, 1296a22–23, 1301b39–40; Labarbe 1972; and Robinson 1997. For a recent and exhaustive attempt to look at specific political institutions of various Greek states, see Jones 1987.

On the fitful history of democracy in Syracuse, see, e.g., Caven 1990, pp. 12–17. As for the lack of inscriptions from Syracuse, Robin Osborne rightly reminds me that the Classical town center has not been excavated. Cf. Drögemüller 1969.

35. Finley (1982) makes this point vigorously; see also the translation of this article in Finley 1985, pp. 27–46.
Even if it is impossible to maintain that democracy in and of itself is the unique and unequivocal cause of an epigraphical habit, it may yet be that the Athenians attached democratic values to the publication of their texts. One way of attempting to demonstrate this link would be to show that the number of preserved inscriptions from Athens increases or declines as democratic sentiment prospers or flounders. More specifically the connection between the production of state inscriptions and the vicissitudes of the democracy might be examined. Unfortunately, as Meritt notes, it is difficult and perhaps dangerous "to argue from the chance way in which inscriptions have been preserved in Athens about the rise and fall of democratic feeling." Nevertheless, Meritt goes on to make the attempt, giving particular attention to the coincidence between an increase in the number of preserved texts and the rise of Athenian democracy, and to the various indications of a reaction against the erection of inscriptions during periods in which the democracy is thought to have been subverted.

We can begin by looking at the regime that preceded the democracy in Athens: the tyranny of the Peisistratids. The number of preserved inscriptions increases over the course of the 6th century. The greatest increase occurs from the second quarter to the third quarter of the 6th century, when the number of texts triples. The third quarter of the century corresponds roughly to the establishment of the tyranny by the elder Peisistratos. Thus the establishment of the tyranny seems to be accompanied by a rise in the use of public writing.

If the publication of the “people’s business” is a hallmark of democracy, then presumably the tyrannical regime that preceded the democracy should show a corresponding indifference or hostility to the public display of official information. According to Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 16.3) the tyrants tried to discourage their subjects from taking an interest in public affairs. In connection with this statement, Meritt observes that there is a “complete dearth of public documents from the time of the tyranny. There are many dedications, but no financial records, no decrees.” It is true that no state decrees have survived from the period of the Peisistratids. Other documents that have survived, however, show that the tyrants were aware of the political uses of writing. Monuments such as the Herms that measured out the roads of the Attic countryside, or the central Altar of the Twelve Gods in the Agora (IG Π 951), or the altar that the younger Peisistratos erected as a memorial of his archonship (Meiggs-Lewis, no. 11) demonstrate a concern for and exploitation of the public, political use of monumental writing, even though this use is presumably not a democratic one.

More important, there was by the 6th century a tradition, both in Athens and elsewhere, of writing down certain kinds of public texts, especially laws. The Archaic states of Crete were famous for their laws, and many fragments of them have been recovered. In Athens, Drakon and Solon are known to have composed written collections of Athenian law at the end of the 7th and beginning of the 6th century, respectively. We do not know where and how these laws were kept before the Classical period. Up to the time of Ephialtes they were kept in some location on the Acropolis; they were later moved to the Prytaneion and Agora. In the last decade

36. Meritt 1940, p. 93.
38. Meritt 1940, p. 91.
39. For the Herms see Osborne 1985.
40. For the Sanctuary of the Twelve Gods see Gadbery 1992.
41. On Archaic laws and connotations see, e.g., the discussion by Thomas (1992, pp. 65–73), with bibliography. See further Thomas 1994.
42. There is a convenient summary of the topic by Willetts (1982). See now Whitley 1997.
43. A few would argue against the likelihood that Drakon’s code was inscribed and publicly erected. It would be difficult, however, to take the same position regarding the Solonian laws: see Ruschenbusch 1966, Stroud 1979.
of the 5th century, some of the laws were reinscribed.\textsuperscript{44} It therefore seems likely that these inscriptions were erected and displayed in a public context through the time of the Peisistratids. Support for this presumption is provided by the common tradition that the tyrants were concerned to preserve the forms of the traditional Athenian system of government, and especially the laws (Hdt. 1.59.6; Thuc. 6.54.6; \textit{Ath. Pol.} 14.3, 16.2).

There is nothing intrinsically democratic about the tradition of displaying laws. The Athenians of the Classical period and later nevertheless seem to have regarded the establishment and display of laws as a democratic measure. The name of Solon was associated with the early laws of Athens and so too with democracy; in some instances the lawgiver was considered to be a, or even the, founder of the democratic order in Athens.\textsuperscript{45}

The Athenian “revolution” and the reforms of Kleisthenes occurred in the last decade of the 6th century, traditionally in and after 508/7. Some, like Meritt, would suggest that the reforms of Kleisthenes (along with the nascent democratic order that these institutional reforms are thought by many to imply) serve as the point of departure for a new and increased use of monumental writing in Athens. There is an increase in the number of preserved inscriptions from the fourth quarter of the 6th century: about two-thirds more have survived than from the third quarter of that century. The attribution of this increase to Kleisthenes and the foundation of the democracy is problematic; for most of the final quarter of the century the tyrants ruled in Athens. The increase in epigraphical documentation might be associated with the “Peisistratid building program.”\textsuperscript{46} Nevertheless, the first inscription that is recognizable as an official decree of the democracy dates to the time of the reforms of Kleisthenes. This text is concerned with the regulations for the kleruchs of Salamis (Meiggs-Lewis, no. 14). It includes a form of what will become the characteristic preamble of inscriptions of the democracy: \textit{ἐδοξοσεν τοι δῆμοι}, “the people have decided.”\textsuperscript{47}

The number of surviving inscriptions more than doubles in the first quarter of the 5th century. This general increase in the use of writing is not paralleled by an explosion in the production of state documents, but at least one decree can be dated to this period. An inscription from the last decade of the 5th century (\textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{3} 105), it is a copy of an earlier inscription.\textsuperscript{48} The original of this text should be dated sometime between 501 and 462, probably somewhat closer to the upper limit of this span than to the lower.\textsuperscript{49} A very few other official inscriptions relating to religious matters have survived, most notably the decree of 485/4 concerning the Hekatompedon (\textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{3} 4).\textsuperscript{50}

The assessment of the democratic significance of these early state inscriptions is made problematic by their isolation from the bulk of Athenian public inscriptions. They are so much earlier than most other decrees of the democracy that their relationship to them is unclear. It is not until the period of the so-called “mature” democracy of the 450s that decrees of the state come to be commonly preserved for us. From the period between the late 480s and the mid-450s, then, virtually no state documents have survived. It is not only public inscriptions that are conspicuous by their absence. In the second quarter of the 5th century there is a steep decline in the general number of preserved inscriptions.

\textsuperscript{44} See Meiggs-Lewis, no. 86 (= \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{3} 104); Stroud 1979, p. 42.


\textsuperscript{46} Shear 1978b.


\textsuperscript{48} See especially Lewis’s note (1967), which demonstrates that an omission in this text can be attributed to an illegible word in the original.

\textsuperscript{49} For the date and significance of this text, see Ostwald 1986, pp. 31–42.

\textsuperscript{50} Meritt 1940, pp. 91–92. For a narrative of the development of the democracy in the period immediately following the Kleisthenic reforms, see Ostwald 1986, pp. 15–47. For other major texts from this period, see \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{3} 1–6 and Whitley 1997.
Meritt attempts to relate the absence of public inscriptions to the vicissitudes of the Athenian democracy during this period.\textsuperscript{51} According to the Aristotelian Constitution of Athens, the Athenian state and the democracy from the time of Kleisthenes down to 480 gradually grew strong. After the Persian War, however, the power of the democracy was preempted by the Areiopagos, which ruled Athens for some seventeen years, down to the time of the reforms of Ephialtes (\textit{Ath. Pol.} 23.1; cf. 25.1). Meritt suggests that the Areiopagos Council reacted against popular trends in favor of a more aristocratic kind of government; and that as part of its general disposition, it did not favor the monumental inscription of state decrees.

In 1940 there were absolutely no public inscriptions known from the period of the rule of the Areiopagos. Some years later, however, Meritt himself published an inscription that appears to have been decreed by the Areiopagos council during this period (\textit{IG^1} 243).\textsuperscript{52} It might yet be maintained that there is relatively little evidence from this period for public documents (but only relative to the 450s; the addition of this single inscription makes the production of state decrees during the period of Areiopagite ascendance entirely comparable to what precedes it). Whether this paucity is due to oligarchic hostility to public writing, or to accidents of preservation, or to other considerations, is debatable. Even granted that the relative poverty of inscriptions in this period is representative of some contemporary political policy, it is not clear what this policy might be, or how it might relate to democracy or oligarchy. Recent publications suggest that the powers of the Areiopagos were not as great and unrestrained in this period as the author of the \textit{Constitution of Athens} might have supposed, and that the reforms of Ephialtes were consequently not as radical as is sometimes presumed. There may have been greater continuities of policy and practice from the time of Kleisthenes through this period and down into the time of Perikles than Meritt supposed.\textsuperscript{53} The reasons for the relative absence of public inscriptions from the time of Kleisthenes down through the seventeen years of the rule of the Areiopagos, and the sudden increase in inscriptions in the 450s, apparently has little to do with democratic decline and resurgence.

From the 450s onward, progressively more documents are preserved, continuing into the mid-4th century. State documents in particular become more numerous.\textsuperscript{54} Meritt attributes this increase to the health of the democracy: “After 454 Athenian democracy was in full bloom and public documents of all kinds were numerous.”\textsuperscript{55} It is tempting to follow Meritt and to ascribe the increase in the number of preserved inscriptions at this time to the development of democratic institutions. This period represents the aftermath of the Ephialtic and Periklean reforms. Some would even claim that it is an overstatement to speak of Athenian “democracy” beginning with Kleisthenes, and that it is only in the 450s that democratic practices begin in Athens.\textsuperscript{56}

The causes for the elaboration in the quantity of writing at this time, however, are more complicated than this simple formulation. As every reader of Thucydides knows, the 450s were also a time of Athenian imperialism. During this period the Athenians were extending their control and influ-

\textsuperscript{51} Meritt 1940, p. 92.
\textsuperscript{52} Meritt 1967, pp. 72–84. See further the comments of Wallace (1989, pp. 80–81), as well as his general comments on the documentation for this period (pp. 77–83).
\textsuperscript{53} More recently the strength and dominance of the Areiopagos in this period have been minimized: Ostwald 1986, pp. 3–83.
\textsuperscript{54} I am glossing over the difficulty of dating some of these documents to the 450s, a problem that has lately become controversial again as the diagnostic value of the three-barred sigma is called into question. I side with those who argue against its strict use as a dating criterion: see Chambers et al. 1990; cf. Chambers’s response to criticism (1993). It takes little courage to agree in retrospect that Mattingly was right, and historical grounds must always take precedence over stylistic grounds in issues of dating. For Mattingly’s essays and a summary of the controversy, see Mattingly 1996. Consequently, there may be fewer inscriptions agreed to be from the 450s than there were some years ago. Even so, it remains true that more inscriptions are preserved from the 450s than theretofore.
\textsuperscript{55} Meritt 1940, p. 92.
\textsuperscript{56} Among the many who have made this argument, see Raaflaub 1996. For a summary of Raaflaub’s continuing statements on the subject, see Ober 1996, pp. 33–34.
ence in an unprecedented manner; simultaneously they were moving toward a less disguised control of their allies.⁵⁷ Meritt chooses the date of 454 as the watershed in the development of democratic writing, not because of the significance of this date for the internal democratic politics of the Athenian state, but because from this year onward the Tribute Lists, the yearly accounts of the money that Athens derived from its empire, were inscribed on the Acropolis. From an epigraphical perspective this decision is convenient: these lists are crucial to any account of epigraphy in the 5th century. They are firmly dated and, since the yearly accounts from 454/3 through 432/1 are inscribed sequentially on just two large stelai, they provide the benchmark for the character and development of the official script of the Athenian state in the mid-5th century.⁵⁸ From the perspective of democratic development, however, it is curious that Meritt should use these texts to mark the beginnings of “democratic writing.” It can certainly be argued that the Tribute Lists were inscribed in part to inform the citizenry of Athens of the financial affairs of the state. Like most public documents of the 450s, however, these texts are more concerned with foreign affairs than with internal issues of self-government. The meaning of the Tribute Lists and other comparable documents is therefore ambiguous: as Thucydides would point out, it is at least as arguable that such “ornaments of the city” serve the tyrannical ends of empire and domination as that they serve to inform the civic body; the rise of democracy is related to the rise of empire.⁵⁹ Many of the monumental state inscriptions of the mid-5th century B.C. should be understood as manifestations of both popular sentiment and imperial power.

It is no easier to prove Meritt’s suggestion that there is a correlation in the later 5th and 4th centuries between the health of the democracy and the number of inscriptions that the state produced. His argument is straightforward: if public writing is an explicitly democratic vehicle, then we should expect that in periods of popular sovereignty there will be many inscriptions, and in times of oligarchic or tyrannical usurpation there will be few, or at least fewer. Unfortunately there are few events against which this idea can be tested. There is some slight fluctuation in the number of preserved inscriptions during this period. The number declines somewhat in the last quarter of the 5th century, then drops steeply in the first quarter of the 4th. This decline is likely to be related to the political, social, military, and economic disturbances that occurred at the end of the Peloponnesian War.

The two famous oligarchic coups of the 5th century, which resulted in the governments of the Four Hundred (in 411) and the Thirty (in 404),⁶⁰ were both too short-lived to provide any evidence of a “typical” oligarchic policy toward public inscriptions and dispersal of information. It does appear, however, that in the wake of the expulsion of each of these oligarchic groups, the democracy emphasized the erection and display of inscriptions. Thus in the years following the conspiracy of the Four Hundred the Athenians attempted to codify and publish a code of laws; some ancient texts that were thought to exemplify the ancestral way of government, the πάτριος πολιτεία, were at this time reinscribed by the state.⁶¹ The measures enacted following the expulsion of the Thirty are a watershed. At

⁵⁸. The first stile includes fifteen lists, the second seven. It would be pointless to discuss the notorious problem of “the missing tribute list” here. Generally on the lists Meritt et al. 1939–1953 remains indispensable, though the texts of the lists published here have been replaced by those provided in IG I² 259–280. For a brief account of the tribute lists see Meiggs-Lewis, no. 39. There is also a good popular account by J. K. Davies in Hornblower and Greenstock 1984, pp. 58–99.
⁵⁹. See Thuc. 1.10, with Hedrick 1995. It is worth noting that at least one document from the mid-5th century relating to the tribute includes the famous formula (discussed at greater length below) “so that all may see”: IG I² 60, line 31. For further discussion of the connection between the publication of state documents and imperialism, see Finley 1985, pp. 27–46, esp. pp. 32–33, 40–44; and Schuller 1984. For further discussion of democracy and imperialism, see Finley 1978. For discussion of the connections between the ideology of empire and that of democracy, see Dougherty 1996.
⁶⁰. Neither lasted even a full year. For a general discussion of politics in the last decade of the 5th century, these two oligarchic coups, and their aftermaths, see Ostwald 1986, pp. 337–524.
⁶¹. See the Law Code of Draco, republished in 409 B.C. (IG I² 104), and the so-called Bouleutic Law (IG I² 105). For comments on the reerection of these inscriptions, see Meiggs-Lewis, no. 86.
this time the state moved decisively to collect and inscribe a corpus of laws through the institution of a board of νομοθέται, or "lawgivers." This period is also critical in the history of Attic epigraphy. In the archonship of Eukleides (403/2) the Athenians decided to replace the Attic script and orthography of their public decrees with a specifically Ionian standard of writing. Whether such measures are linked to a recent oligarchic suppression of information rather than to other considerations is unclear. If, for example, we imagine that the codification of laws was intended to curb the immoderate sovereignty of the demos, then the reforms following 411 and 404 might be seen as a concession by the democracy to oligarchic interests rather than as a reaction against them. The adoption of the Ionian alphabet for Athenian state decrees after 404 probably had as much or more to do with the repudiation of Athenian imperial ambitions as with democratic sentiment.\(^{63}\)

The Thirty destroyed certain texts and inscriptions of the democracy. Some inscriptions on the Areiopagos were removed (\textit{Ath. Pol.} 35.2). Some proxenies were revoked, and the decrees that manifested them obliterated.\(^{64}\) The tyrants may have erased certain of the laws inscribed on the Royal Stoa.\(^{65}\) In one case a decree honoring the Samians (Meiggs-Lewis, no. 94) was passed before the usurpation, in 405, but erected only after the restoration of the democracy in 403: this inscription either was not set up immediately, or if it was, it must have been destroyed by the Thirty, who surely would have revoked this decree, given the opportunity.\(^{66}\) It is also clear, however, that the Thirty erected inscriptions of their own (see especially Andoc. 1.77–79). Despite some acts of censorship it remains to be shown that the Thirty disapproved of public writing in general, rather than just certain decrees and actions of the democracy.

From the restoration of the democracy in 404 until the Battle of Chaeronea there are no disturbances against which to test the correlation of public inscriptions with democracy. The internal government of Athens is relatively stable and inscriptions of all kinds are consistently abundant. After the Battle of Chaeronea, Athens, along with the rest of Greece, lost much of its external autonomy. Henceforth, Athens was in fact, if not in name, a satellite of Macedon. This loss of autonomy, however, arguably did not affect the internal affairs of the state. The internal democratic forms of government continued without any noticeable disturbance.\(^{67}\)

A serious interruption in the continuity of the democratic forms of government began in 322, in the wake of the Lamian War.\(^{68}\) Convinced that the Athenians were unreliable subjects, the Macedonian Antipater settled a garrison in Athens to guarantee their loyalty. At the same time he required the Athenians to replace the old democracy, which had time and again proved untrustworthy, with a new form of government that was marked by a severely limited franchise (Plut. \textit{Phoc.} 28). According to one account, only 9,000 Athenians remained citizens after these mandated reforms (Diod. Sic. 18.18.4). This imposed oligarchic interlude lasted only as long as Antipater was alive. On his death in 318 the democracy was restored. At a meeting of the Assembly the Athenians deposed their magistrates, replacing them with democrats, and executed or exiled those who had participated in the restricted government (Diod. Sic. 18.65; Plut. \textit{Phoc.} 34–35).\(^{69}\)
The reinstated democracy did not last long. Within the year Kassander had taken the Peiraius, forcing the Athenians to come to terms with Macedon again. As part of the settlement he imposed on the Athenians, he required that they receive and support a Macedonian garrison and that they return to a form of government that limited citizenship more restrictively than had the democracy. Supreme authority was invested in one of Kassander's friends, a philosopher, Demetrios of Phaleron. Demetrios took power in Athens in 317. He would dominate the state for ten years, until 307. Plutarch described his regime as "aristocratic in name, but monarchic in fact" (Plut. Demetr. 10).70

Struggles among the diadochoi provided the occasion for the fall of Demetrios's regime. Opposing factions in Athens evidently looked hopefully to Kassander's rival Antigonos to remove Demetrios of Phaleron from his autocratic position. Antigonos's son, Demetrios Poliorcetes, fulfilled their hopes in 307, appearing at the Peiraius with a fleet of 250 ships. Demetrios of Phaleron fled and democracy was restored. The grateful Athenians voted to set up statues of their benefactors, the new founders of democracy in Athens, Antigonos and Demetrios Poliorcetes. The statues were mounted in a chariot near the statues of Harmodios and Aristogeiton. At the same time they added two new tribes to the old Kleisthenic ten, Demetrias and Antigonis. "So the common people, deprived of power in the Lamian War by Antipater, fifteen years afterwards unexpectedly recovered the constitution of their fathers" (Diod. Sic. 20.46).71

For Meritt, the fluctuations in the fortunes of the democracy after the Lamian War provide an important opportunity for testing the correlation between writing and democratic ideology. He points specifically to the contrast between "the almost complete lack of records from the regime of Demetrios of Phaleron (317–307 B.C.), and the abundance of documents from the years immediately following the restoration by Demetrios Poliorcetes."72 This observation is overstated, but essentially correct. Inscriptions were produced during the decade of Demetrios's domination of the state. These texts are formally no different from the documents that precede and follow them: the established democratic protocols of practice and official language are observed. Still, by the standards of the previous periods, few state inscriptions have survived from the time of Demetrios. In particular there are almost no decrees of the assembly in this period.73 Furthermore, no ephetic inscriptions are known, nor are any of the lists of Athenian councillors.74 There is also an increase in the quantity of state inscriptions after his fall, coincident with the restoration of the democracy. The content of these inscriptions is significant as well: democratic themes and rhetoric, and links with the glorious political past of the state are strikingly emphasized after the democratic restoration of 307 (some instances of these appeals to democratic tradition are discussed below, pp. 411–415).

It is tempting to imagine that the decline in the number of public texts erected is due to Demetrios's domination of the popular institutions of the democracy. On the other hand, it might plausibly be argued that the decrease in state inscriptions is more a manifestation of a new public economy and egalitarianism than it is evidence of antidemocratic furtiveness. Demetrios of Phaleron was responsible for sumptuary laws that curbed

71. For this democratic "revival" see Green 1990, pp. 48–51 with note 67; Habicht 1997, pp. 67–81; and Hedrick, forthcoming (a).
72. Meritt 1940, p. 93.
73. See the decrees in IG dated to 318/7–308/7: IG II* 448–454. As Tracy notes (1995, p. 36, note 2), many of these in fact do not belong to the period of Demetrios's rule. Cf. the new inscriptions from Acharnai: ArchEph 131 (1992 [1993]), pp. 179–193.
the excessive exhibitions of the wealthy, particularly their mortuary displays. These sumptuary laws might be seen as measures enforcing democratic egalitarianism; they also might be understood as a way of distancing the Athenians from their imperialist past. Demetrios himself claimed that he had not destroyed democracy, but corrected it (Strab. 9.1.20). It should also be kept in mind that the democracy restored in 307 was concerned to eliminate the material traces of Demetrios’s rule, and destroyed virtually all statues erected of him in Athens. The inscriptions erected under his auspices may have suffered as well.75 In sum, it remains to be seen whether Demetrios was concerned to control public access to information, or whether the paucity of preserved inscriptions is a by-product of other contemporary measures and priorities and of later hostility.

To find a parallel in the distribution of Athenian inscriptions for the fortunes of the democracy during this complicated period would be too much to expect. After the first quarter of the 4th century, the number of known texts rises steeply. The count of inscriptions peaks in the third and fourth quarters of the century, then drops precipitously. The decline in the Athenian production of inscriptions then evidently does not date to the time of Chaireoneia,76 or even to the time of Demetrios of Phaleron, but to the beginning of the 3rd century, when Athens is finally and irrevocably subsumed by the larger Hellenistic world of the diadochoi.

It is usual to end the story of the Athenian democracy at the close of the 4th century, either in 322 with Antipater’s suppression of the democracy, or in 307 with the restoration (if one wants a happy ending).77 Literary sources for the internal affairs of the Athenian state become steadily scantier as the political importance of Athens wanes during the Hellenistic period. Many inscriptions survive, however, and from them it can be seen that the institutions of the democracy do not perish at the end of the 4th century, but remain vital for several more centuries.78 Magistrates and the Boule continued to serve, and the Ekklesia continued to meet. The term “democracy” and the traditional language of the democratic culture remained important in the ideology of the community. The meaning and political uses of democratic language, however, change. As Geoffrey de Ste. Croix (following James Oliver and others) remarks, “during the third and second centuries B.C. demokratia increasingly came to signify no more than an internally self-governing republic.” By the Roman period the word democracy is used to describe not only the senatorial republic, but the principate itself.79 After the Hellenistic period, “democracy” was “universally recognized as the proper constitution of a Greek city,”80 just as in the modern world the term has come to be the uncontested synonym for legitimate political authority. The very popularity of the term, however, threatens its meaning: to the extent that the term can be applied to any political regime, it means nothing.81 Regimes that an Athenian of the 5th or 4th century would have characterized as “oligarchic” took upon themselves the name of “democracy.” Thus, for example, as Christian Habicht has shown, a certain regime that controlled Athens in the early 3rd century (probably from 294 until 287) called itself a democracy; the regime that succeeded it in 287, however, condemned it as an oligarchy.82

Given the ambiguities of nomenclature, it is not surprising that schol-

76. Schwenk (1985, p. v), says that from this period there are over 350 inscriptions, ninety-one of which are decrees.
78. I know of no extensive, up-to-date studies devoted to the “afterlife” of Greek democracies in the Hellenistic and Roman periods: see Jones 1966, pp. 157–191; de Ste. Croix 1981, pp. 300–326, 518–537. For Athens in the Hellenistic period we now have Habicht 1997. For Athens in the Roman period the three old volumes by Graindor (1927, 1931, 1934) continue to be indispensable, with Follet 1976 for the later period; see further the essays cited in Oliver 1983.
81. Cf., e.g., Dahl 1989, p. 2.
82. Habicht 1979, pp. 22–33. See now his general narrative of this complicated period, Habicht 1997, pp. 67–97 and 124–149.
In 296 B.C. there is a considerable decline in the number of inscriptions in Hellenistic times. By the standards of most other Greek regions, however, this repertoire of inscriptions is impressively large. There is reason to believe that the production of inscriptions continued to be linked to the ideology of democracy; it was also linked to the democratic traditions of the city. The "epigraphical habit," like democracy itself, was practiced in Athens in part because of an allegiance to the illustrious civic tradition of the city.

The government sponsored by Poliorketes in 307 may have been a democracy in more than name alone;86 it certainly had democratic pretensions. In either event, this "democracy" was not a long-lived government. In the year of the Battle of Ipsos, 301, the Athenians repudiated their alliance with Demetrios. New politicians and policies came to prominence in connection with this realignment of external alliances, and this change initiated a period of typically violent conflict between factions of oligarchs and democrats.86

The domestic political history of Athens in the early 3rd century is notoriously complicated.87 The discovery of an inscription has thrown significant light on the issues and factions that contended during this period.88 A simplified summary of these events suffices for the purposes of this essay: Athenian independence from Poliorketes did not last long. In 296 he besieged Athens; by 295 he was in possession of the city. As part of his settlement, he established a garrison in the Peiraeus, and sponsored a new government, which seems to have initially had a rather democratic flavor;89 it quickly became more conservative, and in 292 Demetrios forced the Athenians to receive back into the city all exiled oligarchs.90 It is remarkable (and typical of Hellenistic Athens) that, in spite of these fluctuations, there were no noticeable changes in the management of the state.

83. Cf., e.g., MacKendrick 1969.
84. For the importance of this "civic tradition" see above all the work of Oliver, e.g., Oliver 1983. The continuity of democracy as a municipal form of government is one of the major themes of Habicht's writing on Hellenistic Athens: Habicht 1997. For criticism of the construction of political conflict in Hellenistic Athens in terms of oligarchs and democrats, see Badian 1976, pp. 105–106.
87. Ferguson 1911, p. 95, is often cited: "Seven times the government changed hands, and on as many occasions the constitution was in some degree altered . . . Four times the institutions were modified and a new government established, through the violent intervention of a foreign prince. Three uprisings were bloodily suppressed, and the city sustained four blockades, all with equal heroism, but twice unsuccessfully."
89. Habicht 1979, pp. 3–21.
Whatever the realities of power, the formalities of government remained those of the traditional democracy.91

The internal affairs of Athens were closely related to the fortunes of Demetrios Poliorcetes at this time. In 287, just after Demetrios had been attacked by Pyrrhos and Lysimachos, the Athenians revolted again. They took this occasion to repudiate the sponsorship of the king and establish the democracy once more. Demetrios responded by besieging the city. Circumstances here favored the Athenians: faced with more serious threats from the other great Hellenistic powers, Demetrios made peace, acknowledging the autonomy of the democratic government of Athens, but keeping his garrison in the Peiraiæus.92 The democratic government established by this agreement in 287 survived for more than 20 years, until the time of the Chremonidean War. Then, around 268, inspired by promised support from Ptolemy and a desire to recover the Peiraiæus, the Athenians declared war on Demetrios’s son, Antigonus Gonatas. Ptolemy was ultimately unable to keep his promises, and Athens was again reduced by the Macedonians. Macedonian officials were put in charge of the city; the Athenians were not even allowed to appoint magistrates.93

The Macedonians continued to rule Athens for many years. There were occasional relaxations and reimpositions of restrictions regarding internal self-government, but for the most part the old institutions continued, now with a governor imposed by the Macedonian overlords. Certainly the state continued to call itself a democracy. Finally, in 229, Athens (with the help of a subsidy from Aratos and the Achaean League) was able to pay the Macedonians to remove their garrison from the Peiraiæus. Once more the state was free to manage its internal affairs as it saw fit. In external policy the Athenians preserved a careful and prudent neutrality, in keeping with the city’s unimportance and vulnerability. As a result they managed to remain autonomous and internally stable for many years.94

Athens played a minor role in the squabbles of Rome and Philip V of Macedon. Wisely enough (in the long run, in any case) the Athenians supported Rome. Thus in 200 B.C. they declared war on Philip. Although they had firm expectations that Rome would support them, they were disappointed. Philip defeated them easily, but even so they did not lose their autonomy.95 Nevertheless, Athens remained loyal to Rome and henceforth maintained a strong anti-Macedonian policy. Later, when Rome went to war with Perseus the Athenians continued their support. This time they were rewarded. In 167/6 Rome gave Athens control of the commercial center of Delos, as a way of thanking the city and damaging the commercial interests of Rhodes.96 Possession of Delos brought with it an unaccustomed prosperity to Hellenistic Athens; this prosperity left its mark on public affairs. An increasingly visible mercantile elite came to dominate Athens. The old democratic institutions did not disappear, but with the significant approval of Rome, their relative importance was rebalanced: notably the power of the Areiopagos was increased.97

The production of inscriptions during the Hellenistic period is considerably lower than in the 4th century.98 From the beginning of the 3rd century I find no remarkable increases or declines in the number of preserved inscriptions. There are some isolated inscriptions that attest a con-
continuing commitment to the ideals of the old democracy. In some cases the erection of such texts can be associated with periods of democratic revival (a few of these will be considered below). It is impossible, however, to demonstrate any correlation between the fortunes of the democracy and public writing in Athens during this period. There may, however, be some evidence from Delos that confirms at least a continuing ethic of writing in Athens, in contrast to other states. Delos had been, from the 3rd century on, an important commercial center before Athens took possession of it. Clearly the privileged status of tax immunity that the Roman senate granted Delos when they passed it to Athens in 167/6 increased its prosperity immeasurably. At the same time there is a massive increase in the epigraphical use of writing on Delos. Whether this increase is due to greater prosperity or the new Athenian population and their peculiar habits of writing is debatable. In this case, at least, there can be no question of a democratic motivation for writing. The Athenian colonists on Delos were governed by a chief magistrate, drawn from one of the leading local families: there is no justification for describing such an arrangement as in any sense, ancient or modern, "democratic."100

Even in the 1st century B.C., democratic sentiment remained an important factor in the conduct of public affairs in Athens. At the beginning of the century, from about 91 to 88 B.C., Athens suffered a crisis in its internal governance. Normal procedures of state management were suspended. There was a brief period of anarchy and then tyranny. The reasons for these events are unclear, but it is certain that the ideology of democracy played a part in them.101 In 88 B.C. Mithridates was able to lure Athens from its alliance with Rome in part by promising to restore the democracy (Ath. 5.212b). The results of this ill-advised revolt are well known: in 87 Sulla attacked Athens, inflicting considerable material damage on the city. He then revised the Athenian constitution, replacing the old structure of political power with one that seemed more acceptable to him. This "Sullan constitution" was a watershed—the most important constitutional event of the post-Classical era. It remained in service, with some minor modifications, for the remainder of the Roman period.103

Scholars often speak of the Sullan constitution as an absolute break, the end of freedom in Hellenistic Athens. In certain respects, however, it is a consequence of earlier developments. Since the mid-2nd century B.C. the management of the Athenian state had been developing from a popular to an oligarchic system of government. Power was progressively removed from the surviving popular bodies and vested in the hands of elected magistrates and especially the Areiopagos. The Sullan constitution formalized these arrangements. There are continuities through these years. Inscriptions continued to be erected. The state continued to mint coinage. The ideal of democracy remained very much alive in public language and art. There were, however, many significant changes as well. Before the Sullan reforms prytany inscriptions had included a decree of the demos praising the prytaneis; these vanished from the inscriptions after 86 B.C.105 The same development occurred in ephoric inscriptions. After Sulla, decrees in these documents were passed by the Boule alone.106 In fact, as

99. On the epigraphical documentation from Delos in general, see Vial 1984, pp. 1–11.
100. On Athenian governance of Delos, see the classic study by Roussel 1987.
102. Habicht 1997, pp. 297–314, esp. 300–303. Cf. Mosse 1962, pp. 148–149; and Badian 1976. Two 1st-century B.C. texts may perhaps be associated with this democratic resurgence: see IG II 1062 (discussed below) and the text published in Geagan 1971. The latter inscription is enormously important, but its date is uncertain. Is it evidence for a "post-Sullan" oligarchy or for the abandonment of such an oligarchy? It may also date to the period before the Sullan reforms. See Oliver 1983, pp. 52–55, and Habicht 1997, p. 321.
103. For the Sullan constitution, the standard publication is Geagan 1967. See now Habicht 1997, pp. 315–337.
Habicht notes, “for several decades after 86 we have not a single extant Assembly decree, and a very few council decrees, apart from routine measures honoring prytaneis and their treasurers. Not one of these surviving decrees deals with political matters.”

Despite all of the interruptions and interference, the Athenian democratic tradition was still far from dead. It is possible that democratic forms were restored by Caesar for a brief period beginning in 48 B.C. There was almost certainly at least one short-lived democratic revival in Athens during the period of the Roman civil wars. Late in the reign of Augustus, there was probably another Athenian revolt, perhaps prompted in some respects by the city’s long tradition of democracy. During the Roman period, some rather undemocratic limitations on citizenship, defined by ability to participate in the Boule and Areiopagos, were imposed; the power of the law courts passed to these elite governing bodies; civic power was concentrated largely in the hands of the Areiopagos. Nevertheless, as late as the time of Hadrian, such old institutions as the Ekklesia survived and retained certain of their prerogatives. The inscribed letter of Marcus Aurelius discovered in Athens illustrates the continuing importance of the Athenian democratic tradition.

The number of inscriptions erected in Athens remains relatively constant in the Roman period, down to the time of Hadrian. Production is comparable to that of the Hellenistic period, and there are no precipitous increases or declines. Very few ephebic and prytany texts can be assigned to the period from Sulla down to the almost reign of Domitian. Consequently, even if we were better informed about the status of democratic forms in Athens during these centuries, it would be difficult to attempt to correlate use of public writing with changes in the climate of democratic sentiment. The clearest instance of a change in the production of public inscriptions, the increase at the beginning the 2nd century A.C., is not necessarily evidence for a democratic use of writing. It is far more likely to be a reflection of the Hadrianic building programs.

After the time of Hadrian there is a marked decline in the number of surviving Athenian inscriptions. This decline is paralleled by a fall in epigraphical production throughout the Roman empire. In this case the causes of the change may well be sought outside the fortunes of the local political situation. The end of the ancient Athenian epigraphical culture may be dated to the middle of the 3rd century A.C. Gravestones and Christian inscriptions are found later, but the civic epigraphic tradition dies at this time. For example, prytany inscriptions and ephebic texts cease to be inscribed. The cause of this break is certainly the Herulian invasion of A.D. 267, an event that had a devastating impact on all aspects of Athenian life.

The production of certain kinds of inscriptions, especially public inscriptions such as state decrees, is clearly sensitive to political change. This is not to say that antidemocratic regimes were necessarily hostile to the display of public inscriptions, or that the democracy uniformly supported it. We know, for instance, that the Athenian democracy itself “censored” some public writing by destroying certain old, out-of-date inscriptions.
When an oligarchy or a tyrant, usurping the legitimate power of the people, erected inscriptions (as they are known to have done), these texts would not long have survived a restoration of the democracy. The democracy destroyed public writing after the usurpation of the Thirty, as is proved by the “decree of Patrokleides,” quoted by Andokides (1.77–79). It did so again in 307, after the fall of Demetrios of Phaleron.  

Meritt’s attempt to explain the general Athenian epigraphical habit as a consequence of the Athenian democracy is less persuasive, chiefly because the environment of writing is not only political. As I suggested at the beginning of this article, the causes for the unparalleled abundance of epigraphical writing in Athens are surely complex: empire, economy, society, urbanization, demography, and more must be considered, though democratic ideology doubtless played its part. In the end, however, simply to count inscriptions and correlate variations with changes of political regime does not advance the argument very far. The sample of inscriptions is too haphazard, and the possible explanations for variations in the count too numerous.

DEMOCRATIC FORMULAE OF DISCLOSURE

The volume of the ancient Athenian production of inscriptions, suggestive though it may be, does not of itself explain the political significance of that production. An alternative approach to the problem would be to look for explicit statements in ancient Athenian texts linking democratic ideology and the practice of writing. Such statements are rare in the literary sources. Certainly the Athenian democracy was based on a political culture of debate and discussion, and this culture presumes that information is freely available. The most famous statement of this ideal is provided by the funeral oration recorded in Thucydides’ second book. The speaker, Pericles, claims that Athens (unlike other states) “does not regard discussion as an obstacle to action, but as a necessary preliminary to any wise action” (Thuc. 2.40). Statements such as this, while they demonstrate the undeniable importance of the free oral transmission of information in democratic Athens, do not provide a link between the democracy and the transmission of written information.

There are, however, numerous statements that explicitly address the political reasons for the writing of inscriptions. These statements—formulae of disclosure—were expressed in a highly formulaic manner and appended to certain Athenian public inscriptions. Within the full repertoire of occurrences of the formulae of disclosure there are relatively few statements that attest what I would regard as an explicitly and unambiguously “democratic” motivation: seldom is there any noticeable concern for the education of citizens or the dissemination of public information. Even so, in some instances it is clear that a democratic ideology does underpin the practice of erecting public inscriptions; democratic sentiments are not utterly foreign to the Athenian ideology of writing.

The formulae of disclosure have not been thoroughly collected and

118. For general discussions of the eradication of the record of oligarchic usurpation, see Andrews 1976; Boegehold 1990. For erasure or destruction of inscriptions, see Thomas 1989, pp. 51–59, and Hedrick, forthcoming (c).


120. For this culture see Ober 1989.
discussed recently. The standard account is found in the second volume of Wilhelm Larfeld’s *Handbuch der griechischen Epigraphik*—an essay so old that references to it are in the first edition of the *Inscriptiones Graecae*. This catalogue is so antiquated that it was not serviceable as a basis for my own investigations. It was therefore necessary to compile a new working catalogue (Appendix II), which I constructed from the database of the PHI–6 disk, updated with *SEG*. The parameters of the searches by which I compiled the lists will be apparent from the formulae that are included in my discussion. I have not intended to rewrite Larfeld’s account or even to provide a complete and definitive list of these formulae here (much as this project needs to be done). For the most part I have restricted my search to epigraphically attested instances of the formulae; I have not examined literary texts in any systematic way. Rather my discussion and citations are subordinated to a more specific goal: to isolate those specific instances of formulae that may best serve as a guide to the perception of inscriptions by the ancient Athenian audience, and especially those that indicate some political motivation for writing.

The formulae of disclosure are characteristically Athenian. In the following discussion I cite as many instances as I have found: it is remarkable how seldom the formulae occur in the documents of states other than Athens. Furthermore, the formulae are found in Athenian inscriptions of all periods, from the 5th century B.C. down to the 2nd century A.D. Despite the political vicissitudes of the state, continuities of language and institution persist. Regimes that we regard as oligarchical insist on their own democratic character (see above, pp. 403–404). Many institutions of the democracy remain in service, and the civic community always looked to 5th- and 4th-century Athens as its model. So, throughout the Hellenistic and Roman periods, formulae of disclosure are generated within a documentable tradition, which in many cases can be traced back without a break at least to the 4th century. The sentiments expressed in documents of these later periods, even in periods of oligarchic domination, preserve and reflect traditional ideals of the political significance of writing.

Formulae of disclosure are also found on the inscriptions of smaller, “parapolitical” groups such as phratries, *thiasoi*, and *orogeones*. Such texts frequently imitate the forms and language of state documents, even though the membership of these groups is not necessarily restricted to Athenian citizens. Here the ideals of the state regarding the political uses of writing can be seen percolating through society. In Athens even non-Athenians are influenced by the local, political “epigraphical habit.”

As a rule, the formulae of disclosure are juxtaposed with the general arrangements for the erection of the inscription. In many cases it is clear that the formula directly qualifies the decision to display the inscription: “Let the inscription be set up so that all may know.” In other instances, the position of the formula is more ambiguous. It may appear to qualify the whole complex of activities associated with the erection of the inscription, or with the action that a decree enjoins or commands. For instance, it might be ordered that an honorand “be crowned, so that the demos may appear to return a favor in a worthy manner.”

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The context in which disclosure is ordered provides an important check on its motivation. Formulae of disclosure occur in a variety of kinds of document. The overwhelming majority of formulae of disclosure are found in the context of honorary decrees, or personal grants of privileges (citizenship, exemption from taxation, or the like). Out of the more than 350 instances of formulae collected here, no fewer than 328 occur in the context of honorific inscriptions.\(^{122}\) Thus, for example, in the case of a grant of privilege, one reason for erecting an inscription “so that all may know” might be to provide evidence of that grant. In such a context the motivation for disclosure would not be to inform the citizenry for democratic ends, but to provide a concrete guarantee to the honorand of the state’s intention that he enjoy certain rights and privileges, so that if the rights are ever contested the individual can point to the inscription in reply. Another motivation for the disclosure of an honorific inscription would be to prompt future benefactions. The honorand must be thanked as publicly as possible “so that everyone may know that the Athenians know how to return a favor” and “so that he (or others) will continue to be of service to the Athenians in the future.” The audience at which a given inscription is aimed also provides a clue to the motivation for disclosure. In some cases an inscription is intended for the citizen body as a whole; in others a text is erected so that those citizens who may be holding office at any given time may be encouraged to do their jobs well.

In most cases, the formulae of disclosure are used in a context of competitive display, patronage, and gratitude. The inscribed monument is intended as an incentive (ἐφάμιλλον) for others. This motivation is found at all times in honorific documents from states throughout the Graeco-Roman world. In and of itself it is by no means particularly democratic. This is not to say that in an appropriate context this kind of motivation cannot be pressed into the service of a democratic ideology. An anecdote told by Plutarch may provide a useful illustration. Before the Battle of Salamis Aristides slipped through the Persian lines to visit with Themistokles. “We ought to compete (στασίαξε) at all times,” he said, “and especially at this one concerning which of us shall do greater good for our country” (Hdt. 8.79). Just so, competition can be turned to ends consistent with democratic ideals; the monument may be regarded as an incentive for all to compete in the service of the Athenian state, whether as magistrates or benefactors or defenders.\(^{123}\)

In modern times, the quintessentially democratic motivation for public writing is to inform. Information is expected to be available to citizens so that they can hold their government accountable, and use that information in making their political decisions. This ideal is seldom unambiguously attested in Attic epigraphy. Nevertheless, it is possible to point to a few cases in which the goal of disclosure is to inform the citizen body. It is tempting to argue from these instances for a general ethic of public writing in ancient Athens. As Meritt remarks, even a few such instances “imply a sense of public responsibility which must also have been felt in the publication of many documents where these express reasons are not formally stated.”\(^{124}\)

124. Meritt 1940, p. 90.
In the consideration of the link between the practice of erecting inscriptions and democratic ideology, the most interesting formula is also the rarest. In certain cases it is claimed that a text is erected “so that anyone who desires can see it” (σκοπεῖν τῷ βουλομένῳ). The language used in the formula, though austere, is significant. The reference to “the one who wishes,” ὁ βουλομένους, is important because it alludes to the attested ideals of the democracy. The ideal of citizenship that this word presumes, however, is considerably older. The conception of the citizen as a voluntary participant in the political activities of the state (i.e., as ὁ βουλομένους) goes back in all likelihood at least to the time of Solon.¹²⁵ In the Classical period this presumption is one of the elementary underpinnings of democratic government.¹²⁶ The verb used in the formula, σκοπεῖν, is also interesting. In Athenian epigraphy the word is rare, occurring only as a part of this formula. The verb derives from a root meaning “to see.”¹²⁷ It has normally been presumed that in this context it must be understood as roughly the equivalent of “to read.” Lately, however, its meaning in the context of this formula has become controversial. Rosalind Thomas has now argued that ancient inscriptions had at least as much of a monumental as a textual character, and that consequently the verb here should be given at least some of its more literal force: for a democratic Athenian, an inscription was as much a thing to be seen as a thing to be read.¹²⁸ The common and unambiguous word for “reading” in inscriptions (and other Classical Greek texts), for instance, is ἀναγγέλλω. Why should a more specialized verb for “to read” be used here in the formula? If σκοπεῖν does mean “to read,” what might its connotations be?¹²⁹ The usage of the verb in this formula clearly suggests that information, that is, content of the text, is to be communicated. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to presume too quickly that the verb must consequently mean “to read.” I have rendered it here, without prejudice, as “to see.” I expect to return to this formula elsewhere.

The formula σκοπεῖν τῷ βουλομένῳ occurs in only five Athenian inscriptions, all (with one interesting exception) from the 5th century B.C. In fact the chronological range of its usage can be narrowed down even further: the four examples from the 5th century appear to be clustered in the 430s and 420s. There is only one apparent exception: the “Coinage Decree” (IG I 1453 = Meiggs-Lewis, no. 45), which has traditionally been dated to 450–446. As has recently been shown, however, the stylistic criterion (i.e., the dating of the three-barred sigma) that was used to assign this inscription to the mid-5th century is faulty. On historical grounds, the text probably belongs to the late 420s, a date consistent with the other uses of the formula.¹³⁰

Unlike most other formulae of disclosure, which are generally preserved in honorific decrees, the proviso “that anyone who desires can see it” occurs chiefly in the context of financial documents, and more particularly, in financial documents of the Athenian empire. The “Coinage Decree” concerns the minting of money in Athens and the empire. Another of the texts in which the formula occurs (IG I 60) deals with the tribute of the Athenian empire. A third (IG I 140) is too fragmentary for confident

¹²⁷. LSJ takes it as “to examine” or even (without warrant) as “to read.” See Chantraine 1977, IV; and Frisk 1972, II, s.v., both of whom translate it as “to see” or by extension “to examine.”
¹²⁸. Thomas (1989, pp. 51 and 61) could make this point even more forcefully than she does. Some scholars, such as Immerwahr (1992), are unconvinced; I note, however, that Immerwahr’s point rests entirely on assertion: he cites no texts to support his contention. For the verbs normally used in Greek for “to read,” see Chantraine 1950.
identification. The last (IG I² 133) is concerned with a naval tax levied in the name of the Athenian demos and of Castor and Pollux.

One occurrence of the formula is so unusual that it requires special and more elaborate comment. It appears much later than the others, and in the context of a document concerned with laws rather than finances. The inscription (IG I² 487) that reports the formula is a decree in honor of a certain Euchares, son of Euarchos of Konthyle, and dates to 304/3 B.C., that is, to the period of the democracy restored by Demetrios Poliorketes. This regime had reconstituted the old democratic board of nomothetai in order to reestablish the democratic laws of the city. Euchares, as a member of this board, had distinguished himself by “taking care of the inscription of the laws, so that all the laws passed in the archonship of Pherekles [i.e., 304/3 B.C.] be set out for anyone who wishes to see, and no one be ignorant of the city’s laws” ([ἔπει]||μελήθη δὲ καὶ τῆς [ἀνάγραφη]||σφής τὸν νόμων ὅπως σὺ ἐκτε[θώσι] τὰ[ν]τες οἱ ν[έν]δομοι[μο]βετημένοι [ἐπι] Φερε[κλέους] ἴ ἄρχοντος σκοπεῖν [τῷ]: βοουλομένω||), καὶ μὴ δὲ εἰς ἄγνο|||) εἰν τοὺς τῆς [πό]||||||ν[V]ομο||| (lines 4–10). The inscription then provides a justification for its own erection, in terms that are much more usual for the late 4th century (for discussion of this formula, see pp. 416–420 below): “so that the Boule may appear to return appropriate thanks for benefits rendered” (ὅπως [ἀν] ὅν ἂ βουλή [φα]|||νται ἄξιαν χάρι||] | ἐκάστω|| | | | [σ] ἄ[πο]|||διδοῦ||| τῶν περίφατομε|||). [τό]|||κει ἀγαθεῖ δεδόχθαι |] βουλεύ|| [έ]|||και Eὐχάρι||] Ἐινάρχου Κονθ[υ]|||] α||]| | | | στερεονόος αὐτόν κ.τ.λ.) (lines 10–15).

The justification for setting the laws out “for all to see” is spelled out here more clearly than anywhere else: so that no one should be ignorant of the laws of the city. This unparalleled assertion is of capital importance for the interpretation of theformula, and for the general interpretation of the political significance of written texts in ancient Athens. Clearly some texts at least were intended to inform the citizenry at large of the political norms and regulations of the city, and so have what a modern would regard as a peculiarly democratic force. The phrase σκοπεῖν τῷ βουλομένῳ is clearly associated in this instance with this sentiment.

Even so, there are more difficulties and peculiarities in the use of the formula in this instance than may be immediately obvious. To begin with, the formula is not simply appended to the inscription on which it is inscribed, as is customary; rather it is cited within the text of the inscription. Euchares is honored for setting out a text “for all to see.” The decree honoring him, however, is not; rather it is erected “so that the Boule may appear to repay a benefaction.” The juxtaposition of the two formulae raises questions for which there are no obvious answers. Is there some difference in the force of these formulae? Their juxtaposition would seem to imply that this is the case. Does one have a more “democratic” force than the other?

Another difficulty is raised by the isolation of the formula here from its other attestation. All other known Athenian uses of the phrase date to more than a century before this inscription was erected. So we may wonder whether the use of the formula in this instance is archaizing, and to
what extent its use here reflects its early connotations. The political context of the inscription is one that would foster such archaisms. The democracy restored in 307 after almost fifteen years of tyranny and oligarchy was self-consciously concerned with returning to Athens' democratic past. As seen below, other inscriptions from this period are also infected with this political nostalgia. The issue of continuity between texts of the mid-5th century and this late-4th-century decree is also puzzling: why did the phrase vanish from political inscriptions in the late 5th and early 4th centuries? Is it possible that it is especially used for documents other than those that are inscribed on stone?\textsuperscript{132}

The occurrence of the formula in two literary authors may help to explain its use in this late-4th-century context. Andokides, quoting a decree from the end of the 5th century, cites the phrase (1.83 and 84), and some years later in the mid-4th century, Demosthenes uses the formula as well (24.18). Significantly, the *nomothetai* are mentioned in both contexts. The verb ἔκπτθημι also figures prominently in each passage: Andokides speaks of "setting out [the laws] on boards before the eponymous heroes for anyone who desires to see" (ἐν σαῦν ἐκπτθηντων πρὸς τοὺς ἐπωνύμους σκοπεῖν τῷ βουλομένῳ); Demosthenes likewise says that the laws, once written, are to be "set out before the eponymous heroes" (ἐκθεῖναι πρόσθεν τῶν ἐπωνύμων γράφαντα σκοπεῖν τῷ βουλομένῳ). The verb ἔκπτθημι occurs in other contexts in connection with the *nomothetai* (IG II\textsuperscript{2} 244, line 8), or is used to describe the use of wooden boards as a medium to display writing (IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1237, face B, lines 123 and 124).\textsuperscript{133} The two non-Athenian uses of the formula, Syll.\textsuperscript{2} 1004, lines 40–43 (Oropos) and IG XII 7, 515, line 89 (Aigiale on Ἀμοργος), also use the formula of information posted on wooden boards.\textsuperscript{134}

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\textbf{OΠΟΣ ΑΝ ΕΙΔΩΣΙ} & & \\
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\caption{The occurrences of this formula are of two major types. One is an impersonal form: "so that it may be possible to know" (ὅτως ἃν ήτι [or ἡτι] εἶδένω). This form is very rare, with only two attestations, one from the late 5th century, the other from the end of the 4th. In the more usual, personal formulation, it is claimed that an inscription is erected "so that they (or, very rarely, he) may know": ὅτως ἃν εἰδοσι (or εἰδήτ). I find forty-eight instances of this "personal" form, ranging in date from the 4th to the 1st centuries B.C. An early approximation of the formula is found in a phratry document, IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1237, face B, lines 116–125, dating to 396/5. Otherwise the first uses of the formula date to around 353/2 (IG II\textsuperscript{2} 183, lines 5–9, and 196, lines 11–14) and henceforth the sentiment is common. I find twenty-seven occurrences in the 4th century B.C., and seventeen in the 3rd. After the 3rd century, use of the formula declines. There are only three instances from the 2nd century B.C. and one from the 1st. The evidence for the impersonal form, though very small, is tantalizing. The first example of the formula is found in an inscription recording the regulations for the sanctuary of Kodrus, Neleus, and Basile (IG I\textsuperscript{2} 84, line 26), dating to 418/7. The inscription is said to be erected ὅτως ἃν ἔτι εἰδέναι τῷ [i] βολομένῳ, "so that it may be possible for anyone who  
\end{table}
wishes to know." The later of the pair is a decree relating to the construction of the city walls, IG II 463, dating to 307/6. This inscription is erected "so that it may be possible for any Athenian who desires to know and to examine the matters [i.e., finances] pertaining to the walls," [δέπως ἐξήγη τοῖς βουλομένωσι· Ἀθηναῖοι] κατοικιών εἰδέναι καὶ ἔξετάζειν τὰ[α] περὶ τὰ [εἴθης] (lines 30–31).

As in the formula σχοπεῖν τῷ βουλομένῳ, discussed above, the citizen who is to have access to the inscription is described in terms of democratic voluntarism, as "one who wishes," ὁ βουλομένῳ. The later instance of the formula is especially important for the elaboration that it provides. The inscription is made available so that citizens can examine what has been done with reference to the city walls. The use of the verb ἔξετάζειν is interesting. It is a peculiarly Athenian term. It commonly occurs in inventories, and, as we see here, refers to the financial accountability of the Athenian state to its citizens. Here then, we have an expression of a sentiment that has become a virtual commonplace in modern democratic thought: the affairs of the state are made public because the state is accountable to its citizens. The activities of the state are therefore open to scrutiny.

The rarity of the formula and the dates of the two attestations pose interesting problems. To begin with, it is curious that there are only two cases of the impersonal formula, when the personal variation is so common. Does the impersonal type have different connotations than the personal? It should be noted that the earliest instance of this impersonal type antedates the earliest personal formulation of the sentiment by some twenty years. There is also the problem of the later example of the impersonal form: it is contemporary with many attestations of the more common, personal formulation, but it is separated from the only other instance of the impersonal form by more than a century. In fact, it dates to a period of democratic revival, to the time of the restoration of the democracy by Demetrios Poliorketes. There is a parallel: as we have seen, all but one instance of the formula σχοπεῖν τῷ βουλομένῳ date to the 5th century B.C. The one exception occurs during this same period of democratic revival, in 304/3 B.C. It appears, then, that the later instance of the impersonal form is another product of an archaizing, democratic nostalgia that was current in Athens during the last decade of the 4th century.

Both examples of the impersonal type of the formula occur in inscriptions that are concerned with building and property. By contrast, the instances of the more common form occur in the context of honorific decrees. These decrees are erected by the Athenian state and its various official and "parapolitical" subgroupings: soldiers, ephebes, demes, phratries, orgeones, and thiassoi, for example. The formula recorded in IG II 222, lines 11–15, is typical: "so that all may know that the Athenian people return great favors to those who benefit them" [(δέπως άγνους απαντείς οἵ δήμος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἀποδίδων καρτας [μήγη]άλλος τοῖς ἐυεργετοῦσιν εἰσαυτό[ν καὶ] διαμένουσιν ἐπὶ τῆς εὐνοίας[ς το]ύ δήμου]. The subject of the verb "to know" varies according to context. Most are limited in some way: e.g., "all who march with the Athenians" (IG II 276, lines 15–18); "all who desire to show good will to the Athenians" (IG II 303, lines 10–18).
nians” (*IG* II 196, lines 11–14); “those who may be allotted office in the future” (*Agora* XVI 112, lines 12–20) or simply “the others” (*IG* II 391, lines 10–12). In honorific contexts, even when the subject is explicitly indicated to be “all,” it is reasonable to understand “all (who may wish to be benefactors of the Athenians).”

It remains to consider the relationship between the personal type of the formula and democratic sentiment. Unfortunately the verb used in the formula, *eidos*ναι, is vague and flexible, and admits a wide range of connotations. In many (if not most) instances, those who should come to “know” by means of the inscription are a rather limited group—potential donors—and what they are expected to come to “know” is only that the Athenian people are generous and scrupulous in returning favors. While this is a communication of knowledge, there is nothing especially democratic about the knowledge itself or the motivation for communicating it. Even more elaborate confirmation of this connotation “to know” is provided if we extend our search to include participial forms of *eidos*ναι in various other formulae. I find no fewer than 119 occurrences of the verb in the contexts of the various formulae of disclosure. So, for example, one inscription (*IG* II 300, lines 2–5) is erected “so that in the future all may become benefactors, in the knowledge that the people return favors to those who benefit it” (ὅπως ἂν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἀπαντησέως φιλοτιμώνται εἰδοθήσεται ὁ δήμος ἱεράς ἀποδιδόσιν τοῖς ἐκατοσ τω ἄνω ἀνθρωπομενοῖς). Another inscription (*IG* II 786, lines 15–17) is said to be erected “so that it may be an incentive for all to become benefactors, knowing that the people will return the appropriate favor, as is their ancestral custom” (ὅπως ἂν ὅπως ἐγέρθησαν εἰδοθήσονται τοῖς ἐξάντοις ἀνθρώποις, καθάπερ αὐτῶι τὰ πάρμου ἑστιν, ἀποτελεί τὴν προσήκουσαν ἐκάστοις ἵ χάριν).

Nevertheless, in certain contexts it is clear that the formula has an approximately democratic force, in the sense that the document is intended to pass on information that will make participation possible among a certain group. So, in a decree of the tribe Erechtheis, an individual is honored because he passed a decree that made it possible for all members of the tribe to know the extent of their corporate property, and so that the appropriate magistrates could supervise the use of these holdings: ἔγραψε δὲ καὶ φήσωμα ὅπως ἂν Ἠρεχθείδαις εἰδόθαι σοι ἔπαινον 

κτῆματα καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληται ἴ οἱ αὐτοὶ καθιστάμενοι κατ’ ἐναυσών 

βαδίζουσιν ἐπὶ τὰ κτῆματα διὸ τοῦ ἐναυσῶν ἐπισκόπηται τὰ 

τὰ χωρὰ ἐγεργεῖται κατὰ τὰς συνήκς καὶ τοὺς ὅρους εἰ 

ἐφευρέκουσιν κατὰ τὰ αὐτά, κ.τ.λ. (*IG* II 1165, lines 17–22). The least ambiguous example of all is provided by a phratry document from the beginning of the 4th century (*IG* II 1237, face B, lines 116–125): “so that the phratry members may know who is going to be introduced, let their patronym, and their demotic and the name of their mother’s father and his deme be registered with the phratriarch in the first year, or that in which the sacrifice of the *koureion* is brought; and let the phratriarch write up the names of those registered and display them in the place that the Dekeleians frequent, and let the priest write them up on a whitewashed board and display them in the sanctuary of Leto” (ὅπως δ’ ἂν εἰδοθῶν οἱ
I φράτερες τούς μέλλοντας εἰσάγεσθαι, ἀπολυγόφεσθαι τῶν πρώτων ἔτει ἡ ὁ ὁ τὸ κοὐρσην ὁ γεῖ τὸ ὄνομα πατρόθεν καὶ τοῦ δῆμου καὶ τῆς μυτρὸς πατρόθεν καὶ τοῦ δήμου πρῶς τόν Ι φρατρίαρχον, τόν δὲ φαραοιάρχον ἀπογραψάμενων ἀναγράφαντα ἐκ τιθέναι ὧν ἄν Δεξιαλέξεις προσφορτόσι, ἑκατ[έναι δὲ καὶ τόν ἱερά] ἀναγράφάντα ἐν σανιθ[ως λευκωι ἐν τώι ἱερ][ώς ὧς Λητοὺς]. Here names of candidates for admission to the organization are inscribed and posted, so that those who will vote on the names can inform themselves in advance and vote intelligently. Again, this passage presumes a political significance of writing that has come to be a truism in modern democratic states: texts are published to inform citizens, so that they can participate effectively and wisely in democratic processes.

ΟΠΟΣ ΑΝ ΦΑΙΝΗΤΑΙ, ΦΑΝΕΡΟΝ ΗΙ

Easily the most common of the formulae of disclosure are those framed in terms of some verbal or adjectival form of φαίνομαι. Including all variants, I identify 157 occurrences. I divide these roughly into three groups: the “verbal form” (e.g., ὃπος ἂν φαίνηται); the “impersonal adjectival form” (ὅπως ἂν φανερὸν ἂ); and the “personal adjectival form” (e.g., ὃπος ἂν φανεροὶ γίγνονται). The use of the verb φαίνομαι gives a passive flavor to the formula, by the standards of the formulae we have considered to this point. Rather than dictating the activity of those who are to consume the inscription (e.g., “so that they may see” or “know,” etc.), the focus here is on the inscription itself, or on those who have produced it: “so that they will appear,” or “so that the text will appear.”

I find 122 instances of the verbal variant of the formula. There are a few (by my count, four) instances that occur toward the end of the 4th century. The earliest of these is a fragment of a grant of citizenship (IG II² 438, line 6), which appears to date to sometime in the last third of the century. The other three examples of the formula all date to the very end of the century, that is, to the period of democratic revival sponsored by Demetrius Poliorcetes, between 305/4 and 302/1 (IG II² 477, line 19; 487, lines 10–12; 501, lines 3–4). The bulk of the examples of the verbal variant are found in the 3rd through 1st centuries B.C.: I count 32 instances from the 3rd century, 47 from the 2nd, and 36 from the 1st. There is an abrupt drop in imperial times: there are only three examples from the 1st century A.C.

The subject of the verbal form varies according to context. Most commonly it is the people, or the demos. In other cases it is an organ of the government, particularly the Boule, that is the subject. Often too, Boule and demos are coupled as subjects of the verb. Other groups as well may serve as the subject of the clause, although it is noteworthy how seldom the formula is used in decrees other than those of the state. Most notably, the formula is used in inscriptions of orgeones and ephebes.

No fewer than 118 occurrences of this formula occur in the context of honorific inscriptions (including grants of citizenship). What is to appear from the erection of the inscription is regularly specified by the addition of a participle agreeing with the subject of φαίνομαι. As expected, the grati-
tude of the sponsoring agency for a service rendered is commonly emphasized in such texts, and so it is especially common to describe the erection of the text in terms of a repayment, or compensation, for a favor. The most common way of expressing this sentiment is by means of the participial form of ἀποδίδωμι, “to give back” (e.g., ἀποδεδόντες φαίνονται). This combination occurs at least eighteen times. The earliest instances occur at the end of the 4th century (IG II² 487, lines 10–12, and 501, lines 3–4). I find twelve attestations from the 3rd century B.C.; the remaining four date to the 2nd century. Other verbs that are commonly used to express the notion of compensation include ἀποδέχομαι and ἀπονέμω. There are five occurrences of the formula ἀποδεχόμενοι φαίνονται: all but one are found in ephebic documents of the late 1st century B.C. (IG II² 1039, lines 58–59; 1040+, lines 32–33; 1041, lines 25–26; 1043, line 51); the exception is found in a document of 106/5 B.C. (cited in Joseph. AJ 14.154, line 5). There are eleven instances of the formula ἀπονέμοντες φαίνονται; all but one, a decree of some oρεομε (IG II² 1337, lines 9–11), are found in bouleutic texts. All instances are approximately contemporary, occurring in the late 2nd or early 1st centuries B.C.

Another reason commonly alleged for the erection of the inscription is “so that they [e.g., the demos] may appear to do honor” to the benefactor. The participle most commonly used to express this idea is τιμῶντες, which occurs more than fifty times. Most of the examples come from the 2nd (twenty-one instances) and 1st (twenty-two instances) centuries B.C. I find ten occurrences from the 3rd century B.C.; the earliest of these date to the beginning of the century (IG II² 672, lines 10–11; 682, lines 64–66; 693, lines 2–4; 721, lines 2–5). On two occasions the middle of the verb φιλοτιμῶ, is used, the same verb that is often used to describe the actions of the honorand toward the sponsoring agency (IG II² 653, lines 29–32; 1236, lines 11–13). A more common formula (twelve instances), which also expresses the idea of “doing honor,” employs a participle of the verb ποιοῦμαι. In all cases the object of the participle is πρόνοιαν (e.g., ὅπως ἄν οὖν φαίνονται π[λεῖστ[ην] ἑαυτὰ ἀειδωλικά τῆς ἑορτῆς: IG II² 1328, lines 35–37). This formula is employed chiefly, but not exclusively, in the context of bouleutic or ephebic documents. The earliest attestation of the formula by far is provided by a 3rd-century B.C. bouleutic decree (IG II² 698, lines 15–19), which dates to about 289/8. No other examples are known before the 2nd century, when there are four cases. Most occurrences of the formula (seven), however, date to the 1st century B.C. Finally, the idea of honoring or valuing can be brought across with the participle ἀξιοῦντες, which is used once (IG II² 1011, lines 43–45).

Another group of verbs clusters around the significant idea that the inscription is erected in order to commemorate an honorand or a benefaction. In five cases the perfect participle of μυνήσκω is used to express this notion: that is, μενυμένοι φαίνονται (Agora XVI 224, lines 25–27; 239, lines 7–9; IG II² 835, lines 15–18; 1308, lines 16–17; 1326, lines 23–27). All of these date to the late 3rd or early 2nd century B.C. A related form occurs in two bouleutic texts from the 2nd century B.C. (IG II² 956, lines 22–24; 958, lines 18–21). Here it is claimed that the inscription is erected “so that they may appear to commemorate” a benefaction or “so that they

137. The formula is restored in IG II² 1040, 1041, and 1043 on the basis of 1039. The restorations are reasonably secure.
may appear to keep the benefaction in mind” (μημονεύοντες φαίνονται). The same idea is occasionally expressed using the participles διαφυλάττων (two examples) or διατηρῶν (three examples), “to guard” or “to observe,” or “to preserve,” in the sense of “to keep in mind.” For example, an inscription might be erected “so that the Boule and demos may appear to watch over its debts for its benefactors” (ὅπως ἄν οὖν ἢ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ δήμος φαινόνται διαφυλάττων [τοῖς εὐεργέταις] τὰς χάριτας: IG II² 677, lines 7–8; cf. IG II² 1134, frs. c–e, lines 75–76). Again, the motivation might be stated to be “so that the people may always appear to observe the honors granted to its benefactors and their descendants” (ὅπως ἄν οὖν καὶ ὁ δήμος ὁ[ε]ὶ πάσον τοῖς εὐε]ργέταις καὶ τοῖς ἐκχύνοντες αὐτῶν φαίνονταί] διατηρῶν τὰς δεδομένας [τιμάς]: IG II² 716, lines 6–8). The sentiment is expressed more abstractly and generally in an inscription from the late 2nd century B.C., which is said to be erected “so that the Boule and demos may appear not only to preserve the ancestral customs but to fortify the sacrifices and honors in a good and holy manner, so that they may also obtain from the gods worthy favors in return” (ὅπως οὖν ἢ τε βουλὴ καὶ ὁ δήμος ὁ φαινόνται ό [μόνον διστηρώντες τὰ πάτρια, ἄλλα καὶ προσεπτ[αο]])<εκ>τε> κ τάς τε θυσίας καὶ τάς τιμάς καλῶς καὶ εὐσεβῶς, ὦν καὶ πάρα τῶν θεό[ν] κ] τήσωνται τὰς καταξίας χάριτας: SEG XXI 469, fr. c, lines 17–20). In the third case (Agora XVI 335, lines 64–65) the prefix δια- is dropped from the participle (τηροῦντες φαίνονταί).

An interesting, but unusual, reason for having an inscription erected is so that the sponsoring agency “may appear to obey the law of the city” (πεθαρμοῦτες τῶν τῆς πόλεως νόµοι φαίνονται: IG II² 1283, lines 9–13). The phrase “obey the law” is commonly used in ephebic inscriptions, and it more often describes those who are honored by an inscription (e.g., IG II² 1011, lines 22–23: “so that the people may appear to honor those who obey the laws”) than the motivation for erecting the inscription. In either case, this sentiment returns us to consideration of expressly political motives for the use of writing. Here, the inscription is imagined as a kind of affirmation of the laws of the state. While this sentiment is not commonly associated with the democratic ideal of writing in the modern world, it may provide a clue to some of the democratic connotations of inscriptions in ancient Athens.

The impersonal variant of this formula occurs far less frequently than the verbal form: I find only twelve occurrences. One of these is unparalleled, using the verb ποιω: ὅπως ἄν φανερὸν ποιη (IG II² 1318, lines 9–13, dating perhaps to the end of the 3rd century B.C.). The others are homogeneous: ὅπως ἄν φανερὸν ἢ (ορ γήγιται, γένηται) ἄπασιν (or πᾶσι). A variety of sponsoring agencies are attested using this formula: the state, a tbiaos, a garrison. Without exception the formula is directed to “all”; that is, when the impersonal form is used, it is invariably intended to be consumed by all. The earliest of these dates to 321/18 (IG II² 392, lines 1–3). The next earliest, IG II² 505, lines 41–43, dates to the end of the century, 302/1, and four of the other occurrences are contemporary with it, dating to the first quarter of the 3rd century. Three more instances occur in the middle or late 3rd century B.C. Two texts date to the end of the
2nd or beginning of the 1st century B.C. (*IG II* 1028, lines 93–96; 1037, lines 12–13). The only inscription later than this century is much later; it dates to the time of Hadrian (*IG II* 1088, frs. c–d, lines 45–46).

Virtually all of the instances of the impersonal variant of the formula occur in honorific contexts, and as might be expected, what “appears” from the erection of the inscription is the willingness of the sponsoring agency to reciprocate a good turn. The force of the impersonal construction is defined by indirect statements or, more rarely, by imperatives (direct or indirect) describing the honor to be rendered (*IG II* 1273, lines 18–21; 1318, lines 9–13). In practically every case, the inscription is erected to make it clear that “the demos returns a favor” or “knows how (ἐπίσταμαι) to return a favor.” In two instances an inscription is erected “to make it clear that (a group) knows how to honor a benefactor” (*IG II* 1300, lines 5–7; *Agora* XVI 181, lines 19–23). In one case, however, dating to the middle of the 3rd century, an additional motivation is spelled out. The inscription is intended to have a memorial character: “so that there should be a memorial of the gift and it should be apparent to all that the Athenian people know how to repay favors to their benefactors” (ὁπως ἄν μινήμη τῆς δωρεᾶς γένηται καὶ σαλαμόν ἄπασαι[ν ὥστε ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων ἐπιτάσσεται χάριτα[ε ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς ἄφεργοντο[ο]ν ἑαυτῶν κ.τ.λ.: *IG II* 805, lines 5–9).

I find only twenty-four occurrences of the “personal adjectival” variant of the formula. The life of this variant of the formula is contemporary with the occurrences of the “impersonal adjectival” form. I count three instances from the 4th century B.C., nine from the 3rd, eleven from the 2nd, and one from the 1st century B.C. Easily the earliest use is in *IG II* 1629 (face A front, col. a, lines 201–204), which dates to 325/4 B.C. As might have been predicted, the formula occurs regularly in an honorific context, where the motivation for the erection of the inscription consequently is to repay a kindness or debt owed. The subject of the formula may be the agency that had the inscription erected (e.g., the demos or the Boule or a *thiasos*), or it may be an abstract quality of the sponsoring agency, which is responsible for the erection of the text, for instance, its φιλοτιμία or εὐνοία, or εὐδοκεῖα.

As usual, the most common motivation alleged by this formula for the erection of an inscription is to show that the sponsoring agency returns benefactions in a worthy manner. In one interesting but heavily restored case, however, a grant of citizenship from the early 2nd century (188/7 B.C.), the inscription is erected so that what the city has given him should endure apparent: [Ἰνα δὲ καὶ φανερὰ ύπάρχῃ τὰ ἐφήγησαι]μενα αὐτῶι ἡ [φιλάνθρωπα ὑπὸ τοῦ δῆμου *IG II* 893, frs. b–c, lines 26–27]. Here, the motivation is evidently less to show that the demos knows how to return a favor (and so to prompt more) than to provide evidence of the benefits that the city has conferred. Presumably, the inscription may serve as a guarantee, in case the privileges of citizenship should be contested.

The “personal adjectival form” may also announce that the inscription is intended to commemorate a person or deed. An Athenian inscription in honor of Antiochos dating to 175/4, found at Pergamum, provides an interesting instance of this motive (*OGIS* 248, lines 22–27): the inscription
is erected “so that the demos may appear to be first in the return of a favor, and may appear to honor those who are spontaneous benefactors of themselves and their friends, and may appear to lead noble actions into eternal memory, now just as before” (ὅπως ἂν οὕ[υ] | ὁ δήμος ἐγ χάριτος ἀποδώσει φανερῶς πρωτεύων | καὶ τοὺς ἐμετόν καὶ τοὺς φίλους εὐεργετοῦντας | ἄπαρασκήνως φανερῶς ἐπὶ τιμῶν καὶ τὰ καλὰ τῶ[υ] | ἔχων εἰς ἄδειον μνήμην ἀνάγων καὶ νῦν καθάπετα | καὶ πρότερον).

The adjective φανερῶς may also be used to refer to the dissemination of the content of a written text. In one case, an inscription of the early 3rd century A.C. (IG II² 1078, lines 36–38), provision is made “that this proposal be exposed [literally, become apparent] to the Areiopagos and the Boule of the Five Hundred and to the hierophant and to the genos of the Eumolpidai” (γενέσθαι δὲ τὴν γνώμην ταύτην φα[νερ]ῶς καὶ τῷ ἐξ ἀρειπίου πάγον βουλή καὶ τῷ βουλήσ τῶν | Φ[υ] καὶ τῷ ἑρμοφάντη καὶ τῶι γένει τῶν Εὐ[μο]πιδῶν).

ΟΙΩΣ ΑΝ ΕΦΑΜΙΛΛΟΝ ΗΙ

I find forty-six instances of this formula. There is one early instance that dates to the 330s (IG II² 330, lines 36–37). Another pair date to the last years of the 4th century (IG II² 558, lines 11–17; Agora XVI 120, lines 4–7). The bulk of the attestations, some twenty-nine occurrences, however, date to the 3rd century. Another thirteen instances can be placed in the 2nd century. A lone inscription attests the formula in the 1st century b.c. (IG II² 1045, lines 2–4).

Inscriptions in which this formula is used are intended to provoke a competition of benefactors. The inscription is to be set up as an “incentive,” an ἐφαμίλλον, which literally means something like “a thing to be contended for.” As might be expected, the formula occurs regularly in honorific inscriptions. When this formula is used, the audience for the inscription is normally conceived as composed of those who will potentially benefit the Athenian state in the future. In some cases it is hoped that the inscription will inspire all to compete on behalf of the Athenian state. In other instances the “target audience is described more specifically as those who are favorably disposed (φιλοτιμούμενοι), or, even more commonly, as potential future officeholders. It is hoped that these will be inspired to similar generosity or responsible administration. Thus, in an example from the mid-2nd century b.c. (IG II² 1329, lines 19–22), the inscription is erected “so that it may be an incentive for those who may be favorably disposed, knowing that they will receive appropriate thanks for their benefactions” (καὶ οὖν ἡ ἐφαμίλλον ἡ τοῖς ἀξιότεροις οὖν ἀν ἐφιλοτιμήσωσιν).

As I pointed out at the beginning of the discussion of the formulae of disclosure, the traditionally hierarchical values of competition and patronage can be turned to suit the ideology of democracy. Rather than imagining competition and benefaction as undertaken for personal prestige, they can be imagined as subordinated to the common interests of the state. Two instances, both from the period of the democracy restored by
Demetrios Poliorketes, illustrate how the values of competition can be made to serve democratic values. The first is a grant of citizenship, dating to about 303/2. The inscription is erected “so that it may be an incentive to all to compete unhesitatingly on behalf of the policy of the kings and the freedom of the Greeks” ([ὅπως δ’ ἄν ἐφάμιλλον ἦν πάλινι] συναγωγής έσπειράντως τῇ τέ τῶν] βασιλείων προαρέσει]. IG II² 558, lines 11–14). A second inscription, which dates to about the same time (303/2–301/0), expresses the same sentiment. It is erected “so that it may be an incentive to all to compete on behalf of the demos of the Athenians and the salvation of the other Greeks” ([ὅπως ἄν ἐφάμιλλον ἦν καὶ] πᾶσιν ἀνήγαγον ἐπάνω τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἁθηναίων καὶ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων σωτηρίας]. Agora XVI 120, lines 4–7).

ΟΠΟΣ ΤΗΡΗΧΗ ΥΠΟΜΝΗΜΑ

I find thirty-six examples of this formula. The two earliest of these date to the end of the 4th century B.C. (Agera XVI 123, lines 21–23; IG II² 570, lines 10–11), that is, again, to the period of the democracy restored by Demetrios Poliorketes. There are then eight instances of the formula from the 3rd century, twenty-three from the 2nd, and two from the 1st century B.C.

One of the important qualities of the monument is its endurance. The fact that the object lasts is precisely what makes it possible to serve as a reminder: words and deeds may be ephemeral, memory unreliable; but as long as the monument stands it will recall to mind what is gone. Endurance is emphasized in this formula. Sometimes it is claimed that the inscription should be an eternal monument; other times it is suggested that the monument will last “for the rest of time” (e.g., IG II² 1224, frs. a–c, lines 4–5; 1326, lines 47–48; 1534, face B, frs. a–k, line 157; SEG XXVIII 60, lines 104–105; OGIS 248, lines 53–54 [cf. lines 22–27]). This quality of the monument is emphasized by the verb that is usually used in the formula: ὑπάρχει, which has overtones of physical being and endurance. So, for instance, an inscription is erected “so that there may be an enduring monument of the gift given him by the demos” ([ὅπως δ’ ἄν οὖν ὑπάρχει τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἐνδομένης διώκεται ὑπάρχει αὐτῶι]. IG II² 570, lines 10–11); or again, “so that there may be an enduring monument for him of his goodwill toward the demos” ([ὅπως δ’ ἄν καὶ ὑπάρχει αὐτῶι περὶ τῆς πράξει τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου εὐνοίας]. IG II² 908, lines 17–18). The more innocuous verb “to be” is used in the formula relatively rarely (SEG XXV 155, lines 38–40; ASAtene 3 (1941–1942) p. 83, no. 5, lines 3–4; Agora XVI 123, lines 21–23; IG II² 653, lines 50–52; 706, lines 5–6).

In context, the inscription can be intended as a reminder (ὑπόμνησις) of the good deed that the benefactor rendered the demos. So, for example, in IG II² 677, lines 18–19 (an inscription of the mid-3rd century B.C.), it is claimed that the inscription is erected “so that there may be an enduring monument for him of his good disposition ([ὅπως δ’ ἄν οὖν αὐτῶι ὑπόμνησις ὑπάρχει τῆς φιλο[τιμίας]). An inscription can also be intended to commemorate the demos’s repayment of a benefaction, as in IG
II 570, lines 10–11. In some instances, the inscription is intended to commemorate both the favor of the benefactor and the response by the demos. In *IG* II² 653, lines 50–52 (dating to 289/8 B.C.), for instance, the inscription is intended to be “a reminder of his kindliness and of the privileges granted him in addition to those that he already has” (ὅπως ἄν δὲ καὶ ὑπόμνημα ἦ τῆς οἰκείας τοῦ δικαίου τῶν προστιθεμένων αὐτῷ τοῖς τούτοις υπαρχοῦσις).

Inssofar as the inscription is intended to commemorate privileges that the demos grants a benefactor, it may be intended to be used as evidence for the existence of these privileges, so that if the privileges are contested, or if there is some other reason to verify the past benefaction, it will be possible to refer to the inscription. Just such a use of one of these “reminders” is attested in a fascinating inscription of the late 2nd century B.C. (*IG* II² 978+, fr. a, lines 11–15): a certain Athenian “exposed to the Boule the benefactions provided the demos by Epameinon [the Keian], and he read out the existing monument for him to the Boule” (ἐμφανίζει τεῖ βουλή έπείτα γεγονένει εἰς ἐφεργεσίας εἰς τῶν δημοῦ ὑπὸ τῆς Ἐπαμείνονος τοῦ Κείου καὶ τῷ γεγονός αὐτῶι τῆς δοτικῆς ἀνέγγειλεν τεῖ βουλή[λέι]).

The monument can also be intended for the benefit of the general citizenry and future, potential benefactors. Like other inscriptions, it can be intended to provoke competition among those who are well disposed toward Athens. So *SEG* XXV 155, lines 38–40, an honorific inscription of 236/5, is erected “so that it may be a reminder for those desiring to be benefactors of the community of Rhamnous and of those inhabiting the garrison” (Ἰνα ἐν ὑπόμνημα τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐφεργετεῖν τὸ κοινὸν Ῥαμνουσίων καὶ τῶν οἰκιστῶν τῷ φρουρήσιον).

ΟΠΟΣ ΑΝ ΦΙΛΟΤΙΜΩΝΤΑΙ

I find forty instances of this formula. The bulk of these (twenty-nine occurrences) date to the 4th century. Most are concentrated in the mid-4th century, that is, in the 330s; the rest at the end of the century, after 307 and the restoration of the democracy by Demetrios Poliorketes. I find only nine occurrences from the 3rd, many of these from the beginning of the century. The latest instances date to the 2nd century. Here I find two occurrences (*IG* II² 999, lines 1–4; 1019, lines 34–36). The formula is chiefly used in state documents, though there are cases in which it occurs in the inscriptions of the “parapolitical” groups.

The most typical expression of the formula involves coupling it with some form of the verb to know, οἶδα. Most commonly (i.e., in no fewer than twenty-five cases) the verb is cast in the form of a participle. A deme inscription of the mid-4th century provides an intact and typical expression of the formula: “so that the others may contend in the knowledge that they will receive thanks in return from the demesmen” (Ἰνα καί οἶλοι ἀλλοι φιλοτιμώνται εἰδοτες ὅτι χάριτας ἀπολήψονται παρά τῶν δημοτῶν: *IG* II² 1197, lines 15–18). Rarely a subjunctive form, εἰδῶσις, is used, and φιλοτιμώνται is coordinated with it or subordinated to it. For instance, an inscription might be said to be intended “so that the others,
who, being kindly disposed, contend on behalf of the Athenian people, 
may know that the demos will honor them each according to their
arousal of desire and participation in democratic processes, and it is hoped that others will 
be inspired to participate in a similar way. Thus, for example, in one case, an 
inscription dating to the time of the restoration of the democracy by
Demetrius Poliorketes, a magistrate of the state is honored: “so that all others 
may contend by administrating in accordance with the laws and 
desire to do everything on behalf of the democracy, knowing that they will 
receive in return from the demos thanks appropriate to their benefactions” 
(δότως ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀπαντήσεις] φιλοτιμώνται ἄρχειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους 
καὶ υπὲρ τῆς δημοκρατίας έθέλωσι πάντα πρὶν ἔστων εἰδότες ὅτι] χάριτας ἀπολήψωνται παρά τοὺς δήμους ἀξίας τῶν ἐξηγετημάτων: IG ΠΙI 509, lines 7–11). Another inscription, dating to 
about the same time, also alludes to participation in democratic processes 
as an activity that should be inspired by the erection of the honorific in-
scription: “so that all who are allotted to the Boule may know that the 
demos honors those who participate in the Boule and in the assembly 
justly and in accordance with the laws, and so that as many as possible will 
contend in proposing and enacting the best laws for the Boule and the 
people, knowing that they will receive in return thanks” (δότως ἂν 
εἴδοται γιὰ πάντες οἱ ἄν λιγάχ&iota;ναι δουλεύειν ὃ πτι τιμᾶτι ὁ δήμος 
toüς δι[καίως καὶ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους πολειτουργίας ἐν τῇ 
βουλῇ καὶ ἐν τῶι δήμωι καὶ ὃ ἐξείλετος νωμοφωνάντων διά ἑν] τῇ 
γράφειν τα ἐν τῇ ἀριστο τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τού δήμωι εἰδότες ὅτι 
χάλαρτας ἀπολήψωνται: Agora XVI 112, lines 12–20 (307/6–302/1).

ΟΠΟΣ ΑΝ ΔΕΙΚΝΥΟΝΤΑΙ

The infinitive middle of ἔνδεικνυμι occurs several times with φιλοτιμῶνται.
It is therefore appropriate to consider here briefly a fairly rare variant of 
the formulae of disclosure. In one indisputable instance, the verb
ἔνδεικνυμι is used as the main verb of the formula in an inscription from 
the end of the 4th century: “so that all those who pass their time in 
the king’s company may demonstrate their goodwill toward the people,
knowing that they will be honored by the people appropriately for their good 
will” (δότως ἂν οἱ δῆμοι ἀπαντήσεις παρά τοῖς βασιλεὺ ἄπαν[τ]ες ἐνδεικνύωνται 
tὸν εὐνοιαν τοὺς δῆμοι εἰδότες ὅτι τιμήθησονται

138. On the erection of honorific inscriptions and other monuments as 
oligarchic devices, i.e., their use as a 
way of keeping the desires of the lower 
classes at bay, see Arist. Pol. 1321a31– 
42; and de Ste. Croix 1981, pp. 305– 
306.
The use of this formula is confined to the 2nd and 1st centuries B.C. I find sixteen instances of the formula, even from the 2nd and five from the 1st century B.C. The earliest example by far is *Agora* XVI 261, lines 38–41, which dates to 196/5. The latest instances date to the 30s B.C. (IG II' 1043, lines 58–60; 1343, lines 40–43). The “verbal” variant of the formula (ὅπως ἄν ὃν ἔχειον) is far less common than the “adjectival” variant (ὅπως ἄν ὃν γύνωντας ἔχειον): I find two occurrences only of this latter (Joseph. *AJ* 14.154, line 5, and *Agora* XVI 292, lines 14–16), and both of these seem dubious to me (see Appendix I). This formula often occurs in combination with other formulae, particularly those using some form of φανερώς or φανερός: nine out of the fifteen instances exhibit the juxtaposition of this pair of formulae. As is common in the formulae of disclosure, this sentiment appears to be motivated by a desire to provoke competition among potential benefactors. A typical, if late, example is provided by IG II' 1343, lines 40–43 (dating to 37/6 B.C.). This inscription was erected “so that, with these things accomplished, many would become eager to increase the [revenue?], seeing that the founder had received the appropriate good will and memorial” (ὅνα τούτων | συντελουμένων πολλά | ἔχειον | γύνωντας | τὴν | τὴν | σύνοδον ἐπαύξειν, βλέποντες τὸν υπάσαντα τυγχάνοντα τῆς προποίουσας ἐνοίας ταί καὶ μνήμης).

### An Unusual Case

In addition to the more common formulae discussed so far, certain unusual variants occur. I have not collected all of these. One particular instance, however, calls for special attention. IG II' 1062, dating to the 1st century B.C., includes a statement of disclosure not formulaic enough to be included in any of the schemes and groups of formulae that I have devised. Nevertheless, its appeal to the ideals of democracy, in conjunction with a justification of the publication of the inscription itself, makes it important enough to single out for special citation. The language of the inscription appears to be in part literary (i.e., not formulaic); it has an archaizing flavor. Restorations should consequently be regarded with even more caution than usual. The text has been set up “so that the decree not become evanescent through the expanse of time” (ὅλα δὲ τόθιδε τὸ ψηφίσμα μὴ ἔξειτηλον διὰ χρόνου πλήθος γένηται: lines 4–5). The word ἔξειτηλον, if correctly restored (as I think it is), is particularly rare, occurring most notably in the proem to Herodotus. The text then proceeds to provide for the publication of the inscription: “let the secretary of the prytany have the decree inscribed on a marble stele and have it set up on the Acropolis and in the law courts, and let the treasurer of the stratiotic fund apportion to him the expense that is incurred” (ἀναγράφαι | δὲ | τόθε τὸ ψηφίσμα ἐν στήλῃ λιθῶν τὸν γραμματέα | τὸν κατὰ πρωτοείαν καὶ στήσαι | ἐν ἄκροπόλει καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστήριοις: lines 5–6).

139. For general remarks on the formula, see Robert 1960, p. 98, note 1.
140. To pursue these, consult Larfeld 1902, II, pp. 688–690, 720, 763–767.
141. For the historical context, see the bibliography cited above, note 102.
The text then returns to the justification for its publication: “so that when these things are accomplished nothing contrary to the laws or inconvenient may occur, but the democratic and customary [system of government?] may survive for the Athenians” (6α τούτων συντελουμένων μήτε παράνοια|μον μήτε ἀσύνορον γενή|ται μηδέν, ἀλλὰ διαμένη Ἀθη|ναίοις τὸ δημοκρατικόν καὶ σ[υ]ν[θ]ισμένον σύστη|μα?). lines 9–11).

CONCLUSION

It appears clear that the erection of public inscriptions was motivated at least in part by democratic ideology in Athens in the Classical period and later. This motivation is not as apparent in the sheer quantity of inscriptions that were set up, suggestive though the numbers may be. There is nothing intrinsically “democratic” about writing. Anything can be loaded with significance, and made to serve as a symbol of democracy, or of some other political order. Writing can be used for a variety of political ends. If public inscriptions in ancient Athens have a democratic character and meaning, that meaning is not inherent, but historically produced: their significance is contingent and contextual.

More persuasive and informative are the explicit statements of the formulae of disclosure. Here certain characteristics of public inscriptions are singled out and assigned democratic values. I have isolated several of these themes above. Inscriptions might indeed be erected to inform citizens, so that they could participate effectively in politics. They might also be intended as confirmations of the laws, so that citizens might be encouraged to observe and honor the laws in their day-to-day behavior. Inscriptions might also be intended as incentives, honors that would produce competition among those who wished to be of service to the democracy.

Some scholars now argue that the democratic pretensions of Athenian public writing were false, and that the use and display of writing surreptitiously served as an exclusionary device to reinforce a lurking hierarchy of class and education. This is not the place to discuss the relationship between Athenian democratic practice and ideology. On general grounds, however, writing publicly displayed by the state must be regarded as a manifestation of that state’s ideology. The Athenians, who claimed to be democratic, erected many inscriptions. Ipro facto the inscriptions should be regarded as democratic. In this article I hope that I have elaborated some of the specific connotations of these public texts.142

In reviewing the evidence for the various formulae of disclosure, I have encountered particular restorations that seem problematic or wrong. I would like to signal some of the more significant of these here, suggesting new supplements whenever possible.

1. Wilhelm has suggested a problematic restoration in two documents, both dating to the 2nd century B.C., both honoring certain Hellenistic kings. The relatively unusual phrase ἐν χάριτος ἀποδόσει is recognizable in all cases. With this phrase Wilhelm restored μὴ λειτομένος. The first is IG II² 983, fr. a, lines 6–9, a 2nd-century B.C. inscription in honor of Ptolemy.143 As the text is now restored, we read [ὅπως ἦ αὐτῷ ἀποδόσεις]δομένη τιμή πάσι τοῖς ἀφικυνομένοις ἐξ Ἁγίωπτου καταφαλαγῆς ὑπάρχῃ καὶ ὁ δήμος φαίνεται μὴ λειτομένος ἐν χάριτι ἀποδόσει. Wilhelm made the same restoration at IG II² 966, lines 12–14: ἔνα oὐν καὶ ὁ δήμος τῶν Ἀθηναίων φαίνεται καταφαλαγῆς χάριτι ταίς ἀπονέμου τῆς εἰς ἅμως ἐξ [ἑαυτὸν φιλοτιμία για κἀ ἢ λειτομένος ἐν χάριτι] ἀποδόσει.144

Wilhelm produced a number of parallels for this restoration, all from inscriptions outside of Attica.145 He does not include, however, the best parallel. The only fully preserved attestation of the formula comes from an Attic inscription in honor of Antiochos, found at Pergamum: OGIS 248, lines 22–27. There it is claimed that the inscription is erected “so that the demos may appear to be second to none in the return of a favor” (ὅπως ἐν ὀδ[ή]ν | ὁ δήμος ἐν χάριτος ἀποδόσει φαίνεται πρωτεύων[ν], lines 20–21). Like the other two inscriptions, this text belongs to the 2nd century B.C. and was erected to honor a Hellenistic king. Consequently it seems to me that the restoration πρωτεύων should be preferred to μὴ λειτομένος in the fragmentary occurrences of the formula. The fact that this participle is four letters shorter than the current restoration is not excessively troubling; both inscriptions are nonstoichedon, and in both the lines are around forty letters in length. The loss of four letters does not make unrealistic demands on the physical organization of the text.

One other text, IG II² 1330, lines 18–20, is relevant to the problem of this formula. Like the others, it dates to the 2nd century B.C. The syntax and context, however, are not precisely the same. Dittenberger restores

143. Wilhelm 1890, p. 296 and note 1.
144. Wilhelm 1909, p. 194.

Here it would be difficult to restore προτεύειν, because the word ἄλλα, which is present on the stone, evidently implies some contrast between adornment and the verb that must be restored with “return of a favor”: that is, the phrase ending with [ἐν χάριτος ἀποδόσει should evidently have some negative force. The phrase μῆ λείπεσθαι suits the context well. There is a fairly good parallel for this construction outside of Attica, a 2nd-century B.C. inscription from Herakleia in Caria (Syll.3 618, line 15): αὐτὸι δὲ πειρασομέθεα μηδενὸς λείπεσθαι ἐν χάριτος ἀποδόσει.

2. There is a problem with another of Wilhelm’s restorations, this one to IG II² 1286. At lines 9–11 his text reads: “so that the soldiers may appear to know how to return worthy thanks for benefactions” ([ὅπως οὖν φανεροὶ γίνωσκαί ταῖς στρατιώται εἰδότες ἀποδείκνυσιν] τὰς χάρις[τὰς ἐξεισαγόμενα]). The problem here is the use of the participle εἰδότες. This participle is unattested in combination with the formula φανεροὶ γίγνηται. Furthermore, the sense of this verb is wrong in the present context. The soldiers must “know how” to return a favor, not merely “know” to return a favor, and for that meaning some form of the verb ἐπιστάμαι is required (cf., e.g., IG II² 805). A better restoration here would be the simple participle, “returning,” that is, [οὶ στρατιώται ἀποδείκνυσιν] τὰς χάρις[τὰς ἐξεισαγόμενα] (cf. IG II² 845, lines 9–11; SEG XV 111, lines 6–9; XXVIII 107, lines 15–19). The inscription is not stoichedon. Nevertheless, this restoration is six letters shorter than Wilhelm’s, and would produce an uncomfortably short line.

3. Another problematic restoration has been proposed for IG II² 980, lines 22–24, an honorific decree from the middle of the 2nd century B.C.: [Ἰᾶ τοὺ]σοι συντελευμένοι φα[ῖνωντα ὁ]ι φιλοτιμούμενοι] | εἰς τὸν δῆμον τῶν ἤν[άνοιγτες] - - - | τῆς ἑπιγραφῆς. The emendation dates to the presentation of the text in the first edition of IG: II 5, 451. The editor, Koehler, influenced by the apparent occurrence of τυγχάνω and the phrase εἰς τὸν δῆμον in line 24, has restored the honorands as the subject of φαίνωνται, rather than the regular construction, which would have the sponsoring agency as the subject. As a rule, the honorands are not the subject of a verb such as φαίνωνται in the formulae of disclosure. The inscription is erected to make manifest the gratitude for a favor done, not to make manifest the favor done. It is true that in the context of the adjectival form of the formula, the φιλοτιμία of the honorands is on a few occasions the subject of the formula of disclosure (cf. Agora XVI 213, lines 24–25; FidC III.2, 48, lines 55–57; 50, lines 13–14). In these instances it must be asked whether the φιλοτιμία at issue is the honor that has been done the demos, or the honor that the demos gives in return, by erecting the inscription. Perhaps the least ambiguous example is IG II² 1629, face A front, col. a, lines 201–204: ὄπως[ς ἀν ἦν] φανερὰ ἡ φιλοτιμία ἡ ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον τοῖς | [τριφρ]άρχοις.

The text has been recently reedited and the readings verified by Osborne. Osborne wrongly attributes the restoration to the Kirchner but comments rightly that the space available will not accommodate it. He
adds that there are numerous other possibilities. I can find none. No attested formula will fit the readings presented here. Although Koehler's restoration cannot be accepted, his understanding of the sense of the passage must be approximately right: "so that those who honor the demos may appear to hit upon [honor? τῆς τιμῆς vel sim., and] recognition." For τῆς τιμῆς and the general sense of the construction following τυχάνοντες, see SEG XXII 110, line 28.

4. The formula of disclosure restored in Hesperia 40, pp. 96–100, no. 1, lines 7–9, is odd: [ινα τούτων συντελούμενον φανερά φαίνηται πρός τούς καιροὺς καὶ εὐνώς διακ[ειμένους ἢ τῆς πόλεως] ἑνότατον.\(^{149}\) The phrase φανερά φαίνηται is tautologous and unparalleled. Easier (and utterly regular) would be φανερά γίγνηται, which produces a line of the same length.

5. The formula of disclosure in SEG XXVIII 52, col. I, lines 29–31, is incorrectly restored.\(^{150}\) As edited, the text reads: [ὅπως ἂν ἐφάμιλλοι ὄσι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι λέγειν ἴδι ] καὶ πράττειν τά ἄριστα τώι δήμωι εἰδώτεις ὅτι χάρισας δέξια | ἀπολήψονται παρά [τῆς] βο[ν][λής καὶ δέκτες προ[τάνεις]]. The restoration of ἐφάμιλλοι (i.e., as a masculine plural), if accepted, would be unparalleled in Attic epigraphy. The word commonly occurs in the formulae of disclosure as a neuter singular, ἐφάμιλλον.

The inscription is stoichedon, except for these lines;\(^{151}\) consequently there is no exact criterion for the length of the phrase to be restored. An unexceptionable restoration (which is also about the right length) might be: [ὅπως ἂν φιλοτιμοῦντα] καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι λέγειν ἴδι καὶ πράττειν κ.τ.λ.). For this formula compare, for example, Agora XVI 112, lines 12–20 (307/6–302/1); and IG II\(^{2}\) 509, lines 7–11; 553, lines 18–20.

6. An odd expression seems to occur at IG II\(^{2}\) 927, lines 4–6: [ἵνα ο]ὴν ὑπάρχῃ τε εὐχαρίστης καὶ υπόμνημα τῆς εὐεργεσίας τούς εἰς τὰ [ξε]νὰ φιλόθεο[νους].\(^{152}\) The use of εὐχαρίστης here is unusual; the word appears commonly enough in Athenian epigraphy, but not used in this way, as a synonym for an inscription. It is clear from the verb ὑπάρχῃ that υπόμνημα is to be restored here. The word εὐχαρίστης is often employed in this formula, but always in the genitive, i.e., ὑπόμνημα τῆς εὐχαρίστης (cf., e.g., IG II\(^{2}\) 997, lines 4–5; 1024, lines 36–37; 1037, lines 5–6; 1223, lines 15–16; 1224, frs. a–c, lines 21–23; 1331+, fr. b, lines 6–8). In this instance it may be desirable to emend the text, correcting the τῆς to τής. We might consequently restore something like: [ἵνα ο]ὴν ὑπάρχῃ τε τῆς εὐχαρίστης καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας υπόμνημα], or: [ἵνα ο]ὴν ὑπάρχῃ τε τῆς εὐχαρίστης τῆς ἐκ τοῦ δήμου ὑπόμνημα. The inscription is not stoichedon, and either restoration is conceivable in terms of length.

7. A formula that is wrongly restored occurs at IG II\(^{2}\) 978+, fr. b, lines 12–14.\(^{153}\) As currently supplemented, the text reads: "so that a monument might endure of the recent grant of citizenship to him" [ἵνα δὲ καὶ ὑπόλοιμον ὑπάρχη τῆς γεγονο[η]ς αὐτῶι πολιτογραφίας, ἀναγράφω τὸ ψήφισμα τῆς λήμματος κ.τ.λ.]. The word πολιτογραφία is attested in Attic epigraphy, but not in the context of this formula. It is most commonly found in the phrase δοχειμασία τῆς πολιτογραφίας

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149. Geagan 1971, pp. 96–98, no. 1. Cf. his comment at p. 98: "The restoration of lines 7–9 has no precise parallels, but the sense is reflected commonly in Attic decrees and the suggested restorations fit the space available." Geagan restores one definite article too many as well; the text presented here eliminates one of these.

150. Traill (1978, pp. 274–277, no. 5) proposed this restoration without comment. The text is not included in Agora XVI.

151. Traill 1978, p. 274 and pl. 73.

152. The restoration is Kirchner's.

153. This restoration comes from Koehler's edition of the same text at IG II 398; he offers no parallel or argument to support it.
There which was extensively noted in the text. It should also be noted that there is an allusion to the formula in another fragment of the same inscription (IG II² 978+, fr. a, lines 13–14); to the genitives αὐτῶν | ύπόμνημα περὶ τῆς δουρεᾶς. The inscription is not stoichedon. This restoration would be five letters longer than what is currently restored, resulting in a line of a length consistent with others within this inscription.

8. Another problematic restoration is found at Agera XVI 261, lines 38–39: ὅπως ἄν οὖν ὁ δήμος φαίνῃ ταῖς τιμῶν τοὺς ἁγαθοὺς ἀνδρᾶς καί | ὅπως ἄν εἰδόσιν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἥλιον τῆς τουιτῆς αἱρέσεως. At a minimum, the restoration of εἰδόσιν is wrong; ἔξωκαί is uniformly found with the verb γίνονται. Also, there should be no article before ἄλλοι: the sense required is more general. Furthermore, the repetition of ὅπως seems rather clumsy: it is seldom repeated when two formulae are juxtaposed as here (cf., e.g., I. Delos 4, 1507, lines 28–31; 1508, lines 7–11; IG II² 975, lines 17–20; 1006, 88–90; 1039, lines 66–68; 1040+, lines 43–46; 1043, lines 58–60; which illustrate the juxtaposition of these two formulae). I would suggest a restoration along the lines of the following: ὅπως ἄν οὖν ὁ δήμος φαίνῃ ταῖς τιμῶν τοὺς ἁγαθοὺς ἀνδρᾶς καί | ἄξιος, γίνονται δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι ἥλιον τῆς τουιτῆς αἱρέσεως. The inscription is not stoichedon, and the length of this restoration is unexceptionable: it is one letter longer than the previous one. For the phrase τοὺς ἁγαθοὺς ἀνδρᾶς καί | ἄξιος, see IG II² 682, line 66.

9. In two cases the verb ἔξωκαί (as opposed to the regular noun ἔξωκαί) is used in a formula of disclosure. The first is a citation of an inscription in an ancient literary text (Joseph, A. 14.154, line 5): ἔκαστον γυναῖκας χαίρει | ὁ δήμος ἡμῶν ἁπαθικούσοις τοὺς ἱεράς καὶ τῆς προσοχῆς ἁμοιοῦς ἄξιον καὶ ἔξωκαί την περὶ ἡμᾶς συνούσαν τῶν ἥδη τετευμένων. In the second case the verb is restored (Agera XVI 292, lines 14–16). In this latter instance, the text reads ὅπως | καὶ ἄλλοι ἔξωκαί φιλο|δοξείν, εἰδότες ὅτι κοι[μιοῦνται τὰς καταξίας χάρις]τας. The infinitive φιλο|δοξείν is attested elsewhere in Attic epigraphy in only two other places, both times in the context of the form ula ὅπως ἄν ἐφάμαλλον ἤ ταῖς ἐξ ἔξωκα | φιλο|δοξείν (IG II² 931, line 10; 1227, lines 20–22). It might be objected that such a restoration should be ruled out here, because of the presence of the nominative partici ple εἰδότες (to make this restoration, we should expect εἰδόσι, agreeing with πᾶσι). Nevertheless, the rules of grammatical concord are sometimes violated: see especially IG II² 1329, lines 19–22, ἓνα οὖν ἐφάμαλλον ἢ τοῖς ἔξωκα φιλο|δοξείν, εἰδότες ὅτι χάριτας ἔξωκα κοι[μιοῦνται ἄν ἐν εὐεργετήσεωσι] (cf. IG II² 663, lines 30–33; 808, lines 21–24; 1329, lines 19–22). If we omit the particle ἄν, then, we can suggest a restoration that is consistent with the line length of this text (it is one letter longer than the current restoration): ὅπως | ἐφάμαλλον ἢ ταῖς ἐξ ἔξωκα φιλο|δοξείν, εἰδότες ὅτι κοι[μιοῦνται τὰς καταξίας χάρις]τας.
It is possible to restore a formula that is grammatically correct. The most likely would be something like δπως II [ἀν οἱ ἄλλοι φιλοτιμῶνται φιλόηδοξεῖν, εἰδότες ὅτι κοι[μοῦνται τὰς καταξίας χάρι]τας; φιλοτιμῶνται is frequently followed by the infinitive and the participle εἰδότες (cf., e.g., Agora XVI 112, lines 12–20; IG II² 509, lines 7–11; 652, lines 26–29, etc.). This restoration must be ruled out, though, because it requires much more space than is available on the stone.
The following catalogue includes fragmentary attestations of formulae of disclosure. A question mark (?) denotes a speculative restoration or date. Dates, if not qualified, are B.C.

σχοπεῖν τῶν βουλομένων
Andoc. 1.83, 84.
Dem. 24.17–18.
IG I\(^1\) 60, fr. c, line 31 (ca. 430); 133, line 11 (post 434/3); 140, lines 7–8 (450–400); 1453, fr. Smyrna, line 16 (425–420).
IG II\(^1\) 487, lines 6–10 (304/3).
IG XII, 7, 515, line 89 + IG XII suppl. p. 146 [Aigiale, Amorgos] (fin. saec. II).
Syll.\(^3\) 1004, lines 40–43 [Oropos] (saec. IV).
Čf. I. Ephesos 4, face A, lines 22–23 [Ephesos] (ca. 297/6); SEG XXIX 1130 bis, line 8 [Klazomenai] (200–150); Syll.\(^3\) 1023, lines 65–72 [Halasarna, Kos] (ca. 200).

δῶς ἐν εἰδώσιν
Agora XVI 112, lines 12–20 (307/6–302/1); 131, lines 5–6 (?)(saec. IV); 144, lines 16–19 (ex. saec. IV); 158, line 11 (init. saec. III); 164, lines 14–17 (inter annos 300/299 et 295/4); 261 lines 38–41 (196/5).
IG II\(^1\) 183, lines 5–9 (ante 353/2); 196, lines 11–14 (ante 353/2); 216, fr. b, line 8 (346/5); 222, lines 11–16 (ca. 344/3); 233, fr. b, lines 18–19 (340/39); 269, lines 9–12 (ante 336/5); 276, lines 15–18 (ante 336/5); 391, lines 10–12 (321/0–319/8); 423, lines 2–5 (post 336/5); 448, lines 16–19 (321/2); 448, lines 81–84 (321/2); 543, line 11 (ante 303/2); 545, line 21 (post 318/7); 555, lines 9–12 (307/6–304/3); 566, lines 9–10 (fin. saec. IV); 579, lines 16–18 (fin. saec. IV); 586, lines 5–7 (fin. saec. IV); 606, line 12 (fin. saec. IV); 653, lines 42–43 (289/8); 672, lines 29–31 (279/8); 793, lines 13–14 (post 255); 908, lines 7–8 (181–170); 909, lines 8–10 (ca. 170); 1038, lines 8–9 (init. saec. I); 1165, lines 17–22 (300–250); 1193, lines 25–27 (fin. saec. IV); 1198, lines 22–28 (326/5); 1214, lines 33–36 (300–250); 1219, lines 9–12 (med. saec. III); 1232, lines 25–26 (fin. saec. IV); 1237 face B, lines 116–125 (396/5); 1262, line 12 (301/0); 1265, lines 10–12 (ca.
δόσων ἄν ἦν εἰδέναι

*IG* I\(^1\) 84, line 26 (418/7).

*IG* II\(^1\) 463, lines 30–31 (cf. *Agora* XVI 109) (307/6).

δόσων ἄν φαίνεται

*Agora* XV 246, fr. c, lines 27–28 (131/0); 254, frs. a–b, d–f, lines 51–52 (104/3); 255, lines 8–9 (104/3); 260, lines 7–9 (*init. saec. I*); 261, lines 49–51 (95/4); 262, lines 2–3 (95/4); 263, lines 2–4 (*saec. I*); 263, lines 9–11 (*saec. I*); 264, lines 7–8 (ca. 80/79); 264, lines 16–17 (ca. 80/79); 268, lines 19–20 (57/6); 270, lines 8–9 (53/2); 293, lines 19–20 (20); 303, lines 1–3 (*fin. saec. I*); 304, lines 18–19 (*paullo ante a.D. 19*).

*Agora* XVI 173, lines 2–3 (286/5 *vel paullo post*); 187, lines 19–20 (271/0); 224, lines 25–27 (226/5); 239, 7–9 (*ex. saec. III*); 250, lines 1–2 (*saec. III*); 261, lines 38–41 (196/5); 310, lines 37–38 (ca. 135); 323, lines 4–5 (?) (ca. 120–110); 335, lines 64–65 (31–21/20).


*I. Delos* 4, 1500, lines 20–22 (ca. 150); 1507, lines 11–13 (ca. 140); 1507, lines 28–31 (ca. 140); 1508, lines 7–11 (ca. 140).

*IG* II\(^1\) 438, line 6 (*post 336/5*); 477, line 19 (305/4); 487, lines 10–12 (304/3); 501, lines 3–4 (302/1); 653, lines 29–32 (289/8); 672, lines 10–11 (279/8); 677, lines 7–8 (*post 277*); 682, lines 64–66 (276/5); 693, lines 2–4 (*init. saec. III*); 698, lines 15–19 (ca. 289/8); 716, lines 6–8 (*saec. III*); 721, lines 2–5 (*init. saec. III*); 774, frs. b–c, line 24 (ca. 250/49); 776, lines 20–22 (ca. 240); 785, lines 20–22 (ca. 239/8); 788, lines 15–18 (ca. 235/4); 820, lines 2–4 (*med. saec. III*); 823, lines 10–12 (*med. saec. III*); 835, lines 15–18 (*paullo post 229*); 836, lines 10–12 (*paullo post 229*); 844, lines 20–22 (ca. 217/6); 853, lines 18–20 (*med. saec. II*); 891, lines 8–10 (ca. 188/7); 922, lines 1–3 (ca. *init. saec. II*); 945, lines 16–17 (168/7); 956, lines 22–24 (161/0); 958, lines 18–21 (ca. 155/4); 966, lines 12–14 (159–133); 975, lines 17–20 (*post med. saec. II*); 978, fr. a, lines 19–21 (ca. 130); 980, lines 22–24 (*med. saec. II*); 981, lines 1–2 (*med. saec. II*); 983, fr. a, lines 6–9 (*med. saec. II*); 988, fr. a, lines 1–2 (*post med. saec. II*); 989, lines 20–21 (*med. saec. II*); 992, lines 6–8 (*saec. II*); 1006, lines 37–38 (122/1); 1008, lines 30–31 (118/7); 1008, lines 63–65 (118/7); 1009, lines 10–12 (116/5); 1009, lines 45–47 (116/5); 1011, lines 22–23 (106/5); 1011, lines 43–45 (106/5); 1028, lines 42–44 (100/99); 1028, lines 93–96 (100/99); 1029, lines 26–27 (94/3); 1030, lines 37–38 (*post 94/3*); 1036, line 5 (ca. 78/7); 1039, lines 12–13 (79/8); 1039, lines 43–44 (79/8); 1039, lines 58–59 (79/8); 1039, lines 66–68 (79/8); 1040+, lines 17–19 (46/5); 1040+, lines 32–34 (46/5); 1040+, lines 43–46 (46/5); 1041, lines 7–8 (47/6–43/2); 1041, lines 25–26 (47/6–43/2); 1041, lines 33–36 (47/6–43/2); 1042, frs. a–b, line 10 (ca. 41/0); 1042, fr. c, line 1 (ca. 41/0); 1042, fr. d, lines 16–20 (ca. 41/0);
1043, lines 15–16 (38/7); 1043, lines 39–40 (38/7); 1043, line 51 (38/7); 1043, lines 58–60 (38/7); 1049, lines 19–20 (ca. 40/39); 1050, lines 7–8 (med. saec. I); 1050, lines 16–18 (med. saec. I); 1070, lines 18–19 (init. act. imp.); 1124, line 5 (act. imp.); 1131, line 6 (med. saec. II); 1132, lines 78–79 (ca. 278/7); 1134, frs. a–b, lines 41–43 (ca. 117/6); 1134, frs. c–e, lines 75–76 (ca. 117/6); 1171, lines 12–13 (saec. II); 1235, lines 9–11 (ca. 274/3); 1236, lines 11–13 (ante med. saec. II); 1283, lines 9–13 (ante med. saec. III); 1288, lines 19–21 (med. saec. III); 1299, lines 17–19 (post 236/5); 1304, lines 38–40 (paullo post 211/10); 1308, lines 16–18 (ca. fin. saec. III); 1314, lines 9–12 (ca. 213/2); 1315, lines 16–18 (ca. 211/10); 1324, lines 10–12 (init. saec. II); 1326, lines 23–27 (ca. 176/5); 1328, lines 35–37 (183/2); 1334, lines 11–14 (fin. saec. II); 1337, lines 9–11 (95/4).

Joseph. AJ 14.154, line 5 (106/5).
OGIS 248, lines 22–27 (175/4).
SEG XV 104, lines 29–30 (127/6); XXI 469, fr. c, lines 17–20 (129/8).

όπως ἃν φανερὸν ἢ?
Agora XVI 181, lines 19–23 (282/1).
IG II 392, lines 1–3 (321/0–319/8); 505, lines 41–43 (302/1); 657, lines 50–52 (287/6); 805, 5–9 (med. saec. III); 1028, lines 93–96 (100/99); 1037, lines 12–13 (init. saec. I); 1088, frs. c–d, lines 45–46 (A.D. 131–138); 1271, lines 18–21 (298/7); 1273, lines 18–21 (281/0); 1300, lines 5–7 (ca. 230); 1318, lines 9–13 (fin. saec. III?).

όπως ἃν φανεροὶ γέρωνται vel sim.
Agora XVI 213, lines 24–25 (245/4 vel 244/3).
FdD III.2, 48, lines 55–57 (97); 50, lines 13–14 (106 or 97); 140, col. I, lines 17–18 (ca. 190–150 B.C.?).
Hesperia 40, pp. 96–100, no. 1, lines 7–9 (saec. II).
IG II 652, line 14–15 (paullo post 286/5); 741, lines 8–9 (init. saec. III); 845, lines 9–11 (fin. saec. III); 893, frs. b–c, lines 26–27 (ca. 188/7); 979*, fr. b, lines 21–22 (med. saec. II); 1006, lines 88–90 (122/1); 1072, lines 11–12 (A.D. 116/7); 1078, lines 36–38 (ca. A.D. 220); 1222, lines 6–7 (fin. saec. IV); 1286, lines 9–11 (ca. 244/3); 1326, lines 23–27 (ca. 176/5); 1330, lines 18–20 (163–130); 1629, face A, front, col. a, lines 201–204 (325/4).
I. Magnesia [Kern] 37 [Athenian decree], lines 20–22 (209/8–208/7).
OGIS 248, lines 22–27 (175/4).
SEG XV 111, lines 6–9 (229/8); XXI 435, lines 9–10 (187/6); XXVIII 107, lines 15–19 (ca. 229).

όπως ἃν καταφανής ὑπάρχῃ?
IG II 983, fr. a, lines 6–9 (? (med. saec. II).

όπως ἃν εφάμαλλον ἢ?
Agora XVI 120, lines 4–7 (303/2–302/1); 157, lines 21–22 (init. saec. III); 185, lines 16–17 (275/4); 194, fr. b, lines 17–18 (255/4 vel
253/2); 217, lines 13–15 (242/1 vel 241/40 vel 240/39); 240, lines 4–6 (ex. saec. III); 285, lines 5–8 (ca. 170 b.c.); 300, lines 7–8 (saec. II, p. prior) *Hesperia* 2, pp. 503–505, no. 16, lines 13–15 (161/0).

*IG* II² 330, lines 36–37 (335/4); 558, lines 11–17 (ca. 303/2); 663, lines 30–33 (283/2?); 667, lines 10-12 (282/1); 670, lines 13–14 (284/3?); 700, fr. b, lines 16–19 (*ante med. saec. III*); 712, lines 2–4 (295/4–276/5); 721, lines 2–5 (*init. saec. III*); 786, lines 15–17 (*paullus post 229/8*); 798, fr. a, lines 22–25 (*med. saec. III*); 801, lines 1–2 (*med. saec. III*); 808, lines 21–24 (239–229); 847, lines 33–36 (ca. 215/4); 859, lines 11–13 (*fin. saec. III*); 870, line 4 (*saec. III*?); 884, lines 27–31 (ca. 200); 931, line 10 (*init. saec. II*); 984, lines 5–8 (*med. saec. II*); 1011, lines 43–45 (106/5); 1027, lines 26–27 (*fin. saec. II*); 1045, lines 2–4 (*ante med. saec. I*); 1227, lines 20–22 (131/0); 1281, lines 11–14 (ca. 266); 1292, lines 17–19 (*med. saec. III*); 1293, lines 8–11 (*med. saec. III*); 1297, lines 6–9 (ca. 237/6); 1301, lines 8–10 (ca. 222/1); 1319, lines 7–11 (*fin. saec. III*?); 1324, lines 19–25 (*init. saec. II*?); 1327, lines 20–23 (ca. 178/7); 1329, lines 19–22 (175/4).

*SEG* XV 104, lines 90–92 (127/6); XV 112, lines 19–21 (225); XV 113, lines 16–19 (215); XVIII 33, lines 8–11 (*med. saec. III*); XXI 451, lines 20–23 (171/0); XXVI 98, lines 27–29 (late 3rd).

ὅπως ἀν ὑπάρξῃ ὑπόμνημα

*Agora* XVI 123, lines 21–23 (302/1); 276, lines 21–22 (181/80 vel 190/89 vel 169/8); 316, line 5 (ca. 130)

*ASA* *Atene* 3 [1941–1942] [Athenian decree], pp. 82–83, no. 5, lines 3–4 (250–200).

*IG* II² 570, lines 10–11 (*fin. saec. IV*); 637+, line 3 (*saec. IV/III*); 653, lines 50–52 (289/8); 677, lines 18–19 (*post 277*); 706, lines 5–6 (*init. saec. III*); 891, lines 17–18 (ca. 188/7); 895, lines 6–7 (?) (ca. 188/7); 908, lines 17–18 (181–170); 909, lines 19–20 (ca. 170); 927, lines 4–6 (*init. saec. II*); 978+, fr. a, lines 13–14 (ca. 130); 978+, fr. b, lines 12–14 (ca. 130); 982, lines 15–16 (*post med. saec. II*); 984, lines 21–22 (*med. saec. II*); 987, line 1 (*post med. saec. II*); 997, lines 4–5 (*med. saec. II*); 1008, line 78 (118/7); 1011, line 55 (106/5); 1024, lines 36–37 (*fin. saec. II*); 1037, lines 5–6 (*init. saec. I*); 1047, line 1 (49/8); 1223, lines 15–16 (*post 167*); 1224, frs. a–c, lines 4–5 (ca. 166); 1224, frs. a–c, lines 21–23 (ca. 166); 1326, lines 47–48 (ca. 176/5); 1331+, fr. b, lines 6–8 (ca. 130); 1534, face B, frs. a–k, line 157 (ca. 232/1).

*OGIS* 248, lines 53–54 (cf. lines 22–27); (175/4).

*SEG* III 102, lines 12–14 (*fin. saec. III*); XV 104, lines 131–132 (127/6); XXV 155, lines 38–40 (236/5); XXVIII 60, lines 104–105 (cf. *Agora* XVI 255D) (270/69).

ὅπως ἀν μνήμη γένηται?

*IG* II² 805, 5–9 (*med. saec. III*).

ὅπως ἀν φιλοτιμώνται

*Agora* XVI 49, 52–55 (328/7); 58, 3–4 (305/4).

*Agora* XVI 86, lines 21–27 (327/6); 101, lines 40–42 (319/18); 112, lines 12–20 (307/6–302/1); 144, lines 16–19 (*ex. saec. IV*).
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*IG* II² 300, lines 2–5 (ante 336/5); 330, lines 20–23 (335/4); 338, lines 21–24 (333/2); 360, lines 63–65 (330/29); 423, lines 2–5 (post 336/5); 425, lines 9–14 (post 336/5); 488, lines 19–22 (304/3); 509, lines 7–11 (post 307/6); 553, lines 18–20 (ca. 307); 577, lines 1–3 (fin. saec. IV); 641, lines 23–25 (299/8); 652, lines 26–29 (ca. 290/89); 692, lines 5–7 (post 303/2); 999, lines 1–4 (med. saec. II); 1019, lines 34–36 (fin. saec. II); 1182, lines 11–16 (med. saec. IV); 1197, lines 15–18 (ca. 330); 1208, lines 3–8 (post med. saec. IV); 1252, lines 19–22 (post med. saec. IV); 1259, lines 7–9 (313/2); 1261, lines 53–55 (301/0); 1263, lines 27–31 (300/299); 1277, lines 29–33 (ca. 278/7); 1299, 69–73 (post 236/5); 1311, lines 1–2 (ca. fin. saec. III).


*SEG* XXI 525, lines 37–40 (282/1); XXII 116, lines 26–27 (ca. 330); XXVIII 52, col. I, lines 29–31 (?) (ca. 333); XXVIII 107, lines 15–19 (ca. 229); XXXV 104, lines 21–27 (327/6).

οταος ἂν ἐς ἐστρωτι τι γίνωνται

*Agora* XVI 261, lines 38–41 (196/5); 317, lines 5–6 (ca. 130).

I. Delos 4, 1507, lines 28–31 (ca. 140); 1508, lines 7–11 (ca. 140).

*IG* II² 975, lines 17–20 (post med. saec. II); 1006, 88–90 (122/1); 1039, lines 66–68 (79/8); 1040+, lines 43–46 (46/5); 1043, lines 58–60 (38/7); 1046, lines 30–32 (52/1); 1330, lines 54–57 (163–130); 1333, lines 12–13 (post med. saec. II); 1343, lines 40–43 (ca. 37/6).


οταος ἂν ἐς ἐστρωτι (see Appendix I)

*Agora* XVI 292, lines 14–16 (169/8).


οταος ἂν ἐς ἐστρωτι

*Agora* XVI 117, lines 12–17 (303/2).

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