FROM THE WHOLE CITIZEN BODY?

THE SOCIOLOGY OF ELECTION AND LOT IN THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY

ABSTRACT

In this article the author examines the sociology of selection procedures in the Athenian democracy. The role of election and lot within the political system, the extent (or lack) of corruption in the selection of officials, and the impact of the selection procedure on political life are considered. A comparison of selection procedures demonstrates that the lot was a relatively democratic device that distributed offices widely throughout Attica, whereas elections favored demes near the city. The reasons for these different patterns of participation are examined.

ELECTION AND LOT IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS

Most Athenian officials were selected by lot, but elections were also held to allocate offices that required special expertise. In Aristotle’s opinion, “the use of the lot [for the appointment of officials] is regarded as democratic, and the use of the vote as oligarchical” (Pol. 1294b7–9). While modern scholars have sometimes considered the ideological or religious factors associated with election and sortition, the sociology of selection procedures has usually been neglected, despite its importance for understanding Athenian political sociology in general.

Did the choice of procedure promote one group over another or affect the ways in which citizens could participate in public life? Was the lot democratic in practice, or did those who put themselves forward for selection represent relatively small sections of society, such as the wealthy or those who lived close to the city? Were citizens constrained in their political choices by the organization of officeholding? I address these questions in this article by examining political participation in the context of election and lot.

There is, unfortunately, little direct evidence for selection procedures in ancient Athens. The discovery of bronze tokens (pinakia) confirms that officials were selected by lot using allotment machines (kleroteria) similar to those described in the discussion of jury courts in the Athenaion Politeia.

1. Andy Merrills, Peter Rhodes, and the anonymous referees for Hesperia made a number of suggestions to improve this paper at its various stages. Patrick White gave helpful advice on statistics. I am grateful to them all. Unless stated otherwise, all translations are my own.
This process apparently took place in the Theseion (Ath. Pol. 62.1). By the 330s all selected officials except bouleutai and phourourai seem to have been appointed "from the whole tribe," although this was not always the case previously, and there is controversy about the practicalities of the procedure.

Regarding elections, the Ath. Pol. states that "the election of strategoi, hipparchs, and other military officers is held in the assembly, in whatever way the people see fit" (Ath. Pol. 44.4, trans. Rhodes). In the case of the generalship, "the ten strategoi were formerly one from each tribe, but now are appointed from the whole citizen body" (Ath. Pol. 61.1, trans. Rhodes). But it was not only military officials who were elected; some financial and religious officials, as well as envoys and secretaries, were also elected (e.g., Ath. Pol. 54.3–5). In elections for the generalship, voting was by cheirotonia (Aischin. 3.13), a probouleuma was necessary (Ath. Pol. 44.4), and it is likely that some form of promotion of the candidate took place beforehand, either personally or by friends (Dem. 13.19; Thuc. 8.54.4).

Previous scholarship has attempted to reconstruct electoral procedure in more detail (at least for the strategia) from the limited information supplied by the Ath. Pol., supplemented by Plato (Leg. 755c–d, 763d–e). The Ath. Pol. is frustratingly vague, however, while Plato was not describing any existing system. Any conclusions based on these texts are therefore rather speculative. Furthermore, even though it is assumed that the procedure for all elections was similar, presumably not all of them were held in the same Assembly meeting, as the months in which different offices were handed over varied considerably.

Apart from the information in the Ath. Pol., it is not known how votes were organized or to what extent factors such as the candidates' wealth, family background, or deme of origin played a role in influencing or deciding elections. Similarly, we do not know whether electioneering or electoral fraud were common. Previous studies have concentrated on explaining the intricacies of the nomination of candidates, the changing nature of tribal

4. See also Ath. Pol. 42.2, 43.1; Dem. 21.171; Dein. 1.51; Hansen 1987, pp. 121–122, 188, n. 751; Develin 1989, pp. 1–23; Rhodes 1993, pp. 513–517, 599–604, 677–688. For elections of envoys, see Briant 1968; for priests, see Aleshire 1994, although these are not counted as public officials following Arist. Pol. 1299a12–31.
5. See Rhodes 1993, pp. 536–537; Hansen 1999, p. 234. If tribes were allowed to adopt an outside candidate, as stated at Ath. Pol. 44.4, this must have been known prior to the election; see Mitchell 2000, pp. 347–352.
6. Hansen (1999, p. 235) argues that Plato's account was "probably based on Athens," but it is impossible to be certain which features reflected contemporary Athenian practice and which were due to Plato's imagination. See also Hansen 1987, pp. 44–46.
7. Tamiai (treasurers) did not take office until after the Panathenaia, five or six months after the elections for strategoi. There was a gap of some months between the election of strategoi and the assumption of their office, however. See Hansen 1987, p. 121. For tamiai, see Ath. Pol. 43.1. Furthermore, the ephetic sopbronistai started their term of office in Boedromion, later in the year than strategoi, but they are only attested after 334/3. See Rhodes 1993, p. 504; Hansen 1999, p. 234.
representation, and the political power wielded by the *strategoi.* Many scholars have recognized that a range of factors must have affected the outcomes of these elections, but much less emphasis has been placed on isolating these issues or assessing the sociology of selection procedures in a wider context. These neglected problems are addressed below, beginning with a consideration of whether corruption was a factor in Athenian elections, followed by an analysis of the sociological dimensions of election and lot.

**PATRONAGE AND POLITICS IN ATHENS**

If there is little evidence for the procedural aspects of Athenian elections, there is even less for any type of malpractice associated with the elections, such as electioneering or bribery. This situation is surprising given the frequent accusations of bribery in other contexts (e.g., for speaking in the Assembly, accepting gifts while on an embassy, or in the law courts) and may suggest that elections were not considered important enough to manipulate. In comparison with Roman Republican elections, where canvassing for votes was common and money was an important factor, the Athenian case was strikingly different. The holding of office fulfilled a different sociopolitical function in Athens, partly because power was attainable without political office—through speaking in the Assembly, for example. There was, moreover, no Athenian equivalent of the Roman *cursus honorum,* which required that a candidate have held a previous office before he could stand for high office.

The Roman Republican example is useful, however, for providing a framework in which to think about the functioning of Athenian elections. To be successful in Roman elections, candidates needed to cultivate a public reputation with oratorical skills, make great shows of popularity, exploit friendship and patronage ties, and disparage opponents (Cicero, *Comment. pet.* 2–3, 7–13, 16, 34–38). Some of these features can certainly be seen in Athens. For example, the creation and maintenance of a public reputation was as vital in Athens as in Rome, oratorical skills were highly prized, and opponents were attacked in the Assembly and courts. Speaking regularly in the Assembly considerably enhanced a citizen’s profile, and many *strategoi* are known to have played a leading role in Assembly policy and decision making, especially in the 5th and early 4th centuries B.C.

Disparaging opponents and prosecuting them in court were also useful ways of obtaining or sustaining influence in the Assembly, as the battles between Demosthenes and Aischines demonstrate (e.g., Aischin. 3.93; Dem. 19.120–122).


9. Hamel (1998, p. 19) highlights the difficulty, stating that “for the most part . . . we must remain ignorant of the political considerations which influenced Athenian appointments and of the tribal, familial, and other loyalties which probably determined how large numbers of Athenians voted.”


12. For the separation of *rhetores* and *strategoi* after the 370s, see Davies 1981, p. 125. That it is not so marked as Davies suggests is exemplified by the careers of Phormion in the 5th century and Kallistratos in the 4th; see Sinclair 1988, p. 46.
Displays of popularity and the use of patronage ties so characteristic of Roman elections, however, seem not to have been common in Athens.\(^{13}\) Eliciting sympathy and highlighting personal courage through the display of war wounds and scars were commonplace in Roman elections,\(^{14}\) but such ploys may perhaps have reminded the Athenians too much of Peisistratos and tyranny to be successful in their case (Hdt. 1.59); Nikomachides complained that despite his many wounds, he was not elected strategos (Xen. Mem. 3.4.1).\(^{15}\)

Paul Millett has argued that patronage, although crucially important in Roman political life, played a minimal role in Athenian politics, at least after Perikles' introduction of jury pay.\(^{16}\) According to Millett, jury pay, portrayed in the *Ath. Pol.* as a response to Kimon’s generosity, undermined a social system that tied ordinary citizens to the local elite and enabled them to have access to resources without relying on men such as Kimon (*Ath. Pol.* 27.3–4; Theopomp., *FGrH* 115 F89; Plut. *Kim.* 10.1–6).\(^{17}\) Nicholas Jones contends, however, that while Millett is correct in minimizing the role of patronage in the democratic context of the city, where citizens could redirect the patron–client relationship through the democratic institutions of the Assembly or the law courts, traditional patronage relationships survived in rural Attica, principally as a means of spreading agricultural risk.\(^{18}\) The only direct support for his argument, unfortunately, is from the case of Kimon himself, since his deme, Lakiadai, was not in the city. This reasoning, as we shall see, is less than convincing.

Jones acknowledges that there is a lack of direct evidence for patronage after this episode in the mid-5th century, but suggests that its absence conceals a form of disguised patronage that is difficult to recognize. He is certainly correct that there is no reason to expect indications of patronage in the literary evidence; as he says, in Rome it was the role of the client, not the patron, to advertise the relationship, usually epigraphically.\(^{19}\) Instead, Jones cites honorific decrees passed by demes as evidence of local patronage. This argument is not particularly persuasive, as these decrees praise wealthy demesmen for their benefactions, with none of the language of personal patronage that appears in the Roman corpus (e.g., *patronus, cliens,* and *amicus*).\(^{20}\) The decrees commemorate expenditures benefiting

\(^{13}\) Alkibiades, advertising his Olympic victories in a bid to get elected, may be considered an exception; Thuc. 6.16.2–6. Amazingly popular as well as being severely loathed, he played on this ambiguity for his own political advancement; see Thuc. 6.28.2; 8.48.4, 53.2.

\(^{14}\) For Cato the Elder, see Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 49 (Mor. 276C–D); for Marius, see Sall. *Iug.* 85.29; and in general Plut. *Cor.* 14.1. Cicero also used the showing of scars as a rhetorical tactic in law courts; see Quint. *Inst.* 6.1.21; Leigh 1995, pp. 195–203.

\(^{15}\) It is unclear whether Xenophon wants us to believe that Nikomachides actually displayed his scars during the vote. He certainly was not too shy to do so, since he is portrayed showing them to Sokrates, but it is clear that the demos knew of his battle experience and still voted for a candidate more experienced in business than in war. Perhaps such a tactic was more successful for other candidates, however, since Xenophon presents Nikomachides as someone who thought the display of war wounds could lead to his election. 16. Millett 1989; but see also Rhodes 1986, pp. 135–136; Zelnick-Abramowitz 2000.


the entire community, such as the financing of a chorus \( (IG~II^2~1198) \) or the building of a bridge \( (IG~II^2~1191) \), but they afford little indication of a personal relationship between honorand and deme members.

Furthermore, it is difficult to equate these local honorific decrees with those passed by the polis. Jones calculates that 58% (94 out of 162) of the attested deme inscriptions are honorific decrees. Three-quarters of these can plausibly be interpreted as honoring wealthy or prominent citizens; thus Jones claims that a “model of patronal exchange” is represented here.\(^{21}\) These figures, however, are not out of line with the number of decrees enacted by the polis, yet the polis decrees do not represent patronage relations between foreigners and Athens, at least not in the terms that Jones suggests.\(^{22}\) Clearly, a large proportion of surviving decrees, whether enacted by the polis or the deme, were honorific. They demonstrate social and economic stratification of some sort, but they are not in themselves indicators of patronage, as Jones claims.

Finally, the distinction Jones makes between the deme of Lakiadai and the city is overstated.\(^{23}\) Lakiadai lay outside the city walls, probably close to the Sacred Way, east of the Kephisos River.\(^{24}\) It was therefore less than 4 km from the city and was located on a major communications route. The deme was not at all isolated or separated from the city, and it would hardly have been difficult for demesmen to journey to Athens to participate in democratic government. The democratic alternative to patronage was literally within an hour’s walk of the deme.

**ELECTORAL CORRUPTION? THE CASE OF OSTRACISM**

Although Jones’s analysis of patronage in Athenian society does not stand up to scrutiny, there are examples of networks of friends of equal status performing favors for one another, such as lending money without interest (\textit{eranos} loans)\(^{25}\) or the \textit{hetaireiai} described by Thucydides (8.54.4) in the context of the oligarchic coup of 411. Although these groups may not have functioned solely as revolutionary organizations, the fact that they are mentioned in a revolutionary setting and existed for the expressed purpose of promoting their members in the law courts and elections is revealing.\(^{26}\) Such \textit{hetaireiai} are widely believed to have been used in the ostracism of Hyperbolos, when Alkibiades’ and Nikias’s supporters allegedly united to exile him.\(^{27}\) In

\(^{21}\) Jones 2004, p. 79.

\(^{22}\) Of the 775 4th-century decrees collated by Hansen (1987, pp. 110–112), 367 (47%) were honorary decrees.

\(^{23}\) Jones (2004, p. 78) notes that “the effects of the rise of the democratic ideology invoked by Millett remained a mainly urban phenomenon and . . . in rural demes, certainly in ones as far removed from the asty as Kimon’s Lakiadai, the old ways survived” (my italics).

\(^{24}\) Milchhoefer 1883, p. 16; Traill 1986, p. 133.


\(^{27}\) [Andoc.] 4.4; Plut. \textit{Nik.} 11.3–4, \textit{Alk.} 13.4, \textit{Arist.} 7.3. Heftner (2000, pp. 52–55) is skeptical, however, and sees the machinations as late-5th-century speculation after the event to explain the surprise result. Nonetheless, contemporary speculation of this kind is in itself good evidence for what the Athenians believed could have occurred. See also Hansen 1987, pp. 76–77; Siewert 1999; contra Rosivach 1987, pp. 163–167; Rhodes 1994, p. 94.
light of this case, it may be worthwhile to examine ostracisms for indications of how elections might have been open to manipulation. The evidence is controversial, however, and the procedure for ostracism was slightly different from that used for electing officials. For these reasons, the process is summarized here.

After the initial vote to hold an ostracism was taken in the Assembly, the actual vote, a ballot organized by tribe (Ath. Pol. 43.5; Philoch., FGrH 328 F30), was held in the Agora. Although Philochoros says that the inscribed side of the ostrakon was carried face down (implying that this was a secret ballot), scribes were sometimes used, which suggests that secrecy was not always maintained. This must have been especially true in the case of poor citizens, who were the most likely to be illiterate. The discovery of a deposit of ostraka bearing the name of Themistokles has suggested to some that groups of Themistokles’ enemies prepared votes for distribution. M. H. Hansen, however, is probably correct in doubting the role of organized political groups here; these ostraka were, after all, not used.

Even if the Themistokles ostraka do not attest to the manipulation of ostracism votes in any underhanded way, it certainly demonstrates that the vote was not as secret as suggested by Philochoros. Nevertheless, a different sort of manipulation can perhaps be detected in the vote to ostracize Hyperbolos. As mentioned above, Hyperbolos was ostracized after Alkibiades and Nikias (or Phaiax?) allegedly joined forces against him. It is difficult to reconstruct the details surrounding this vote; the fullest account is given by Plutarch (Alk. 13.4), who highlights the confusion, not least in the identification of the protagonists. Contemporary sources suggest that the result was not particularly surprising in view of Hyperbolos’s poor reputation (Thuc. 8.73.3; Plato Com. fr. 187 K = 203 K-A).

Given the difficulties of this episode, it may not be wise to place too much weight on any suggestions of corruption. It may instead be useful to consider other factors that could have contributed to the result. Prospographical analysis of ostraka shows that candidates with large numbers of votes, that is, those who were in serious danger of being ostracized, came predominantly from the wealthy elite. Other factors, such as the political prominence or notoriety of individuals or the election procedure itself may also have been relevant, as discussed further below. Direct

28. Hansen 1999, p. 35; Forsdyke 2005, pp. 146–149. Brenne (2002, p. 103) discusses the possible interpretations of Kerameikos O 1309 (= T 1/88), an ostrakon inscribed with the name Megakles, son of Hippokrates. The inscription on the reverse of this sherd (Antiochides phyles) may demonstrate the organization of voting by tribes. Brenne suggests that it may have belonged to the tribe of Antiochis, of which Megakles himself was not a member. 29. Plut. Arist. 7.4–6. See also Vanderpool 1973, p. 218; Brenne 1994, p. 21. Boegehold (1963, p. 372) finds it difficult to believe that secret ballots (in the law courts) were used in Athens “until well into the fifth century.” 30. Bronner (1938, pp. 231–241) suggested that 14 people were responsible for the 190 ostraka found on the deposit. See also Lang in Agora XXV, pp. 142–161; and n. 31, below. For variation in the letter styles, see Bronner 1938, pp. 231–232.

31. Hansen 2002. It is unknown, however, whether any prepared ostraka were used.

32. Rosivach 1987, pp. 166–167; Rhodes 1994, p. 94; Heftner 2000, pp. 56–57. For other citizens who had ostrakon cast against them on this occasion, see Heftner 2000, p. 50. A second ostrakon cast against Nikias was found in the Agora in 1998 (P 33264, unpublished); for details, see http://www.agathe.gr (1998 excavation season).

33. Scheidel (2002, pp. 488–489) demonstrates that social and moralizing motives for ostracism were as regular as political motives, e.g., Kimon’s alleged sexual relationship with his half-sister Elpinike; Kerameikos O 6874 (= T 1/67). See also Brenne 2002, pp. 92–93.

34. See Brenne 2001.
manipulation of the vote by disgruntled aristocrats cannot necessarily be assumed.

The supposed use of the secret ballot in the ostracism of powerful citizens is interesting, given that secrecy was not maintained for the selection of officials in the first place. In Rome, the secret ballot was used in elections at least after A.D. 139. It was usually connected with efforts to discourage electoral bribery; candidates could no longer be sure whether their efforts to bribe the voters would be successful.35 Secret ballots were used in Athens not by voters to elect officials, but by juries to decide legal cases.36 It is perhaps ironic that the only extant evidence suggesting corruption specifically in relation to voting comes from arenas in which the secret ballot was used. This may suggest that there was at least a perception that secrecy was necessary in certain contexts.37

There are, however, accusations of bribery connected with officials. Isokrates specifically makes a link between bribery and strategoi, noting that “although the penalty fixed for anyone convicted of bribery [ἀλα δεκάζων] is death, we elect those who do it most obviously to be generals” (Isok. 8.50). The verb (συν)δεκαζειν often occurs in the context of a law court, but it is clear that it was also associated with the Assembly (συνδεκαζειν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν καὶ τὰλλα δικαστήρια; Aischin. 1.86), and perhaps even with the 10 tribes. This would make its use in an electoral context plausible, as candidates were selected according to tribe (Dem. 46.26; Ath. Pol. 27.5).38 These elections and the effects of the selection procedure in general are assessed in the remainder of this article.

A COMPARISON OF ELECTION AND LOT

Electioneering, electoral bribery, or other electoral malpractice could have been operative in isolated cases of Athenian politics, but there is no evidence that such practices were a feature of the democratic system. In the surviving source material, the Athenians frequently accused each other

35. If this was the intention, it was not particularly successful; competitive bribery continued, and voters expected to receive bribes from all candidates. See Yakobson 1999, pp. 124–126, 142. For a different view of the political significance of the change, see Gruen 1991, pp. 259–261. See also Lintott 1990, p. 4.

36. The religious importance of the secret ballot is highlighted by Dem. 19.239. This contrasts with Lys. 13.37, a trial in which voting was not secret, and which is portrayed as a flagrant act of intimidation by the Thirty. The use of ballots that were not secret in the law courts seems to be associated with revolution and oligarchy; see, for example, the reprisals against the Athenian sympathizers at Megara (Thuc. 4.74.3).

See esp. Boegehold 1963, pp. 372–374, who suggests that ballots were originally not intended to be secret, but that secrecy became important in votes in which accuracy in counting was required. See further Rhodes 1981, pp. 126–127; Hall 1990, p. 193; Hansen 1999, p. 202; along with Spivey (1994, pp. 48–51), who examines the cluster of voting scenes on red-figure pottery around 490–470 and suggests that this was a way in which the Athenians could create a link between contemporary practice and “the epic past.”

37. Dem. 57.13 alleges double voting in a deme diasephismos. Ath. Pol. 27.5 claims Anytos tried to bribe a jury, while Lys. 29.12 accuses Ergokles of the same. See also Xen. Symp. 5.8 and Arist. Pol. 1303a15 for intrigue (ερίθειας) in elections at Heraia in Arkadia that led to the switch from elections to the lot.

38. Nevertheless, the main aim of the surviving legislation on bribery seems to have been its prevention in respect to speakers in the Assembly, rather than electoral bribery (Dein. 2.16–17; Hyp. 4.7–8), and admittedly the link with strategoi seems to refer to their period of office rather than their selection. Ar. Acb. 598 implies that elections lent themselves to manipulation by the wealthy, however. In any case, MacDowell (1983, p. 68) does not sufficiently explain the appearance of the Assembly in Aischin. 1.86–87. See also Harvey 1985, pp. 108–113.
of taking bribes to speak in the Assembly, propose decrees, or advise a particular course of action, but not to sway an election.\textsuperscript{39} This relative lack of interest in electoral bribery may be partially explained by the procedural practices of elections themselves. Inducing many members of the Assembly to raise their hands for a specific candidate may, in practice, have been difficult, and perhaps not worth the trouble—especially if elections were, relatively speaking, not that important in any case.\textsuperscript{40} If energy was to be spent swaying the Assembly, it would be better used to influence the vote on a particular decree.

Social factors and the dynamics of the selection procedure may have figured more prominently in Athenian political life than electoral malpractice. The "Old Oligarch" claimed that offices such as the \textit{strategia} were distributed on socioeconomic grounds; he asserted that some citizens deliberately avoided holding positions that "bring safety or danger to the people as a whole," because they did not want to take responsibility for the associated risks ([Xen.] \textit{Ath. Pol.} 1.3). Although he may have observed a genuine phenomenon (that is, while all citizens were equally entitled to hold these offices, in practice not all citizens did), his explanation for this need not be accepted. Nevertheless, wealth was undoubtedly a factor in political activity, and the wealthy were disproportionately represented in many areas of public life.\textsuperscript{41} Indeed, well over half of all attested elections produced officials known to be rich, supporting the idea that certain types of political activities attracted the wealthy elite.\textsuperscript{42}

Large financial resources may not have been the only factor affecting officeholding. Just as the procedure used in the judging of dramatic competitions can be seen to influence the outcome of those competitions,\textsuperscript{43} electoral procedure may have been a factor in deciding who was selected for certain positions, boosting those candidates from a particular region of Attica. Organization of offices into boards of 10 members, although designed to ensure equality of tribal representation, may have accentuated differences and resulted in unintended consequences. For example, the geographical distribution of elected officials seems to have differed from that of officials selected by lot. The relationship between this variation and the method of appointment are considered below.

\textsuperscript{39} See n. 10, above. \textit{Ath. Pol.} 62.1 mentions corruption in the appointment to sortitive offices organized by demes, in which they seem to have been illegally sold. The remedy for this, however, was the removal of office allocation from the demes to the whole tribe, suggesting that there was less opportunity for this kind of corruption at tribal level. Aischines (3.62) alleges that Demosthenes bribed fellow demesmen not to stand for the Boule in order that he be selected (by lot).

\textsuperscript{40} Even so, this did not prevent accusations of bribery against those speaking in the Assembly, e.g., Kallistratos (Hyp. \textit{Eux.} 1–2, 39) and Philo-

\textsuperscript{41} This situation may have been more common in the 5th century than the 4th; see Taylor, forthcoming.

\textsuperscript{42} Of the 631 known elections, 61% produced officials who were also liturgy payers. (Note that these figures treat all elections separately, and thus count individuals more than once. If individuals are counted only once, 42% of the 305 elected citizens are also attested as liturgy payers—still a significant proportion).

\textsuperscript{43} See Marshall and van Willigenburg 2004, p. 101, on the role of the judging procedure in the outcome of dramatic competitions.
Elected Officials: Strategoi

Strategoi could be highly influential, presumably because they were among the few officials who could serve for more than one year in office. In the first half of the 5th century the strategoi, like other officials, were chosen one from each tribe for a board of 10 (Ath. Pol. 22.2). Most scholars agree that there were three stages in the development of elections to the strategia. In 501/0 candidates were chosen one from each tribe, but there seems to have been some modification by at least 441/0 to allow tribes to field two representatives if required. Sometime between 357/6 and ca. 329/8 the tribal basis of elections was completely abandoned, and the Ath. Pol. (61.1) refers to all of the strategoi being elected from the whole of the citizen body.

The phenomenon of double representation has provoked controversy both in regard to its organization and its purpose. It was once thought to be a way of conferring special privileges on individuals, but K. J. Dover has demonstrated that this was not the case. Charles Fornara claimed that tribal representation was completely abandoned in the 460s, but this point has been disputed, most recently by L. G. Mitchell, who also suggested that double representation was a way in which strategoi could be elected for their special expertise. The acceptance of double representation as a phenomenon relies on the prosopographical identification of strategoi, which may be problematic in itself. The problem is heightened with the possible appearance of “double-doubles” (i.e., only eight tribes represented instead of ten), but Mitchell has shown that double-doubles can theoretically be accepted as part of a system in which tribal voting was still used (tribes that could not field a suitable candidate could put forward someone from another tribe). She suggests that this may have occurred in practice on a handful of occasions. Mitchell’s theory on the election of strategoi is persuasive in that it would account both for double representation and double-doubles.

Whatever the reasons behind double representation, it seems that in the 5th century, at least, the practice favored strategoi from demes lying in close proximity to the city (Fig. 1). This is not surprising, given that individual boards of strategoi were also weighted toward citizens from these demes. In most 5th-century examples of double representation, one or both members of the pair had a demotic from these demes (Table 1).

45. Other officials selected in this way included, e.g., tamiai, archons, poletai, apodektai, logistai, epimeletai of the dockyards, repairers of temples, astynomoi, agoranomoi, metronomoi, epimeletai of the emporion, synegoroi, and epimeletai of the Dionysia; Ath. Pol. 8.1, 47.1, 48.1, 48.3, 50–51, 54.2, 55.1, 56.4. The Forty were appointed four from a tribe; Ath. Pol. 53.1.
49. Lewis 1961, pp. 118–119; see also the general criticisms by Thompson (1974).
50. Mitchell 2000, p. 345, n. 11, pp. 353–354. The years that may have “double-doubles” are 432, 431, and 426.
51. The demes shown in Fig. 1 are all within approximately two-hours’ walk from the city.
In 441/0 seven of the board of ten strategoi (all of whom are known) came from demes close to the city area (Androtion, FGrH 324 F38).\(^{52}\) Again in 433/2 five of the nine attested strategoi have demotics from this area (Table 2).\(^{53}\) This may simply be chance, but together these observations imply that the demes close to the city were important providers of strategoi and that belonging to one of these demes aided a candidate's chances of being elected.\(^ {54}\)

The organization of the strategia along tribal lines is consistent with the pattern of office division in the democracy, and it was presumably deemed to be a fair way of dividing powers.\(^ {55}\) The fact that the strategia was distributed among the 10 tribes, however, made it possible that all

52. The suggestion of Fornara (1971, p. 49) that Glauktes Athenaios is a later interpolation should stand.

53. Thuc. 1.45.2, 51.4, 57.6; IG I' 364 (Meiggs-Lewis no. 61); IG I' 466; Plut. Per. 16.3. See Develin 1989, pp. 99–100.

54. It is unlikely that this pattern was a deliberate intention of Kleisthenes, as suggested by Sealey (1967, pp. 85–94) in a study of the demotics of strategoi known in each decade from 441/0–412/1. Sealey claimed that this city elite was eventually broken down during the Peloponnesian War. His arguments seem unlikely, however, as a city elite still appears to have been prominent in the strategia after the later adjustments to the system of election, which Kleisthenes could not have foreseen (i.e., after the introduction of double representation and the abandonment of tribal organization). Furthermore, the evidence probably does not warrant the breakdown into such small temporal categories. See also Sealey 1960, pp. 173–174; Lewis 1963; Andrews 1977, p. 247; Stanton 1984, pp. 8–16; Osborne 1996, pp. 299–304.

55. The widespread use of boards of 10 suggests that the citizen population was (at least in the perception of the Athenians) divided reasonably equally between tribes. This idea gains support from the fact that the army was also organized by tribe (and it would presumably have been important to have fighting units of approximately equal size); Ath. Pol. 21.3, 22.2. See Stanton 1984, p. 9; Rhodes 1993, p. 253.
### TABLE 1. DOUBLE REPRESENTATION OF STRATEGOI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Strategoi</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>441/0</td>
<td>Perikles of Cholargos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>435/4</td>
<td>Glaukon of Kerameis</td>
<td>Akamantis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>434/3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>433/2</td>
<td>Proteas of Aixone</td>
<td>Kekropis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Archestratos of Phlya?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432/1</td>
<td>Perikles of Cholargos</td>
<td>Akamantis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>431/0</td>
<td>Karkinos of Thorikos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432/1</td>
<td>Proteas of Aixone</td>
<td>Kekropis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eukrates of Melite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>431/0</td>
<td>Phormio of Paania?</td>
<td>Pandionis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>430/29</td>
<td>Hagnon of Steiria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>429/8</td>
<td>Sophokles of Acharnai?</td>
<td>Oineis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>426/5</td>
<td>Lamachos of Oe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>425/4</td>
<td>Hipponikos of Alopeke</td>
<td>Antiochis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aristoteles of Thorai?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>424/3</td>
<td>Thucydides of Halimous</td>
<td>Leontis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nikostratos of Skambonidai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>423/2</td>
<td>Kleon of Kydathenaion?</td>
<td>Pandionis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>? of Myrrhinous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>418/7</td>
<td>Laches of Aixone</td>
<td>Kekropis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kleomedes of Phlya?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>407/6</td>
<td>Alkibiades of Skambonidai</td>
<td>Leontis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adeimantos of Skambonidai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mitchell 2000, pp. 354–355. Strategoi in italics have demotics from or near the city.

### TABLE 2. DEMOTICS OF BOARDS OF STRATEGOI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>“City”</th>
<th>Rest of Attica</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>441/0</td>
<td>Sophokles of Kolonos</td>
<td>Kallistratos of Acharnai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Andokides of Kydathenaion</td>
<td>Kleitophon of Thorai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kreon of Skambonidai</td>
<td>Sokrates of Anagyrous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perikles of Cholargos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Glaukon of Kerameis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Xenophon of Melite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lampides of Piraeus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>433/2</td>
<td>Diotimos of Euonymon</td>
<td>Proteas of Aixone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lakedaimonios of Lakiadai</td>
<td>Archestratos of Phlya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Glaukon of Kerameis</td>
<td>Drakontides of Thorai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metagenes of Koile</td>
<td>Archenautes of Ikarion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perikles of Cholargos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Develin 1989, pp. 89–90, 99–100. The term “city” refers to demes in or near the city.
strategoi in a given year could be from demes near the city, enabling a city elite to dominate this office. An examination of the strategoi elected between 480/79 and 357/6 (i.e., when the tribal system is known to have operated) suggests that the bias toward the city elite visible in Tables 1 and 2 was not uncommon. But in order to assess whether strategoi throughout the 5th and 4th centuries were heavily drawn from demes in close proximity to the city, it is necessary to compare the number of strategoi who could be expected to hold office from specific areas of Attica with the number who actually served. By comparing this distribution of strategoi with that of tamiai (who were selected by tribally organized lot), it is possible to see the impact of the choice of selection procedure on participation in politics.

Officials Selected by Lot: Tamiai

Strategoi were elected, but most tamiai were selected by lot, presumably by means of pinakia and klerotia. Here tamiai refers to the tamiai of Athena and the tamiai of the Other Gods only, since the tamiai of the stratiotic and theoretic funds were elected, and it is disputed whether hellenotamiai were elected or were selected by lot.

W. Kendrick Pritchett argues that there is evidence of iteration among hellenotamiai and that accordingly the office must have been elected. He claims, moreover, that because the Ath. Pol. (30.2) groups together strategoi and hellenotamiai in the discussion of the constitution of the Five Thousand, they must both have been elected offices in the period of the democracy. It is obvious that this cannot be assumed. Moreover, Pritchett’s claims of iteration in this office are weak and have been completely refuted by Benjamin Meritt.

Aristotle groups strategoi with tamiai (not hellenotamiai) in his Politics, probably because both offices were distributed among the wealthy, rather than because of the method of selection (Arist. Pol. 1282a30–33, 1300b6–13). Aristotle also implies elsewhere (Pol. 1309b1–9) that tamiai were elected. Some tamiai were indeed elected in the second half of the 4th century (Ath. Pol. 43.1, 61.7), but tamiai of Athena were explicitly noted not to have been elected (Ath. Pol. 47.1). There is no surviving evidence for the selection procedure used for hellenotamiai, and for this reason they are excluded from the following analysis.

57. For tamiai of Athena, see Ath. Pol. 47.1. For tamiai of the Other Gods, see IG I1 52, lines 13–14: “tamiai of these moneys are to be chosen by lot [διὰ χρυσοκομετένων].” For the Kallias decree and the creation of a new board of tamiai, rather than the reorganization of a previously existing board selected by a different procedure, see Samons 2000, pp. 125–126. See also Ath. Pol. 8.1. There are various other tamiai known (e.g., those for the ships Paralos and Ammonias), but these were either elected or had a different role from that of the tamiai of Athena and the Other Gods; in any case, they provide very little prosopographical information.
60. Meritt (1971, pp. 105–106) disputes this in vitriolic style (he does allow, however, that hellenotamiai are elected; p. 105, n. 6); see also Meritt 1987, p. 174. The debate is bound up with arguments over the calendar. For discussion see Samons 2000, pp. 299–304.
61. Hellenotamiai no longer existed by the time Aristotle was writing. In a fragmentary text attributed to Theophrastos, strategoi and tamiai are considered similarly high officials; Keaney and Szegedy-Maszak 1976, pp. 230–236. See also Davies 1981, pp. 122–123.
Strategoi and Tamiai in Attica

Strategoi and tamiai warrant comparison as the evidence for both offices is relatively good, and in both cases the officeholders were likely to have been recruited predominantly from the wealthy. If the demotics of people holding these two offices reveal different geographical distributions within Attica, this may have been related to differing methods of selection (although continuity of officeholding or personal prominence may also have played some role). Since the evidence presented above in Tables 1 and 2 indicates that strategoi came disproportionately from demes in close proximity to the city, it is important to ask whether all known strategoi were distributed in this way, or whether this pattern is simply a feature of the small body of evidence presented in the tables.

A simple chi-square test may be used to establish whether there is a statistically significant difference between the number of officeholders attested in a given area and the number expected in that area if their distribution mirrored that of the citizen population in general. This analysis is based on the assumptions that the relative citizen population of the demes is partly recoverable through the bouleutic quotas and that deme membership and citizen population were closely related, even if the relationship is not exact. Although citizens undoubtedly moved around Attica, permanent migration has generally been overestimated, and regardless of its extent, it does not significantly affect the conclusions discussed below.

The results of the chi-square test, shown in Table 3, support the patterns seen in Tables 1 and 2: strategoi were not equally distributed throughout Attica. A comparison of the observed with the expected distributions of strategoi (based on the general citizen population from which they were drawn) shows a statistically significant difference. This is not the case for tamiai, however; the difference between the distribution of attested tamiai and the distribution that might be expected based on the general citizen population is not particularly large. These results, together with the evidence presented in Tables 1 and 2, suggest that strategoi were concentrated in areas close to the city, but that tamiai were drawn more evenly from demes throughout Attica. This conclusion is further supported by an examination of individual boards of tamiai: in any given board, tamiai were not heavily weighted toward the city.

The extent to which personal prominence or office rotation affected the sociology of democracy has long been debated. The different social geography of the strategoi and the tamiai may have been due to a combination

---

62. For tamiai as pentakosiomedimnoi, see Ath. Pol. 8.1. That this meant little by the end of the 4th century is evident from Ath. Pol. 47.1. See Rhodes 1993, pp. 146–148, 551.
63. See the Appendix below for details of the chi-square test and discussion of the mathematical assumptions.
64. This view is accepted by, e.g., Gomme 1933, pp. 49–66; Rhodes 1972, pp. 11–12; Traill 1975, p. 56; Whitehead 1986, pp. 22–23.
65. Cf. Damsgaard-Madsen 1988; Hansen 1989c; Osborne 1991; and see n. 80, below.
66. The chi-square value is 0.36, less than the theoretical distribution of 3.84 (see Table 3).
67. In fact, although there are more nearly complete, boards of tamiai than strategoi, there is little hint that tamiai with city demotics outnumbered those from the rest of Attica on any specific board. See, for example, IG I3 455 (dated to 444/3); I3 457 (442/1; only eight listed; see Develin 1986, p. 82); I3 472 (full boards for 421/0 and 418/7, along with nine from 420/19).
TABLE 3. STRATEGOI AND TAMIAI FROM THE CITY (AND VICINITY) AND THE REST OF ATTICA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officials</th>
<th>&quot;City&quot;</th>
<th>Rest of Attica</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Chi-square**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategoi</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>8.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(27.92)</td>
<td>(83.08)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamiai</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(62.88)</td>
<td>(187.12)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The expected number of strategoi (shown in parentheses) is based on the proportion of citizen population attested for each area, derived from bouleutic quotas. If 25% of the citizen population can be said to have demotics from demes in or near the city (123/489 assignable bouleutai), then we would expect 27.92 of 111 strategoi to have demotics from this area. In fact there are 41.

** The theoretical value of chi-square at a significance level of 0.05 with 1 degree of freedom is 3.84; a larger observed value means that there is a statistically significant relationship between deme of origin and officeholding. See the Appendix for an explanation of the calculations.

of factors. Tamiai are often believed to have held more responsibility than power, and the officeholders were rotated regularly, thus broadening participation in this office.68 The scale of participation in the strategia, by contrast, may have been influenced by the possibility of holding office for more than one term, making these positions more attractive for politically ambitious members of the city elite. The difference in the selection procedure would have further contributed to the differing geographical distribution of officeholders. The comparison of tamiai and strategoi suggests that the use of the lot mitigated the effects of distance on participation in democracy to a much larger degree than the use of election. The question of whether this conclusion is valid only for these two elite offices, however, or whether other positions were similarly affected must now be considered.

Broader Political Effects of Election and Lot

Strategoi and tamiai are not the only officials who show different distributional patterns. Selection procedure seems to have had a social impact on other elective and sortitive offices as well, and in elections unrelated to officeholding. Like the strategoi, candidates for ostracism (categorized as an election because voting was used) were also distributed unequally throughout Attica. Conversely, dikasts, who were selected by lot like tamiai, seem to have been distributed more evenly (Table 4).69 This observation further supports the hypothesis that selection procedure affected political participation.70

68. See further [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.2–3.
69. Table 5 in the Appendix gives a more detailed breakdown of the evidence. To those dikasts recorded by Kroll (1972) should be added Chairestratos, son of Phoryskides of Lamptrai, whose pinakion was found in tomb 148 in the cemetery uncovered by the metro excavations at Syntagma Square (along the road leading out to the mesogeia); Parlaman and Stampolidis 2000, p. 166, no. 137. For 4th-century kleroteria and courtroom procedure, see Rhodes 1993, pp. 704–722; Bers 2000, pp. 553–557.
70. A similar relationship can also be seen on magisterial pinakia, the tickets for selection by lot, and also for
The office of secretary to the Boule (grammateus tes boules) presents another relevant case for consideration.71 This office was an elected office until the 360s; a new grammateus was elected in every prytany from the members of the Boule, except those of the tribe in prytany.72 Between 366/5 and 363/2, however, the grammateus became an annual office chosen by lot from the whole of the demos.73 A difference in the geographical distribution of officeholders between the elected and sortitive phases of this office would provide strong support for the influence of selection procedure. This pattern is clearly indicated in Table 4: in a sample of 95 grammateis, the chi-square test shows that elected grammateis were unequally distributed across Attica, but grammateis selected by lot cannot be said to be unequally distributed. Such variation within the same office strongly suggests that the choice of procedure affected the selection (or self-selection) of candidates.74

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Chi-square</th>
<th>Significant*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grammateis (before 363)</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategoi</td>
<td>8.19</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostracism candidates</td>
<td>23.72</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grammateis (after 363)</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dikasts</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamiai</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significance is determined on the basis of a comparison of the calculated chi-square value with the theoretical value of chi-square (3.84) at a significance level of 0.05 with 1 degree of freedom.

Values in Square Meters

Table 4: Selection Methods and the Distribution of Political Activity

Archons (according to Ath. Pol. 22.5, they were selected by lot after 487/6). The distribution of both magisterial pinakia and archons cannot be said to have been unequal throughout Attica, following the patterns of tamiai and dikasts. There are 18 examples of magisterial pinakia (31 including those of classes 3 and 6, which could be either dikastic or magisterial; see Kroll 1972, pp. 126–147, 212–232) and 34 archons.

71. This position was known as the grammateus kata prytaneian after 363/2. See Rhodes 1972, pp. 134–137; Henry 2002, p. 92.

72. It is not known who elected the grammateis, but presumably it was the members of the Boule. There are a variety of ways to reconstruct the election process, though without any evidence all remain hypothetical. It is possible that each tribe elected its own representatives, who served after some sort of secretary-tribal order allotment had taken place (Ferguson 1898, p. 26), but there are other possibilities, e.g., the tribe in prytany could have elected a man from the rest of the Boule with whom they wished to work. Alternatively, the tribes not in prytany could have elected a grammateus from the 450 remaining bouleutai (as the epistates ton prytaneion selected by lot one of the nine proedroi, excluding his own tribe, to serve as the epistates ton proedroi; Rhodes 1972, p. 25), or the whole Boule could have elected the grammateus every time. The latter seems easiest, and since the grammateis served the whole Boule, it is perhaps most likely. All other offices were elected by the Assembly, however, so this could also have been the case for grammateis.

73. Henry 2002, p. 92, n. 5. Abel (1983, pp. 62–63) thinks that grammateis would have been subject to prokrisis before they were selected by lot because they required "functional literacy." But see Rhodes 1985 and Hansen 1986 for a refutation of her arguments.

74. See also Appendix, Table 5. The reason for the change from election to lot is obscure, though it probably did not signal a major change in attitudes to record-keeping or a desire to weaken the Boule. It did, however, bring the selection of grammateis into line with that of most other offices and perhaps was more efficient since citizens would have had a longer tenure. See Ferguson 1914–1915, p. 395; Rhodes 1972, pp. 137–138; Sickinger 1999, pp. 141–146; contra Brillant 1911, pp. 27–28.
ELECTIONS, SORTITION, AND THE CITY ELITE

The use of the lot not only randomized the selection process, as Isokrates (7.23) once noted, it also dispersed officeholding to a wider section of society and prevented monopolization of power by a city elite.75 The comparison of the two selection methods shows that when elections were held, candidates with demotics from or near the city were disproportionately represented. On the one hand, this finding implies that elective offices were particularly attractive to members of city demes. On the other hand, the lack of evidence for electoral corruption suggests that elections were not considered worth manipulating and that elected positions were not highly sought. If the incidence of allegations of corruption is meaningful, other political activities, such as speaking in the Assembly or representing the city on an embassy, seem to have been considered more important. Serving as a strategos, of course, was not a negligible activity. It was clearly a position that brought influence, attracting many prominent citizens to serve for years at a time. The possibility of reelection probably played a role in ensuring that strategoi hailed disproportionately from city demes. Yet considerations of political power cannot explain why elected grammateis display the same distributional pattern as the strategoi. It may be useful, therefore, to examine the process of election in more detail, that is, to look at the candidates themselves and how the demos voted.

Wealth may have been an important factor in the pursuit of elected office. There were large numbers of candidates in all types of election who were demonstrably wealthy. Even among the grammateis, those who could be classified as wealthy were selected predominantly by election rather than by lot.76 If those who were wealthy and had longstanding associations with the city were much more visible in elective office than in sortitive office, we should perhaps emphasize the competitive aspect of elections, which offered candidates the possibility of demonstrating and accruing political capital.77

Members of the elite could compete with one another for influence in the Assembly, but elections allowed them to demonstrate this influence further by winning votes. The process of contesting elections should thus be seen within the context of an agonistic aristocratic culture. It was not necessarily the office that was the primary reward (although the office could bestow on the elite the power and influence to which they believed they were entitled), but the acting out of aristocratic values and rivalries in open competition. It is no wonder, therefore, that Aristotle regarded elections as oligarchic.

In terms of the voting itself, there is very little evidence to suggest that malpractice was considered a problem (or even a feature). It is remotely possible that the disproportionate number of elected officials from the city demes was achieved through the mobilization of supporters by betaireiai or other such groups, but it is much more likely to reflect the organization (not necessarily deliberate or underhanded) of voters from the candidates’ home demes or the self-selection of candidates themselves. Although it may have been worthwhile engineering support for elections to the strategia or to rid the city of opponents through ostracism, it is difficult to see why it

76. Seven of the nine grammateis attested as wealthy occupied the office during the period when election was used. Large numbers of strategoi and candidates for ostracism were also demonstrably wealthy. See also n. 42, above.
77. For a similar view of ostracism as “a symbolic institution,” see Forsdyke 2005, pp. 149–165.
would have been necessary or desirable for one to manipulate an election to become the **grammateus** of the Boule.\(^78\) Demes close to the city were probably well represented not only by candidates but also by voters who outnumbered those from outlying demes.

The comparison of elected and selected officials suggests that members of the city elite were overrepresented in positions of elected responsibility, and also provides insight into the electoral behavior of the Athenian demos. Sara Forsdyke suggests that ostracisms were aimed deliberately to include as many citizens as possible in "the decisions of exile," but those from more distant demes may not have found it easy to attend.\(^79\) It may have been more difficult for citizens from nonurban demes to compete in elections, either because they themselves were not based permanently in the city or because many of their supporters were not. Any individual could move to the city and live there, and many did, but this does not explain the disproportionate representation of certain demes in elective offices.\(^80\) To be successful in an election or to be ostracized, a candidate would need to be well known to those citizens who voted, whether or not he himself was from the city area. Given the minimal evidence for corruption or malpractice, it is perhaps more plausible that voters from the city area cast their votes in elections in greater numbers than did voters from other parts of Attica.

This argument assumes that citizens voted predominantly according to deme ties. Although this may not be an unreasonable assumption, it is far from demonstrable, and in reality decisions were probably far more complex. It would be interesting to know whether the composition of the Assembly in meetings in which elections for office were held was socially representative, and whether the voting patterns characteristic of those occasions were replicated when other votes were taken within the Assembly. Unfortunately, detailed evidence for participation in these proceedings is lacking.

It is possible, however, to observe the deme of origin of those proposing decrees. Hansen demonstrated that the number of individuals proposing a decree must have been great, since a high proportion of proposers are attested only once.\(^81\) If the surviving decrees are representative, Hansen's findings suggest that such proposals were a common form of political activity not dominated by a political elite. Comparing these citizens with nonurban demotics, perhaps implying residence in the city for citizens registered in other demes. While some citizens certainly did move to Athens, it is very difficult to assess whether this movement was widespread or occasional, whether it was permanent or temporary, or whether property ownership in both the city and the deme was common. For some of the difficulties of using funerary inscriptions as evidence for migration, see Osborne 1991.

\(^78\) The **grammateus** was "in charge of all the documents" (*Ath. Pol. 54.4*) and was responsible for recording and displaying decrees as well as checking the archives when necessary. This was an important job in administrative terms, but one that had little political power in comparison with that of the strategoi. A **grammateus** may have been able to decide whether to include a relief sculpture on a published stele, but presumably only if it fell within the cost allocated by the Assembly itself or provided by an honorand (cf. *IG II* 31 and *IG I* 156). See further Rhodes 1993, p. 603; Lawton 1995, p. 26; Low 2005, pp. 102–103.


\(^80\) There are many examples of individuals from nonurban demes owning property in Athens or Piraeus: e.g., Demosthenes of Paania and Timotheos of Anaphlystos both had properties in Piraeus (Dein. 1.69; Dem. 49.22). Timarchos of Sphetos had a house near the Acropolis (Aischin. 1.97), and Themistokles of Phrarrhoia supposedly had one in Melite (Plut. *Them.* 22.2). Similarly, many gravestones from the city record

\(^81\) Hansen 1989a, pp. 112–125.
the general citizen population by means of the chi-square test shows that proposers of decrees were not concentrated in the city area, but came from demes throughout Attica. The result of the test implies that the Assembly attracted citizens from a very wide area, not just from the city. If decree-proposers came from all corners of Attica and included a large number of citizens, then we might assume that the composition of the Assembly was quite varied. Thus, a wide range of citizens both attended and participated actively in the Assembly, and the Athenian democracy was not merely the concern of a privileged few.

Elected offices in Athens were held primarily by the wealthier members of demes near the city. Due to the practice of assigning positions to boards of officeholders rather than to individuals, however, no single officeholder within the democracy wielded a vast amount of power. Instead, elections allowed members of the elite to compete with each other and to demonstrate their influence within the demos as a whole. Elections played a dual role in Athenian life: they allowed offices that required particular expertise to be distributed according to the wishes of the demos, and they permitted a highly controlled form of aristocratic competition.

The selection of officials by lot, on the other hand, minimized the geographical bias of elections and allowed more citizens from other parts of Attica to participate in the political process. Since sortition was widely used while elections were comparatively scarce, Athenian political life is perhaps better characterized by the lot than by the popular vote. The lot distributed political power throughout Attica more effectively and encouraged hoi bouloumenoi to take an active part in public affairs. It was a system in which nonurban citizens could, and did, participate widely. Aristotle's observation that the lot was a democratic element in ancient Greek politics is well substantiated by the evidence presented here.

82. The value of chi-square is 1.55; as in the cases discussed above, the value would have to exceed 3.84 in order for the null hypothesis to be rejected.

83. Ruschenbusch 1994, p. 190; and to a lesser extent, Hansen 1989c, pp. 80–84.
The chi-square goodness-of-fit test is a statistical test that measures the departure of a set of observed values from a corresponding set of expected values. It does not measure degrees of association or interrelationship between variables, but rather the likelihood that the relationship apparent in the data (here, the relationship between deme of origin and officeholding) is not a result of sampling variation.

The calculation requires the setting of a null hypothesis ($H_0$), that is, a hypothesis of no association, that the test seeks to disprove. In this case, $H_0$ states that there is no relationship between deme of origin and officeholding. $H_1$ (its opposite) states that there is a relationship.

Through the use of the chi-square test, we can either accept or reject $H_0$ by asking how likely it is that, for example, the observed number of strategoi from various demes in our sample is typical of the distribution of the citizen population of Attica from which it was drawn. The analysis necessitates a number of historical and mathematical assumptions. First, it is assumed that bouleutic quotas are representative of the distribution of the citizen population of Attica, which is therefore recoverable within certain limits. Second, the data must be collected in the form of counts and be divided into mutually exclusive categories. Third, underlying the calculation is the assumption that the sample is typical rather than unusual.

The formula for chi-square is as follows:

$$
\chi^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{k} \frac{(O_i - E_i)^2}{E_i}
$$

$O_i$ = the observed number of officeholders in any category (expressed as category $i$)

$E_i$ = the expected number of officeholders in any category

$k$ = the number of categories (i.e., the number of cells in the table)

For example, the chi-square calculation for strategoi (see Table 3, above) is as follows:

$$
\frac{(41 - 27.92)^2}{27.92} + \frac{(70 - 83.08)^2}{83.08} = 8.19
$$

TABLE 5. POLITICALLY ACTIVE CITIZENS FROM THE CITY (AND VICINITY) AND THE REST OF ATTICA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Figures</th>
<th>&quot;City&quot;</th>
<th>Rest of Attica</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Chi-square*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ostracism candidates</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>23.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(25.66)</td>
<td>(76.34)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dikasts</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(18.36)</td>
<td>(54.64)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grammateis (before 363)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>5.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15.85)</td>
<td>(47.15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grammateis (after 363)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8.05)</td>
<td>(23.95)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The theoretical value of chi-square at a significance level of 0.05 with 1 degree of freedom is 3.84.

The chi-square value calculated must then be tested for statistical significance by determining what level of risk is appropriate and the degrees of freedom associated with the sample. In this instance the level of risk or significance is 0.05 (a standard choice, meaning that if H₀ is true there is only a 5% risk of the data showing the observed pattern as a result of chance variation). The degrees of freedom are determined by subtracting one from the number of cells in the table; here, because there are two cells in the table there is one degree of freedom. Statistics textbooks provide a reference table to find the corresponding value for chi-square with one degree of freedom at the 0.05 significance level. This figure (3.84) is then compared with the value calculated.

If the calculated value is larger, chi-square can be said to be statistically significant, and H₀ must be rejected. If the calculated value is smaller, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. For strategoi, chi-square is 8.19, which is larger than 3.84. Therefore H₀ is rejected; there is a statistically significant relationship between deme of origin and officeholding for strategoi. The opposite is the case for tamiai: chi-square is 0.36, which is less than 3.84, meaning that the null hypothesis must stand.

Table 5 presents the data on which the calculations discussed above and summarized in Table 4 are based.

85. Shennan 1997 is the most accessible textbook for nonmathematicians; see esp. pp. 422–423, table F.
REFERENCES

Agora XXV = M. L. Lang, Ostraka (Agora XXV), Princeton 1990.
Calhoun, G. M. 1931. Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation, Austin.
Dover, K. J. 1960. Δέκατος οίνος, JHS 80, pp. 61–77.


Claire Taylor

University of Manchester

Department of Classics and Ancient History

School of Arts, Histories, and Cultures

Oxford Road

Manchester M13 9PL

United Kingdom

claire.taylor-2@man.ac.uk